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Abstract
P eop le dependent on illicit drugs have prompted a range o f  policy responses. In England, the 
m edical profession has played a major role in this area since the nineteenth century, 
prescrib ing drugs such as heroin and morphine to those addicts considered unable to give up 
using them. In the late 1960s, amid important regulatory changes, drug dependent patients 
were transferred out o f primary care and into new National Health Sendee ‘Clinics’ based in 
hospitals.
This thesis starts just after these major changes and traces the relationship between doctors 
treating  drug users within the NHS — initially inside the C linics, and later also  in general 
p ractice  — and doctors prescribing privately and paid by fee. A debate about appropriate 
prescribing to drug users is traced from its origins within the Clinics in the 1970s to include 
the ro le  o f doctors working outside both privately and in the NHS in the 1980s and ’90s. 
C onflict emerged between these doctors and manifested itself in regulatory activities and in 
the general and medical media. 'Hie role o f  formal and informal regulation in these battles 
and th e  involvement o f the media arc particular foci o f the research which considers the 
parts played by the Home O ffice Drugs Inspectorate, the General Medical Council, and the 
production of clinical guidelines, as well as the formation o f professional interest groups 
representing different doctors.
The study used oral history materials (53 interviews were carried out with key individuals and 
private prescribers), archival research, published reports, the medical and general press and 
academ ic journals, as well as broadcast radio and television programmes.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction
People dependent on illicit drugs have prompted a range of policy responses. In the United States, 
drug addicts were criminalised and doctors excluded from treating their addictions from the 1920s. 
By contrast, the English medical profession has played a major role in this area since the nineteenth 
century. In 1926 dmg addiction was defined as an illness and therefore the responsibility of 
doctors' with official British policy allowing the prescription of substitute drugs to addicts in non­
increasing doses if  they were unable to give up using drugs. This approach, which became known 
as the ‘British System’, maintained the drug user’s addiction but reliev ed their difficulties in 
obtaining a supply.
Doctors in England continued to prescribe to their small number o f mainly opiate dependent 
patients until the 1960s when a government enquiry located such substitute prescribing as the 
source of an illicit trade increasing the number of addicts. Restrictions on prescribing substitute 
dnigs were introduced and conflict re-emerged within the medical profession regarding appropriate 
treatment. Since this time, a major fault line o f tliis debate has been between practitioners 
practising privately and on the National I lealth Service (NI IS).
Treatment norms for illicit drugs in the Nl IS changed between 1970 and 1999 in term s of the 
dnigs prescribed, the route o f administration and the goals o f treatment. Private practitioners’ 
continued willingness to prescribe injectable opiates and methadone came under critical scrutiny" 
and the interface between public and private treatment became more antagonistic than in other 
areas o f health care.
Areas o f conflict between p ub lic  and private p re sc rib es  and related agenc ies
( ipiates were at the heart of the debates over treatment in the last century. It was these dntgs for 
which substitute therapy was provided by the medical profession, whether in the form o f the 
original dmg o f addiction, such as morphine or heroin, or more recently, a replacement such as 
methadone. Some substitute prescribing was also provided for amphetamine anil latterly 
benzodiazepine dependence. It was substitute therapy that was the focus of the greatest 1
1 Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction, Kr/wi |Rolleston Keport| (lanidon: HMSO,
I'126) p it.
cg j. Strang, J. Sheridan and N. Ilarlx-r, ‘Prescribing injectable and oral methadone to opiate addicts: results o f  
the 19*15 national postal survey o f  community pharmacies in Kngland and Wales’, Hrthsh A ie/lh t i l  AIA
(1*1*16), 270 2.
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controversy in the last 30 years. Private facilities that did not prescribe substitute drugs have 
generally escaped the censure directed at prescribers.
For many years NHS doctors accused private practitioners o f prescribing substitute drugs in over 
large quantities, with the risk o f causing overdose in their patients and o f those in receipt of 
prescriptions selling any surplus on the black market and so sprcatling addiction1. 'Ihese doctors 
were also portrayed as entering the field without adequate training or experience, of failing to check 
their patients’ compliance with treatment and o f  being motivated primarily by money.4 It has also 
been argued that because most dependent drug users in treatment were unemployed, they must be 
selling some of their prescribed drugs on the black market in order to pay their medical bills.
In turn, private doctors accused the NHS of being overly bureaucratic, o f caring more about 
controlling the supply of prescribed drugs than about die health of their patients, and of hypocrisy.5 
These arguments were aired in a number of arenas including regulatory hearings before the General 
Medical Council and the Home Office’s Drugs Tribunals, the medical press and the general 
media.6 Media coverage was in turn used to inform the regulatory process.
Aims o f the Research
ITte period started after some m ajor changes to doctors’ clinical autonomy in the late 1960s, along 
with the establishment of specialist N1 IS treatment centres, and ended just before an intensive 
period of regulatory intervention against private prescribers. In 2000 and 2001 a flurry o f GMC 
cases disciplined and stmek off the medical register a number o f private prescribers. In the 
intervening years there were many challenges to private doctors and the way they prescribed dmgs 
to addict patients.
' eg. Advisory Council on the Misuse o f  Drugs, Treatment unit Reluit»'Station, DI ISS (London: 1IMSC1, 1982). 
4 Anonymous, ‘Doctor Death’, The I Js fen er(29,hJuly 1982), 22. 
s eg. A. Dally, A D ottori Stoty (London, Macmillan, 1990) pp.57-98.
(l T. Bewley, and A. 11. Cihodsc, ‘Unacceptable face o f  private practice: prescription o f controlled drugs to 
addicts’, ¡British MedialiJournal, 286 (1983), 1876-77.
7 ‘file on Four’, BBC Radio Four (1997).
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Private prescribing was virtually unknown outside the south east of England and has almost entirely 
been concentrated in Ixindon. Since the position of private prescribes in this study was particular 
to England, and there were considerable differences in services and prescribing practices in both 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, this thesis usually refers to ‘England’. ‘Britain’ is used where 
policies or conditions also related to Wales and Scotland and refers to the ‘United Kingdom’ when 
also including Northern Ireland. The English situation was not easily comparable with overseas 
countries so there was little scope for an international comparative perspective.
This study has taken both a narrow and a broad focus. It has aimed to explain the causes and 
development of die conflict between and around N1 IS and private practitioners in the treatment of 
drug misuse and also to illuminate wider issues. The research was pursued on two axes, 
chronologically, through historical périodisation since the 1970s, and through cross cutting themes. 
Its aims were:
1. To research the recent historical and current relationships between the public and private 
treatment of addiction since the major changes in dmg treatment policy of the 1960s, including 
the issues and implications o f  the regulation of the medical profession, the roles o f professional 
and organizational issues, and o f the relationship between research and policy.
2. To contribute to current policy debates on the treatment of addiction a research led 
analysis based on longer tenn perspectives.
3. To consider contemporary historical methodologies and techniques in both archival and 
oral history approaches.
Methodology
The study of the distant past has tended to offer the historian a simple choice o f sources limited by 
what little has survived. By contrast, the contemporary historian risks being overwhelmed by the 
range and detail o f available material. Much has been accessible for study, although there were 
certain locked doors, such as some government material and most patient records. Aside from the 
practical problems o f selection and comprehensiveness that this abundance could present, it has 
offered the potential for the historian to prix luce a detailed and vivid picture o f the recent past.
Several contcmjxirary historians have offered their aih icc on the benefits and pitfalls o f  the various 
sources available for smdying the twentieth century: oral history, government documents, personal 
papers, audio-visual materials, biography, journals, the press, and policy reports, all o f which were 
used in this study. Certain principles applied across all sources: the need to be aware o f  censorship, 
either self-nn|x >scd or from outside; judging the degree of the material’s reliability; the extent to
which the creator or selector o f the source was self-consciously aware of its place in history; the 
context in which the source was created and its intended purpose.* ' 1"
A number of caveats have been expressed regarding the use of central government archives. Such 
archives were not drawn up by a historian but by archivists and have formed an ‘organic whole’ 
where papers related to each other.11 Two processes therefore needed to be considered; how and 
why the document was originally produced, and then the criteria behind its preservation and 
availability in the archives. 1 lowever, this did not always turn out to be the case. W ith the 
Department of 1 Iealth’s archives, documents were selected by the civil servants who generated 
them, and the content of files was often unknown to the record officers.
Oral history has answered two o f the contemporary historian’s needs: the ability to ask questions 
about the past which the histonan has so far been unable to understand from other sources, and 
the possibility o f exploring areas o f  interest to the present which were not thought to be of 
importance or went unrecorded at the time.1“ Paul Thompson has been at the vanguard of the 
campaign to develop ‘a more socially conscious and democratic history* bv using oral history to 
represent die lives o f those who were often undocumented.1'
Anthony Seldon has also recommended its use for studying elites. Ihis has generally involved 
‘purposive’ sampling where interviewees were selected ‘because of who they are or what they did’.14 
In drawing up the sample, however, Seldon referred to the variation in reliability across different 
occupational groups. I le concluded that politicians were the least satisfactory o f interviewees 
because of their ‘pathological difficulty in distinguishing the truth, so set have their minds become 
by long experience of partisan thought.’ By contrast, civil servants were among the best because of 
their dispassionate and carefiil observation of events.11
" M. James, 'I listorical research methods’ in K. McConway (ed.), Xl/a/yint’ Health and O isease (1-ondon: ( >pen 
University Press, 1994) pp.36-48.
’’ N. Cox, ‘National British archives: public records’ in B. Brivati.J. Buxton and A. Seldon (cds.), 77v 
Contemporary Pritish I listory I U i M  (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996) pp.253 
271.
M. Scammcll, ‘Television and contemporary history’ in B. Brivati, J. Buxton and A . Seldon (cds.). The 
Contemporary British I Ustnry I landbook. (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996) pp.408 
422.
11 N. Cox, (1996) op. at.. p.254.
12 A. Seldon, ‘Bitte interviews’ in B. Brivati.J. Buxton and A. Seldon, (1996), op. lit., p p .353 465.
I! P. Thompson, The Voice o f  the Past. O ra l History (()xford: ( Ixford University Press, first edition 1978, this 
edition 1988) p.viii.
14 A. Seldon, (1996) op. tit., p.353.
14 /Wrf.p.360.
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Following this advice, and the fact that politicians had very little direct involvement in the events 
considered, no politicians were interviewed for the project; as Seldon predicted, interviews with civil 
servants proved very helpful, with detailed recall o f events which usually proved accurate when they 
could be cross-checked with other sources.
The importance of establishing trust with interviewees has also been discussed,16 especially when 
asking potentially intrusive questions o f strangers. Here, the techniques for establishing trust 
developed and explored in the sociological literature were helpful. This research was particularly 
sensitive to pursue, especially among private doctors, who feared interest in their working practices 
because of the unwelcome attentions several had received from the media and from regulatory 
bodies. Furthennore, the polarised nature of the debate made many doctors suspicious that the 
research was starting from a partisan viewpoint.
William Foote Whyte’s classic study o f an Italian slum in North America showed the essential role 
plaved by a ‘sponsor’, who, trusted bv the subjects, vouched for the researcher.1 In the research on 
private doctors, this cx:curred not with a single sponsor, but with a succession. Trust established 
with one interviewee led to their contacting another potential interviewee, who, once his trust was 
gained, referred the researcher to another and so on. 'lTiis was similar to ‘snowball sampling’, a 
technique used to gain  access to hidden populations, but differed in that most of the interviewees’ 
names were known in  advance to the researcher. Trust established during the interview was 
probably based on all the signs and signals that denoted the researcher was engaged in serious 
academic study rather than sensationalist reporting and had spent a number o f years in the field.
As a school of public health, I xindon School o f Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s neutral position 
in the debate also helped to gain the confidence o f interviewees that the research was not partisan, 
in a way that would not have been the case had the research been carried out from a drugs research 
instinition. Finally, the reputation o f the author’s supervisor was also helpful in interviewing 
doctors and patients. In some cases interviewees knew of Virginia Berridge as a highly respected 
historian who was no t allied to particular policy lines. In others, certain interviewees had 
misinterpreted her w ork on nineteenth century opium use as advocating dmg legalisation or law 
reform in the present day. Both these views, accurate and otherwise, disposed several wary 
interviewees favourably towards the research.
'<■ Ibidp.iSS.
17 W. F. Whyte, Street C orner Satiety. The Social Structure o f  an Italian Slum  (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 
1955) pp.279-373.
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Once trust was established, Seldon suggested that in turn it could bring difficulties: as a personal 
relationship developed during the course of an interview it could be difficult being critical of 
someone who had been kind and hospitable. Presumably the opposite could apply too, but was 
not considered. He also warned o f the danger, particularly for younger researchers, o f being overly 
deferential to senior people. 'ITie importance of being dispassionate was emphasised. Scldon noted 
the advantages o f the animate nature of oral history, with interviewees offering further documents 
o f their own or suggesting new areas of inquiry.1* Both of these happened, with six interviewees 
providing papers from government and professional organisations and one lending a video tape of 
television programmes from the period.
The reliability or otherwise of memory has received considerable attention with relation to oral 
history. Its selectivity and loss o f accuracy over time have been noted, as well as the common 
instance of similar events becoming merged together and the difficulty o f extracting fact from 
opinion.19 Given this variable reliability, Paul Thompson and Robert Perks have recommended that 
evidence should be evaluated in terms of internal consistency of a particular interview and in 
comparison with other sources. Indeed the very subjectivity of oral history interviews has been put 
forward as an asset, providing opinion and a personal perspective on events, processes and 
personalities.211
Age was a problem with some interviewees who were in their eighties and could not remember 
some events well enough, which they found frustrating and depressing. I lowever, other elderly 
interviews, thinking that they had p<x>r memories, were gratified when questions prompted 
recollections they had long since thought they had forgotten. An interviewee’s lifestyle could also 
affect their memory. Although the exact effects of long term illicit opiate use (often combined with 
other illicit dnigs and adulterants) on already formed memories are unknown, being intoxicated 
tends to prevent clear memories from forming at the time. One patient interviewed said that his 
chronology of events was rather hazy because he was ‘quite out of it’ for a lot o f the 1980s.'1
'Ihc fact that time intervened between events under discussion anil the present also brought up the 
influence of hindsight, anil how views and events have lx'en subsequently rearranged by the
A. Scldon, (1996) op. at., pp.353-359.
19 P. Thompson and R. Perks, An Introduction to the Use o f  Ont/1 listory in the / listo iy o f  Mediane. (1 imilon: National 
l i fe  Story Collection, 199.3) pp. 12 13.
31 Ik idpM .
21 Patient 001, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
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interviewee to suit the p re se n t .T h is  was borne in mind but it applied equally to any retrospective 
source.
During the oral history research, the author began to consider how purposive sampling and the 
interview process constructed the identity of the interviewees. W ith elite history, a doctor or civil 
servant was chosen for interview on the grounds of his or her profession and often, achievements. 
This role was usually one that they had chosen themselves and how  they would willingly identify 
themselves. Other interviewees were chosen because they were drug users and had been or still 
were patients, an identity which may have involved less positive choices and, being stigmatised, was 
not necessarily the way in which they would identify themselves to others or even to themselves.
In order to counteract this labelling, during one of the interviews with a drug user, instead o f asking 
about their drug using history, the first questions were about her life and occupations, hoping to see 
where drug use would fit into this picture, rather than imposing it from the outset. 'Ihe interviewee 
was also asked how she would introduce herself at a party to see how she would describe herself in 
a non-medical context. I b e  results were interesting, but it was not certain whether this approach 
actually altered the outcome. Further future research on the differences between identities imposed 
and those taken willingly and their effect on interview data could be useful.
Oral testimony has often formed part o f television and radio broadcasts, about which many o f the 
same caveats have been expressed and new ones added. Both television and radio have played a 
part in the debate around the private treatment of drug addiction. A s ‘historical actors’ in the field 
of medicine and health, television and film mav have influenced directly government policy or 
indirectly through raising public concern. Kelly Ixmghlin stated that the ‘medico-scientific elite’ was 
unusual in the level o f influence it has enjoyed in the media and its ability to reply to criticism made 
through the media.
Ibe author also considered what could be termed the ‘analytical distance’ from the research subject. 
If there were no theoretical distance taken by die researcher, so that categories and definitions 
expressed by those involved in the debate were accepted at face value, there would be a number of 
difficulties. First, different parties expressed contradicting values and beliefs that could not be 
reconciled. Second, the lack o f any distance would prevent any deeper theoretical understanding 
that could be used to make comparisons across time and space. 2
22 A. Scldon, (1996) op. at., p.356.
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Taking an intermediate level erf analytical distance would enable the use o f commonplace concepts 
such as ‘profession’, ‘medicine’, ‘regulation’ and ‘patient’. These terms have been useful in relating 
empirical research to theoretical knowledge, and transferring concepts between different contexts. 
They are also easily recognisable and can be related to everyday experience without difficulty and so 
relatively accessible to the reader. A weakness was that they were historically situated and meant 
different things at different times. A single term could cloak important changes in both substance 
and understanding without the user realising.
A t a third, higher level of analytical distance, every category and concept used would first be open 
to question and re-definition. Such an approach might ask “What is a doctor?’ A ‘doctor’ might be 
defined as someone who has invested in a long period o f study and been admitted to an exclusive 
occupational group allowing him/her to practice technical skills on live human bodies and to 
demand certain financial rewards. Ihe value of such an approach would be to cut away familiarities 
and presumptions, letting us see things afresh. I Iowevcr, any explanation, however abstract, would 
require some underlying model in order to communicate to the reader, and so risked replacing one 
set o f assumptions with an< >thcr. 1 'urther, it would have greatly reduced the quantity o f  empirical 
data that could be considered in a given time.
ITtc approach o f this study was generally to take an intermediate level of analytical distance. A 
certain degree o f acceptance o f  everyday concepts has been necessary in order to make progress in 
the empirical research beyond theoretical abstractions, using concepts that seemed useful, while 
questioning others, such as ‘expertise’ and ‘private’, that have emerged from the data as being 
particularly problematic.
S tu d y  Design
Ih e  study used several archival collections, including the papers of Dr Ann Dally, the highest 
profile private prescriberof the 1980s, which she had deposited at the W ellcome library for the 
I listory and Understanding o f  Medicine and included those of the Association o f Independent 
Doctors in Addiction which she founded. Under ‘open government’ the Department of I lealth 
granted access to committee papers and correspondence on the 1984 and 1999 ‘good practice’ 
guidelines on the treatment o f  dmg misuse. Committee documents and transcripts o f hearings 
before the disciplinary committee o f the General Medical Council were also studied in detail. 
Informal archives in the possession of interviewees were loaned for the Association o f 
Independent I’rescribers, the I aindon Consultants’ Group, the Department of I lealth’s ‘good
16
practice’ guidelines working groups, and a Home Office Drugs Tribunal. Published sources such 
as reports of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, clinical guidelines, the medical and 
general press and academic journals were used, as well as broadcast radio and television 
programmes.
Fifty-three oral interviews were carried out with 45 individuals, including 28 doctors practising 
privately and in the NHS (see Appendix A for details), two nurses, two senior civil servants from 
the Department of Health, three senior or middle-ranking civil servants from the Home Office, 
five members of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (a partially overlapping category), 
four patients, one researcher, three senior voluntary sector workers, a policeman and an 
administrative police employee. In addition numerous informal discussions with existing contacts 
took place.
With the private doctors, the aim was to interview as many as possible. Prior to the start of the 
project, the author had held some concerns regarding the willingness o f this group to be 
interviewed. However, she succeeded in gaining the confidence of nearly all the private prescribers 
with significant involvement in addiction in the years 2(XX)-2(X)3, and a number who had retired. 
'ITiis generated the most complete dataset o f this group produced to date. The other interviewees 
were sampled purposivcly for their individual involvement in developments of the periixl, while 
also trying to gain good representation o f the relevant agencies and historical periods.
All interviewees were given an information sheet outlining the study plans and the background o f  
Sarah Mars and Virginia Berridge. They also signed a consent form in line with National Sound 
Archive and 1-SI 1TM I listory Group practice (see Appendix C ) offering a range of conditions for 
attribution which seemed to give them confidence to speak freely without fear of misquotation. 
Most of the interviews were audio taped, but some interviewees declined to lx- recorded and 
contemporaneous handwritten notes were made instead with their pennission.
Analysis
i lie  study used the sources in a ‘sceptical empiricist’ way, where each piece of evidence was 
assessed with the overall analysis in mind, l lie  use of many different types of sources enabled 
triangulation of the data. The methodology was an inductive one, where the process of analysis 
continued throughout the evidence gathering. Ongoing data collection anil analysis in turn guided 
the selection of sources.
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In considering all the source material, questions were asked about internal consistency, agreement 
or otherwise with other sources, as well as the biases discussed above. Ihe themes that have 
concerned those studying policy were o f  interest, including relations between the centre and 
periphery, relations between the state and professionals, relations within professions, involvement 
ot lay people and non-medical individuals in the policy process, processes of policy development 
and implementation and the relationship between research evidence and policy'. Concepts 
developed from the policy community literature and from organizational theories such as Cultural 
'l"heory (also known as ‘Grid Group Theory") suggested that fonns o f groups and networks could 
be significant in explaining doctors’ different approaches and strategies. These arc discussed in 
greater detail in the reviews o f the literature below.
O bstacles Encountered D uring the Research
Access to Department of Health documents was covered by the Thirty Year Rule’, but was 
granted under ‘open government’ legislation. Record officers at the Department of I lealth’s 
archive in Nelson, 1 Lancashire, were helpful but files had been named inaccurately and 
inconsistently by the civil servants sending them to the archive and were therefore difficult to 
identify1 and retrieve. Furthermore, many important committee papers were missing from these 
files. Fortunately this was partly overcome by the generosity o f members of the 1984 and 1999 
working parties responsible for producing good practice guidelines who loaned die author their 
committee papers and correspondence, revealing a much fuller picture of events.
Following legal advice, the Home Office was unwilling to disclose documents relating to their 
Misuse o f Drugs Act Tribunals, but grantee! several extensive interviews. One doctor who had 
been subject to a tribunal passed copies o f  its entire proceedings to die author, but since this was 
the only accessible example o f die tribunals, and had a number o f unusual features, limited 
conclusions could be drawn about die process. Furthermore, had access been grantee! to 1 Iome 
Office documents, it seems likely that this might also have proved frustrating as many of the 
documents seem to have been destroyed or never archived, lh e  GMC provided full transcripts o f 
their disciplinary proceedings on request, but repeated attempts to seek interviews came to nothing.
Papers o f the Ixindon Consultants Group (LCG) were sought through a number o f routes 
throughout the project, but their existence was repeatedly denied. Evcnftiallv some were found to 
lie in the possession of a practising consultant psychiatrist member, and after sharing a couple of 
documents, he sought the Group’s permission before divulging any more. The LCG would not 
allow my attendance at its meeting to explain the purpose of the research and, despite the apparent
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support of the member in possession o f the papers, the group refused the request. Oral history 
interviews and the small number o f accessed papers were therefore used to provide as hill a picture 
as possible of the role o f the LCG. I h is frustrating experience was, however, illuminating o f the 
nature of the LCG: it had succeeded in controlling information which dated back to 1968, across 
generations, despite the fact that it was not centrally held and its existence possibly not even known 
among other members before the meeting. I he Group’s strong identity and sense of solidarity 
meant that an individual member did not feel able to act autonomously, but needed corporate 
permission to proceed, and its secrecy showed a strong boundary to the outside world.
Problems were also encountered in trying to quantify the number of private practitioners working 
during the period and how many patients they treated. Most national figures relating to doctors 
treating patients for addiction between 1970 and 1997 were derived from the Addicts Index, held 
by the Home Office. (The Index was closed in 1997). Doctors would complete forms giving their 
own name, that of the patient, the drugs to which he/she was addicted, and whether thev worked 
in a DDU, general practice or prison. Unfortunately the forms did not distinguish whether the 
doctor was practising privately or for the NI IS.
It was hoped that by compiling a list o f  all private doctors working during the period through 
documentary and interview research, their names could be matched to die dated returns to the 
Addicts Index to determine which doctors were treating patients at different periods and the 
number of patients they had treated. However, searching the returns would have been too great a 
task for this, and, in spite o f the enthusiasm of one relatively junior member of staff at the Home 
Office, it is uncertain whether the I Ionic Office would have allowed it on grounds of 
confidentiality due to the presence o f patients’ names on the returns. The Medical Register might 
have offered an alternative avenue, but it tended not to give details o f a doctor’s private practice in 
dnig treatment. A private doctor interviewed explained that not publicising his services allowed 
liim to control demand and avoid being inundated with these patients.-'
Reviews o f the Literature
No one has written a history of this topic, and in fact there has been little research carried out on 
1 English private medicine in general; these literature reviews have not therefore included any 
‘histories o f private prescribing’ but concentrate on relevant background areas and useful 
theoretical approaches. Publications which could lx- said to constinitc the public-private debate 
itself were considered as such in the main Ixxly of the primary research. The existing literature on
21 M. Johnson, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2<XH)).
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the history of drug treatment services and policies has been given a chapter of its own after these 
reviews to illustrate the background developments to the study (see Chapter 2). l"he research 
project crossed several areas o f study, and these are reflected in the reviews. 'Ihe literature on 
public-private mix in health care was an obvious starting point, and from  there, some historical 
context on the history of the English medical profession was explored to provide a wider context 
to tile debate. 'ITie concepts o f addiction and dependence were to be central to discussions around 
prescribing to drug users and so were also considered. Professions an d  their regulatory systems 
have been the subject of considerable attention, particularly from sociologists and economists, as 
well as historians; their work has been reviewed, along with the less extensive literature on external 
systems of inspection. As a history of policy, this project considered literature on the ‘policy 
community’, as a useful conceptual approach, and finally, Cultural T heory (or ‘Grid Group 
Theory’) offered potential for understanding the structures, values and strategies of some of the 
organisations studied.
Public and private health care mix
Although the debate between private and Nl IS doctors has been presented, particularly bv those 
exclusively in the Nl IS, as a clash between two sectors, many of the doctors who have practised in 
the private sector worked concurrently in the Nl IS. Furthermore, this private practice was 
untypical of the English private sector for the following reasons: it was extremely unusual for Nl IS 
consultant psychiatrists treating dmg users to take on private patients; m ost private practice was 
undertaken either by consultants who had left the public sector or bv general practitioners. Those 
entidsing priv ate practice have claimed a further difference from other areas of private health care 
was that many o f the patients did not have a regular income and funded treatment from criminal 
sources.'4 It has not been possible to gather t|uantifiable data on patients’ sources o f income during 
this study, but interview data has suggested a range o f methods of paving fees, including health 
insurance,"’ social security,'4’ or payment by family members27 as well as the sale o f prescribed 
dmgs."" Data from GMC hearings also suggested that non-payment o f  fees was a common 
problem for doctors in this area.
Much o f this private treatment was long term, which was also unusual a s  was the relationship 
between supply and demand. Some doctors working in this area sought to deter patients from
*  eg AC.MD, (1982) op. at., p.S4.
-s C. Brewer, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2000). 
2,1 M. Johnson, (2(KK>) op. at.
27 A. Garfoot, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2000). 
’* Patient 002, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
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seeking their help rather than openly advertising their services for fear o f being overwhelmed by 
demand and also to select desirable patients. A form of treatment for dmg users more typical of 
the w ider private sector has been provided by in-patient psychiatric hospitals such as the Priory 
Group, but in view o f dieir abstinence orientated approach and lack of long term substitute 
prescribing,' ’ they were not involved in this public-private controversy.
For these reasons, the existing literature on public-private mix has had limited relevance and litde 
has been written specifically on the relations between private and NHS doctors in the drugs field; 
what could be considered ‘secondary sources’, constitute part of the debate itself and so are 
generally treated as primary sources. Private primary care as a whole was extremely poorly 
documented and private practice by consultants was also largely uncharted, with the most 
comprehensive research relating to surgical practice.1" Iaing and Buisson produced an annual 
overview of the private sector dating back to the 1988 but have not been able to overcome these 
shortfalls in the data.11 Mote theoretical work has been carried out on fee-paying private practice in 
developing countries1'  but has been difficult to apply to this unusual area o f English private 
practice.
H isto ry of the m ed ica l profession in England
Medical practice in F.ngland has dated back many centuries, but it was in 1518 that doctors in 
London gained a royal charter for their Colleges o f Physicians, set up to control medical practice in 
and around the City o f London through a system o f licensing. These were the beginnings of 
medicine’s organisation as a profession with attendant regulation. In the nineteenth century 
Britain’s doctors arranged themselves into Ixxlies to represent themselves nationally in the form of 
the liritish Medical Association, and with state support, to regulate themselves through the General 
Medical Council (1858).
I listones of the medical profession since the National I Icalth Service (1948), for which most o f the 
doctors in England work, have concentrated particularly on its relations with the state. Important 
work has been carried out by Rudolf Klein, Chris I lam and Charles Webster."'14'11 29
29 D. Curson, ‘Private treatment o f alcohol and drug problems in Britain’, British Journal o f  Addiction, 86 (1991), 9- 
11.
“'J. Yates, Private Eye. Heart ami llip . Surpicat consultants. tlse National Health Service, and Private Medicine (Edinburgh: 
Churchill I Jvingstonc, 1995).
”  eg Laing and Buisson, Review o f  Private I Healthcare and I amp Term Cart (London: I -aing and Buisson, 1999).
12 eg S. Bennett, B. McPake and A. Mills, Private Providers in deve/opinp Countries: Servinp the Public Interest( (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1997).
”  eg R. Klein, The N ew Politics o f  rise National Health Service (first published 1983, London and New York: 
Longman; fourth edition, Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2001).
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Changes in the status and power of the medical profession both as a whole and within its 
constituent parts have been observed over the last half-century. The establishment of the NHS 
changed the relationship between hospital doctors and GPs as their division of labour, roles and 
stams altered. Frank Honigsbaum explored the development o f this separatism and the tensions 
that arose before and after the NHS was established. The negotiated settlement between 
government and the profession gave voluntary hospital consultants and leaders of the profession 
security, privilege and high remuneration while permitting the continuation of private practice. It 
also worsened the long-running rift between the consultants and CPs.'6’''
Webster has shown how GPs’ status lagged behind hospital doctors for many years under the 
NHS, until change started with the 1966 new contract that encouraged improvements in practice 
premises, continuing education and the employment of ancillary' help. This consequently 
stimulated group practices among GPs and their involvement in health centres.'* General practice 
continued to enhance its status and its role in medical politics in the 1970s, but failed negotiations 
with government led to the imposition of a new contract in 1989 bringing enforced changes.' ’ The 
development of general practice as an academic subject also helped raise their status.
As a political force, the medical profession held considerable power tor most ot the twentieth 
century. Moran and Wood have put the high point o f their power and influence as the late 1960s, 
when the prevailing wisdom in politics was ‘that experts knew best’.4" 'Ibis began to change in the 
1970s and ’80s, with a questioning o f the philosophical assumptions of Western medicine, a 
burgeoning interest in alternative medicines and an increasing sympathy for the ideas o f the nnti- 
psycltiatry movement that disease was socially constructed.4
The profession’s ability to present a united front, particularly in negotiation with government, has 
also varied over the last century. Klein, a political scientist, stated that while it appeared to be
” cg C. I lam, / lea/th Polity in Britain: The Politics ami Organisation o f  the National I lea/lh Service (Fourth edition, 
lloundmills: Macmillan, 1999).
"  eg C.Webster, The National Health Service. A Political I lis/ory ( ( txford: < ixford University Press, 1998).
“  F. I lonigsbaum, The Division in British Medicine. A I listory o f  the Separation o f  General Practice from I losp/lal Citre 
1911-1968 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1979).
17 M. Drury, T he general practitioner and professional organisations’ in I. London, J. I lorder and C. Webster 
(eds.). General Practice Under the National Health Service. 1948-1991 (London: Clarendon Press, 1998) pp. 205-223. 
’» C.Wcbstcr, (1998) op. a t., p.131. 
w Ibid, p.l 81.
4n M. Moran and B. Wood, States. Regulation and the M edical Profession (Buckingham, UK, and Bristol, PA, USA:
( )pcn University Press, 1993) p.32.
41 V. Berridgc and C. Webster, ‘The crisis o f  welfare, 1974- 1990s’ in CAX’ebster (ed.). Gating for Health: History 
and Diversity (Buckingham: ( )pcn University Press, 1993) pp. 127-149.
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corporadst and disciplined, it was, in fact, made up of individualistic practitioners who were difficult 
to either control or organise.'1'  He described this as ‘syndicalism’, with individual doctors holding 
the power to take strike action themselves without the official central structure o f their trade union, 
the British Medical Association, and splintering off into rival groups.4’
The history o f private practice, a minority activity in England since the NI IS, has received less 
attention. In mid-1970s I-ondon, the influx o f Arab patients and their oil wealth led to a massive, if 
short-lived increase in private practice centred around Harley Street, but this tailed off as the Gulf 
States established their own hospitals. After Labour’s attempts to eliminate private beds from NI IS 
hospitals, the new consultant contract intrcxluced by the Conservative government in 1979 brought 
a change of direction, removing all practical constraints on the supply o f consultant labour to the 
private sector.42 *4 45The new emphasis on private medicine from the Thatcher administration 
continued in the 1980s with a substantial increase in private out-patient attendance and a large 
expansion of private bed provision in private hospitals.4’
Addiction and dependence
As treatment of addicted patients through substitute prescribing has been the ftxais of the debate 
between private and NHS doctors, the development o f the concept o f ‘addiction’ has required 
some attention. ’Ihe literantre on addiction has not formed a coherent whole and there has been 
considerable disagreement even to the extent to which addiction has existed. At one extreme John 
Booth Davies, whose book The Myth of ¿Addiction*' has proposed that people use dntgs because they 
want to and that any phannacological properties which produce a compulsion to use have been 
over-stated.
I listorical work, most notably that of Virginia Bcrridge, has shown the concept of addiction to be 
both culturally and historically located, its development in relation to both alcohol and drugs 
reflecting the needs and purposes of professional groups and the processes of scientific ‘advance’.
I Ier work on opium use in the nineteenth centurv showed an absence of the idea of addiction from 
common understanding at that time. W hile long term use of opium might have led to the 
development o f a ‘habit’, this was of relatively little concern. There was no suggesdc >n that die
42 R. Klein, The Politics o f  the Notional Wealth S ervice (1-ondnn and New York: longman, 1983) pp.89-90.
45 R. Klein, (2001) op. a t .  pp.84-88.
44 W . I.aing, Going Primte. Independent Wealth Carr in  landon  (London: King’s Fund, 1992).
45 V. Bcrridge and C. Webster, (1993) op. a t .  p p .127-149.
4,1 J . B. Davies, The M yth o f  Addiction (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997).
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opium lacked the qualities termed addictive today, rather its context of use and resulting emphases 
were different/7
Historian Roy Porter’s research on alcohol showed that various disease models emerged in the 
eighteenth century and crystallized by the mid-nineteenth century in which drunkenness was seen 
as requiring medical attention, replacing its conception as a moral or religious weakness. Thomas 
Trotter, a British doctor writing in 1804, was the first analyst to describe habitual drunkenness as a 
mental illness, and he likened the effects of spirits to the use of opium, describing them all as 
narcotics.4*
Even among those of a more positivist approach who have taken the view that it has a basis in 
scientifically reproducible experiment, addiction’s boundaries have changed considerably over time. 
The once separate categories o f psychological and physical addiction have come together,4'' and the 
centrality of withdrawal symptoms and tolerance has been replaced with the sense of compulsion 
to use a substance. Both ‘physical’ and ‘psychological’ aspects were drawn on when the World 
I lealth Organization introduced the term ‘dependence’ in 1964 to replace ‘addiction’ and 
‘habituation’.5" Bringing together these two ideas under one term widened the range o f substances 
considered to have ‘dependence’ potential. 'ITie merging o f psychological and physical aspects 
arose in part from experimental work showing that dependence developed from learned 
experiences of substances and anticipation o f their effects preceding re-use. Psychology and 
physiology were therefore seen as intricately entwined.
Influenced by the alcohol literature, the more behavioural definition emphasised an increasing 
difficulty controlling substance-taking behaviour often reflected in a progressive neglect of 
alternative activities and an inability to stop regardless of harmful consequences.51 It meant that a 
wider range of substances, including cannabis, tobacco and cocaine, could be termed addictive, so 
extending the scope for medical intervention and upholding the existing legal control system. 17
17 V. Berridge and G  Edwards, Opium and the People. Opiate Use in Nineteenth Century l in la n d  (first published 1981 
London: Allen Lane; this edition New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987).
,H R. Porter, ‘Introduction’, in T. Trotter (and cd. R. Porter), An Essay Medical, Philosophical, and Chemical on 
Drunkenness and Its Effects on tire Human Body (London: Routledgc, 1988) pp.ix-xliii.
T. Stockwcll, ‘Psychological and social basis o f drug dependence: an analysis o f drug seeking behaviour in 
animals and dependence as learned behaviour’ in G. Edwards and M. Lader (eds.). The Nature o f  Drug Dependence 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) pp.195-203.
Vl V. Berridge and S. Mars, ‘Glossary o f  the history o f  addiction’, journal o f  Epidemiology and Community Health, 58 
(2004), 747-750.
Sl G. Edwards and M Gross, 'Alcohol dependence: provisional description o f a clinical syndrome’, British 
lU .ii/  /numal i (1976), 1058-1061.
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Jim Orford, while advancing a psychological approach to addiction, or what he has termed 
‘excessive appetites’, was nonetheless critical o f applying the concept of addiction to drugs, noting 
that different substances challenged the model. For instance, nicotine produced withdrawal 
symptoms but not intoxication; cannabis produced a compulsion to use but negligible withdrawal 
symptoms and caffeine withdrawal brought on symptoms but users seem to have little difficulty 
stopping. To overcome these difficulties, he recommended that sex and gambling should instead be 
placed more centrally in the model of addiction.’2
As with many areas o f behaviour, genetic research has also investigated a hereditary risk from drug 
problems. WTtile the search for a single ‘addictive personality’ has produced little, research has 
moved towards inherited personality traits that may play roles as risk factors in drug and alcohol 
problems invoking complex modelling with environmental factors.’5
Professions and Professionalization
'ITie sociological literature which has concerned itself with the development of the professions, 
what it termed ‘professionalization’, has also been useful in providing concepts to interpret the 
stmemres, values and relationships of the medical profession during the period under study. While 
not a unified theory, differing approaches have predicted likely changes and the conditions required 
for these changes. As the term suggests, ‘professionalization’ refers to a process by which an 
occupation organises itself into a profession.
i l i e  role ot professions was commented upon by Weber, Durkheim and Marx in the nineteenth 
ccnniry, but it was not until 1928 that Carr-Saunders began a more systematic and detailed 
approach.’* Turner noted that the writings of Durkheim, Weber and Mannheim were criticised for 
taking an optimistic view of the professions’ self-proclaimed altniistic service of others.55 Recent 
commentators such as Freidson have emphasised the economic benefits and power accrued by the 
professions by their monopoly of certain service provision at the expense of other occupational 
groups.5,1
s* J . < irford, ‘Addiction as excessive appetite’. Addiction, 96 (2001), 15-31.
v' S. A. Ball, ‘Personality traits, disorders, and substance abuse* in R. M. Stelmack (ed.). On The Psycbobio/ogr o f 
Personality: lissays in Honor o f  Marvin Y.ttckertnan (( Ixford: Elsevier, 2004) pp.203-222.
1,t 11. M. Yollmcr and D. 1.. Mills (cds), Professionab^ation (Englewood ( ’lifts. New |crsey: Prentice-1 fall, Inc., 
1966).
ss B. Turner, M edical Ponvr and Social Knowledge (lajndon: Sage, first published 1987, this edition 1995) pp. 129 
131.
E. Pried son. T he centrality o f professionalism to health care’ in li. Friedson (ed.). Professionalism Reborn. 
Theory, Prophesy and Policy (Cambridge: Polity Press with Blackwell Publishers, 1994) pp. 184 198.
25
Up until the 1970s, criticism about the role o f professionalism in society was focused on its 
economic and social advantages and disadvantages with an implicit understanding that this related 
only to men. Feminist critics changed this, targeting the medical profession as a patriarchal 
authority controlling subordinate social groups, particularly women,’7 not only as patients but also 
where they made up the majority o f  an occupational group such as nursing.’"
Johnson considered that by the 1970s the original conditions under which professionalism had 
developed no longer existed and put forward patronage and state mediation as alternative models 
for controlling expertise. The model o f  state mediation could be said to have described the NHS at 
that time. It provided a guaranteed ‘clientele’ for the professional, rather than relying on the 
vagaries of demand from fee-paying clients. This not only increased the level of consumer demand 
but also limited the effects of consumer choice. The employment of practitioners by the state 
brought bureaucratic elements to their role and resulted in a general dilemma for the professional in 
trying to balance administrative and consumer needs. ’7 The apparent absence o f a consumer voice 
in the treatment of drug dependent patients in the NHS mav have indicated that, where the client 
was in a weak social position, this balance may have swung further towards administrative needs.
1 larrison and Ahmad considered that since 1975 the medical profession had lost its dominance 
over other related professions and its autonomy from regulation and evaluation in the United 
Kingdom. They described a new medical labour process emerging as a ‘scientific bureaucratic 
machine’ in which treatments were derived from an externally generated body of research evidence 
and implemented through bureaucratic niles in the form of clinical guidelines.6" These guidelines 
were in fact the condensation of political criteria dressed up as technical mles and enforced by 
regulatory agencies.61 Individual doctors no longer determined treatment decisions for their 
patients. With this process I larrison and Ahmad charted the rise of the manager within the NHS 
and the emergence of NI IS management as a career path in its own right.
Johnson’s later work, influenced by Foucault, rejected the arguments around autonomy and 
intervention and interpreted the professions in the hitter half o f the twentieth century as ‘socio- 
technical devices’ through which the means and ends o f government were articulated. This was 
achieved by the professions identifying new social problems, constnicting the means to solve them
s7 eg C). Moscucci, The Science o f  Woman (Cambridge: Cambndge University Press, 1993).
“  B. Turner, (1995) op. ¡it., p. 130.
M T.J. Johnson, Profusions and Power {London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1972) pp.41-61.
w’ S. I larrison and W. I. U. Ahmad, ‘Medical autonomy and the UK state 1975-2025’, Sono/o^y, 34 (2000), 129-
146, p.138.
¡hid. p. 129 146.
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and staffing the organisations created to cope with them.'1'  This image of professions as part of 
‘govemmcntality’ may sit more comfortably with the involvement of medical professionals within 
‘policy communities’.
T heoretical Approaches to M ed ical Regulation
While the ‘professionalization’ literature has considered the development of occupations, of which 
self-regulation has constituted an element, this body o f work has considered more broadly the 
different models available for regulating health care and their theoretical underpinnings. It has 
generally arisen with the aims o f  identifying and explaining the diverse approaches and assessing the 
advantages and disadvantages o f each/1'
Medical regulation, it has been noted, is not a special activity, but part o f wider processes of 
regulation within society, which have included both formal and informal controls ranging from 
legislation to peer disapproval/ 4 The chief concerns of the literature have depended on the systems 
that have emerged and the political culture in their countries o f origin. For instance, in the United 
States, where a larger proportion of health care has been private and the political discourse more 
orientated towards industry and commerce, the literature was particularly preoccupied with the role 
of the market in regulation.65 The British literature, although often cross-national in its 
comparisons, has tended to address the relationship between the state and the health professions, 
as the majority o f Britain’s health care has been provided through the state. 1 hnvever since the 
1980s, when the New Right championed market forces in public services, interest in private health 
care and economic competition have emerged in the regulation literature.66
Baggott has identified five conceptual frameworks used by those considering regulatory origins and 
change.6 The first two, ‘public interest’ and ‘private interest’ theories have chiefly concerned self- 
regulation bv the professions, and their main contributors have been discussed above (see 
“Professionalism and Professionalization’). Private interest theories have taken a cynical view.
42 T. Johnson, ‘Govcrnmcntality and the institutionalization o f expertise’ in T. Johnson, G. Larkin and M. Saks 
(cds.), I It tilth Professions anti the State in liurope (London: Routledge, 1995) p.23.
41 R. Baggott, ‘Regulatory polities, health professionals, and the publie interest’ in J. Allsop and M. Saks (cds.), 
Remulating the i  lealth Professions (1 .ondon. Thousand ( >aks, C A, USA, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002) 
pp.31-47.
44 J. Allsop, ‘Regulation and the medical profession’ in j .  Allsop and M. Saks (2002) o f. a t.. pp.79-93.
45 eg D. Yaggy and W. G . Anlyan (cds.), Financing Health Care: Competition Versus Regulation. The Papers anil 
Proceedings o f  the Sixth Private Sector Conference March 23 and 24. 1981. Duke University (Cambridge, MA, USA: 
Ballinger Publishing, 1982).
44 cg C. Scott, Public and Private Roles in Health Care Systems. (Buckingham, UK, and Bristol, PA, USA: ( lpcn 
University Press, 2001).
47 R. Baggott, (2002) op. at., pp.31-47.
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seeing regulation as designed and maintained primarily in the interests of the regulated. Baggott has 
criticised the private interest paradigm by suggesting that professions’ codes o f  ethics have shown 
that economic self-interest has not always been the primary motivation for regulation. I lowever, 
other authors have noted the heavier punishments allotted by some professional groups to 
members transgressing ethical rules governing competition compared with those for harming 
patients.611,69 The opposite position has been put forward in ‘public interest theories’, sometimes 
taking at their word the claims of the professions.
A more pluralist version o f private interest theories has emerged in the literature typed ‘interest 
group’ theories, which have described regulation as the stun of interactions between different 
‘stakeholders’, whether inside a profession or between professional groups and other regulatory 
bodies. Wliich groups have been included in the process has depended upon their recognition as 
legitimate parties at different points in liistory, with, for instance, greater inclusion of patient groups 
during the 1980s and ’90s than during the 1950s and ’60s. A fourth set o f commentators has 
approached regulation as guided by particular ideas and ideologies, and the results of attempts to 
implement them, while the last group identified bv Baggott used the prism ot institutional politics, 
both within and between regulatory institutions. Moran and Wood have incorporated several o f 
these approaches in their work comparing Britain, Germany and the United States. Particularly 
interesting to this research project has been the division of regulation into formal and informal 
methods, since informal approaches often seem to have been overlooked in the regulation 
literature. "
Several medical historians, including Roy Porter and Roger Cooter, have considered the 
development of medical ethics, the constantly changing bodv of thought used to arbitrate questions 
of the conduct of medicine and medical research within the profession. They have tended to take 
the ‘interest group’ approach mentioned above, seeing medical ethics as the profession’s way of 
elevating itself above mere trade, entitling it to respectful deference from clients and exempting it 
from various external political and legal controls, while legitimising its rights to self-government and 
self-policing.'1'' Cooter has argued eloquently that although the ‘ethical’ is conventionally
M eg M. Stacey, Regn/ating British Medicine: The General Medica/ Cornial (Chichester: John W iley and Sons, 1992).
<>'t eg M. Moran, Governing the Wealth C an State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
7,1 eg M. Moran and B. Wood, States. Regulation and the Medical Profession (Buckingham, U K . and Bristol, PA, USA: 
Open University Press, 1993).
71 R. Porter, ‘Thomas Gislxjmc: Physicians, Christians and Gentlemen’ in A. Wear, |. Gcycr-Kordesch and R. 
French (eds.) Doctors and Ethics: The Earlier H istorical Selling o f  Professional Ethics, (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi, 
1993) pp.252-273.
72 R. Cootcr, ‘The ethical body’, in R. Cootcr and J. Pickstone (eds.) Mediarte in the Tuvntieth Century,
(Amsterdam: I lanvood Academic Publishers, 2000) pp.457-468.
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juxtaposed against the ‘political’, ethics is simply ‘politics by other means’. ‘Arbitrating the good 
and the bad in medicine, (as in society), is necessarily about commanding authority’ and has no 
legitimate claim to the higher morality it has claimed.''
Klein’s work, while not primarily theoretical has also considered regulation. Mis observations on 
clinical autonomy have produced a usefiil division between ‘collective’ and ‘individual’. Rather than 
considering state regulation, in  the form of clinical guidelines and protocols, as strengthening state 
control over the medical profession and weakening medical autonomy,74 Klein has seen this, and 
the process of clinical audit, as the medical profession accepting and participating in the restriction 
of individual clinicians’ autonomy in order to strengthen collective professional autonomy.'5
Ihese various concepts m ay be useful in considering the regulation of doctors treating drug users. 
One part o f the process o f state regulation has been the part played by the Home Office’s Drugs 
Inspectorate, and it is to the small part of the literature on regulation that has considered the role of 
government inspectors and inspectorates that this review now turns.
Inspection and Inspectorates
Regulating doctors who w ere prescribing controlled drugs was not just the work o f  their peers at 
the GMC, but also involved direct policing by the state. 'I lie  I lom e Office’s Drugs Inspectorate, 
originating in 1916, has been the subject of detailed study in this project. Very little has been written 
on the Dnigs Inspectorate itself and research on other inspectorates and relevant theoretical 
approaches have therefore been considered here.
In the field of government surveillance, Michel Foucault has made the largest impression on 
theoretical approaches in the twentieth century. I Iis works on the development o f  modem 
medicine and the punishment of criminals have been hugely influential on W estern thought. '1'
Key has been the notion o f  ‘disciplinary power’, which described the use o f new “scientific” ideas 
at the nim of the eighteenth and nineteenth century to define norms, enforcing them through 
constant surveillance and regulafit >n of time and space in institutions such as asylums, schools, the 
annv, and prisons. These systems controlled individual lxxlies and internalised pressure to
Ibid. pp.457-460.
74 S. Harrison and W.I.U. Ahm ad, (2000,1 op. it/., p p .129-146.
7* R. Klein, The New Politics o f th e  National Health Service, (London and New York: lx>ngman, first published 1983, 
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77 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth oftlse Prison, translated by A. Sheridan (first edition. Edition 
Gallimard, 1975; this edition I larmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1991).
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conform. Those found to be delinquent were dealt with through programmes which both cured 
and reinforced delinquency, building in their own failure. * Here Foucault was describing 
processes, rather than interests or institutions, and his work denied personal agency as a historical 
force.7''
While Foucault did not necessarily intend his ideas to be taken as a general or consistent theory, or 
to be applied to other historical contexts,"" his acolytes have been more expansive. Worthy o f 
particular attention in this research project is the work of David Armstrong, who adapted 
Foucault’s ideas about the “Panopticon’, Jeremy Bentham’s prison design in which all inmates could 
be observed at all times from a single vantage point, to medical surveillance in the twentieth 
century. Armstrong described the archetype o f a tuberculosis dispensary which acted as a central 
clearing house of information about sickness and potential sickness in the wider community, 
mapping the spread of disease and gaining the consent of the well population to undergo policing 
and surveillance."1 This model could be valuable in understanding the policing o f both doctors and 
patients in the community by the Home Office Dnigs Inspectorate and through the Addicts Index.
Also o f potential utility were the more empirical studies of inspectorates. Denis Lawton and Peter 
Gordon, writing about Her Majesty’s Inspectorate o f Schools (HMI) described three main 
elements of inspection: accountability (regarding public expenditure), surveillance for the Secretary 
o f State, and advisory, giving advice to teachers and educational institutions.K‘ Although I .awton 
and Gordon did not consider a Foucauldian approach, their description of 11MI, would not 
support one. 'Ihe Inspectorate o f Schools’ surveillance work over teachers acted less to control 
them and more as a method o f  advocacy for the professional teaching viewpoint to other civil 
servants and politicians in government.
Gerald Rhodes looked at several inspectorates within British government, describing seven 
different types, but concentrated mainly on those inspecting compliance with statutory 
requirements and those which inspected to maintain or improve standards o f performance. I le 
placed the I Ionic Office Drugs Inspectorate into the first category. Rlnxlcs observed that 
inspectorates often did more than ins|X'cting and drew some potentially relevant conclusions about
7" //W.pp.257-292.
n  F. Driver, ‘Bodies in space. Foucault’s account o f  disciplinary power’ in C. Jones and R. Porter (eds.). 
Reassessing Poucau/t. Power. Aledidne and the Rot/)1 (Condon and New York: Routlcdge, first published 1004, this 
edition 1998) p p .ll.V 13 l.
/¿/r/.pp.ll6-123.
Iil D. Armstrong, Political Anatomy o f  tire Rody. Medical Knowledge in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
l ’mvcrsity Press, 1983) pp.7-18.
D. Lawton and P. Gordon, HMI (1 smelon and New York: Routledgc and Kegan Paul, 1987).
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central government inspectorates which he observed tended to be more specialised and smaller 
than those of local government. For instance, as well as enforcing legislation among those they 
inspected, they could develop into professional advisors to ministers and departments, as in the 
case o f the Railway Inspectorate advising the Department of Transport on railway investment
■ Ittplans.
The Home Office Dmgs Inspectorate can also be seen in terms of a bureaucracy — or part of one. 
Max Weber described the basis of bureaucratic power as technical expertise and knowledge 
developed through experience in the service. I le also saw bureaucracies as having an interest ir. 
perpetuating themselves into permanent institutions, rather than serving the ends for which they 
were originally designed."4 It will be interesting to see the extent to which the Home Office 
Inspectorate matched or deviated from these theoretical models and historical case studies.
Policy com m unities
'Hie ‘policy community’ literamre has attempted to explain the policy-making processes in 
government that have developed in the last fifty years. It has examined the relationship between 
structures inside and outside government that have been involved in decision-making, and has 
integrated those with an expertise and interest in a particular issue into the process outside 
government into the picture. ITie policy community literature has seen four main types o f actor 
making up this relationship: politicians, administrators, lobbyists and ‘experts’.
The origins of the policy network literature are in sociology, political science, and social psychology 
but RAW Rhodes considered there to be general agreement that the term had been used 
imprecisely and lacked a unified theoretical underpinning. Some uses were simply descriptive and 
did not constitute a ‘theory’ in that they made no attempt to explain why things were as they were.*’
‘Sub-government’ was a term that originated in the United States. Typically, these clusters of 
individuals were comprised o f members of the 1 louse and Senate, members o f congressional staffs, 
bureaucrats, and representatives of private groups and organisations interested in a well-defined 
policy area."0 They considered the non-governmental actors to be an important influence on policy
M1 G. Rhodes, Inspectorates in British Government. b a r  linforerment and Standards o f  l i f f i t i e n y ,  Royal Institute o f Public 
Administration (1-ondon: George Allen and Unwin, 1981) p.240.
w M. Welter, I'rom .Max U'eber tissays in Sociology, translated and edited by 11. 11. G erth and C. Wright Mills (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, first published 1946, this edition, 1964).
MS R. A. W. Rhodes, ‘Policy networks a British perspective’. Journa lofT beon tica ! Politics, 2, 3 (1990), 293-317.
*6 R. B. Ripley and G . A. Franklin, Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Polity (Pacific G rove, California: 
Brooks/Colc, first published 1976, this edition, 1987) pp.8-10.
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and programme content, but emphasised the variation o f sub-governments’ influence, particularly 
dominating the lowest profile policy areas.
Heclo and Wildavsky, in their 1981 book on public expenditure and decision-making in British 
politics, decided to interpret their subject not in ‘the usual terms of relative power and divisions of 
responsibility’ ‘but in terms o f community and policy’. I lere, ‘community’ referred to the persona] 
relationships between major political and administrative actors, where ‘community [was] the 
cohesive and orienting bond underlying any particular issue’.117 However, they put great emphasis 
on the relationship between politicians and civil servants and gave little space to outsiders, 
concluding with a plea for the ‘government community’ to be opened up ‘so that outsiders and 
insiders have more in common — including an understanding of each other’s problems.’1"'
For historians using the idea o f  policy communities, an apparent absence of movement in these 
models that could take account of change over time has been a problem.1"1 Hay and Richards have 
tried to rectify this in work arising from die Economic and Social Research Council’s Whitehall 
Programme. The need for this was not merely a theoretical one, but resulted from the changed 
nature of government itself: they considered that the stability of the past had gone and networks 
were existing in a state of flux in the new context of heightened mobility of capital, trans-national 
political interventions, economic decentralisation and privatisation.""
Turning to work specific to the health field, Wistow described a ‘health service policy community’ 
and, widi a broad brush, traced its development since the establishment of the N1 IS, and the 
changing balance of power between the medical profession, patients, and administrators and 
politicians, voluntary services and latterly managers. He related the relative power of parts of the 
medical profession and their influence on policy to doctors’ own system of prestige. ” This may be 
of particular relevance to the drugs field where prestige o f psycliiatry has been notably low, and 
addiction psychiatry even more so.
M7 H. Heclo and A Wildavsky, The Printie Government o f  Public Money. Community and Polity Inside British Polities 
(1-ondon: Macmillan, first edition 1974, this edition, 1981) p.lxv.
B" Ibid, p.389.
"" D. von W alden Laing, HIV/AIDS in Sweden and the United Kingdom Polity Networks.!982- /992 (Stockholm: 
Stockholm University, 2001).
C. I lay and 13. Richards, T he tangled welts o f  Westminster and Whitehall: the discourse, strategy and practice 
o f networking within the British core executive’, Pubtie Administration, 78 (20(X)), 1-28.
1,1 G. Wistow, ‘The health service policy community. Professionals pre-eminent or under challenge?’ in 13.
Marsh and R. A. W. Rhodes (eds.). Polity Nelwtsrks in British Oovernment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) pp.51 
74.
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Historical work carried out on alcohol policy formation, in which some of the same actors were 
involved as in the drugs field, has clearly mapped a policy community. 92 O f particular interest to 
tliis study is die close relationship between the government and the clinicians and academics based 
at the Maudsley Hospital in South London, which may also be relevant to drug policies.
Cultural Theory
In trying to understand any conflict or debate, the researcher must seek out the different values that 
have underlain the positions taken and ask how and why these values have developed. Cultural 
anthropology has made an important contribution to explaining viewpoints and ideologies in 
different cultures, initially in distant lands, and more recendy, within our own society. An approach 
that has been increasingly used to understand the way people have interpreted the world and 
developed values, including in lfistorical work,” has been Cultural Theory, sometimes known as 
‘Grid Group Theory’.
Originally developed by Mary Douglas,” Cultural 'ITieory has linked values and beliefs to social 
relationships, and from diese, has explained behaviour. The debate between private prcscribers 
and NI IS doctors has involved a range of activities from individuals writing to medical journals to 
the formation o f professional groupings. Douglas and Wildavskv used Cultural lTieorv to consider 
the activities and beliefs of environmental pressure groups and how these changed over time to 
revealing effect, and it may be useful in examining doctors’ organizations and the different 
strategies they have employed.
Cultural Theory has measured social stmeture by two dimensions — ‘grid’ and ‘group’. ‘Group’ 
measured the extent to which an individual was part of a wider group that met face-to-face and the 
extent to which that group had boundaries. At the ‘zero’ position along the ‘group’ (x) axis, die 
individual was in a network of his own making which had no re-cognisable boundaries. (Sec Figure 
1.1) Others, further along from tltis position, may have belonged to several associations which were 
clearly bounded so that they could determine who was and who was not a member. At the 
extreme, an individual’s existence may have been completely dominated by group membership.
‘,2 Thom, B. Dealing With Drink. Alcohol and Social Policy From Treatment to Management, (London and 
New York: Free Association Books, 1999).
w eg A. Wildavsky and D. Polls.tr, ‘l-'rom individual to system blame: analysis o f historical change in the law o f 
torts’, Journal o j Policy History, 1, 129-155.
1)1 M. Douglas, Cultural Bias, ( Iccasional Paper No 35 (London Royal Anthropological Institute o f Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, 1978).
,,s M. Douglas and A. Wildavsky. R/i k. and Culture. A n F.ssay on the Selection o f  Technological and environmental Danger/ 
(Berkeley, Ia>s Angeles and London: Llnivcrsity o f  California Press, 1982).
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I Tie more an individual’s life was absorbed in the group, for instance working inside the group, 
marrying inside the group, and so on, the stronger their ‘group’ score would be.
‘Grid’ measured rules, ‘social classification’ or regulation. I f  social categories o f people and their 
appropriate behaviour were heavily imposed by a culture, then grid was stronger, if  behaviour and 
status were more flexible or left to individual autonomy, then grid was weaker. In combination, 
these dimensions have produced five possible social forms: hierarchy, egalitarianism, fatalism, 
individualism and autonomy. These archetypes were extremes, perhaps never found in actual 
existence, but useful as explanatory tools. To illustrate these archetypes, Thompson, Ellis and 
Wildavsky have given the examples of the hierarchical high-caste I lindu villager, the egalitarian 
communard, the fatalistic non-unionised weaver, the individualistic self-made manufacturer, and 
the autonomous hermit (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Five Archetypes Mapped onto the Two Dimensions of Social Structure *
Grid
The ‘strong grid’ high caste I lindu villager and the non-unionised mill worker were both 
constrained by a socially imposed ‘gridiron’ of things they could and could not do, but while the 
villager was part of a larger hierarchical group which gave him  rights to land anil deference from 
those beneath him, the non-unionised mill worker was isolated from other workers and 
experienced no solidarity with them, lacking also any scope for competition.9'
M. Thompson, R. Ellis anil A. Wildavsky, Cjiltiirul Vhenty (boulder anil Oxford: 1990) p.8. 
1,7 Ibid. p.9.
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The Nveak grid’ self-made manufacturer and the self-sufficient communard both considered 
themselves much freer to act as they pleased, one to hire and fire, and the other to act as equal to 
his fellow communards, uncontrolled by the perceived coercive world outside the commune. The 
self-made manufacturer got where he was through rugged individualism, valuing market 
mechanisms, and using individualistic and pragmatic strategies through networks he had developed 
himself. I he communard was defined through membersliip of a group that rejected the 
inequalities of the outside world. The commune’s only principle of organization was rejection of 
those outside the group’s boundary; there were no set ways of resolving conflict or reaching 
decisions inside the commune.
I^ast o f  all was the hermit, who was not necessarily reclusive but withdrew from the coercive social 
involvement of which the other four tvpes became part. He/she valued autonomy above all else, 
and aimed at a life of relaxed, unbeholden self-sufficiency, trying to avoid both the manipulations 
experienced by the mill worker and the communard, and opportunities for manipulation o f others 
open to the manufacturer and high-cast I lindu. I lis job might have been driving a taxi, working 
alone, with ambitions only to be self-sufficient rather than expanding business to work with 
others.™
Corresponding with all these differences, were value systems and strategics relating to all aspects of 
life, including attitudes to authority, working to long term and short term goals, patterns of 
consumption and perceptions of nature. Yet people classified in these categories were not 
conceived o f as lifeless automatons, but able to think critically alxnit their situations. Ihc contexts 
in which they lived were not rigid stnicturcs but constantly re-created by individual actions: they 
were the results of myriad individual decisions made in the past and re-shaped each day7* This 
brief thumbnail sketch o f  Cultural lheory cannot do justice to its detail and subtlety, but it is hoped 
that its value will be perceived more clearly in its application to some of the empirical data in this 
research project.
Structure o f the Thesis
The second chapter continues the literature review in greater depth, exploring developments in 
dnig policies, treatment and services starting from a few years before the period under smdy. 
Chapters 3 to 8 set out the results o f the original research project, examining key events.
Ibid, pp.5 11.
<w M. Douglas, (1978) of.\ cit., pp.5-6.
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developments and structures in the history of the public-private relationship. Chapter 3 reveals the 
first major policy change in drug treatment since the developments of the late 1960s as the 
Treatment and Rehabilitation report from the Advisory Council on the Misuse ofDrugs (1982), and 
considers how and why it came about. One o f its most important consequences was the 
production o f official ‘good practice guidelines’ (1984) by a medical working group, the first such 
guidelines in the British health service, and Chapter 4 tells their story. Its new investigation of 
accusations made by one committee member regarding behind-the-scenes manoeuvres sheds new 
light on the conduct of medical regulation. Chapter 5 considers the General Medical Council as a 
major regulatory structure in the public-private relationship, and analyses the cases of Dr Ann 
Dally, the most high profile private prcscribcr to lx- brought before the Council on disciplinary 
charges between 1983 and 1988. Moving away from professional self-regulation. Chapter 6 focuses 
on state regulation in the form of the Home Office Drugs Inspectorate and its tribunal system for 
regulating doctors prescribing controlled drugs. ITie chapter offers the first in-depth historical 
smdy o f the Inspectorate. Chapter 7 looks at the third and last major regulatory intervention of the 
period, the third edition o f the good practice guidelines, and the repeated attempts to restrict 
d ix  tors’ prescribing using a system o f Home Office licensing, lh e  eighth chapter moves away 
from formal structures o f regulation to consider three less formal professional groupings 
representing groups of drug dixtors and considers the strategies they pursued. None of these 
groupings have previously been studied. I'he ninth and final chapter and its conclusions develops a 
new chronology for the public-private relationship and drug policy, revising that of Chapter 2, and 
drawing together the thematic findings o f the research.
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Chapter 2:
Changes in Drug Treatment, Services and Policy, 1965-99
Introduction
To set the public-private debate in context, this chapter has drawn from the published literature to 
illustrate the changes in drug treatment services and policies of the rime. After a period o f relative 
calm in drug policy between the 1930s and the  ’50s, the last four decades of the century saw a 
transformation in the way drugs were obtained and used, arousing increasing public and 
professional interest. Between 1970 and 1999 drug treatment developed amid three key contextual 
factors: a massive increase in the availability o f  trafficked drugs in Kngland; a similarly large increase 
in the numbers of drug users both outside an d  seeking treatment; and the emergence of 
HIV/AIDS.
'Hie main sources of information on the availability of dmgs and numbers of drug users in 
treatment were those compiled by the Home Office. Dnig availability was gauged through the 
number of seizures of dmgs both at borders and within Kngland bv enforcement agencies. As a 
measure of dmgs available in Kngland it was far from accurate. Shortcomings o f die data and 
caveats for interpretation have been described elsewhere.1 2* I lowever, as an indicator of relative 
increases it has proved valuable. Data have a lso  suggested that from 1978 onwards there was a 
downward trend in the price of trafficked heroin despite there being no reduction in its potency."
Between 1968 and 1997 it was a statutory requirement for doctors treating patients dependent on 
opiates or cocaine to notify die Home Office’s Addicts Index. Aldiough methods of data collection 
changed over this period and may not have been comprehensive or entirely accurate for reasons 
such as the use of false names bv dnig users o r doctors’ failure to notify the Index, it was 
considered the best source for comparisons over more than one decade and gave an indication of 
the vast increase in the numbers of addicted patients.'’4 In 1970, 2657 addicts were notified to the 
I lome Office during the year, while in 1992, after a long rise, 24,703 addicts were notified.'
1 eg Institute for the Study o f Drug Dependence, D rug Misuse in lint,an 1996 (Jxtndon: ISDD, 1007).
2 J. Strang, I’ . Griffiths and M. Gossop, ‘Heroin in the United Kingdom: different forms, different origins, and
the relationship to different routes o f administration', Drug and A lcohol Renew, 16 (1697), 329-337.
' J. Mott, ‘Notification and the I lome ( Ifftcc’ in J . Strang and M. Gossop (cds.), / Icn in  Addiction and Dnig Polity: 
7he llritish System ( (Ixford, New York, Tokyo: ( Ixford University Press, 1994) pp.270-291.
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'ITie impact of HIV/AIDS, once its transmission through injecting drug use became clear, was 
major. In Britain, HIV was known to have infected dmg users in New York by 198*4-85 and a few 
deaths had occurred in Britain, and concern significantly permeated the drugs policy community in 
1985/' The reality of its arrival became clear when an epidemic among injecting dnig users in 
Edinburgh was made public in 1986. Complex political manoeuvring preceded the official 
permission for syringe provision to dmg users and the subsequent allocation o f specific binding to 
HIV prevention.
A fragile national consensus emerged which emphasized a pre-existing and more accepting 
approach to drug use, while attempting to reduce the harm it caused to the user and others, 
becoming known as ‘harm minimization’ or ‘hann reduction’. Prescribing was used to attract 
patients into treatment services with the Department of Health promoting a return to the 
prescription o f oral methadone on a maintenance basis to discourage injecting, at a time when such 
long tenn prescribing was discouraged. Needle exchanges, which had spmng up through grass 
routes activism, were introduced officially, albeit on a ‘pilot’ basis, lhc  dnigs field, long divided 
between those advocating abstinence as the goal o f treatment and those more sympathetic towards 
maintenance prescribing, saw a shift towards greater consensus after 11 IN' and in 1988 the harm 
reduction approach received official policy approval."
An analysis o f the literature has suggested that dmg treatment policies in the period under study 
could be divided into two chronological phases: 1968-1984 before IIIV/AIDS became an issue in 
dmg treatment policies and 1985-1999 afterwards. Gerry Stimson, a sociologist who later became 
involved with the hann reduction movement, has divided the later period up further, with 1987-97 
representing a time when policies were aimed at improving public health, and the health o f addicts, 
and after which treatment policy was directed primarily to reduce dmg-relatcd crime.'’ 1*9
1J. Strang and C. Taylor, ‘Different gender and age characteristics o f  the UK heroin epidemic o f  the 1990s
compared with the 1080s: new evidence from analyses o f  national treatment data’, liaropean Addiction Research, 3
(1997), 43 44.
' J .  Mott. (1994) op. at., p.284.
u V. Berridge, A1T)S in the UK The Making of Policy, 1981-/994 (( )xford: < )xford University Press, 1996) p.91.
Had. pp.119-121; p.221.
M H. I ludebinc, ‘Applying cognitive policy analysis to the drug issue: harm reduction and the reversal o f the
deviantization o f  drug users in Britain 1985-2<XX)\ Addiction Research and Theory (forthcoming).
9 G. V. Stimson, “‘Blair declares war”: the unhealthy state o f British drug policy’. International Jou rna lo j Drug 
Polity, 11 (2(KK1), 259-264.
58
1965-1970, The Second Brain Committee
The committee that was responsible for a new age in dmg treatment sendees, the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, was chaired by Lord Brain, a former president 
o f the Royal College of Physicians (1950-57). It published its slim report to government, the 
second Brain Report, in 1965."111121,14 The committee’s membership and the almost wholesale 
implementation o f its recommendations by government reflected the dominance o f  the medical 
profession in the formulation of drug treatment policy in the first three-quarters o f  the twentieth 
century. In 1961 the same committee’s first report had advocated a medical rather than criminal 
justice approach to dnig users, recommending treatment in the psychiatric ward o f  a general 
hospital as ‘addiction should be regarded as an expression of mental disorder rather than a form of 
criminal behaviour’.1’ 'Ibis medical approach was reinforced in the 1965 report w ith its statement 
that ‘the addict should be regarded as a sick person (and) should be treated as such and not as a 
criminal, provided that he does not resort to criminal acts’.10 2*6
As a response to the growing number o f drug users of a noticeably different sexual and age 
demographic, the committee had been reconvened in 1964. Since the 1920s there had been very 
little opiate addiction and what there was had tended to be concentrated among ‘therapeutic 
addicts’ who had acquired their dependence inadvertently through medical treatment and among 
professionals involved in medicine whose proximity to medicines had facilitated their dependence. 
Ihev were a diminishing, ageing population who received prescribed drugs and were not generally 
seen as a cause of social concern, hears were raised by the press and Parliament, however, in 
response to the new type of young, usually male drug users, mainly congregating in London from 
the late 1950s. Between 1960 and 1964, the number o f heroin addicts known to the I lome Office
10 H. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), Heroin A ddition Cate and Control: The ‘British System’ 1916-1984 ) .  Mott (ed.), 
(London: Drugscopc, 2002).
11 C. Smart, ‘Social policy and drug dependence: an historical case study’, Dm^and AlcoholDependence, 16 (1985), 
169-180.
12 V. Bcrridgc, Opium and the People (first published by (first published 1981 London: Allen 1 .ane; this edition 
I xindon: b'ree Association Books, 1999).
'’ J. Strang, “‘The British System”: past, present and future'. International Remn> o f  Psychiatry, 1 (1989), 109-120.
u G. V. Stimson and R. Lart, T he relationship between the state and ltxal practice in the development o f 
national policy on drugs between 1920 and 1990’ in ). Strang and M. Gossop (1994) op. tit., pp.331-341.
n Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, Report oj the interdepartmental Committee on  Orny Addiction 
(1-ondon: 1IMSO, 1961), quoted in Interdepartmental Committee on Dnig Addiction, Prwg Addiction. The Second 
Report o f  the Interdepartmental Committee |sccond Brain Report], Ministry o f I lealth, Scottish 1 Ionic and 1 lealth 
Department, (Iatndon: I IMSO, 1965) p.4.
16 Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, (1965) op. lit., p.8.
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rose from 94 to 342.17 *The number of cocaine addicts also increased from 52 in 1960 to 211 in 
1964."
The 1965 report, reconsidering its earlier findings, resulted in wide ranging legislative and policy 
changes. 'Ihe committee’s membership was medical and interpreted its terms o f reference ‘as 
meaning that w e were not being invited to survey the subject of drug addiction as a whole, but 
rather to pay particular attention to the part played by medical practitioners in the supply o f these 
drugs’. 19 'ITie second Brain Report concluded that the major source o f the new addicts’ heroin and 
cocaine was not trafficked drugs but ‘the activity of a very few doctors who have prescribed 
excessively for addicts’.2" The report perceived there was a need for greater treatment provision 
and tighter control o f supply within a medical framework. Its recommendations were implemented 
in the 1967 Dangerous Drugs Act and the Dangerous Drugs (Supply to Addicts) Regulations,
1968, which introduced special licences to be granted by the I lome Office to doctors wishing to 
prescribe heroin o r cocaine. Between 1968 and 1970 specialist hospital-based dmg dependency 
units (DDUs) w ere set up, mosdy led by consultant psychiatrists and generally in London where 
the problem was particularly concentrated. In practice, the 1 lome Office almost exclusively limited 
heroin and cocaine licences to doctors working in the DDUs, which became known as the ‘C dirties’, 
and in hospital departments. Until this point many addicts were known by the 1 lome Office 
through doctors’ voluntary reports, inspections o f pharmacy registers and inspectors’ face-to-face 
contacts with users. From 1968 formal notification became a statutory requirement and was 
modelled on infectious disease notification.
Tlie problem o f  drug use was defined as that o f addiction, maintaining the disease model. The 
second Brain Report described addiction as ‘a socially infectious condition’. It has been proposed 
that prior to the 1960s the medical model was only pursued in tenns o f individual treatment but 
that the second Brain Report formulated the disease model to emphasise control within a public 
health approach.21 2These developments drew dnig users into specialist medical treatment and 
discouraged general practitioners from involvement, and were not forcefully opposed by GPs.
17 D. 1 lawks, ‘The dimensions o f  drug dependence in the United Kingdom’, in (I. Edwards, M. A. 11. Russell, 
D. I lawks f t  a l ( c ds.), O ntff anti Drug Dfptndfmo (Eamborough, 1 1ants., Kngland: Saxon I louse and Lexington, 
Mass., USA: 1-exington Books, 1976) p.7.
“  Ibid p.7.
19 Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, (1965) op. if/., p.5.
20 Ibid. p.6.
21 G. V. Stimson and E. ( Ippcnhcimcr, Htmin Addiction: Tnratmrnt and Control in Britain (Umdon: Tavistock, 
1982) pp.49-53.
22 C. Smart, ‘Social policy and drug dependence: an historical case study*, Prrt£ and A lcohol P fprndrntf, 16 (1985), 
169-180.
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Ihcy also established the DDUs in a dual role of treating drug users and controlling the wider 
drugs supply to addicts. This control system saw the Clinics as near monopoly suppliers of drugs.2’ 
In addition to the provision of free prescribed drugs, the mechanisms designed to achieve this were 
the Addicts Index, which could be checked to see whether a patient was already receiving a supply 
from another doctor and uphold inter-clinic agreements not to treat each others’ patients.24
1970-1984
I he Misuse o f Dnigs Act, 1971 was a substantial piece o f legislation, consolidating previous 
Dangerous Drugs Acts and incorporating heavy criminal penalties. It created an important policy 
mechanism in the Advisory Council on the Misuse o f Dnigs (ACMD), (taking over from the earlier 
Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence established in 1967),25 to advise on future policy 
responses to the evolving dmg scene, and it re-instituted the I lomc Office’s Dnig Tribunals, 
designed to regulate doctors’ prescribing o f controlled dnigs (they had been included in legislation 
between 1926 to 1961 but had not been used, and are discussed in detail in Chapter 6).2'1 These 
came into operation in 1973; in practice the Tribunals were never used against doctors working in 
the Clinics, only outside. The Act also renamed ‘dangerous drugs’ as ‘controlled drugs’.
In the early years of the DDUs, the numbers of addicts were very small, with only 2240 registered 
heroin addicts in 1968, and the Clinics seemed able to meet demand.27 Cocaine prescribing was 
tried out but quickly abandoned.2* I leroin and methadone were prescribed in injectable form on a 
long term maintenance basis until the end of the mid-1970s. Around this time there was discussion 
about the relative merits o f the three main opiates o f prescription: injectable heroin, injectable 
methadone and oral methadone.'7 John Strang, a senior I />nd<in Clinic psychiatrist and prolific and 
influential researcher who became one o f  the key players in the control of prescribing, has reported 
that by the mid-1970s some Clinics were Ix-gtnning to inUoducc a policy that only oral methadone 
would be prescribed to new patients and by the end of die 1970s most o f the Clinics had followed 
suite. I le described a ‘therapeutic apartheid’ between those patients who had attended the Clinics 
prv-1975 who often still received maintenance supplies o f injectable dnigs and those who were 31*7
31 A. Gian/, ‘The fall and rise o f the general practitioner’, in J . Strang and M. Gossop, (1994) op. <7/., pp. 15 166 .
34 T. II. Bewley and R. S. Hemingcr, 'Staff/patient problems in drag dependence treatment clinics’, Joumn/of
Psychosomatic Rrstanh, 14 (1970), 303-6.
35 H. B. Spear (and cd. J. Mott), (2002) op. a t., p.170.
3(11’. Bean, ‘Policing the medical profession: the use o f tribunals’ in 13. K.. Whyncs and P. T. Bean (cds.), Polictne.
aad Pnscribinn. The British System o f  P nyf Control (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991) pp.60-70.
37 13. Hawks, (1976) op. at., p.7.
31 (j. V. Srimson and E. ( )ppenhcimer (1982) op. ii/., p.99.
-'J. Strang, (1989) op. ,it„ p.l 13.
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taken on by the Clinics later who were only offered oral methadone.1<’ These changes, and the 
mechanisms by which they were achieved, are considered in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 8.
Major changes also took place in England’s illicit drug supply: until 1979 prescribing remained the 
main source of opiates and other drugs both legitimately and on the illicit market, with patients 
selling or sharing the excess from their prescriptions. H. B. ‘Bing’ Spear, Chief Inspector at the 
Home Office between 1977 and 1986, recalled that some expensive smuggled Chinese heroin 
could be found but relatively small quantities o f  trafficked drugs were entering the country.’ 1 
However, from 1978-79 the quantity of trafficked heroin in England increased,’ " as did the 
numbers of heroin users both outside and seeking treatment. Instead o f being the chief guardians 
o f the drug supply, doctors found themselves faced with major competition from a fully fledged 
black market in imported heroin.
Although the Clinics had been set up with an aim of undercutting the black market through 
‘competitive prescribing’, they had abandoned this model by the late 1970s. 'lh e  near monopoly o f 
treatment they held, had allowed the Clinics to  become unresponsive to the preferences of their 
patients, while the private d<x:tors were able to supply the unmet demand.”
Until the 1980s most of England’s heroin use and its treatment provision had been concentrated in 
Ixindon, but where heroin spread across the country, dnig services were slow to follow.” What 
Clinics there were had insufficient treatment places and found that drug users were increasingly 
looking elsewhere for treatment. The I lomc Office Addicts Index”  showed that over the 1970s the 
proportion of patients seeing both priv ate and NI IS CPs grew in both absolute terms and as a 
proportion of all those seen by doctors. After the establishment o f the Clinics, NI IS doctors in 
general practice had had little involvement in the treatment of addiction and minimal training. In 
1970 C Ps only notified 15 ¡>cr cent (111) of all addicted patients to the Addicts Index in 1970. This 
rose to 29 percent (264) of notifications in 1975 and 53 percent (1191) in 1981.”
w Ibid. p. 113.
"  H. B. Spear (and cd.J. Mott), (2002) op. dr., p.228.
' R. lew is, R. 11 art noil, S. Bryer f t  at., ‘Scoring smack: the illicit heroin market in 1 -o ml oil 1980-1983’, llntixb 
Journal o f  Addiction, 80 (1985), 281-290.
” A. Gianz, (1994) op. at., p.155.
“  D. Turner, “1116 development o f the voluntary sector: no further need for pioneers?’ in J . Strang and M. 
Gossop (1994) op. at., pp.222-230.
“  Under the law, doctors were obliged to notify to the 1 Ionic ( )fftce Addicts Index anyone they attended who  
was dependent on certain specified opiates or cocaine. Doctors were encouraged to phone the Addicts Index to 
find out if  anyone for whom they were about the prescribe a drug was already receiving a prescription from  
another doctor.
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Outside the N H S
While government and the medical profession chiefly shaped services within the NHS, die 
voluntary and private sectors tended to play the role o f  meeting unmet demand either for profit or 
otherwise. ‘Voluntary sector’ has been used here to encompass charities and other non-statutory, 
non-profit organisations. Voluntary organisations set up to help drug users with social and health 
problems were numerous in the drugs field. The late 1960s saw a growth in street services and day 
centres providing social care and counselling in London and other cities, some church based, 
usually following a social rather than medical model, but often with close links to treatment 
services.
The UK’s first Narcotics Anonymous (NA) began in 1979, modelled on Alcoholics Anonymous, a 
‘12-step’ or ‘Minnesota Model’ fellowsliip. These meetings aimed at maintaining daily abstinence 
from all mood altering dnigs, with attendance and ‘recovery’ going long beyond initial 
detoxification. Psychiatrist Brian Wells, a 12-stepper himself, described a common cynicism both 
among users and professionals regarding NA in the early 1980s, but despite this the movement 
continued to grow.' Voluntary services were represented by the umbrella organisation, the 
Standing Conference on Drug Abuse (SCODA), set up in 1973.
Those working within the NHS were also involved in voluntary sector projects and their 
approaches had mutual influence, (irit'fith Edwards, an NHS psychiatrist who had started and run 
the Institute o f Psychiatry’s Addiction Research Unit, was instrumental in establishing Phoenix 
1 louse, an abstinence based therapeutic community modelled on its original in New York. John 
Strang has suggested that these and other similar abstinence rehabilitation houses in the UK 
influenced the move against maintenance prescribing in the late 1970s and early ’80s.'1
A system under strain
Despite the expansion o f specialist care from London to the provinces — by 1975 there were 15 
outpatient DDL's in I xmdon and 21 in the rest of the country — the continuing increase in the 
number o f drug users put pressure on their ability to meet demand.'1 Disillusionment was not 
limited to the Clinics: the oil crisis o f  1973 had had an immense impact on the Bntish economy and 
the following years had brought optimistic expectations about future investment in the health 
service to an end. Webster explained, ‘Until that time, it was confidently anticipated that the
'7 B. Wells, ‘Narcotics Anonymous (NA) in Britain’, in J. Strang and M. Gossop (1994) »/>. <»/., pp.240 247. 
J. Strang, (1989) op. cit., p.l 13.
v’ 131ISS, Better Services fo r  the Menta/fy l/l (London: I IMS(), 1975) pp.68-69.
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economic system was capable of achieving a rate o f growth sufficient to meet rising social 
expectations.’4"
Optimism did not return swiftly as from 1974 to 1979 four factors created a state of crisis and 
demoralization in the health service: cuts in public expenditure; Sir Keith Joseph’s reorganisation; 
resentment from vulnerable groups about the failure to improve services; and the failure in 
leadership o f  health ministers.41 The hospital service in particular lost its previous protection from 
spending cuts from 1974 and this coincided with pressure from the introduction o f stricter financial 
disciplines into health spending plans.42
The second Brain Report had anticipated that controls on the prescription o f heroin and cocaine 
would be sufficient to deal with demand, but once the prescription of those drugs was under tighter 
control, there seems to have been a move among patients to obtain other drugs from doctors 
outside Clinics. The Iranian Revolution, with its resultant emigration, helped establish a new heroin 
route into Britain from the Gulf, meeting demand o f existing addicts no longer supplied by the 
DDUs, and spreading use across the country on a previously unimagined scale, lliis  source was 
then superseded by Turkish heroin in 1980 and then the following year’s major supplier became 
Pakistan.4'
Yet it is perhaps unsurprising that a medical committee wliich had restricted its remit to the role of 
medical practitioners in the supply o f drugs, rather than ‘dnig addiction as a whole’,41 did not 
consider or anticipate the subsequent changes in the international drugs trade. As the DDUs had 
been set up with the aim not only of treating but of controlling the spread o f addiction, the 
penetration o f  trafficked heroin into new areas of the country in die 1970s and most dramatically 
from 1979, provided a basis for the criticism that the Clinics had failed. In som e circles, this was 
presented as a failure o f the ‘medical model’.45 Others responded by criticising maintenance 
prescribing about which they had long felt uncomfortable.44'
411C. Webster, 7 hr Naliotial I Itnllh Strvict. y  J Political I lis/orj ((Ixford: < lx ford University Press, 1998) p. 138.
41 Ibid. pp. 138-139.
42 Ibid. p. 111.
44 Anonymous, ‘What's happening with heroin?’ DrugUnk Information ly/ter. 1SDD, 17 (1982), I S.
44 Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, (1963) op. lit.. p.S.
44 M. Ashton, ‘Controlling addiction: the role o f the Clinics’, Pntgbnk Information J ¿tier, 1SDD, 13 (1980), 1-6.
4I' eg P. 11. Connell, ‘ 1985 Dent lecture: “I need heroin”. Thirty years’ experience o f drug dependence and o f  
the medical challenges at local, national, international and political level. What next?’, British journal o f Addiction. 
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The Reluctant Re-entty of General Practice
In 1968 GPs had lost the authority to prescribe heroin and cocaine to their addict patients, 
although they could still prescribe them for the treatment of pain and some other indications.
Other opiates like methadone could be prescribed by all doctors for the treatment of drug 
dependence. Until the 1980s, most general practices in Kngland and Wales had had litde to do with 
the management o f drug misuse. The opposite was the case in Scodand, where there was litde 
specialist involvement.4' Due to the relatively small numbers of drug users in the 1970s, few GPs 
were affected by the problem. By the early 1980s the situation had changed and the policy 
community responded. However, as dnig use, and particularly heroin addiction, increased 
significandy from 1979, dnig users sought help from their GPs, bringing them into the picture in an 
unplanned way.47 8 'ITie ACMD addressed this state o f affairs in 1982 and recommended that 
renewed GP involvement become official policy alongside the Clinics. 49 The government 
responded to these recommendations and an ongoing batde began between forces encouraging GP 
involvement, (emanating from both specialists and generalists, the drug policy community and 
central government) and the many reluctant GPs, supported in the 1990s by their trade union, the 
General Medical Services Committee of the British Medical Association, lhe ir reluctance was 
largely based in the unpopularity of drug addicts as patients, and uncertainty over whether drug 
problems constituted an appropriate sphere for medical intervention, even among those who 
treated them as patients.'" Similar attitudes have been noted in doctors’ attitudes towards alcoholic 
patients, described in sociologist Philip Strong’s study o f doctors and ‘dirty- work’.’ 1
Polydrug use an d  the C lin ics
In the 1970s, a pattern of use distinctive to Britain emerged, with dnig users injecting barbiturates 
often in combination with other drugs. The hypnotic and tranquilliser drugs used became seen as a 
major problem for accident and emergency departments, particularly in Iondon, due to frequent 
overdosing,’ ’ and aggression towards casualty staff.”  'ITirough the 1970s barbiturates were the 
drugs most commonly involved in overdose deaths among addicts. After experimentation, it was 
concluded that barbiturates were not a suitable drug for maintenance therapy through the Clinics,
47 V. Berridgc, (1996) op. at., p.92.
4" A. Gian/. (1994) op. at., pp. 155-156.
”  ACMD, (1982) op. lit., pp.HI 86.
N. McKeganey, ‘Shadowland: general practitioners and the treatment o f  opiate-abusing patients’. British 
Journal o f  Addiction 83  (1988), 373 386.
1,1 P. M. Strong, ‘D octors and dirty work -  the case o f  alcoholism’, Sotio/ogy o f  Health anti illness, 2 (1980), 24 47. 
s2 11. Ghodse, A . ( lycfeso and B. Kilpatrick, ‘Mortality o f drug addicts in the UK, 1967 1993’, Internationa! 
Journal o f  Epidemiology, 27 (1998), 473 478.
" A. 11. Ghodse, 'D nig problems ilealt with by 62 latndon casualty departments’, British Journal o f  Pnventiur anti 
Social Methane, 30, 4  (1976), 251-256.
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who were later criticised for their apparent inability to respond to polydrug use, and barbiturates in 
particular.14 Whether, in fact, polydmg use was a new phenomenon in the 1970s or had always 
been part of the non-therapeutic drug use addressed by the second Brain Committee, was unclear. 
Gerry Stimson and Hdna Oppenheimer noted that in 1964 virtually all the cocaine users known to 
the Home Office were also addicted to heroin.35
In 1975 the ACMD launched the ‘Campaign on the Use and Restriction o f Barbiturates’ (CURB), 
to reduce barbiturate prescribing by doctors. According to Bing Spear, Chief Inspector at the 
Home Office Drugs Branch at the time, ‘As an effective response to the barbiturate-injecting 
problem, CURB was a singularly futile exercise, which merely postponed the day when realistic 
controls would have to be imposed.’56 Barbiturates eventually became controlled drugs in 1984, 
but by this time the problem had already diminished, possibly because of the increasing availability 
of trafficked heroin in the 1980s.’ 7
As barbiturates fell from favour, benzodiazepines were mistakenly prescribed as the non-addictive 
subsumte for barbiturates,’“ and use by addicts followed suit. By 1986-87, benzodiazepines were 
commonly available from GPs and on the streets.”  In Scotland in particular, a ‘non injectable’ gel- 
filled oral temazepam capsule was formulated to prevent this use, but persistent injectors suffered 
horrific injuries and disease during the 1980s and ’90s. In 1992 the ACMD called for restrictions 
on the prescription of temazepam, but legislative change did not follow until three years later. An 
alternative, and, in the eyes of the BMA, very effective approach to restricting the black market in 
temazepam gel-filled capsules was pursued by banning the formulation from National I lealth 
Service prescription.6"
The Central Funding Initiative (1983-89)
Responding favourably to the recommendations of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of 
Drugs,61 the Department of I lealth and Social Security prepared a large new source of funding to 
cover start-up costs for new services, litis ‘Central Funding Initiative’ (CPI) consisted o f £17.5
w A. Glanz, (1994) op. at., p.155.
“  G. V Stimson and E. C Ippenheimer, (1982) op. a t ., p.49.
“  H. B. Spear, (2(X)2) op. at., p.258.
1,7 Working Party o f  the Royal College o f Psychiatrists am) the Royal College o f Physicians, Pruts, Dilemmas,nut 
Choices (I-ondon: Gaskcll, 2(MM>) p.SO.
SH Ibid  p.SO.
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million distributed in 188 grants over 6 years and had a number o f  goals.62 It aimed at funding local 
initiatives, such as the development of cross-agency problem drug teams, the development of 
community-based responses across the country, and integration o f dmg services into mainstream 
health services. On the quiet it was also intended to shift the concentration of services and power 
away from the London psychiatric Clinic consultants.6’
This initiative and the return of GPs have also been linked to a ‘normalization’ o f drug services in 
the early and mid-1980s, as dnig use and dmg dependence became more common and drug 
services were integrated into mainstream healthcare.6'1'65 From this encouragement o f the voluntary 
sector followed a new status and recognition given by policy documents to its role in mid-1980s.“  
Although acknowledging the importance of the Central Funding Initiative, David Turner, 
who represented voluntary dmg sendees from 1975 to 1994 as Co-ordinator ofSCO DA, 
considered that the sector’s strong influence and growth pre-dated the flow of money from the 
CFI by a couple o f years.67 1 lowever, it may be that Turner preferred to see voluntary sendees as 
responding sensitively to local demand rather than following central edict.
1985-1999
Bntish dmg policy during the 1980s has received academic interest from sociologists, 
anthropologists and historians.6"'6' ' " Agreement has emerged over a number o f the themes o f this 
penod: that community dmg sendees, both voluntary and statutory, expanded during the 1980s; 
that the professional groups involved in dmg treatment and policy increased and diversified; that 
GPs re-entered the picture, albeit reluctantly, after over a decade’s absence; and that in response to 
11IV/AIDS, dmg and treatment policies liberalised in the late 1980s, with ‘harm reduction’ 
becoming official policy in 1988.
’’’ S. MacGregor, B. Ettorrc, R. Coombcr, e! a t , Drug Services in H olland and  the Impact o f  the Central Funding 
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M V. Berridge, (1996) op. cit., p.94. 
w A. Glanz, (1994) op. cit., pp.155-158.
6* J. Strang, ‘A model service: turning the generalist on to drugs’ in S. MacGregor (ed.). Drug? and Rritish Satiety. 
Responses to a Social Problem in the I'ISOs (I-ondon and New York: Routledge, 1989) pp. 143 169.
M: G. V. Stimson, ‘British drug policies in the 1980s: a preliminary analysis and suggestions for research’, British 
jou rna l o f  Addiction 82, 5 (1987), 477 488.
67 D. Turner, (1994) op. at., p.222.
(■* eg N. Dorn and N. South (eds.), A 1 send Fit f o r  Heroin? Deng Polities, Prevention and Practice (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1987).
S. MacGregor (cd.), D ru g and Rritish Society. Responses to a Sotial Proble/n in  the / ISOs (1 amdim and New York: 
Routledge, 1989)
" eg. V. Berridge, ’Historical issues’ in S. MacGregor (1989) op. tit., pp. 20-35.
71 K. Duke, D rug, Prisons and PolityMaking (l-ondon: Macmillan, 200.3).
47
Later observations by Stimson defined 1997 as the beginning o f yet another new phase, with the 
election o f the Blair government. 'ITiis, he claimed, brought an end to the ‘public health approach’, 
dated from 1987, where ‘the aim was to help problem drug users to lead healthier lives, and to limit 
the damage they might cause themselves or others’ and introduced an ‘unhealthy’ ‘punitive and 
coercive ethos’ for dealing with dependent drug users. ’
Behind these policies, drug use continued to rise, spread to new parts of the country, and diversify. 
New drugs and new formulations joined the existing array of substances, while others dropped 
from availability or favour. Heroin use climbed through the eighties and nineties, joined by ‘crack’, 
a new smokeable form of cocaine, which came from the United States in the mid-1980s and grew 
to considerable popularity. Ecstasy, (the street name for 3,4-methylene-dioxymethamphetaminc) a 
stimulant with empathy-inducing properties, became popular as a ‘dance thug’ at parties and clubs, 
usually taken as an oral tablet, along with other stimulants and psychedelic drugs. Amid great 
public and media concern over a small number of sudden deaths associated with the drug, 
educational responses were launched, but no individual treatment was provided. Meanwhile 
cannabis remained the most popular dmg in England throughout this period, with demands for 
reduced penalties or legalisation becoming increasingly common and less controversial.
GPs and Community Based Services
From the beginning o f their re-involvement, with the exception o f a small number o f enthusiasts, 
and despite concerns over 11IV/A IDS in the latter 1980s and 1990s, GPs remained reluctant to 
prescribe substitute dmgs to addicts. In 1990 GP Tom Waller, prominent for his encouragement o f 
his peers, proposed additional payments to GPs as an incentive for treating dmg users. 1 Although 
criticised as expensive, possibly unethical, and probably ineffective, 4 the idea was taken up bv GP 
negotiators in 1996 who declared that treatment o f drug misuse was no longer to be considered 
part of their contract to provide general medical services but required an additional fee. ’ While 
there were a few local arrangements paying extra, the Department o f 1 lealth «.lid not move on the 
issue.
Despite GPs’ wariness of ad«Jicts, commentators noted a shift from specialist to generalist services 
«.luring the 1980s. 'ITie 1984 clinical guidelines and subsequent D ! 1SS circulars reinforced this.
72 G. V. Stimson, (2000) op. «V/., p.259-264.
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making drug services more like other areas of the NHS, where it was unusual for any condition to 
be solely addressed by specialists. Criminologist Alan Glanz has linked the revival o f G1V 
involvement in drugs, and the emphasis on ‘community’ rather than specialist or instinitional care, 
to their rising status as a group. GP leaders had been working to establish general practice as a 
‘specialty’ with academic departments and compulsory vocational training. Improved terms and 
conditions had followed and by 1984 it had changed from being an unpopular career choice for 
medical students to the most desirable. 6
Sociologists Gerry Stimson and Rachel I art have argued that British drug policy could not be 
considered as a separate arena but reflected wider changes in social policy and health services, being 
determined in the 1960s and ’70s by the relationship between the state and the medical profession, 
and from the 1980s with the addition of social services as a third player. '
Political encouragement of private medicine, which strengthened through the 1980s and 1990s, 
related mainlv to those funded by insurance premium, rather than direct payment by the patient, 
and did not concern private prescribe!«. Early after achieving power, the Conservatives abolished 
the 1 lealth Services Board, established by Labour to supervise the private hospital sector and phase 
out private beds from the NHS,78 but private prescribing was almost overwhelmingly on an out­
patient basis, 'lh e  little written by academic researchers on private drug doctors noted that they 
continued to have a role, which remained controversial, and in the 1980s attempted to improve 
their status through the Association o f Independent Doctors in Addiction (AIDA). ’
AIDS and Official Harm Reduction
Once those in the dmgs field had started to see 11IV/AIDS as an important threat, a number of 
policy options were available in response. I lard line campaigns against dnig use had emerged from 
the Conservative government in 1985-86, and at the same time a penal approach both at a political 
rhetorical and policy level pressed through legislation to freeze, trace and confiscate money from 
dnig dealing, and to increase penalties for trafficking. Berridge’s research has shown that, while a 
continuation of this penal and stigmatising approach might have been expected from the New- 
Right, in the event, it was a non-coercive public health approach that won out. The stmgglc behind 
this owed much to medical bureaucrats in the Department o f I lealth, in alliance with outside
74 A. Glanz, (1994) op. at.. p.159.
77 G. V. Stimson and R. I .art, (1994) op. a t . pp..339-340.
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pressure groups in the voluntary sector. As a result, AIDS brought together politicians and 
‘experts’ in an alliance based on minimising the harm from drug use, rather than eradicating or 
curing it, using needle exchange as the means to achieve this."1
Although given the new name o f ‘harm reduction’, this approach had a long history, with 
antecedents in the 1880s and 1960s."" Rather than the drugs policy community' switching wholesale 
from one approach to another, controversy over different methods of dealing with drug use had 
existed since at least the 1960s, with different groups gaining ascendance at particular moments. 
‘Fixing rooms’ for instance, where injectors could take their prescribed drugs, had existed in the 
early 1970s, but along with the provision of injecting equipment, had been phased out by 1975 as 
the Clinics moved to providing oral drugs."' The voluntary sector had always pursued a more 
‘harm reductionist’ approach but advocated it more openly after 1986.""
The significant policy event of that year was the McClelland Report from a committee set up by 
John Mackay at the Scottish I lome and 1 lealth Department under die chainnanship of Dr D. B. L. 
McClelland. From a committee membership not derived from the drugs field, it was this 
document which first officially championed a harm reduction approach in relation to AIDS 
including the establishment of needle exchanges. This position has often erroneously been given to 
the ACMD, whose report A ID S  und Drug Misuse did not com e out until 1 9 8 8 . Scodand had 
taken the lead on this approach as the problem of HIV among injecting drug users had been 
effectively publicized by Dr Roy Robertson, a GP practicing in the deprived Muirhousc area o f 
I-alin burgh. In 1985, he had found levels of 111V among his injecting patients o f around 50" b.*'
I larm reduction, which became official British policy in 1988, changed prescribing once again. 
AIDS made long-term prescribing a legitimate option, and appeared to resolve ‘the prescribing 
question that had bedevilled drug policy in the 1970s and 1980s.’"" The 1960s and 70s policy o f 
‘competitive prescribing’ was revived to attract dmg users into treatment, albeit with oral 
methadone, rather than injectable heroin.
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Just as proponents o f ‘harm reduction’ did not appear overnight in 1988, neither were its earlier 
opponents complete converts under the new ‘consensus’. Furthermore, ‘harm reduction’ meant 
different things to different professional groups.1” Political scientist I lerve I ludebine noted that the 
1991 edition o f the clinical guidelines,’" chaired by the most senior addiction psychiatrist, John 
Strang, emphasised the importance o f harm reduction, but reasserted abstinence as a primary goal, 
and advised GPs against undertaking methadone maintenance without specialist advice. Through 
this the specialists, who had had to face competition from other sectors both in financial and policy 
terms since the first half of the 1980s, reaffirmed their primacy. ’1
Part of the government’s strategy against HIV/ AIDS involved funding research not just on 
epidemiology and biology but also on the intimate behaviour o f drug users, including their injecting 
and sexual practices. ’2 Government research grants went from a total o f £2.5 million in 1986/87 to 
around £23 million in 1992/93.” Stimson hinted at a decline in this funding during the late 1990s 
in his attack on the Blair Government, and its implications for the relationship with government o f 
experts dependent on such funding, but no serious study o f the effects have been made. ”
I ludebine put some of these changes a little earlier, noting that ‘harm reduction’, although still 
pursued at local level, had almost disappeared from the national policy agenda in 1995-96 and that 
ear marked funds for health authorities to prevent AIDS also ceased after 1993.”  Sociologist Nigel 
South has observed, however, that harm reduction continued as a policy priority in Scotland.”'
Drugs and Crime
While possession and distribution of drugs controlled under the Misuse o f Drugs Act, 1971, were 
usually crimes in themselves,” public and policy concern over drug-related crime during this period 
tended to mean acquisitive crime perpetrated to obtain the means to buy addictive dnigs, and 
sometimes violent crime resulting from intoxication.
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Estimates varied as to what proportion o f crime was committed by drug users in pursuit of their 
substance. In the mid-1990s politicians and drugs policy researchers produced contradictory 
estimates, with researchers emphasizing the range of income sources available to dependent heroin 
users other than acquisitive crime.'*'”  In the late 1990s, however, there seemed to be emerging 
consensus in the drug policy field, as well as among politicians, of the importance of links between 
dependent drug use and acquisitive crime. A literature review showed that dependent heroin users, 
disproportionately likely to be poor people in deprived communities, were very likely to resort to 
burglary, shoplifting, fraud and theft to pay for drugs."1" Stimson observed with dismay the changes 
he observed in treatment services that flowed from making this connection. Focusing treatment on 
reducing drug use in order to curb drug-related crime broke the post-AIDS public health 
consensus, which had prioritised the prevention of blood borne disease and pursued harm 
reduction as a humanitarian goal. ""
While some of Stimson’s concerns related to anticipation o f the future direction of such policies, 
some initiatives were already in place by the end of the century. Drug treatment and testing orders 
(DTTOs), influenced by American ‘drug courts’, could ‘sentence’ a drug user to treatment rather 
than prison, with freedom dependent on monitored results, and were piloted by the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1998. Without waiting for the pilot smdy’s conclusions, the I lome Secretary extended 
DTTOs across the country. Until this point, there had been little coercive treatment in England,"' 
although it had been discussed since the 1880s and was recommended by the second Brain 
Committee.
Another linking mechanism used in the 1990s was arrest referral schemes, where dnigs workers 
sought out dmg users in the criminal justice system, often in police cells, and referred them to 
treatment. 1 Iere though, involvement with the schemes was voluntary and not an alternative to 
prosecution. Although these multiplied from 1999 onwards, they had been in existence before this, 
and some have seen arrest referral as part of a liberal rather than penal approach.1"'
'm eg. Labour Parry, Dmgs: '¡'hr Need fo r  Action (London: Labour Party, 1994).
’’’* eg. N. Dorn, < ). Baker & T. Seddon, Paying For Heroin: Listienatinfg The Fintsttcits! Cost O f Acquisitive Crime 
Committed ley Dependent Heroin Users in lingland ttnd Wales (1 xmdon: ISDD, 1994).
11. Parker, C. Bury, and R. Hgginton, New t  leroin Outhreaka 1mongst ) ostteg People in lingland and Wales, Crime 
Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 92 (larndon: I lome ( tfficc Police Policy Directorate, 1998) pp.6-7.
1,11 < i V. Samoa, (2000) O p. at., p.2S9 264.
102 P. J. Turnbull, T. McSwccncy, R. Webster, et a/., Dmg Treatment and Testing Orders: Final Mvtilnation Repoet. 
Home ( Ifficc Research Study 212 (I-ondon: Home ( Ifficc Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 
2000) pp. 1-7.
"H 11. I ludebine, (forthcoming) op. rit.
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So has Stimson over-emphasised the starkness o f policy change from public health to crime 
prevention in the pre and post Blair era to make a political point?1“4 Berridge took the view that 
penal policy persisted during the era of harm reduction, albeit in a modified form, and that coercive 
approaches to drug and alcohol treatment had their roots as far back as late nineteenth century 
inebriates legislation. Between 1987 and 1997 Britain did not depart from the international or 
European systems o f dnig control and at a local level, police were involved in drug advisory 
committees, co-operating in the establishment of needle exchanges.11'3 Furthermore, the option of 
diverting dnig users into treatment rather than prison had become government policy as long ago 
as 1990 in the Government’s White Paper Crime Justice and Protecting tlx Public. Berridge, writing in 
the eadv 1990s, considered the balance of power between penal and medical approaches post- 
AIDS to be too complex to be ‘adequately subsumed under rhetorical barriers such as the “public 
health” approach of dnig policy.’""4’ Furthermore, Stimson has overlooked the potentially coercive 
role o f public health, which has used powers of compulsory quarantine and notification.
Voluntary Services
As mentioned, voluntary services were critical to the direction o f policy and service provision post- 
11IV, although initially divided on the issue of needle exchanges.1"7 The distinction between 
Voluntary’ and ‘statutory’ had become somewhat blurred over the period of study by government 
binding o f voluntary sector organisations. This trend strengthened in the 1980s when the 
Conservative Government started to contract out m any statutory services to the voluntary sector.
SCODA’s David Turner claimed that the establishment of voluntary services had not diminished 
their role as advocates o f dnig users and agitators for change. And, although government funding 
could be seen as a way of controlling these organisations, and reining in their radicalism, Berridge, 
in her work on the anti-tobacco pressure group Action on Smoking and I Icalth, has shown how 
state support for a radical group outside government could serve to lobby for change desired by 
but unvoiceable from government."" Turner himself, writing after needle exchange had become 
orthodoxy, explained voluntary dnig services’ fears over endorsing hann reduction as a result o f
"M In 2000 Gerry Stimsim helped to establish and became t-hair o f the UK I larm Reduction Alliance to 
campaign for harm reduction policies.
V Berridge, (1993) op. cit., pp.138-152.
"* Ibid. p. 152.
1(17 V. Berridge, (1996) op. at., pp.91-92.
,lw V. Berridge, ‘Issue network versus producer network? ASH, the Tobacco Products Research Trust and UK  
smoking policy’ in V. Berridge (cd.). Making I lenlth Pobiy: Networks in Research and Polity s i f t e r  tO df (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2005) pp. 101-124.
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threats to funding when they were perceived ‘as having gone too far’,1"” suggesting that control was 
still an element in state funding.
Professionalization was a feature o f the 1980s and continuing in the 1990s in the voluntary sector, 
including greater requirement for formal qualifications among staff, management standards, 
performance measures and other bureaucratic features demanded by those contracting their 
services. Also emerging in the 1990s was drug user activism, agitating for changes to services and 
legislation.11,1
As well as providing statutory services, the voluntary sector also saw the growth of self help groups 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Narcotics Anonymous continued to spread fairly evenly across the country 
with 223 weekly meetings by 1991. There were also residential 12-step treatment centres in the 
private and voluntary sectors, with ‘a diluted version’ sometimes found in NHS addiction units. By 
1991 there were 30 treatment centres in the UK and Ireland providing Minnesota Model drug-free 
style treatment.111
Local Arrangements
In treatment services, local arrangements were encouraged bv central government during the 1990s. 
Chief among these exhortations came ‘shared care’, which involved a formal division of a patient’s 
workload between specialist psychiatrists and GPs.11'
1-ocal inter-agency co-operation had been encouraged for many years, but from 1995, there was a 
radical departure to the established arrangements with the setting up of 19rug Action Teams in 
every health district. 'Iheir memberships comprised a small number o f budget holders ideally 
representing key local authorities, services and criminal justice agencies, lheir aim was to reduce 
drug-related hann in accordance with the targets set by the Conservative Government’s White 
Paper Tackling D r»¡¡.i Vogttber. These goals were Ixith aimed at reducing drug supplies and demand 
for dnigs and encompassed both penal anti hann reduction approaches. Each Dntg Action Team 
was advised by a Drug Reference Group made up of local people with expertise in the various 
services and these arrangements persisted through to the end of the cenmry with minor 
nxxlification. Similar but separate arrangements were set up following strategies for Wales,
D. Turner, (1994) op  ci!., p.228.
"" Ibid, p.229.
1.1 B. Wells, (1994) op  ci!., pp.241-246.
1.2 eg UK I lealth Departments, Dng Misuse and Dependence: ( ioide lines on C im cat Management (London: I h e 
Stationery Office, 1999) pp.10-15.
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Scotland and Northern Ireland. Later, under Ijibour, Drug Action Teams became responsible for 
commissioning and evaluating drug services.
Wider Changes in Health Services, Public and Private
If drug treatment services had joined the mainstream in the 1980s, what was happening in the rest 
of the health service? A major theme of the 1980s and ’90s in the rest of the health service was the 
changing relationship between the centre and the periphery, with management becoming 
increasingly important. Before the 1974 reorganisation of the NHS, ‘management was conspicuous 
by its absence’. Administrators and treasurers did not take a proactive line in developing services, 
which was left to the medical profession."1 'Hits was followed by a penod o f ‘consensus 
management’ that tended to reinforce the strong position of the medical profession but all this 
changed with the election o f  the Conservative government in 1979. From then on, the NHS 
underwent ‘continuous revolution’.114 'lb e  medical profession’s assumed right to consultation over 
NI IS changes was not honoured by Margaret 'Ihatcher, and even employment terms and 
conditions could be imposed without mumal agreement."5
General management was introduced in 1984-85, providing for the first time, accoriling to Sdmson 
and I .art, an effective central mechanism for controlling peripheral activity beyond budgetary 
control. I lowever, this central control paradoxically encouraged devolved decision-making, which 
in turn led to a huge increase in guidelines, directives and circulars from the centre advising the 
periphery on how it was to carry out these devolved responsibilities.1,6 The Centra] Funding 
Initiative could be seen as part of this pattern, encouraging the development of locally autonomous 
services, while orchestrating them from the centre. Throughout the 1990s, management of the 
NI IS was lead by the NI IS Executive, with centralisation becoming stronger in the second half o f  
the decade.
Most controversial was the introduction o f market reforms and a split between ‘purchasers’ of 
health cate, general practitioners and health authorities, and providers, hospitals and community 
sen-ices, following 1989’s White Paper Workinpjor Patients. With providers’ budgets dependent on 
the success of their sen-ices in attracting patients, the idea was that consumer choice and efficiency 
would both improve. P-rom this major change arose a pressure to quantify the outcomes of 
treatment for comparison and to standardize treatment dirough the use of clinical guidelines,
G. V. Stimson and R. I .art, (1994) op. at., pp.334-335.
,u C. Webster, (1998) op. at., pp.140-214.
R- Klein, (2001) op. at., pp. 169-172.
11,1 G. V. Stimson and R. I .art, (1994) op. at., pp.336-339.
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coinciding with the emerging ‘evidence-based medicine’ movement in the medical profession, 
which favoured guidelines as a distilled, applied source of research findings. I he market endured 
under )ohn Major’s premiership, but was partially dismantled by Tony Blair, reflecting its 
unpopularity with the public.
One of the themes ofjohn Major’s period o f office noted by Klein was the transformation o f  NHS 
patients into ‘consumers’. 'Ihe Patient’s Charter (1991) outlined patients’ consumer rights for the first 
time, although more symbolic and rhetorical in significance than in acnially producing change. 'Ihe 
extent to which NHS patients were able to exercise effective choice as consumers has been 
questioned.11' Consumerism was also  a popular theme with New Labour, appealing as it did across 
employees and employers, the constituents o f ‘old’ labo u r and the New Right.
With the rejection of competition as die spur o f change in the NHS, the managerialism of the early 
and mid-1980s was revived in the late 1990s. Producing clinical guidelines and other advice was a 
new National Institute for Clinical Excellence to assemble and disseminate good practice evidence.
Amidst the ongoing creation o f new systems o f state control over the medical profession, arguably 
the greatest state scrutiny arose from the case o f two heart surgeons working at Bristol Infirmary. 
Pound guilty o f serious professional misconduct after die deaths o f 15 small children in 1997, the 
government capitalized on the case to increase scrutiny in the Nl IS without medical opposition.
As well as the huge media attention, the Government launched a public inquiry into the case, 
creating an atmosphere in which the medical profession were pushed into accepting a much higher 
degree of government control than ever before in the NHS. Clinical audit, where the outcomes of 
treatment were monitored, was m ade compulsory.1 '* In 1999, tmst in die profession was further 
shaken when GP I larold Shipman was accused o f mass-murdering his patients over a long 
period.m
Although government attention fell direedy on the public sector, the increased pressure on the 
GMC also increased surveillance o f  ¿///doctors. By the end o f the twentieth century, medical 
regulation looked quite different to 30 years earlier the President o f the GMC himself was calling 
for a more active approach to self-regulation and the medical Royal Colleges had accepted regular 
competence testing of consultants. Klein concluded ‘collegial control over the performance o f
" 7 R. Klein, (2001) op. at., pp.180-181.
"" Ibid, p.210.
Staff and Agencies, ‘Harold Shipman: a chronology’. The GuanUan, (July 15, 2004), 
www.guardian.co.uk/archivc.
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doctors had largely been maintained but at the cost o f sacrificing the autonomy of individual 
doctors.’
W ider D rug Policies
In 1985, the first comprehensive drug strategy Tackling Drug Alisuse was published by the 
Conservative Government.12" This new development signalled increased political interest and 
Stimson has claimed that this act politicised drug strategy in a new way,121 but when the subsequent 
I -abour Government published its ten-year drug strategy, Tackling Drugs Together to Build a Better 
Britain, modelling its tide on the Conservatives’ 1995 Tackling Drugs Together'22 it demonstrated 
continuity with its predecessor and a cross-party consensus.
The appointment to the newly created post of D rug Czar’ of the former Chief Constable o f West 
Yorkshire, Keith Hellawell, was seen as part of die penal approach to drug policy dating from 
1997.'21 However, his deputy, Mike Trace, had extensive experience in dmg treatment services. 
Hellawell then published an annual report with perfonnance targets for die next decade, for 
instance the reduction of the number o f people under 25 using heroin and crack cocaine by a 
quarter within 5 years and by a half widiin 10 years. Such targets drew criticisms from a number of 
sources as unmeasurable by existing mechanisms,124 but were quiedv abandoned, as was, though 
more noisily, the Drug Czar himself. The 1998 drugs strategy also departed from its predecessors 
by concentrating policy on heroin and cocaine as die dmgs causing the greatest harm, and by 
hailing health interventions as die most effective way o f reducing offending behaviour over and 
above penal solutions.
Those who have passed judgement on the 1990s have tended to emphasise continuity over 
change.12,12,1 Perhaps because they have considered dmg policy as a whole, rather than focusing on 
treatment services, any move away from hann reduction rhetoric and greater use of coercion in
12111 .orei Privy Council, Tackling Drug M isuse: A Summary o f  the Government's Strategy (London: ,HMS(), 1985).
121 G. V. Stimson, (1987) oft. eit., pp.483-484.
122 Lord President o f the Council and I eader o f the I louse o f  Commons, Secretary o f State for the I Ionic 
Department, Secretary o f  State, et at.. Tackling Drugs Vogettter. A Strategy f o r  England 1995 1998 (London: HMSO, 
1995).
124 G. V. Stimson, (21 MM)) oft. at., p.260.
124 eg Working Party o f  the Royal College o f  Psychiatrists and the Roval College o f Physicians, (2000) oft. at., 
p.258.
125 N. South, Tackling drug control in Britain: from Sir Malcolm Dclevingne to the new drugs strategy’ in R. 
Coomber (ed.), The Control of 'Dmgs and Drug Users. Retison o r Reactioni (Amsterdam: I larwood Academic 
Publishers, 1998) pp.87 106.
I:il S. MacGregor, ‘Pragmatism or principle? continuity and change in the British approach to treatment and 
control’ in R. Coomber (1998) op. at., p p .131-154.
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treatment were marked as less significant than in the work of Samson.'”' Though Nigel South 
acknowledged a punitive approach in  both rhetoric and legislation, he saw  inconsistency in policies 
across Britain, with Scottish policy documents strongly endorsing harm reduction. I .ahour’s 
concerns about the role o f ‘social exclusion’ as a factor in dmg use were seen by both Rowdy Yates, 
a harm reduction activist, and Geoffrey Pearson, a criminologist and sociologist, as a significant 
change during the late 1990s, but what impact this had in practical policy terms was unclear. 
Both authors also considered the emergence of ecstasy and the widespread dance dnig 
phenomenon of the late 1980s and 1990s as a major development, which Yates claimed had ‘made 
existing drug treatment services almost irrelevant.’
How treatment policy was fonnulated, 1970-99
'ITte dnig policy community and the policy-making process have been considered primarily by 
Stimson and 1-art, Berridge, Smart, Duke and MacGregor.,'"'n ,'l ' : 'l11,m Sociologists Stimson and 
1-art noted the traditions of British policy making which continued into the 1970s, reached through 
committees where debate was characterised by politeness and an absence o f politics. Policy was 
made in private through accommodation between experts and civil servants, as exemplified by 
ACMD, set up in 1971. Bcrridge’s account of the development of AID S policy during the 1980s, 
although involving much more media attention, and a greater variety o f  outside groups, had similar 
components, being privately fonnulated between bureaucrats and outside interests and experts.' 
While doctors were not the chief architects of policy, as they were with the second Brain Report, 
key members o f the profession, particularly medical civil servants like Dorothy Black, and 
psychiatrists like |ohn Strang, were very influential.
Agreement has emerged about the declining centrality of medicine in response to drugs problems. 
Ihc growth of new dnig agencies following the Central Funding Initiative drew many new 
occupational groups into working with dnig users, diversifying the policy community in the 1980s, 
and displacing the purely medical perspective on dnig use and users.1 v’ Responses to dnigs in the 127
127 eg Ci. V . Stimson, (2000) op. a t., pp.259-264.
R. Yates. ‘A brief history o f British drug policy, 1950-2001’, P n g s : Utilisation. PmtHtion ¡mil Polity. 9  (2002), 
113-124.
G. Pearson, ‘Drugs at the end o f  the century’, British Journal o f  Criminology, 39  (1999), pp.477-487.
I'° eg. G. V. Stimson and R. I art, (1994) op. at., pp.331-341. 
nl eg. V. Berridge, (1993) op. a t., p p .135-156.
1,2 eg. C. Smart, ‘Social policy and drug addiction: a critical study o f policy development’, British Jou rna l o f  
AM etion, 79 (1984), 31-39.
'”  eg. K. Duke, (2003) op. at.
'“ eg. S. MacGregor, (1998) op. tit., pp. 131 154.
V. Berridge, (1996) op. at.
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late 1980s included a more prominent place for government, the criminal justice system, and the 
community with medicine taking an important but less central role.1’7
In a departure from the earlier ‘gendemanly’ period o f policy-making, Stimson saw the late 1980s as 
a time of politicisation. The establishment o f the Ministerial Group on the Misuse of Dmgs, for 
instance, showed that drugs were moving out of professional and advisory committees and that 
debate was becoming more public. linked  to this politicisation was a huge rift between the 
‘political’ and ‘policy’ community view o f drugs, exemplified by the controversy over the 
Conservative Government’s mass media anti-heroin campaign in 1985-86. Going against ‘expert’ 
advice from the drugs policy field, including that of the ACME) which opposed widespread 
publicity not part of an overall educational approach,” '’ the publicity materials told people ‘Heroin 
Screws You Up’. The aim was to eradicate rather than reduce the harm from use. I he government 
commissioned its own evaluation of the campaign that gave it positive results, but the methodology 
was also criticized by the policy community.1*' Undeterred, in 1987 the Government launched 
another campaign with the message “Don’t Inject AIDS’. These events corresponded with 
anthropologist Susanne MacGregor’s piemre of a Anush approach to policy developing from 
debate among a limited range o f ‘well-informed interest groups’, which shared a basic consensus. 
'Ihis process would occasionally be interrupted by intervention from politicians seeking to gain 
political capital ftom taking up dmg issues.141
I lerve 1 ludebine, examining both national policies and local dmg services in London in the last 15 
years of the century, described the policy process as existing at a number of levels simultaneously, 
with gaps between the let-els o f national political rhetoric, policy resulting from civil servants and 
local agencies. A complex process appeared to be at work in the dnig policy community, involving 
various understandings, tolerance and flexibility and acceptable degrees of confrontation and 
challenge bom  of mutual dependence between government and the various agencies. This allowed 
some degree o f coexistence within the apparent policy contradictions of the different levels.142
After varying degrees of enthusiasm and reluctance from different agencies, I ludebine saw harm 
reduction as becoming institutionalised in Dindon between 1989 and 1993, with needle exchanges
1,7 G. V. Stimson, (1987) op. lit., p.481.
IM Ibid, p.484.
,w R- Power, ‘Drills anil the media: prevention campaigns and television’, S. MacGregor, (1989) op. a t ,  pp. 129 
142.
""Ib id  pp. 133-134.
141 S. MacGregor, (1998) op. at.
1 II. I ludebine, (forthcoming) op. at.
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in voluntary services and pharmacies, collaboration between GPs and street agencies, provision of 
condoms, and so o n .143 l i t is  was then followed by harm reduction becoming more contentious 
once again in the political rhetoric and it had fallen to the lowest ranking policy goal of the White 
Paper Tackling Drugs Togel/nrm 1995.144
Conclusion
This background sketch o f the last three decades o f the twentieth century has shown a period of 
turbulent change in both drug use and the policy responses to it. A widening range of people have 
become involved in taking illicit drugs, in commenting upon drug use, and in providing services. 
The policy process has moved from being mainly conducted in private, to an often public and 
more overtly political one and while there was no disagreement about the ubiquity of drugs at the 
end of the century, the extent to which their use has become ‘normal’ has remained contentious. 14*
141 Ibid
144 Ibid.
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Chapter 3
Major Policy Change:
The Treatment and R ehabilitation  Report (1982)
Introduction
The issue of private doctors prescribing to drug using patients was to be central to the controls 
considered and partially implemented in the early 1980s. Measures proposed in 1982 in the report 
'Treatment and Rehabilitation.1 potentially affecting the prescribing o f around 30,000 GPs and other 
doctors, were greatly influenced by the emerging dispute between the small number of private 
prescribers and NHS Clinic psychiatrists in London.
Treatment and Rehabilitation was the first policy document to lead treatment services out of the 
hospitals and into the community after the centralisation of drug treatment into the Clinics in the 
late 1960s. It also outlined a role for voluntary sen-ices, and saw them as an important part o f the 
multi-disciplinan' response, praising their ‘problem oriented approach’ in contrast to the substance 
based approach of the Clinics.'1 Overshadowed by this wider impact, the report’s significance for 
private doctors has been largely overlooked.
The policy-making process here and w ith the ‘good practice’ guidelines, which are discussed in the 
next chapter, was centred around the ‘expert committee’, continuing a pattern in the drugs field of 
the 1960s and early 1970s where decisions were reached through committees, in private, through 
accommodation between experts and civil servants.' Published research evidence played a minimal 
role, with the emphasis rather on the authority, integrity and non-partisan approach of the 
committee members. 1 lowcver, in a politicised and polarised field tltis proved problematic.
Background and Context
Treatment goals for drug users oscillated after the establishment of the ( dimes with renewed 
conflict within the medical profession regarding appropriate treatment. Particularly contentious was 
the issue of prescribing for opiate addicts, the main users o f England’s dnig treatment services then
1 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, DJISS, (Ixindon: HMSO, 1982).
2 Ibid, pp.46-47.
' G . V. Stimson and R. I -art. ‘The Relationship Between the State and laical Practice in the Development o f  
National Policy on Drugs between 1920 and 1990*, in J. Strang and M. Gossop (eds). Heroin Addiction And Drug 
Policy. The British System (Oxford, New York, Tokyo, ( Ixford University Press, 1994) pp.331-341, p.336.
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and now. Prescribing styles advocated ranged between two extremes of ‘maintenance prescribing’, 
with drug users stabilised on a long term opioid prescription in the hope that this would enable 
them to focus on other aspects o f their lifestyle and improve their health. At the other end o f the 
treatment spectrum, abstinence was the most important goal with reducing doses of the drug 
prescribed over a short period to achieve detoxification. Prescribing debates also concerned the 
type o f substitute opioids, whether heroin or methadone, their formulation as oral or injectable, and 
the appropriate doses. Concern about HIV/AIDS did not significantly permeate British drugs 
policy until 1985,4 and will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters.
When they opened in the late 1960s, the Clinics were offering mainly maintenance heroin 
prescribing, and some injectable methadone. Although the I lome Office licences to prescribe 
heroin had almost entirely been restricted to psychiatrists running the Clinics, their services 
voluntarily moved away from this practice at the end of the 1970s. New practices favoured 
methadone instead of heroin, and then oral rather than injectable formulations. Instead o f 
maintenance prescribing, the Clinics instigated a limited stabilisation period on a fixed dose that was 
then progressively cut to zero, often with a contractual obligation to attend for therapy.5
When the Clinics were being set up, a leading Clinic psychiatrist described as one of the rationales 
of the new approach the expectation that ‘regular contact between the addict and the doctor o f  the 
centre gives the opportunity for a relationship to build up which may eventually lead to the addict 
requesting to be taken off the dmg/' But this optimism may have been misplaced and by 1975, the 
Department of I lealth and Social Security was observing that, ‘A p<x>l of addicts on long-tenn 
maintenance who are unwilling to try to break their dependence on drugs has built up in the years 
since the present system was introduced in 1968’.' A new approach was sought by clinicians and by 
the time Treatment and Rehabilitation was published, most of the London Clinics were offering only 
oral methadone detoxification to new opiate addicted patients without the option of longer tenn 
prescriptions or injectable drugs. WTiilc treatment had become more uniform in the Clinics, 
doctors outside, both NHS and private, were not so easily influenced. Conflict emerged between
4 V. Bcrridge, AIDS in the UK The Slaking o f  Policy, 1981-1994 (Oxford: ( fxford University Press, 1996) pp.90-
93.
1 M. Mircheson, ‘Drug Clinics in the 1970s’, in |. Strang and M. Gossop (cds). Heroin Addiction r in d  Drug Policy: 
I'he british System (< )xford. New York, Tokyo, ( lx ford University Press, 1994) pp. 179-191. 
f‘ P. H. Connell, ‘Drug dependence in Great Britain: a challenge to the practice o f medicine’ in 11. Stcinlterg 
(ed.), Scientific basis o f  Drug Dependence, Coordinating Committee for Symposia on Drug Action, (I-on don: J& A  
Churchill, 1969) pp.291 299, p293.
7 DHSS, better Services fo r  the Mentally III (London: HMS< ), 1975) p.67.
62
those inside and outside the Clinics with published attacks on private prescribes appearing in 
medical journals from 1980 onwards."
O rigins and Purpose
The Treatment and Rehabilitation report (known for short as TeirR) emerged after a very long 
gestation period (1975-82). It was the second of two reports prepared by a Working Group of the 
Advisory Council on the Misuse o f  Drugs, an independent body set up in 1971 under the Misuse 
o f  Drugs Act, to advise government. Its secretariat was usually provided by the I lome Office, but 
where a subject had particular relevance to health or social services, it could be provided by that 
department. T&R, the Working G roup’s final report, was preceded in 1977 by an interim report.9 
ITte changing membership o f the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group is given in Table 
3.1.
The Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group’s original task, in 1975, was ‘to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the treatment and rehabilitation services for drug misusers and to make 
recommendations for dealing with both immediate problems and the situation generally’.' The 
interim report gave several reasons for its concents in 1977, but it is uncertain whether these 
formed the original motivation for their investigations in 1975. 'The introduction described ‘a 
continuing, serious and slowly worsening problem’ o f which the authorities seemed unaware: 
overloaded Ixtndon Clinics, increasing multiple drug use for which there were insufficient 
treatment places, and also a limited choice in rehabilitation facilities. David Turner recalled that 
the Working Group was established very early on in the life of the Council, before there was any 
pressure for action from outside the Council. At the rime it was particularly concerned about the 
level of barbiturate injecting and overdoses.1’’1' It seemed likely that some of these concerns would 
have emerged during the Working Group’s research but because most o f  the ACMD’s minutes 
were covered by the Official Secrets Act, further investigation into the reasons for setting up the 
group an- unknown.
The 'Treatment and Rehabilitation W orking Group’s secretariat was provided by the I lome Office 
but in 1976 its chairman, Arthur Blenkinsop, suggested it be transferred to the Department of
I lealth and Social Security (D1ISS). According to one account,14 Mr Blenkinsop and at least one
" eg. T. II. Bcwlcy, ‘Prescribing psychoactivc drugs to addicts’, British Medirat Jou rna l 281 (1980), 497 498.
' ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group, I'irst Interim Report (1 .ondon: DHSS, 1977).
Ib id  p.2.
II Ib id  p.J.
12 D. Turner [SCODA], (2003) op. rit.
11 DHSS, (1975) op. rit., p.69.
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other member felt it was inappropriate for the Home Office to take an active role in the treatment 
of thug dependence and believed that there should be a clear separation between treatment, the 
usual domain of the DHSS, and criminal jurisdiction, the responsibility of the Home Office.
Although both the interim and final reports were published under the imprimatur of the DHSS, a 
formal transfer of secretariat does not seem to have occurred. 'Ibe interim report listed only two 
secretariat members at the time of reporting, both from the Home Office. While officials from 
both ministries attended the Working Group’s meetings, a lengthy correspondence between DHSS 
civil servants made clear their reluctance to accede to the Chairman’s wishes and take over the 
formal secretariat role and their belief that the Home Office was equally unwilling to relinquish it.15 
The DHSS officials were amenable to being more involved in the Working Group, particularly by 
providing a wider range o f  professional advisors to the committee, but falling short of taking on the 
secretariat’s role. Christopher Ralph, a D! 1SS civil servant, considered the Home Office’s distance 
from the details of treatment sendees to have been beneficial to the Working Group’s research and 
the DHSS ‘always preferred to keep its distance from the Council’.16 He took the view that by 
hating a 1 lom e Office secretariat, staff in treatment sendees had felt able to give more detailed 
responses to committee members’ questions on priorities and budget reviews than they might had 
the secretariat been provided by die DHSS. 1 Ie also referred to potential conflicts with other 
related policy work D11SS staff were involved in and the additional workload involved. The 
DHSS’s previous experience of Mr Blenkinsop’s heavy reliance on their secretariat also seems to 
have deterred them. In )une 1976, the D1 ISS’s Dr Alan Sippert recorded agreement benveen 
himself, the I lome Office Working Group secretary Mr D. G. Turner1 and the chainnan Mr 
Blenkinsop that the Home Office would continue to provide the Working Group’s secretariat but 
that Dr Sippert would attend the meetings regularly.1* The preserved notes gave the impression of 
agreement and perhaps collusion between die two departments to keep the Working Group where 
they wanted it., J
The first Working Group, responsible for the interim report, gathered oral and written evidence. 
Some o f its members made site visits, which included health authorities in I xindon and Newcastle 
where they met an accident and emergency doctor, psychiatrists, other hospital staff involved in
M IT. T urner [SC( )DA], Personal communication, (2003).
Is DHSS Minutes, (25"’ May 1976-7">Junc 1976), File D/A242/12B, DH Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
1,1 D. Turner [SCODA), (2003) op. cii.
17 Mr D Cl Turner was secretary to the W orking (Troup and should nor to be confused with Mr David Turner, 
Co-ordinator of the Standing Conference on Drug Abuse, representing voluntary drug services.
’* A. Sippert, DHSS Minute, (17'" June 1976), File D/A242/12B, DH Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
” DHSS Minutes, (25"' May 1976-7* June 1976), File D/A242/12B, DH Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
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treating drug users, police and probation officers, and representatives from social services and local 
voluntary agencies. Oral evidence was received by the Working Group from the chairman of a 
London health authority Drug Misuse lia ison  Committee, Sister Beaurepaire (an A&Fi nurse who 
was to become a member of the next Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group), an A&E 
consultant, a probation officer, members o f the prison service including medical officers, Dr Martin 
Mitcheson (a I -ondon DDU psychiatrist) and Dr 11 amid Ghodse (a psychiatrist colleague and 
collaborator of Working Group member Dr Thomas Bewley, both o f  whom were at St 'Ihomas’
I lospital DDU). Also giving oral evidence were a consultant psychiatrist and probation officer 
from Norwich and three representatives o f voluntary organisations. The sources o f its written 
evidence were not described.
Although interviewees were overwhelmingly medical, the wider range o f  site visits suggested that 
this first Working Group was looking beyond a medical response, perhaps foreshadowing the 
second Working Group’s emphasis on the multi-disciplinary model. Die committee did not reveal 
how these sources o f  evidence were selected, with the exception o f individuals from specialist 
sendees who were proposed by one member, Dr Bewley.
M em bership
The selection of members showed both continuity with and change from the past. While the mix 
o f ‘experts’ and concerned, well-connected citizens typified earlier policy-making styles in the drugs 
field (see Table 3.1), its multi-disciplinary approach was a departure from the all-medical Brain 
Committees of the 1960s. The Working Group had a strong London bias, perhaps to lx1 expected 
as dntg sendees (and dmg use) had been centred in Ixmdon for several decades, although this was 
beginning to change (see Chapter 2).
Ibis first group included a social work advisor on dmg problems based in Ixtndon, a nurse 
specialist, a worker at a lxtndon Citizens Advice Bureau (also married to a prominent social 
scientist with a hereditary title), a Ixtndon consultant psychiatrist and bead of a Clinic, a fellow of an 
Oxford college, and the head o f the Standing Conference on Dntg Abuse (SCODA), representing 
the voluntary sector. The Working Group’s chainrtan was the Ixtbour Member o f Parliament for 
South Shields in the North o f Kngland. In total four had expertise in the dmgs field and three were 
lay members o f the ACMD. No one from general practice was represented, neither was oral 
evidence taken from GPs, features that changed on the second Working Group. The emphasis of 
the interim report was on the Clinics anil accident and emergency services; primary care had little 
role in dmg treatment at this stage.
65
Table 3.1 Membership of the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group, 1975-82
Working Group from 1975 
(responsible for the interim 
report2")
Working Group from 
1978 (responsible for the 
final report2')
Description
Mr Arthur Blenkinsop 
(Chairman)
Member of Parliament for South 
Shields, labour.
Dr Thomas H Bewley Dr Ihomas H Bewley Consultant Psychiatrist, St Thomas’ 
I lospital, London
Miss Annas Dixon Miss Annas Dixon Social W ork Advisor on Drug 
Problems. Camden Social Services 
(until September 1979) Then freelance 
consultant and lecturer on drugs
Mrs Jennifer Hart Academic, fellow of a college of 
Oxford University.
Rev E I >c\vis Rev E lewis (until 
December 1980)
Area Nurse Specialist
Mrs Ruth Runciman Mrs Ruth Runciman Citizen’s Advice Bureau, 1 lackney
Mr R E Searchfield I lead of SCODA
Prof R Duckworth 
(C chairman)
Prof of Oral Medicine, Ix>ndon 
I lospital Medical College
Miss F Adamson I lecturer in Social Work
Sister B Beaurepaire (until 
her death in 1979)
Nurse, A&K, St Thomas’ 1 lospital 
laondon.
Dr Philip Connell (from 
November 1981)
Director, Dmg Dependence Clinical 
Research and Treatment Unit, 
Maudslcy, laondon. Consultant 
Psychiatrist
Mr A Gorst Director of Social Services, I aondon 
Borough of Barnet
Prof 11 G wynne-Jones 
(member Oct 78-June 81)
Dept of Psychology', I aceds 
University.
Dr G Mathers GP, Gloucester, Police Surgeon
Dr D J Parr (member Consultant Psychiatrist, Brighton
" ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation Working C ¡roup (1977) op. fit. 
21 ACMD, (1982) op. at.
66
from November 1978) 1 lealth District
Mr S Ratcliffe (member 
from May 1981)
Probation Officer, London
Mrs M Sharpe (member 
from Sept 1979)
Sister, University College Hospital 
DDU
Dr Anthony P Thorley Consultant Psychiatrist, Newcasde 
(Director, Alcohol and Drugs DDU)
Mr D Tomlinson 
(member from October 
1978)
Executive Director, Phoenix I louse.
Mr D Wild Regional Medical Officer, South West 
Thames RHA
Professor Sir Robert 
Bradlaw (member until 
December 1980, retired)
Chairman of ACMD ‘ex officio 
member’
Mr David Turner Co-ordinator, Standing Conference 
on Drug Abuse
Secretariat
Mr D G Turner Mr D G Turner (until 
1980)
Committee Secretar}’, Home Office
Mrs MJ Taylor Assistant Committee Secretary, 1 lome 
C office
Mr DJ 1 lardwick Secretary of the ACMD
Assisted by
Miss C Le Poer Trench
Mr N Shackk-ford
Mrs C 1 leald
Miss K Albiston
Mr R G Yates
Table 3.1 shows the extent to which the second W orking Group grew, gaining much wider drugs 
expertise and get »graphical spread. The second Working Group gained three more psychiatrists, a 
general practitioner and a new chairman. No private practitioners were members, but oral evidence 
was taken from them. O nly four of the original seven members remained on the second 
committee, which swelled to nineteen, although not simultaneously; the secretary left in 1980 and
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the assistant secretary did not continue on after the interim report was published. TdrR  listed seven 
secretariat members, not to mention the twenty-six officials who were also involved. The reasons 
for this seem to have been its new remit, the new perceived urgency of the situation facing drug 
treatment services, and changes in the three-yearly membership of the ACMD itself, from whom 
most of the Working Group members were drawn.”
In |uly 1978, nearly a year after the interim report’s publication, the Working Group agreed its new  
brief as being ‘to examine the range of sendees available for those who suffered harm through their 
drug misuse; consider whether this was sufficiendy flexible to the needs of the individual and 
suggest ways in which the combined response could be im p ro v ed .In  order for the Working 
Group to fiilfil this task, it seems likely that it considered that it needed representatives from all the 
agencies between which coordination was desired. David Turner, the co-ordinator of SCODA, 
also drew the new second Working Group’s attention to the question of how adequate information 
could be obtained regarding the situation outside Dindon,’4 which was in part answered by 
expanding the membership."’
Findings of the first Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group (1977):<’
One would expect an interim report to be more cautious, as its conclusions were not final, and this 
was certainly the case, proposing retention o f the existing system until reviews had taken place and 
further research. It also laid the ground for some of the recommendations taken further in the final 
report, including its view that ‘a multi-disciplinary approach to die problem of dmg misuse is 
essential’, and recommended:
(i) A review of the notification procedure for the I lom e Office’s Addicts Index to improve 
the quality of data collected (also considered by 7 c~K, paras 6.20-6.21, conclutling that the 
data should be made more widely available)
(ii) No Clinic dosures before a full review (lc!~R  maintained an important role for Clinics and 
set minimum staffing and service levels in ( Chapter 6 )
(iii) Provision of services for multiple dmg users (also recommended in TC~R)
(iv) Closer working between Clinics, sodal services and voluntary organisations (a major 
concern of 7 cM i, and remit of the second Working Group, which envisaged this could he 
achieved through a new framework of committees.)
’ D. Turner [SCODA], Personal communication, (2003).
D. Turner |SC()DA), TRWG (2)/20 Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Croup’. (16,h Novemltcr 1078), 
Pile D/A242/12, D ll Archive, Nelson, Iancashirc.
*  I bill
”  17- Turner |SC( )DA], (2003) op. til.
26 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group, (1977) op. a!., pp.6-18.
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(v) A new role for specialists in educating GPs and others involved in treatment. (7ei“R found 
severe shortcomings in training and made recommendations for major changes).
(vi) Further research into the role and effectiveness o f treatment (these were repeated and 
extended in Tei“R’s Chapter 8)
'Hie Interim Report did not discuss the form treatment itself should take, and avoided tackling the 
sensitive issue o f substitute prescribing, saying “We recognise that there is considerable uncertainty 
about effective methcxls o f treatment for drug misusers and we avoid making specific 
recommendations which might seem to lim it innovation’.27
T he Second W orking Group
In the light of the second Working Group’s broad remit, agreed in Ju ly 1978, David Turner, who 
had replaced Bob Searchfield on the ACM D  as representative of SCODA, was asked to identify 
specific areas for consideration taking into account the responses to the interim report. The report 
had been circulated to Area and Regional I lealth Authorities, social services authorities and 
professional and voluntary organisations. 1 lealth Authorities were relied upon to coordinate the 
responses in their local areas, induding those from Clinics. The resulting paper signed off by D add 
Turner made some radical proposals against a background o f Home Office statistics and responses 
to the report that apparendy confirmed the interim report’s view of a ‘serious and slowly worsening 
problem’.2"
In addition to some simple tidying suggestions, like producing a dear definition o f ‘multiple dmg 
takers’, Dadd Turner also drew attention to  the need for information about the situation outside 
I xindon. Then, marked as a ‘major dilemma’ raised in responses to the first report, he pointed to 
Clinics’ varying presenbing policies, with particular contrasts between diose in I -ondon and those 
outside, and came to the radical condusion that. The role o f the treatment service (191X7) '' as both 
a treatment system and as a means of control both of the supply of dmgs to dependent persons 
and of the spread o f addiction is no longer viable, if it ever was.’'"
D add Turner concluded by suggesting tw o alternatives to the Working Group: adapting the 
present structure to make services available to a wider group o f patients or proposing an alternative
27 Ibid. p.8.
-K D. Turner |SC( )DA), TRWG (2)/2(> Treatm ent and Rehabilitation Working Group’, (16,h November 1978), 
File D/A242/12, DM Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
I9I9C stands for ‘dmg dependence clinic’ and is interchangeable with DDU or ‘Clinic’.
” D. 1  umer |SC( )DA], (16th Novcmlicr 1978), op. at.
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model for the provision of services ‘which is not based upon the substance misused but the social, 
medical, personal, etc problems facing the individual’. '1 Given the tone o f the paper and preceding 
justification, much greater weight went behind these second of the two options. TTius a non­
medical member was questioning the value of the dominant medical system and laying the ground 
for a new phase in drug treatment policy.
Findings of the final Treatm ent an d  Rehab ilitation  Report (1982)
/ ¿~R was published with the fill] approval o f the ACME) which added weight to its 
recommendations. I Tic report was divided into eleven chapters. The first described the original 
task, interim report, the broadening of the remit since the earlier report and scope of TeHE 
Chapter 2 considered the historical background going back to the legislative controls on drugs and 
the Rolleston report o f the 1920s, the conclusions of which formed the basis for treatment and 
rehabilitation policies until the 1960s, followed by the first and second Brain Committees and the 
subsequent Clinic and notification systems under consideration by both the Working Groups. TTie 
legislative framework, particularly important to set the scene for Chapter 7’s proposed 
modifications, was outlined.
Discussion o f existing treatment and rehabilitation services and their ‘effectiveness’ according to 
«'search took a detached view, not favouring any particular approach. Trends in dmg use since the 
1960s that were seen as significant were multiple drug use, the high prevalence of barbiturate and 
other tranquilliser misuse, the increase in the proportion o f new heroin addicts in the numbers 
being notified to the Addicts Index and the drop in the age o f drug users. It also described an 
increase in the proportion o f addicts being notified to the Addicts Index (ie presenting for 
treatment and being found dependent on opiates or cocaine) from outside the Clinics, and possible- 
reasons why dntg users might be turning away from the Clinics and towards private practice or 
NHSGPs.
letter on, the report suggested that, particularly where there was no prospect o f an adilict becoming 
abstinent, curbs on prescribing by the Clinics might have encouraged dmg users to seek treatment 
from GPs and private prescribers in order to obtain prescriptions. A new concept was also 
introduced: the ‘problem drug taker’, which replaced the ‘dmg addict’, and was intended to 
encourage a ‘problem oriented rather than specifically client or substance labelled’ approach.'
11 Ibid
AC MI), (1982) op at., p.34.
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The report then went on to propose local and national structures to provide the sendees it 
envisioned. Regional health authorities were to assess the extent of problem dmg use and services 
in their region and make arrangements to meet perceived needs, recommending the establishment 
of a multi-disciplinary regional dnig problem teams to help with this process, lTte team’s ambitious 
workload would include running the specialist sendee and providing support to doctors outside the 
Clinics. At district level, drug advisory committees would be set up to monitor problem drug 
taking in their districts, assess sendee effectiveness, propose improvements and generally improve 
coordination benveen agencies. It then described the roles for the statutory and non-statutory 
specialist sendees, and non-specialist sendees, laying down minimum responsibilities for the Clinics 
and obsendng that “During the visits to selected areas and in discussions with those working in 
treatment centres, it was noted that many clinics fall far short of the above minimum standards’.”
Chapter 7 of the report proposed extensive curbs on prescribing by ‘doctors working away from 
the hospital-based specialist sendees’ ie Nf IS GPs and private prescribers treating dmg users. 'Idle 
chapter was most particularly concerned by ‘a marked increase in private prescribing to problem 
dmg takers, particularly in london, exemplified by three doctors in private practice who 
contributed over 10 per cent of all notifications to the 1 lom e Office during the nine months 
January to September 1980.’”
Idle rise in treatment outside the Clinics worried the Working Group for four reasons.
These were a ‘Lack of specialised knowledge, training and experience’ essential for working in ‘this 
difficult area’;”  the dispensing o f dmgs less often than daily and thus increasing the likelihood o f 
supplies being diverted to the black market and o f dmg users taking more than their daily dose at 
once and overdosing; pressure from patients on vulnerable doctors to prescribe dmgs was listed as 
a worry, with uncited ‘evidence o f doctors issuing prescriptions simply to get rid of threatening 
patients’ and finally the lack o f ‘easy access to the support staff and facilities that were available to 
doctors in some hospital-based Clinics.”
These apparently created two major problems: liberal prescribing was attracting patients away from 
the Clinics to obtain larger doses o f dmgs from other doctors, which could increase their 
dependence and it was increasing the amount o f legally manufactured dmgs available in the illegal 
market as patients sold their surplus. Although it stated that ‘problems arise whether the doctor
” Ibid. p.45.
M ¡bid. pp.51-62.
15 ¡bid. p.52. 
v’ ¡bid. pp.52-53.
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provides treatment under the National Health Service or privately’, 7'e5“R went on to vehemently 
attack private prescribing, even questioning whether a therapeutic relationship could develop when 
fees were involved.' It found existing regulatory mechanisms inadequate, remarking that private 
prescribing of controlled drugs to problem drug takers was ‘undesirable’ because there were ‘moral 
and ethical aspects which cannot easily be dealt with by the General Medical Council and give grave 
cause for concern.’ There was suspicion as to how mostly unemployed patients could pay for 
treatment without selling a proportion of their prescribed dnigs on the black market, although no 
evidence was cited.'*
'ITiree corrective measures were proposed: the preparation of ‘good practice’ prescribing guidelines 
by a medical working group; the extension of I lom c Office licensing from heroin and cocaine to all 
opioid drugs, with urgent action being taken on dipipanone,19 and changes to the I lomc Office- 
tribunal system so that it addressed a wider range o f ‘irresponsible prescribing’. This last 
recommendation may have been suggested by the I lome Office Drugs Inspectorate,*1 
representatives of which were present at the Working Group’s meetings. Bing Spear, then Chief 
Drugs Inspector, later expressed his agreement with the report’s criticism that the I lomc Office 
had under used the tribunal system.41 I lome Office tribunals are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
The licensing extension would have meant that instead of only heroin and cocaine prescription for 
the treatment o f addiction being restricted to doctors holding a special I lomc Office licence, the 
prescribing of additional drugs would lie limited to licence-holders.
Great deficiencies were found in training provision, both among those already working with drug 
users and those whose jobs might lead them into contact with them in the future, and 
recommendations to remedy this were made. Chapter 9 made a brief exploration o f the difficulties 
of conducting research in this area, defining and assessing success in treatment and rehabilitation 
and the lack of research evidence, recommending areas needed to inform service development.
7 c~R described shortcomings o f the existing Clinic system in the face of increasing demand and 
altered patterns o f recorded dnig use. Alternatives to expanding treatment were briefly considered 
and rejected, including ending prescribing entirely and leaving most aspects o f  drug misuse to the
,7 Ibid. p. S4. 
w Ibid. p.54.
w Iiipipanonc combined with the anti- nausea drug cvclizinc was marketed as Diconal and had Ix-eil widely 
illicitly used in the North o f England.
*" A. Thorley, Interview by Sarab Mars, (2002).
" 11. B. Spear (and cd. J. Mott), Heroin Addiction Care and  Control: The ‘British System' 1916-19/14 (1-ondon: 
DrugScope, 2002) p.63.
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control of the criminal justice system. A reversal of the existing policy that had excluded general 
practitioners from treatment was put forward as a solution.
General practice, already established throughout the country, offered a cheaper solution to 
extensive development of the Clinic system, although some hospital-based expansion was also 
recommended. To the Working Group, the involvement o f GPs in treatment would enable wider 
geographical coverage and treatment for more drug users. But this also risked devolving prescribing 
decision-making away from the centre, justifying Chapter 7’s three inter-connected measures to 
strengthen prescribing regulation. Yet these measures were less aimed at future developments in 
the re-involvement of GPs as at the existing situation in 1982: private doctors’ perceived over­
liberal prescribing and the black market in pharmaceutical drugs.42
Significance
Since its publication in 1982, Tei“R  has been defined as important in a number of ways. Its 
advocacy of integrating treatment and rehabilitation services through a multi-disciplinary approach 
involving health, social service, probation, education services, and the voluntary sector was widely 
seen as departure from existing policy,4' but this was not a new idea. Closer ctxiperadon had been 
recommended in the 1)1 ISS’s 1975 White Paper better Senicts for the Mentally 1U ? and by the 
Working Group’s interim report.4’ 7'c~R’s multi-disciplinary, integrating approach had also been 
touched on briefly by the second Brain Committee. Ixtrd Brain’s report had recommended that 
‘proper facilities for long-term rehabilitation, both physical and psychological, (should be provided] 
in the treatment centres and elsewhere’.44’ However, when the Clinics were established they did not 
incorporate rehabilitation facilities and the split between treatment and rehabilitation remained 
through the rest of the century.
Both / c~R and the interim report showed many areas of continuity with Better Services Jbr the A tentu/fy 
III, and indeed many documents written in the 1970s: they described the apparent increase in 
multiple dmg use unmatched by services, overburdened Clinics and the continuing drug use o f 
long tertn users despite treatment. Both the interim report, the 1975 White Paper, and later /e~R, 
advocated a ‘multi-disciplinary’ approach within Clinics, and between Clinics and other agencies, as
42 T. Bcwlcy, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
" S. MacGregor, ‘Choices for policy and practice’, in S MacGregor (cd.) Drugs ¡nut British Sotiety. Responses to a 
Social Problem in the t9X0s (London and New York: Routledgc, 1989) pp. 170-2(X).
14 D11SS, Better Services for the Mentally ///(Iaindon: 1 1MS( >, 1975).
*' ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group, (1977) op. at., p.9.
1,1 Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, Drug Addiction. The Second Report ojThe Interdepartmental 
( ommittee [second Brain Repost), Ministry o f I Icalth, Scottish I lome and I lealth Department, (Iaindon: 1 IMS( >,
1965) p.9.
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did most of the policy documents that succeeded them, emphasising a wider approach to addiction 
beyond the medical into social rehabilitation.
Commentators have also given prominence to 7 ei'R’s redefinition of the ‘drug addict’ as the 
‘problem drug taker’. Following a change o f terminology in the alcohol field, it described problem 
drug takers as ‘any person who experiences social, psychological, physical or legal problems related 
to intoxication and/or regular excessive consumption and/or dependence as a consequence o f his 
own use of drugs or other chemical substances (excluding alcohol and tobacco).’4 '48 'lh e  Advisory 
Committee on Alcoholism had produced a report on the pattern and range of services for problem 
drinkers which was received by the second Working Group, in which the term ‘alcoholic’ was 
replaced with ‘problem drinker’. Anthony Thorley, one of the four Clinic psychiatrists on the 
second Working Group, was impressed and considered its equivalent might usefiillv replace ‘addict’ 
as a non-medical term.41'" It has been claimed that this eased the movement towards a more 
problem-oriented approach and away from a preoccupation with the particular substance being 
used’.51
In conceptual tenns, introducing the new tenn ‘problem drug taker’ seemed to recast the policy 
focus away from a disease based model to a broader viewpoint. Whether this took place in practice 
was harder to say. Furthermore, although a less narrowly medical model might seem to have 
reduced the potential role for medicine by necessitating input from the other professions and 
voluntary services, liistorian Betsy Thom has suggested that in the alcohol field this change also 
opened up new approaches for psychiatry,52 and it seems that a very similar effect could lx- seen in 
the drugs field, with psychiatry maintaining a dominant, if challenged, position.
Ihe new term could be seen as both normalising and re-pathologising dmg users: on  the one hand 
it suggested that not all drug users had problems resulting from their drug use as ‘the majority are 
relatively stable individuals who have more in common with the general population than with any 
essentially pathological sub-group.’”  On the other it also stated that addiction was not the limit of 47*
47 ACMD, (1982) op. ¡it., p.34.
M. Plant, ‘The epidemiology o f illicit drug-use* in S MacGregor (ed.) Drujp anil British Society. Responses to is 
Social Problem in the t980s. (latndon and New York: Routlcdgc, 1989) pp.52-63.
rl I lome Office, TRWG Mins 23, Minutes o f the 23"' Meeting o f the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working 
C »roup, (27,h November 1978), File D2/A242/12 Vol. G., D ll Archive, Nelson, 1 encash ire.
*" A. Thorley, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
41J- Strang, ‘A model service: turning the generalist on to drugs' in S. MacGregor (ed.) Drugs ant! British Society. 
Responses to a Social Problem in the 1980s (I /indon and New York: Routledge, 1989) pp. 143-169.
' 13- lhom . Dealing With Drink* Aliolsol and Social Policy Prom Treatment to Management (Iamdon and New York: 
Free Association Books, 1999) pp.105-134.
”  ACMD, (1982) op. tit., p.31.
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drug problems that drug services, both medical and non-medical, might need to address, but 
should include regular excessive consumption and intoxication.
ITie Working Group’s minutes showed that two of its psychiatrists were keen to put drug use into 
a wider context outside medicine,’4 and the report reflected this, arguing against the utility of the 
disease model: The problem drug taker seeking treatment may regard himself as having a disease or 
illness and may adopt a relatively passive sick role’ which was ‘inappropriate in the management of 
drug problems where clearly there is a volitional element, and personal responsibility and 
accountability arc implicit.’55
Also in common with Better Services for tlx MenUt/fy lit\ there was a perception that drug services 
required central funding because in times o f spending cut-backs, unpopular patient groups would 
be the first to suffer at the local level. This was repeated in To~R, won the support o f Nornian 
Fowler, and took form in the Central Funding Initiative (see Chapter 2).
Perhaps the reason that Tc~R has been credited with innovations that earlier polio’ documents had 
trailed, was that, unlike its forerunners, many of its recommendations were implemented. Its 
publication coincided with a rime of considerable public and political concern about the rise in dnig 
use, and the government implemented many of its recommendations. Dipipanone was swiftly 
added to the list of dnigs for which doctors needed a I lom e Office licence to prescribe in the 
treatment of addiction; a medical working group was set up to draw up good practice guidelines; 
several million pounds were m ade available to develop drug services and GPs were officially 
encouraged to treat dmg users with support from community drug teams.
Alternatively, its impact may have lain in the unquestionable novelty o f re-involving the medical 
generalist,5'’ albeit with strict controls, and bringing drug services out o f the hospital setting.5 Spear 
saw the report’s emphasis on the multi-disciplinary approach beyond prescribing as heralding the 
end of the Clinic era and the dominance of hospital-based treatment services,514 but this was 
probably over-stating the case, given the subsequent difficulties in recruiting GPs to take up the 
challenge. Sl
Sl 1 lome < )ffice, TRWG Mins 23, Minutes o f the 23"1 Meeting o f  the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working 
Group, (27,h November 1978), bile I32/A242/12 Vol. G., DM Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
“  ACMD, (1982) op. al.. p.35.
**,)• Strang, ‘“'live British System”: past, present and future*. International Rtww o f  Psychiatry, 1 (1989), 109-120.
47 V. Berridge, i  listorica) issues’, in S. MacGregor (cd.) O ntff anti British Society. Responses to a Soeial Problem in the 
l9X0s (I-ondon and New York: Routledge, 1989) pp.20-35.
“  H. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2(X)2) op. eil., p.276.
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I “he most significant aspect o f the report in the public-private debate was the raft o f regulatory 
measures over prescribing Treatment and Rehabilitation recommended, most of which were 
implemented and had major significance for the clinical autonomy o f doctors treating drug users.
At the heart o f this lay its heavy attack on private prescribers and the extensive measures 
recommended to control them and other doctors working outside hospital-based services (GPs). 
Few aside from Bing Spear noted the importance of this chapter, which he saw as an opportunity 
for ‘the more politically motivated and forcefi.il members’ o f the Ixindon Consultants Group 
(discussed in Chapter 8) ‘to regain the influence they feared they were in danger o f losing.’” 
Evidence examined in this study has supported Spear’s argument.
Development 1975-82
Differences between the interim and final reports can be attributed in part to the changes in 
membership and to external developments. The interim report’s relatively cautious 
recommendations may also have resulted from the first Working Group’s lack o f leadership: Mrs P 
A  Lee, a DHSS civil servant wrote that ‘Mr Blenkinsop himself is not a strong chairman with any 
marked capacity to guide lus Committee.*’" In addition he is said to have relied heavily on the 
secretariat for briefing before meetings rather than forming his own views and to have lacked a 
sense of direction/'1
Developments outside the Working Group had a significant impact. Nineteen seventy-seven, 
when the interim report was published, could be described as the ‘lull before the storm’. In 
launching the interim report, Roland Moyle, the then Minister of State for 1 lealth and Social 
Services, said, i t  does not appear that there has been the explosion o f narcotic dmg addiction 
which was feared at the time when the present dmg clinics were set up/1'  Due to the length o f time 
lx-tvveen collection and analysis by the I lom e Office, the figures available to Mr Moyle only reached 
1975, and both the report, and resulting press statement, referred to a levelling off and even a slight 
fall in registered addicts. Yet even by the time of David Turner’s briefing paper to the new 
Working Group/’’ it was clear that the trend had changed, and by 1982, the picture was 
transfonned again (see Chapter 2 o f the thesis). David Turner later recalled:
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It  was in 1978 or early 1979 that we issued a SC O D / i press release noting that then was a rapidly increasing 
number of young heroin smokers appearing at drug sendees and ca/lingforan urgent response from tlx D H SS. Tins 
was confirmed by the notification figures for 1978 and /979 andgate a much greater urgency to tlx work of Ox 
Group. Before it had Ixen moving slowly with relatively little sense of urgency but this approach could no longer lx 
sustained and both the D H S S  and the Home Office recognised this;
The new supply of cheap, trafficked heroin which had started com ing into the country in the late 
1970s replaced diverted pharmaceutical drugs as the main source o f  illicit supply, and, as David 
Turner remembered, this resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of notified addicts. There 
were also suggestions that even larger numbers were not coming forward for treatment. ITie 
increase in the availability o f  illicit drugs had also altered the relationship between doctors and the 
source of supply. While they could still offer treatment, changes in  prescribing patterns could have 
minimal affect on the availability or price of illicit heroin and the role of the Clinics in controlling 
the drug supply was therefore significantly weakened (see Chapter 2).
In addition to the subsequent increase in drug users was the apparent rise in the number o f 
doctors involved in treatment outside the Clinics, unsanctioned by either government 
policies or the British Medical Association. Figures from the I lomc Office’s Addicts Index 
showed that the proportion of patients notified from general practice (but not specifying 
NHS or private) had risen from 15% in 1970 to 53% in 1981, constituting an absolute as well 
as relative increase. In 1977, when the involvement o f private prescribers was 
uncontroversial, and possibly on a smaller scale, the interim report had confined itselt to 
Nl IS services. The future report, it said, was to consider voluntary services, but no mention 
was made o f  private prescribe». As central government became more sensitive to drugs issues, 
the DIISS sent more staff to attend the Working Group’s meetings, aware that it was about to 
lxxome a political issue (see Table 3.1).
The Final Treatm ent u n d  R ehabilitation Report (1982):
Safeguarding Centralised Control
Although the report recommended a reversal of the policy that had discouraged G l’s trom 
involvement in this fidd since the late 1960s, and criticised the ability of the Clinics to meet 
demand, it held up hospital-based services as the theoretical ideal. Access to support staff such as 
nurses, social workers and psychologists and assessment fadlities, although admittedly not
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universally available in the Clinics, was seen as preferable, as well as the advantage of employing 
doctors within the ‘structured system’ of a hospital, which allowed restrictions to Ije imposed upon 
their prescribing by the consultant who took ultimate responsibility. I lowevcr there was no 
mention o f whether this had ever happened and the report did not consider the prescribing 
decisions of hospital consultants themselves, some of whom had no specialised knowledge in the 
treatment of drug misuse, but were simply general psychiatrists working on general psychiatric 
wards.
7e~R considered it preferable for both NHS and private doctors working outside hospitals to liase 
closely with hospital specialists and members o f other disciplines in making their prescribing 
decisions. It also suggested that further knowledge could be gained by GPs taking up clinical 
assistantships in hospital-based services. Along with the other methods o f surveillance and 
monitoring recommended by the Working Group, these proposals could have enabled control of 
the prescribed drug supply to have been taken along the lines favoured by the London NHS 
psychiatric establishment.
The two Ixtndon consultant psychiatrist members of the 7 C~R Working Group — Dr Bewley and 
Dr Connell — supported a policy of very restricted prescribing and opposed maintenance on 
opiates, especially outside the hospital setting. 'Ihev favoured abstinence-oriented treatment over 
longer tenn prescribing, and methadone over heroin. I he other two, Dr Parr and Dr Thorley, had 
been invited onto the Working Group at the end of 1978 by the medical civil servant Dr Sippcrt as 
‘pennanent expert witnesses’ due to their experience of treatment outside London (in Brighton and 
Newcastle respectively),66 and, in the case rtf Dr "ITtoriey, to counter-balance the lamdon/South 
East dominance of the Group/" Dr Thorlcy, according to one member, was ‘o f a newer 
generation, more open to working with other people and other services and keener on the idea of 
multi-disciplinary working.. .he represented a different approach and one not always welcomed by 
his consultant colleagues on the Working Group.’6"
Thorley saw things similarly and contrasted his own approach with that o f Thomas Bewley within 
the Group: ‘'lh e whole o f the process was on the threshold o f a, a rather different view looking at 
so-called dnig addiction, which a number o f us were quite keen in framing, sort of, new way of 
thinking. And he |Bewlcy] represented a kind o f old schtx>l meilical model, you know, in a very
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dear and identifiable way.* ' Bewley was considered the most senior medical member of the 
committee, and in the highly stratified system of mcdidne this could have an inhibiting effect on 
other doctors on the Group.7"’71 Dr Thoriey explained,
[D r Bewleyj had a lot of persona! influent e, and power and so on. / mean be went on to take bit}) office in the Royal 
Collette of Psychiatrists later, and so on and so forth, and he was very actively on t!>e Genera! Medical Council. ..And, 
and so, you know, when you 're just a young baby consultant coming along and you ivgot somebody as senior as that 
in the medical kind of hierarchy, it !r not easy to make a sort of, a, you know, start to initiate what was... a bit of a 
paradigm shift realty.,2
Philip Connell had established his reputation with a study proving the previously unknown 
psychotic effects o f amphetamine ' and 'Ihomas Bewley had been one o f the first psychiatrists 
treating dmg users England during the 1960s.74 Among psychiatrists around the I xjndon Clinics, 
there were a range o f views on the wisdom of maintenance prescribing. However, those in the 
most powerful positions, including Dr Connell and Dr Bewley, seemed to have been successful in 
imposing their dews on the majority of others at meetings of the London consultants held at the 
1 lome Office. They also took an interest in the regulation o f the profession. Philip Connell was the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists’ representative on the GMC from 1979, and Thomas Bewley 
replaced him in 1991. 5,76 In 1980, Bewley had been responsible for the first published attack on 
private prescribing, suggesting that control o f psychoactivc drugs should be confined to licensed 
practitioners, views repeated in 7 e~K and a few years later he reported Ann Dally, a well known 
private prescriber, to the GMC.7"’™
Both Connell and Bewley were based at hospitals with large numbers o f drug dependent patients. 
Both were members o f the ACMD, of which Connell was to become chairman in 1982, both held
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the post of specialist advisor to the Chief Medical Officer of drug dependence at various times and 
Dr Bewley was soon (in 1984) to become President of the Royal College of Psychiatrists.
I'cr-R  itself avoided taking a stand on maintenance prescribing because, it said, expert opinions 
differed and decisions depended on individual circumstances. This would seem to preclude the 
possibility of producing consensus guidelines on good prescribing practice, and yet this was exactly 
what Te5“R recommended. Paragraph 7.24 called for ‘an authoritative statement o f good practice, 
which should incorporate the need to make use of the support facilities we have mentioned..., is 
required urgently.’ Ilie reference to ‘support facilities’ was another indication o f the retention of an 
important role for the Clinics. This chapter of the report described how the Working Group had 
considered whether this could be drawn up by the ACMD but had concluded that ‘since the matter 
is primarily one for the medical profession, the task should be undertaken by an ad hoc body of 
representatives o f the profession.’
When David Turner had raised question o f disparities in the Clinics’ prescribing practices at the 
outset of the second Working Group’s programme of work, Dr Bewley had commented at a 
meeting o f the Working Group that there was a problem of appearing to interfere with doctors’ 
clinical freedom by making recommendations about treatment and whether to prescribe or not."" 
Such guidelines drawn up by representatives of the medical profession would circumvent the 
problem as the profession would be regulating itself. One member recalled agreement on the 
Working Group, that ‘the overall view around the table in Treatment and Reljabilitation was to see 
people come off dnigs anil that the idea o f encouraging or in a sense, affmning their right to have 
long-term for life prescribing was not on,’ but despite holding definite opinions the Group “was shy 
of itself making a strong statement alxa it treatment... it wasn’t really the business o f  die Working 
Barn’’."' ITtis sensitivity over those outside die medical profession commenting on particular lines 
of treatment meant that production o f  the Guidelines was passed to an all medical working group."-
The establishment of a medical working group also served another function. 'ITtose I xindon 
psychiatrists who were against maintenance prescribing succeeded in m ining discussion o f die 
details of treatment content to an arena in which they were supreme. In the highly stratified world 
ol medicine, Connell and Bewley, as the more experienced specialist hospital consultants held 
seniority; if an all-medical working group, as recommended by 7 ei“R. were set up to deal with this
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matter separately, their views would carry the greatest weight. Ihe argument that doctors alone 
should determine prescribing policies may have been used by the I-ondon psychiatrists to ensure 
that the matter was left to a medical working group. In the event such a working group was to be 
chaired by Connell with Bewley as a member and their anti-maintenance approach was indeed 
victorious (see Chapter 4).
'Die decision by the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group to recommend setting 
guidelines seems to have been the result of a compromise. Some o f the Working Group’s 
psychiatrist members were pushing for statutory controls on prescribing to restrict drug treatment 
to the N1 IS and end private doctors’ involvement. Opposing them was David Turner, a founder 
member and the director o f the Standing Conference on Drug Abuse, representing voluntary drug 
services. Turner, like Bewley and Connell, was concerned about private doctors’ prescribing but 
saw a danger in the Clinics holding a monopoly o f uniform treatment.
The secretariat, and in particular the DI ISS’s medical advisor on dmgs, Dr Dorothy Black, also 
supported a wider range of treatment choice than was being offered by the Clinics, and may have 
helped to broker this compromise."’ The guidelines could offer a deterrent to private over- 
ptescribers without recourse to the law. The idea may have been borrowed from the Association of 
Independent Doctors in Addiction (or AIDA, pronounced like the opera), a group o f NI IS and 
private doctors working outside the Clinics, led by bigh profile private doctor Ann Dally. AIDA 
had produced its own draft guidelines in 1982 on which Dorothy Black had provided comments, 
and these were circulated to the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group that year."4'"'
Ihe extension of I lome Office licensing to all opioids could also have effectively shut private 
doctors out of treating dmg users, if licences had only been granted to doctors working in the 
Clinics, but some members of the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group did not object to 
the recommendation as they thought it unlikely to be implemented.“4’
Among some of those responsible for the Guidelines, it has been claimed that the control of private 
doctors was a major, if  not the primary motivation of those on the Treatment and Rehabilitation
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Working Group who made the original recommendation for their production." HK"' Supporting this 
was the strong justificatory attack on private doctors in Treatment and Rehabilitation and the use o f the 
Guidelines in the actions against the best known private prescribcr o f  the 1980s, Dr Ann Dally- In 
1985, a year after their publication, Ann Dally was interviewed by inspectors from the Home Office 
Dmgs Branch concerned about her prescribing, who compared her practice with that advised in 
the Guidelines."' 'ITie following year, the GMC’s disciplinary case against Dr Dally quoted extensively 
from the Guidelines." The fact that she had been a member of the Medical Working Group that had 
drafted them may have strengthened the case against her.
Producing the Guidelines put the spotlight on prescribing, apparendy contradicting the central 
message o f  Treatment and Rehabilitation that medical treatment and substitute prescribing were only 
one component of the range of care needed by dntg users. Out o f a  Working Group keen to 
emphasise the ‘multi-disciplinary’ approach to treatment and rehabilitation, and in which the 
medical members were free to comment on other members’ areas o f  work, the medical members 
seemed to have found a way to protect dicir own contribution from the interference of other 
disciplines.
7 C~R contained some interesting contradictions regarding ‘gtxid practice’ in treatment. It 
recommended die preparation of an ‘authoritative statement’ on good medical practice,’'  but it 
seemed to have reservations about the feasibility o f this. At one point the text reconsidered what it 
saw as the second Brain Committee's dilemma ‘as to how far it was right to offer drugs to addicts 
as an inducement to seek or maintain treatment’, and answered accordingly ‘We do not 
consider.. .that there can lie  anv simple answer to the question since expert opinions differ and 
much must depend upon individual circumstances. Rather we prefer an alternative, more flexible 
approach responsive to the varying problems faced bv dnig users.’’'” These apparendy opposing 
views may have represented not just differences among the range o f  professionals, but divisions 
among the medical members.
Aside from these conflicts o f  opinion, the report also conceded the limited research base on which 
it could be based: ‘It is not possible.. .on the basis o f research undertaken so far to demonstrate
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conclusively that one approach [to treatment and rehabilitation] is more effective than another’.w 
'lhen, rather surprisingly, the report declared that ‘there has always been a broad consensus as to 
good and effective treatment o f  problem drug takers’ but ‘it has not always been widely known or 
widely applied’.1' This varying range of new s pointed to divisions within the Working Group over 
the content of treatment over which ‘there was clearly going to be no agreement’.“
Minutes from an ACMD meeting that approved Tc“R also suggested a split on the Council itself 
over the prospects for producing good practice guidelines. Members spoke both o f the 
‘diametrically opposed views on treatment’ among experts, making agreement on guidelines 
difficult, but also ‘a pattern of good treatment practice which it was hoped would emerge in 
discussions’.9 Like the Working Group, the Council itself seemed to have been divided over issues 
of maintenance and abstinence oriented treatments.',*
While the London psychiatrists had developed prescribing conformity among their ranks, if not 
consensus, general practitioners and private doctors had reached neither. As independent 
contractors to the NI IS, and with so few of their number apparently interested in treating dmg 
users, there was no equivalent attempt among the ranks o f GPs to establish a clearly defined 
approach. Among the more patient-led private doctors who catered to needs or desires unmet by 
the NI IS, there was greater sympathy for more liberal prescribing, and less concern about pressure 
from within the medical profession. Private prvscribers did not require high status or position to 
continue to maintain a gcxid income from the treatment o f drug users. The main theoretical threat 
to their livelihood was from disciplinary action by the 1 tome Office Dnigs Inspectorate or the 
GMC which could stop such prescribing but this was relatively rare at this point. While the doctors 
outside the Clinics had tried to agree some criteria forgtxxj treaunent by prrxlucing their own 
guidelines, ultimately they had ‘agreed to differ’ and the guidelines were never finalised (see Chapter
8).«,lm
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Attributing patients’ move from the Clinics to outside doctors to the formers’ reluctance to 
prescribe, T& .R considered these independent doctors an inadequate alternative as they did not 
have ‘the resources to provide the full range of support services needed for the treatment and 
rehabilitation of drug misusers.’1"' Such sendees were clearly only available in the hospital setting, 
supporting its case that patients should be treated there (the Working Group’s preferred option), o r 
that any doctor treating drug misusers outside hospital should do so in collaboration with hospital 
sendees.
It was Dr Bcwley who suggested that prescribing outside the Clinics merited a separate chapter.1"- 
Before this, the proposals for extending licensing to other drugs were already included. Indeed in 
discussions Dr Bewley had gone further still, suggesting that the extended licence should cover all 
dmgs controlled under the Misuse of Dmgs Act underclasses A, B and C, not just opioids, 
something the Ix>ndon Clinics consultants had proposed back in 1968.'"’ D r ’lliorley thought that 
a wider extension to non-opioids was too radical to receive practical support’"1 and it was never 
recommended. Spear has asserted that the proposed controls and their justifications in Chapter 7 
“were little more than an elaboration o f the consultants’ views.’1"4 I lowevcr, other members have 
testified to agreement across the Working Group that private prescribing needed to be tackled."16 
Thorlcy explained,
7 here was a real sort of keenness to tty and tidy up the hadpractice that existed in the private sector. ..So there 
wasn’t a difference with D r Bewley and the rest of tire snoop I  think on that one at all.. .And infact, in a kind of 
way, I  think it’s quite reasonable to consider that one of the bedrock themes of tire Treatment and Rehabilitation 
Cirotrp was to address this problem! "
Members from different professional backgrounds and with different agendas were united in their 
agreement over the problem but there seemed to have been different views on how it should be 
done. An earlv draft of Chapter Seven suggested that private doctors and GPs should only be 
granted licences to treat dmg users if they worked with consultants in the Clinics. Although this 
idea was raised in the published chapter, it instead merely recommended close liaison with hospital
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services and access to expert second opinions. The call for reforms to the tribunals system were 
introduced in the new chapter.
The Conservatives’ manifesto of 1979 pledged the Government to simplifying and decentralising 
the N1 IS. However, as Charles W ebster has noted, in the health service and elsewhere, despite this 
commitment, the Government actually ended up introducing a much greater degree of central 
supervision over local activities."“1 'ITie manœuvres behind Tei”R illustrated this process, with 
centralising recommendations emanating from the Working Group, opposed by citai servants in 
the belief that they were ‘upholding Ministers’ policies’ of decen tralization ,w ho  were in turn 
overruled by ministers wanting to control matters from the centre.
The report’s first recommendation was for an expansion of the arrangements for central 
government to give advice and support to local agencies. 'ITie draft government response prepared 
bv a DHSS official rejected this as it w ould ‘conflict with Government policy on non-interference 
with local decisions on the allocation o f  local resources’."" Kenneth Clarke, then Minister for 
I lealth, was ‘not very impressed’ with this draft response and, in a memo to Norman Fowler, then 
Secretary o f State at the DHSS, stated that “Leaving the provision o f senice to “local decision- 
makers” will not make much progress unless we give them a steer’." 1 Furthermore, the 
government was also already committed to spending six million centrally allocated pounds on 
developing dmg services on the W orking Group’s recommendation.
This first recommendation was in fact a retreat from the Working Group’s original desire for ‘a 
central QUANGO to provide service o r  lav down strategies’. Again the DHSS civil servants 
dissuaded the Working Group -  tilts tim e successfully — but according to one of the officials ‘they 
still hankerjed] after a central monitoring/advisory team on I IAS lines’.' This referred to the 
I lealth Advisory Service, a body that monitored the NITS funded by the DHSS.
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When submitted to the Advisory Council itself, the new chapter on ‘Prescribing Safeguards’ elicited 
opposing responses. A minute of the July 1982 meeting showed that the ACMD did not wish to 
change it but some members felt that the report was too critical of private prescribers: although 
some private practitioners had misused their powers to prescribe, so too had N1 IS practitioners. 
‘Others pointed out that when patients were paying for prescriptions for dnigs of addiction.. .there 
was more potential for abuse.’11'
Use of Evidence
'ITie Treatment and Rehabilitation report made very little reference to published research evidence.
Only the three pages concerning The effectiveness o f treatment and rehabilitation’ referred to a 
handful o f research studies. Statistics from the Home Office on the number o f patients in 
treatment, drug offenders and dmg seizures were used in the report, and provided as an appendix, 
but most o f  the evidence used by the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group was of a more 
informal type, derived from the experiences o f its members and their visits around the country. 
Ihese trips provided the opportunity for discussions with a wide range of workers in contact with 
dnig users and with patients, ex-addicts and other concerned individuals, who were listed by their 
job title or role in an appendix. Ihe T&R Working Group also t<x>k oral evidence at meetings. 
7c~R’s cause for concern about doctors working away from hospital-based services was based on 
discussions with the Home Office Drugs Branch Inspectorate, doctors from the DHSS, doctors 
working with dnig users and views expressed in medical journals and elsewhere.1 4
’Ihe lack o f cited research evidence seemed in part to be a result of its limited availability at that 
time, the central point made in the report’s chapter on research, and was continued elsewhere."’
I lowcver, other reports by die ACMD published during the 1980s on topics for which there was 
much more research evidence, such as IHV/AIDS,"6 also lacked citations, relying again on 
submissions to the committee from organisations and individuals. The fact that the ACMD 
published reports during the 1980s without perceiving a need to support its statements through 
reference to published research implied a reliance on its authority as a body. ‘Expertise’ resided in 
its committee members’ experience and assumed impartiality with an expectation that their 
conclusions could be tmsted and that the information from which they were drawn did require 
independent senitiny. lliis  approach was not uncommon in medicine before the advent of
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‘evidence-based medicine’ but in such a politicised field the assumption of an objective, neutral 
expertise, whether truly possible in any circumstances, could be particularly ill-founded.
Reception o f Treatm ent and R ehabilitation
Aside from what it said, 7'eMf was a significant report because government implemented so many 
of its recommendations. 'ITie reason for ministers’ responsiveness and willingness to spend money 
on drug services has been attributed to their keen interest in dmg misuse at the time, referred to 
both between DHSS civil servants at the time and subsequently,"7'"* which in turn reflected the 
dramatic increase in Britain’s drug use, particularly heroin.
'llie  government was also keen to gain the support of the medical profession fo r the report’s 
proposals and called a conference o f medical representatives in January 1983 to  achieve this. 
Nonnan Fowler, the Secretary o f State at the DHSS, gave the keynote address, a departure from 
the normal protocol under which a more junior minister or senior official would have addressed 
the conference,"' again reflecting the priority given to this area. 1 lis interest in the topic dated back 
to his time as a journalist before entering p< >litics.
Overall the minister seems to have received a positive response from the medical representatives 
who showed no greater sympathy for private prescribes than the Treatment and Rehabilitation 
Working Group. A note o f the meeting showed some disquiet about ‘the principle of private 
prescribing’ in view of the charging o f fees, but these comments were unattributed.12" llicre 
appeared to have been dissent as to whether GPs should treat drug misuse but agreement that if 
they were to be, training and additional support would lie required.121 The BM A ’s General Medical 
Services Committee, representing the majority of GPs, supported the recommendations for gtxxl 
practice guidelines and for the extension o f  licensing initially to dipipanone and later other 
opioids,122 as did the majority o f medical representatives.
1,7 Senior Civil Servant, 1)1 ISS, Interview by Sarah Mars (2001).
,,M A. M. Blythe, Memo to M. Moodic. ‘Services for Dmg Misusers. ACM D’, (5'1' February 1982), File D AC 7, 
DH Archive, Nelson, I .ancashire.
1111 Senior Civil Servant, Dl ISS, (2001) op. lit.
,2h Anonymous, ‘Note o f the ( hie day medical conference convened at the Dl ISS to discuss the medical 
response to the ACMD report on Treatment and Rehabilitation on 28,h January 1983’. File DAC 28, D ll  
Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
121 Ibid.
122 L. Webb. Letter to K. Shore, Deputy Chief Medical Officer, DIISS. (12,h October, 1984) File DAC 28, DH 
Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
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ITie requirements for doctors to obtain licences proposed at the January 1983 medical conference 
were strict; those who wished to be able to prescribe methadone and other opioids by Home 
Office licence should have additional training, multi-disciplinary support, and membership of the 
Royal College of General Practitioners or the British Medical Association.'2' These obstacles to 
practice may have reflected the general lack of enthusiasm among GPs for treating dmg users. 
Another suggestion was that the number of drug dependent patients should be limited to 3 or 4 on 
any GP’s list -  this would have effectively ended private prescribing on any significant scale.
A wider range of views was recorded on the utility of or necessity for good practice guidelines and 
the Department agreed to invite further small groups to consider both the question of licensing and 
die preparation of guidelines in the light of responses to a wider consultation exercise.1“4 A dvil 
servant’s draft of Norman Fowler’s letter to the I lome Secretary gave a rather more triumphant 
tone to Fowler’s achievements at this meeting where he ‘secured a favourable climate’ for the 
establishment of the good practice guidelines and licensing working group.121’ In the actual letter 
Fowler sent, mention o f  the ‘favourable climate’ had been removed.1"6
Conclusion
Tirulmen/ and RehMlitution heralded many changes to the freedoms and responsibilities o f doctors 
working outside the Clinics and the first major regulatory interventions against private doctors since 
the Brain Committee’s changes of the late 1960s. While attacking private doctors, 1'drR  also gave 
approval to the involvement of the generalist in the treatment of dnig users, reversing over a 
decade’s policy of exclusion. Such expansion and concerns over existing non-Clinic prescribing 
were used to justify the retention o f power for the hospital consultants and central government 
through the development of new and existing control mechanisms. Theae controls were in fact 
primarily designed for existing private prescribcrs rather than anticipated GP involvement.
'lTiat the report’s recommendations were implemented almost wholesale can be attributed to widely 
publicised changes in the landscape o f dnig taking in Britain since the late 1970s and the 
subsequent political will to address these publidy. Some of these wide reaching changes might 
never have been suggested or given such prominence had it not been for the determination o f a 
few individuals deeply concerned about the role of private prescribers and perceived
1 22 Anonymous, ‘Note conference on 28,h January 1983’, op. at.
124 Ibid.
125 Anonymous, Draft reply to Home Secretary from Norman Fowler (undated) File DAC 14 Volume 4, D l I 
Archive, Nelson, 1 Lancashire.
,26 N. Fowler, letter to  L. Britton (MV* November 1983), File D AC  14, D ll Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
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encroachments on their dominant position. Although expanding, the still small size of the drugs 
policy community in the late 1970s and early 1980s allowed some ambitious individuals to gain 
great influence across a number of settings. Philip Connell and Thomas Bewley’s authority within 
the London psychiatric drugs field and their presence on this and subsequent working groups 
played a pivotal role in seeking to control private prescribing. And although opposed to the Clinic 
monopoly over controlled drug prescribing sought by the consultants, concerns about private 
prescribing struck a chord with the voluntary sector representation as well.
While the second Brain Committee had been entirely medical, in the day of the Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Working Group medicine was having to make room for other disciplines and 
occupational groups. Non-medical members wielded considerable influence, with T&R’s radical 
agenda set by David Turner at the outset o f  the second Working Group. Yet it still successfully 
defended its territory from infringements, and managed to keep the most controversial treatment 
issue — namely prescribing — within its professional borders. The story o f what happened within 
those borders is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Major Regulatory Interventions I:
The Guidelines o f  Good C linical Practice in  the Treatm ent 
o f D rug M isuse (1984)
Introduction
In 1984, amid a steep increase in the number o f  drug users seeking treatment, the Department o f 
I lealth and Social Security (DI1SS) published the Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in tin Treatment of 
Drug M isuse' one of the first official clinical guidelines in British medicine. The proliferation of 
clinical guidelines and protocols which followed, particularly after the N I IS market reforms of 
1991, has been interpreted as the increasing of state control over the medical profession and a 
weakening o f medical autonomy." I lowever, this chapter argues that these first clinical guidelines 
represented the use o f regulation by an alliance o f one part of the medical profession and an ann o f 
the state to control the practice o f a second group of doctors. The Guidelines were used to secure 
the ascendancy of one particular treatment model and impose this on all doctors, while citing no 
supporting published research evidence. The experience of an expert committee was deemed by 
government and many o f those involved to Ijc  sufficient for determining ‘gtxxl practice’.
Background and Context
In 1982, the ACMD had published Treatment and Rehabilitation. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
its recommendations were to change the direction of dnig treatment policy in England. At that 
point, doctors working outside the Clinics were still able to prescribe methadone, a synthetic opiate- 
used to replace heroin, dexamphetamine (a stimulant o f the amphetamine family) and other 
substitute drugs, and their prescribing was receiving unwelcome attention, particularly from senior 
consultant psychiatrists in the Ixtndon Clinics. Chief among those irritated by the private 
prescribe« were Dr'ITiomas Bewlev and Dr Philip Connell who had led  the move from 
maintenance heroin prescribing to short term methadone detoxification, and from injectable to oral 
formulations across the Ixmdon Clinics. 12
1 Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence, Guidelines o f  Good Glinical Practice in the Treatment o f  
Drug Misuse (I -ondon: DHSS, 1984).
2 8. I larrison and W.I.U. Ahmad, ‘Medical autonomy and the UK state 1975-2025 ’, Smiotoey, 34 (2000), 129— 
146.
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In the 1970s and early 80s little research had been carried out to evaluate these different approaches 
to prescribing,1 and w hat existed was often misrepresented. Richard I Iartnoll and Martin 
Mitcheson’s randomised trial of injectable heroin and oral methadone was frequently cited to justify 
the prescribing changes in the Clinics and had been key in achieving the move from maintenance 
prescribing of heroin to limited stabilisation on methadone followed by short term detoxification, 
often with obligatory therapy sessions.4
In the early 1970s Richard I Iartnoll and Martin Mitcheson randomly allocated 96 opiate dependent 
patients at a North I -ondon Clinic to either injectable heroin or oral methadone maintenance 
treatment and then followed up a year later.5 'Ihe research was carried out between 1972 and 1976 
but was unpublished until 1980. I lowever, in the 1970s its findings were frequently cited to justify 
the prescribing changes in the Clinics/’ In a published paper the study’s authors were equivocal 
about its findings, stressing they showed no one treatment to be superior. Although their results 
showed different positive and negative points for both the heroin and the methadone prescription 
groups, ‘the differences between the two groups, although often statistically significant are not 
startling. Which ever treatment is given, there are obvious casualties that may reflect the pre-existing 
chaos of the patients as much as the treatment offered.” The authors concluded that die findings 
‘contribute to a more informed discussion’ o f the issues around heroin prescription ‘rather than 
provide an unequivocal answer.’® Yet in spite o f  these cautious words, the research was used to 
justify a switch away from heroin prescribing and towards oral methadone. Martin Mitcheson, co­
author of the study, stopped prescribing injectable drugs entirely to new patients at his Clinic after 
the research was completed in the mid-1970s.’
Senior Clinic consultant Dr Thomas Bewley described how, because the evidence showed neither 
dntg to be superior, ‘I felt it was open to the prcscribcr to choose so I moved over to methadone 
and phased out heroin’, " trying to encourage other doctors to follow suit. One of the opponents of 
the Clinics’ switch to methadone complained that ‘while critics of what the (Clinics] were doing
' A. Thorley, ‘Longitudinal studies o f drug dependence’ in G. Edwards and C. Busch (cds.) Drag Problems in 
Britain: A Review o f  Ten Y ean  (London, Academic Press, 1981), 117—169.
1 M. Mitcheson, ‘Drug clinics in the 1970s’ in J. Strang and M. Gossop (cds.). Heroin Addiction and Dm# Polity: 
lire British System (( ix fo rd . New York and Tokyo: ( )xford University Press, 1994) pp. 179-191.
’ R. 1 lartnoll, M. C. Mitcheson, A. Battcrsby, G Brown, M Ellis, P. Fleming, N. I Icdlcy, ‘Evaluation o f heroin 
maintenance in controlled trial’. Archives o f  General Psychiatry, h i  (1980), 877-884.
6 G. V. Stimson and E. < ippenheimer, / leroin Addiction: Treatment and Control in  Britain (1 amdon: Tavistock 
Publications, 1982) pp.215-219.
R. Ilartnol], M. C. Mitcheson, A. Battcrsby et a t ,  p.88.V
* Ibid.p.BBh.
’’ M. Sharpe, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
10 I* Bewley, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
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were required to produce data to support their criticisms’, one of its proponents had freely admitted 
that there was ‘no scientific basis’ for this major change." By the time the Guideline.rwere being 
drafted in 1984, oral methadone detoxification was the only option offered to new patients seeking 
help from the Clinics.
Ihe 1 jondon Clinics’ unified approach was facilitated by a regular meeting o f  their consultant 
psychiatrists, from 1968,12 in order to share information and standardise practice. This was held 
first at the DHSS and from 1977 at the Home Office.11 Martin Mitcheson, a consultant at 
University College Hospital DDU, described these meetings as ‘typically English, discreet peer 
group pressure tending to moderate the prescribing o f  heroin’ in order to prevent dmgs being 
traded illegally.1'*
One DDU consultant psychiatrist who continued to disagree with the anti-maintenance approach 
at the I-ondon consultants groups claimed to have been pressurised to conform when he persisted 
with the practice.1’ Another complained that these conformist pressures produced farcical double 
standards: doctors who continued to prescribe injectable heroin were criticised but licensed 
colleagues in other Clinics would phone to ask them to prescribe heroin to a patient because, 
although licensed, they did not feel able to do so themselves.16 (The I-ondon Consultants Group is 
considered in detail in Chapter 8.)
Over this period the relationship between the prescribers and the black market also changed. In 
their early days, the Clinics, as monopoly suppliers o f  dnigs, hail pursued a practice known as 
‘competitive prescribing’ as a deterrent against the development of the black market. They 
therefore took a dual role of treating drug users and controlling the wider drug supply, aiming to 
treat mill vidual patients and protect wider public health through controlling the availability of 
dmgs.' At this point, prescriben could influence the supply of dnigs considerably because there 
was little supply of trafficked dmgs available, but this changed in the late 1970s and by the early 
1980s the substantial supplies o f smuggled heroin entering Britain provided a burgeoning black 
market.
11I I. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), /leroin Addiction Carr and Control: the ‘Rritish System' 1916-1984 (London: 
Drugscope, 2002) pp.2*45-246.
12 DHSS, 'Drug dependence: clinical conference’, [Minutes o f  meeting) (28"' November 1968), Private archive. 
11 II. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott) (2002), op. tit., p.243.
M M. Mitcheson, (1994) op. tit., pp.178-179.
1 s K. Sathananthan, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
If' |. II. VC’illis, 'Unacceptable face o f  private practice: prescription o f controlled dmgs to addicts’ [letter], Rritish 
Medita!Journal, 287 (1983), 500.
17 G. V. Stimson and I .. ( Ippenheimer, (1982) op. tit., pp.54-56.
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Insufficient treatment places in the Clinics and the spread o f  heroin use to parts of the country 
without specialist provision were the context against which drug users were increasingly seeking 
treatment from NHS or private general practice.18 The m ove away from the Clinics may have 
resulted not just from their long waiting lists but also because o f their changing prescribing 
policies,"1 particularly in London. Clinic psychiatrists expressed disquiet at these changes, 
particularly regarding private doctors prescribing outside the Clinic system on a fee-paying basis.
In 1980 the first open attack on private prescribing had appeared in the British MedicalJournal, in 
which its author commented, There are strong economic pressures on addicts to try to obtain 
controlled drugs on prescription and then to sell some of them ; and there are subtle pressures on a 
doctor who considers prescribing privately to convince him that he will be treating patients rather 
than selling drugs.. .The medical profession should consider whether there is any place for private 
treatment of addicts where a fee is contingent o f a prescription.0"
A vehement debate developed around the differences in prescribing methods of these groups o f 
doctors, emerging in the medical press21 and official reports,”  sometimes spilling into disciplinary 
cases at the General Medical Council (see Chapter 5).2' Private prescribers were accused of selling 
drug prescriptions for profit rather than treating patients,24 while private doctors accused the Clinics 
of failing to meet addicts’ needs. Among their alleged shortcomings were the prescription of drugs 
only after delays or in formulations unacceptable to their patients, both o f  which, it was claimed, led 
dnig users to buy more dangerous black market drugs to prevent withdrawal symptoms.25 One o f 
the most vigorous defenders of private prescribing. Dr A nn Dally, was to become a member o f  the 
committee responsible for the Guidelines, and her prescribing was also subject to disciplinary 
hearings before the GMC.
The peer pressure exercised successfully by the I xmdon psychiatrists continued after heroin 
prescribing had diminished, successfully effecting the m ove towards prescribing injectable and then 
oral methadone in the Clinics. It had not, however, succeeded in imposing confonnity on the
See ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, Dl ISS (London: IIMSC ), 1982) pp.26-27.
19 J. Strang, ‘Personal view’, British Medieal Journal, 283 (1981), 376.
20 T. II. Bcwlcy, ‘Prescribing Psychoactive Drugs to Addicts’, B ritish  Medical Journal, 281 (1980), 497-498, p.497.
21 eg. T. Bewlcy and A . 11. (ihodsc, ‘Unacceptable face o f private practice: prescription o f controlled drugs to 
addicts’, British M edical Journal, 286 (1983), 1876-1877.
22 ACMD, (1982) op. a t., pp.51-62.
24 See A. Dally, A Doctor's Story (1 xtndon: Macmillan, 1990).
24 T. 11. Bcwlcy, (1980) op. ¡it., p.497.
' eg A. Dally, ‘Drug clinics today’ |lettcr|. The Ldineet, 8328 (1983), 826.
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practice of private prescribe!? or general practitioners prescribing outside the Clinics, both of 
whom greatly valued their independence from their peers.
Conservative politicians, who might be seen as champions o f private treatment for drug users, did 
not involve themselves in this particular debate. Although the new Conservative government of 
1979 had gready facilitated the supply of consultant labour to the private sector,'6 private 
prescribing for the treatment o f addiction by Nl IS Clinic psychiatrists was rare and not well 
respected. Ihc 1979 Conservative manifesto had proposed an end to die Vendetta’ against private 
practice and its 1983 successor encouraged a positive role for private medicine.26 7 *29However, this did 
not include dmg treatment which was dealt with as a ‘dntgs’ issue rather than a ‘private medicine’ 
issue, and as such was not treated as a party political concern.
H om e O ffice D rugs Inspectorate
Unlike other areas o f prescribing dealt with by the CMC as part o f the medical profession’s self­
regulating remit, the prescription of controlled drugs such as heroin, cocaine and methadone also 
came under the scrutiny of the I lome Office. 'ITiese powers had a precedent in the unsuccessful 
Inebriates Acts o f  the late nineteenth century and they developed during and after the hirst World 
W ar. Amendments to the Defence of the Realm Act passed in 1916 empowered the Home 
Secretary to withdraw from a doctor the power to prescribe cocaine if  he was convicted of an 
offence under the Act and controls on opiates followed. I lomc Office officials were detailed to 
monitor compliance and in 1917 this authority was extended to senior police officers.2* Building on 
these developments, the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1920, developed two different systems of 
monitoring: the I lome Office’s own Dmgs Inspectorate and the |-k dice's chemist inspecting 
officers concerned with criminal offences. ‘Irresponsible prescribing’ by doctors concerned the 
I lom e ( )ffice, rather than the police, but was not defined by law and up until publication of the 
Guidelines, the Home Office had no official measure against which to gauge it.
Much of the I lom e Office Inspectorate’s regulatory work was carried out on an official but 
informal basis, with inspectors visiting doctors and advising them to modify their practice.2-’ On 
rare occasions, doctors were summoned to a I lome Office Tribunal that had the power to remove 
their right to prescribe controlled dmgs. I I.B.'Bing’ Spear, Chief Drugs Inspector from 1977 to 
1986, and active in the Inspectorate since 1952, t<x>k a personal interest in the prescribing habits of
26 w . I.aing, Going Private. Uiilepeniient I leulth Cart in \sondon (Ixrndon: King’s Fund, 1992).
27 C. Webster, / V  National Wealth Service. A  Political History (Oxford: ( )xford University Press, 1998) p.146.
2" 11. B. Spear (and cd. J. Mott), (2002) op. ¡it., p.37
29 Ibid, p.260.
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doctors and in the wellbeing o f their patients, and possessed an intimate knowledge of the drugs 
‘scene’. In this role he became not merely an implementer of others’ policy, but a major influence in 
his own right. M ining, as he did, among the doctors, civil servants, committees and dnig users on 
the streets, he was recognised by all sides of the prescribing debate as one of the most 
knowledgeable and trustworthy sources of information and guidance.'"'"'" .Although a strong 
supporter of doctors’ freedom to prescribe on a maintenance basis and an opponent of the changes 
brought in by the London Clinic psychiatrists, he also believed in the need to regulate doctors’ 
prescribing."
Until 1986 Spear attended most of the Ixtndon Clinic psychiatrists’ meetings," where he was able 
to provide information to the consultants and in his regulatory capacity could follow up reports of 
‘irresponsible prescribing’ among private prescribes and other doctors." lTie 1 lome Office Drugs 
Tribunals, used to discipline doctors considered to be prescribing irresponsibly, were only directed 
against doctors working outside the (Trues." 'ITie Clinics were therefore free to prescribe within 
the standards they set for themselves, and the picture was one o f self-regulation rather than 
regulation by the state.
M em bership an d  intentions o f  the M edical W orking Group
At the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group, the medical profession had successfully 
preserved prescribing policy for themselves; encouraged and facilitated by the DI1SS, and its 
medical civil servants, the G’/r/WM>/r.r’membership reflected this. Most of the all-Mcdical Working 
Group’s members had been nominated by medical lx Kites on the suggestion o f the DI 1SS: the 
General Medical Council, British Medical Association, the Royal Colleges of Psychiatrists and 
General Practitioners, the |oint Consultants’ Committee and the Association o f Independent 
Doctors in Addiction (AIDA).
The presence o f  AIDA, whose president was Dr Ann Dally, the most outspoken private prescriber 
of the 1980s, was a deliberate political move by the chairman and secretariat to create at least the 
appearance of a consensus statement.’7’’* Views have varied as to whether this was a genuine
*,T. Bcwlcv, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
”  A. Dally,"(1990) op. at., pp.71-275.
'2 D. Turner [SC()DA), Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
U eg. 11. B. Spear (and ed. |. Mott) (2002), op. tit., pp.62-63. 
u  eg. I but. p.62.
”  T. Bcwley, (2001) op. at.
" I lomc ( Iffice, Personal communication, (2002).
'' Senior Civil Servant, DI1SS, (2001) op. tit. 
w H. D. Beckett, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
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intention to take on the views o f private doctors or in fact an attempt ‘to smother the enemy.. .  by 
creating something they appear to agree with’.39 Professor Neil Kessel, in his role as the Chief 
Medical Officer’s advisor on alcohol, was appointed to the Working Group and a minority were 
invited for their particular expertise: Dr Arthur Banks had written on treating drug users in general 
practice,411,41 and Dr Elizabeth Tyldcn was an authority on drug use in pregnancy.42 There was 
therefore a mix of representation from medical bodies and expertise in the drugs field, across NHS 
and private medicine.
i l i e  original aims of the psychiatrist members o f  the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group 
and the chairman of the Medical Working G roup, Dr Philip Connell, in producing the good 
practice Guidelines can be summarised as controlling doctors working outside the Clinics, 
particularly those in private practice,4''44 retaining dominance for drug dependence psychiatrists and 
their preferred treatment model, and preventing diversion o f prescribed drugs onto the black 
market. Indeed the first papers circulated to Medical Working Group members were an article 
criticising private prescribing and related correspondence in the British A iedicalJournal and the 
Lancet.**
Dr Thomas Bewley’s motives were similar to those of Dr Connell and could be described as 
stopping maintenance prescribing and promoting the model of treatment dominant among 
London psychiatrists. Dr Bewley, at this time, had been won over to methadone from heroin 
prescribing after meeting Vincent Dole, a pioneer of methadone substitution therapy, during a visit 
to the US in 1967.4 '4HI le also hoped to bring private prescribing to an end.4” "
Dr Arthur Banks, a GP in Chelmsford, Essex, with considerable experience o f treating dmg users, 
wished to encourage other GPs to get involved. There was little published guidance available to 
GPs at that time and he hoped that the Guidelines would give them greater confidence and sh< >\v 
their obligations in treating dmg users. 1 le w anted ‘something official that was a considered
w D. Turner, (2002) op. at.
81 eg. T. Waller and A. Banks, ‘Drug abuse pull out supplement’, GP, (25,h March 1983), 27-45.
11 eg. A. Banks and T. A. N. Waller, Drue, Addiction u n d  Potydinq Use: The Ro/e o f  the General Practitioner (London: 
ISDD, 1983).
4’ eg. 1'.. Tyldcn, '(Are o f the pregnant drug addict’, AtlAtS, I"'June (198.3), 1-4.
43 A. Thorley, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
44 Senior Civil Servant, DUSS, (2001) op. cit.
45 T. Bewley and A. H. Ghodse, (1983) op. cit., pp.1876-1877.
4<l A. Dally, (1983) op. ,it„ p.826.
47 Anonymous, 'Journal Interview 36: Conversation with 'lhomas Bcwlcy’, Addiction, 90 (1995), 883 892.
48 T. Bewley, ‘Drug dependence in the USA’, bulletin on  Narcotics, XXI, 2 (1969), 13-29.
49 Sec T. H. Bewlcy, (1980) op. cit., p.497.
“  -Sec T. Bewley and A. H. Ghodsc, (1983) op. cit., pp.1876-1877.
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document summarising the best ideas on treatment of drug addicts and something that would be 
available to all GPs.’51 I Ie did not have specific concerns about the potential for the Guidelines to 
enforce a particular model but strongly opposed the extension of licensing to all opioids, seeing it as 
likely to destroy any emergent interest in treating drug users from general practice.52 *He also wanted 
to show GPs that there was government backing for their involvement independent from 
addiction psychiatrists.
Private doctor Ann Dally also opposed the extension of licensing, and wished to promote her 
news on treatment, including the need for long tenn prescribing. I ike virtually all doctors 
practising outside the Clinics, she did not have a licence to prescribe heroin or cocaine. A fellow 
member recalled that she ‘fought her comer with great vigour.’”  1 lad the licensing system been 
extended to cover all opioid dmgs, she might have been denied the right to continue prescribing 
and so would have had to cease her practice. She saw herself as one of a group o f ‘dissidents’ which 
included Dr H. Dale Beckett whom she had invited onto the Medical Working Group from 
AIDA, and sometimes Arthur Banks, opposing the psychiatric ‘establishment’ on the 
committee.54'55 Psychiatrist Dale Beckett, at this stage retired from his NI IS consultant post in 
charge of a Clinic at Cane 1 lill I lospital, Surrey, and working in private practice, held unorthodox 
views on the rights of dmg users to maintenance supplies, believing that heroin, a ‘gentle dmg’, 
should be made available to addicts and he supported Ann Dally on treatment and licensing 
issues.'6''’7
Among the representatives o f the medical bodies without specific dmgs expertise, the BMA’s Dr J 
A Riddell, a Glasgow GP, strongly opposed GP involvement in treating dmg users.5* ‘1 le just felt 
they’d be overwhelmed; there’d be more problems because they wouldn’t cope’,57 and on most 
issues the other non-expert representatives tended to side with the psychiatrists, including < m the 
matter of licensing.6"’*1
Sl A. Banks, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
A. Banks, Letter to N. Fowler, MP, (1983), Ref 40117, DrugScopc library, London
H A. Banks, (2001) op. at.
s* A. Dally, Dorter's Story (Ia)ndon: Macmillan, 1990) pp.127-132.
** A. Thoiicy, (2002) up. a t
56 H. D. Beckett, ‘Heroin, the gentle drug’. New Sodety. 49, 877 (1979), 181-182.
57 H. D. Beckett, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
SM A. Banks, (2001) op. at.
v> Senior Civil Servant, DHSS, (2001) op. at.
A. Banks, (2001) op. til.
“  A. Dally, (1990) op. at., pp.127-132.
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In the Medical Working Group, the push for additional restrictions on prescribing through further 
I lome Office licensing, which would have considerably reduced doctors’ clinical autonomy, came 
from the psychiatrist members appointed by the secretariat. It was supported by many of the 
elected doctors and opposed by medical civil servants at the DI1SS and administrative civil sen-ants 
at the 1 lom e Office.6-'61 Although it was unknown how exactly such a licensing system would have 
operated, it was unlikely that it would have had an impact on the prescribing of the Clinic 
psychiatrists who already held I lome Office licences for heroin and cocaine prescribing. The group 
recommended by a vote of eleven in favour, one abstention and three opposed, that licensing 
restrictions should be extended to all opioids except oral methadone,61 but it was later over-ruled by 
ministers as unnecessary and possibly likely to deter GPs from treating drug users.65*®
The R o le o f  the Secretariat
Ihe secretariat to the Medical Working Group was provided by Dr Dorothy Black, senior medical 
officer dealing with drugs policy at the DHSS, and Mr R Wittenberg, a career civil servant. Dr 
Black, who came to the Department in 1981 from her post as consultant psychiatrist working with 
drug users in Sheffield, was pardculariy influential in drug service policy of the early 1980s. Despite 
sharing a medical specialty, she did not automatically side with the dominant Ixtndon addiction 
psychiatrists and was encouraging o f non-statutory and non-medical involvement in drug treatment 
services.6' Her experience of patterns of dmg use outside o f London was important in countering 
the Ixmdon-centric policy making of the period.6" While attending the Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Working Group, she is thought to have been responsible for suggesting the Guidelines 
recommendation as a compromise between the 1 xindon consultants’ call for legal regulatory 
changes and those opposing them. One member of the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working 
Group commented,
/ lomthy Block was important... in avoiding formal regulation in favour ojguidelines... Partly 1 think, that 
regulation was a rather impracticalprocess hut secondly I  drink drat Domttry was more conscious of lire need for a 
greater range of treatment options rather than a very standardised system [of lire Clinics],w
1,2 Senior Civil Servant, Dl 1SS, (2001) op. cit.
M Home ( )fûce, MWG (84) 33, ‘Power to restrict licences to prescribe under Misuse o f Drugs Act 1971’, (1984) 
Private archive.
f'* D. Black, ‘Medical Working Group on Dmg Dependence’, (1985), File 16/DAC 28/2, DH Archive, Nelson, 
1-ancashire.
D. Mcllor, letter to R. Whitney, (10* December 1985), File 16/DAC 28/2, DH Archive, Nelson, Lancashire. 
“ J. Patten, letter to D. Mcllor, (15,h May 1985), File 16/DAC 28/2, DH Archive, Nelson, I-ancashire.
67 A. Ihorley, (2002) op. tit.
“  Senior Civil Servant, DHSS, (2001) op. eil.
"" D. Turner, (2<X>2) op. at.
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Her wide scope to initiate policy in the DHSS of the early ’80s seems to have been facilitated by 
both the lack of interest in drug treatment policies among the administrative civil servants (ie. those 
who were employed as career bureaucrats rather than hired for their particular expertise in a 
subject) and the enthusiastic support o f Norman howler, then Secretary of State, whose interest in 
drug issues predated his political career.7" According to a contemporary source in the Department, 
‘there was nobody else in the Department who knew anything at all about dmgs... from the point 
of new of the administrative civil servants it was almost seen as being sent to Mongolia.’71 Dr Black 
was closely involved in the selection process for membership of the Medical Working Group and 
carried out most of the Guidelines drafting work as Mr Wittenberg was unwell for much of the 
project.'
An important feature o f  die DHSS was the inclusion o f medical civil sen-ants on its staff direedy 
answerable until 1995,71 to the Chief Medical Officer. These medical civil servants acted as ‘experts’ 
and tended not to become hilly assimilated into the bureaucracy. Compared to the administrative 
staff they had considerable independence 4 to work as ‘professionals’ and played a significant part in 
initiating policy, which was then carried out by the administrative staff. 5 For instance, as DHSS 
‘obsen-ers’ on AC\II9 Working Groups, they were encouraged to speak as experienced clinicians 
rather than administrators, and many working in dmg and alcohol policy returned to clinical work 
after periods at the Department during the 1980s and ’90s. In addition to the secretariat who 
drafted the document, obsen-ers from both the DHSS and I lome Office attended the Medical 
W orking Group’s meetings, reflecting the Home Office’s regulator)7 interest.
Regulation by th e S ta te
Ihe Guidelines quoted Treatment and Rebabilitatiotfs hope that ‘these guidelines would help to identity 
those cases where prescribing practices might be regarded as irresponsible.’ " The Guidelines were 
therefore valuable to the Home Office Dmgs Inspectorate in their role of advising doctors and 
bringing Tribunal proceedings against them. In tliis they were helping the state use bureaucratic 
mles to control otherwise self-regulating professionals.
" Senior Civil Servant, DHSS, (2001) op. tit.
71 Ibid
72 ¡bid
77 A. Thorley, (2002) op. cit.
74 Senior Civil Servant, DHSS, (2001) op. at.
77 A. Thorlcy, (2002) op. at.
Senior Civil Servant, DHSS, (2001) op. at.
77 ACMD, Treatment am t Rehabilitation, DHSS (Iaindon: HMSO, 1982) p.59.
78 Medical Working G roup  on Drug Dependence, (1984) op. at., p.3.
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As a DHSS civil servant commented, The Inspectorate, if you like, had their own internal view [on 
prescribing] and there’d never been any guidelines before.. .it would reinforce what the 
Inspectorate said as they trundled round all the doctors.’
Not only were the Guidelines official, but they gave an appearance of medical self-regulation, rather 
than regulation by the state. For the Inspectorate it would ‘give them another piece of support 
when they were advising doctors, that.. .to a doctor it might be more effective in influencing their 
practice to say “This is from a working party of doctors”, rather than saying as a I lome Office 
Inspector, “Do you think your prescribing levels are too high?” ''
The Home Office did not, however, seek the extension of licensing, which could have given it 
greater powers over prescribing drugs. This may have been because the most influential civil 
servant in this field, Bing Spear, then Chief Home Office Drugs Inspector, was not sympathetic to 
the leading psychiatrists advocating the licensing extension, such as Philip Connell, who he 
described as paring ‘bp service.. .to the concept o f  cbnical freedom’ while ‘conformity and 
psycliiatric domination o f the drug misuse field remained the ultimate goals.-*"
I lere then, was a department o f the I lome Office acting within the pobey community in part to its 
own agenda. Spear, while concerned to control the flow of prescrilx'd dmgs from reaching the 
black market, part of the Home Office’s remit for regulating doctors, also had a strong bebet in die 
traditions o f the ‘British System’ and the freedom it allowed to prescribe!«. Under his leadership, 
the Inspectorate allied with the I xmdon psychiatrists’ interests o f producing the Guidelines when 
seeking to reinforce its own pobcing powers, and opposed them when their |x>licies were seen as 
too restrictive.
Outcom es
What the G uidelines said
In style and presentation the Guidelines wen: functional and unemlxibshed. The text, broken into 
short paragraphs, was impersonal and detached, giving an impression of authority and consensus. It 
conveyed a sense that treating dmg users was straightforward and relatively simple with limited 
variation. The content was targeted at the various doctors both inside and outside hospitals who 
might be involved in treating dmg users, including general practitioners, psychiatrists and casualty 
officers. It focused on opiate, barbiturate and Ix-nztxbazepine dependence, with just a few 
sentences on alcohol, stimulants and other drugs.
Vl Senior Civil Servant, I )1 ISS, (2001) op. at.
HO II. B. Spear (and cd.J. Mott), (2002) op. at., p.279.
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The Guidelines told all doctors, including GPs, that it was their duty to provide care for their 
patients’ drug related problems, a point emphasised in the covering letter from the Chief Medical 
Officer.1*1 Abstinence and cessation of injecting were the goals o f treatment; long term opiate 
prescription was strongly discouraged and GPs were told to consider it only under the guidance of 
a specialist. I "he substitute drug of choice was oral methadone to be used only for withdrawal over 
no more than six months. Patient and doctor needed to agree the detoxification regime (but this is 
in an absence o f any alternative prescribing). No concessions to injectable prescribing were made, 
although patients’ dependence on ‘injecting and injecting practice’ were acknowledged. Doctors 
were also advised to consider prescribing non-controlled dmgs instead o f opioids to alleviate 
withdrawal symptoms.
An appendix ‘Managing withdrawal symptoms and detoxification’ set out various detoxification 
regimes for use inside and outside hospitals. 1 lere too most attention was devoted to opi< »id, 
barbiturates and benzodiazepine dependence. For opioid withdrawal, no limit was set on the dose 
of methadone that could be prescribed but the suggestion was that doctors were unlikely to need to 
prescribe more than 80mg a day. Prescriptions o f  80-100mg of methadone, the Guidelines advised, 
should not be attempted in outpatients. (I"he 1999 Guidelines recommended a daily limit of 
12< hug.1*2) Prescribing regimes ranged between two weeks, which required the patient to be in stable 
accommodation and to receive intensive support from the doctor, and family or friends, to up to 
six months for which domestic stability was also needed. Daily dispensing to ensure the methadone 
was consumed only by the patient was encouraged.
As with other reports on drug treatment from the mid-1970s onwards, the ‘multi-disciplinary’ 
approach w as advocated, both in hospital through team working and by liaison with other 
agencies."’ '’*4 CiPs were advised not to manage more chaotic patients or those on high doses but 
rather to refer them to hospital-based services. In short, doctors were advised on the range of 
prescribing they should and should not undertake, the type o f patients they should take on or refer, 
the context in  which they should prescribe, the acceptable dmgs, doses, and formulations and their 
duties to drug using patients, 'litis did not reflect agreement across the views of the Medical
"* E. D. Achcmon, ‘Guidelines o f Good Clinical Practice in the Treatment o f Drug Dependence' (fetter to all 
doctors accompanying the Guidelines], (29"’ October 1984).
"’ UK I Icalth Departments, Dru& Misuse und Dependence. Guidelines on CUniculManaffmeut (I aindon: The Stationery 
( )ffice, 1999) p.47
"’ eg. DHSS, Better Sendees f o r  the Menially ///(London: HMSO, 1975) pp.68-70.
M eg. ACM D. (1982) op. ,r/„ pp.81 86.
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Working Group, or the summation o f research findings, but rather the dominance of some 
doctors’ views over others.
L icensing
licensing had first been introduced in 1968, on the recommendation of the second Brain 
Committee, so that doctors wanting to prescribe heroin or cocaine (and from 1984 dipipanone) for 
the treatment o f addiction were requited to apply to the I lome Office (see Chapter 2)."5 These 
licences were almost exclusively granted to psychiatrists working in the new NHS Clinics. Only 
two or three doctors were ever licensed to prescribe heroin privately.“6'“' lia s  change was followed 
by a series of attempts, originating with the I xindon Clinic constlltants, to extend licensing and 
further restrict the prescribing powers o f doctors outside the Clinic system. The case was made for 
this through concerns about the diversion of prescribed dmgs onto the black market, blamed on 
doctors working outside the Clinics, and sometimes a disapproval o f maintenance prescribing itself.
Ilie first in this series of attempts occurred almost as soon as the Clinics had been set up and the 
first heroin and cocaine licences issued. A Department of I lealth meeting of the London Clinic 
psychiatrists in 1969 had proposed that all dependency producing drugs to known addicts, not just 
heroin and cocaine, should be removed from GPs and limited to the Clinics. 1 lowcver, the idea 
was rejected by the Department for financial reasons.1“ The idea was then revived at two meetings 
between the voluntary sector and consultants in 1979 and 1980, held at the Institute for die Study 
of Drug Dependence, aimed at providing recommendations for the ACNID’s Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Working Group. 'Hie second meeting yielded a recommendation to extend licensing 
for doctors prescribing on a maintenance basis only to those working with or under a specialist 
facility. Although this recommendation seems to have misrepresented the views of a number of the 
voluntary sector agencies, it was forwarded to the AGMD nonetheless."'’ These then emerged only 
slightly modified in Treatment and Rehabilitation as recommendations for production of die 
Guidelines and to extend licensing to cover all opioid dmgs (see ( Chapter 3 o f the thesis).“’ Despite
Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, 7 'he Second Report o fth e  Interdepartmental Committee (London: 
HMSO, 1965) pp.9-10.
“  Department o f  I Icalth and Social Security, Department o f education and Science, I lome ( )ffrce and 
Manpower Services Commission, Misuse o fD n tff with Special Reference to the Treatment and Rehabilitation o f  Misusers o/ 
Hard Ontff: Clonemment Response to the i'onrth Report from the Social Services Committee Session I9S4 K i (London: 
HMSO, 1985) pp. 18-19.
1,7 A. Macfarlane, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
J. 1.. Reed, “Meeting o f Doctors Working in Iaindon Dntg Dependency Treatment Centres, November 25lh, 
1969 at St Bartholomew’s Hospital” [Minutes], Private Archive.
H. B. Spear (and ed. ). Mott), (2002) op. at., pp.279-280.
*’ ACMD, (1982) op. at., p.84.
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the Medical Working Group’s majority support for the licensing extension, ministers at the 1 lome 
Office and DHSS rejected the proposal.
It was an analysis of prescriptions for two opioids thought to be of most concern, Pulfitim and 
DPI 18s, which seems to have convinced Ray Witney, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for 
I lealth, that these extra controls were not needed.” However, the summary of the findings sent to 
David Mellor, his opposite number at the I lom e Office, advising against extending licensing, gave a 
somewhat partial and more optimistic interpretation than the prescribing figures in the 
accompanying table allowed (see table 8.1). This was then further exaggerated in W itney’s covering 
letter, which referred to a ‘downward trend since 1978’ in dextromoramide (Piilfmm) and 
dihydrocodeine tartrate (DF118). DF118 prescribing had actually increased between 1974 and 
1982 from 718 prescriptions to 944, followed b y  one year o f slight decline to 922.
Table 4.1 Prescription Analysis: Opioids 1974-1983
Year DF118 x 
30mgms
Pulftum  x 
lOmgm
P iiliiiu n  x 
5mgm
P id ß um  5mgm 
and 10mgm 
combined 
quantities
Number of prescriptions from 1:200 sample in thousands
1974 718 (Pti/fittm lOmg 75.3 4363
1975 713 not marketed 66.9 3990
1976 752 until 1978) 67.6 4450
1977 795 60.8 3675
1978 832 8.4 61.4 4483
1979 864 8.1 51.9 3633
1980 897 13.6 50.5 3934
1981 902 10.6 55.8 4225
1982 944 14.1 44.6 3687
1983 922 11.2 37.8 3268
n R. Witney, Letter to D. Mcllor, (22"*' November 198.S), pile 16/DAC 28/2, D ll Archive, Nelson, Lancashire. 
'n Anonymous, ‘Prescription analysis: opioids 1974-198.V, Annex to R. Witney, (22ml November 1985) File 
16/DAC 28/2, DU Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
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The prescription analysis drtcument itself did not specify the source from which these figures were 
derived. Two possibilities existed: the controlled ilmgs registers held by phannacists, which 
included details of every prescription issued whether private or NHS, but which were not held 
centrally, and the predecessor body to the Prescription Pricing Authority, which collected data on 
every prescription issued under the NHS for cost purposes. It was unlikely that the DHSS carried 
out its analysis o f one in 200 prescriptions unless they were using the central! v held NHS 
information, therefore leaving private scripts out o f the calculations. Any falls in the number of 
prescriptions for these opioids of concern, as was seen with Pid ft urn, might therefore have 
represented the privatisation of its prescribing, the very issue which had prompted calls for the 
extension of licensing in the first place.
Ultimately David Mellor,95 then Parliamentary Under Secretary o f State at the Home Office, the 
Chief Medical Officer, Donald Acheson94 and )ohn Patten,9’ Parliamentary Under Secretary of 
State for Health, all agreed that licensing should not be extended. Ihcre was no indication that the 
prescribing policies pursued by the psychiatrists were influenced by politicians’ mews. After the 
major changes of the late 1960s and until 1981, prescribing policies were o f very little political 
interest in the D11SS,9<I and the 1 lome Office Inspectorate, while keeping a close eye on prescribing 
outside the (dimes, had made little use of the Tribunal system to discipline doctors.
While ministers at the DI1SS did not take an interest in their content, they applied great pressure 
for speedy production of the Guidelines and preference was given to their completion over any 
consideration o f licensing extension.91 Evidence suggested, however, that the politicians’ motive 
was to expand treatment provision amid heightened public concern about heroin, rather than to 
control prescribing, as the psychiatrists had intended. The Guidelines were presented by the 
Conservative Government as a plank in their response to the heroin epidemic o f the early 1980s,w 
to encourage greater involvement o f the medical profession in the care of dmg users and so 
increase treatment provision.
D. Mcllor, (1985) op. at.
1,1 D. Achcson, Memo to Ms Bateman, (30* < ktolxrr 1985), Pile 16/DAC 28/2, DH Archive, Nelson, 
Lancashire.
,,s J. Patten, (1985) op. at.
Senior Civil Servant, DHSS, (2(X)1) op. at.
1,7 cg. K. Clarke, "Tackling drugs misuse’, (31" ( ictober 1983), Pile DAC 14/4, DH Archive, Nelson, Iatncashirc. 
9H J. Patten, Thames Television, (1984).
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Winners and Losers
The final version o f the Guidelines fulfilled the aims o f the London psychiatrists Philip Connell and 
Iliomas Bewley. I>ong term maintenance prescribing was only to be undertaken by psychiatrists 
and GPs with specialist supervision experienced in that approach.” Although lFiomas Bewley’s 
first draft of the appendix was not used and Anthony Thorlcy, a young consultant psychiatrist 
working in Newcastle,1""'"" was responsible for the final version, Bewley’s overall prescribing 
preferences were reflected and abstinence was to be the clear strategy. The chapter “Guidance for 
Psychiatrists’ began by saying that ‘Few psychiatrists have any specific training or wide experience 
in the treatment o f drug misuse. Even fewer work in drug treatment units.’ The deficiencies of 
psychiatric training were also referred to. Yet regardless of experience in drug and alcohol 
problems, it said, ‘It is the responsibility of psychiatrists to ensure adequate arrangements for the 
necessary treatment and continuing care of those drug misusers referred to them, and in particular 
to provide advice and support for general practitioners in areas where there is no specialist dntg 
treatment unit.’ Another Bewley and Connell preference was reflected in the emphatically stated 
superiority of methadone over heroin. Even in hospitals ‘there are no clinical grounds for heroin or 
an other opioid being prescribed’ (except allergic reaction to methadone).
Arthur Banks was gratified by the Guideline!! initial statement that ‘All doctors have a responsibility 
to provide care for both the general health needs o f dmg misusers and their drug related problems’, 
going against the wishes o f Dr Riddell, who opposed GP involvement. Although those opposing 
the extension of licensing to all opioid drugs lost the battle in the Working Group, they won the 
war when the status quo was preferred by ministers, probably on account of the Home Office’s 
advice. In the Guidelines, the 1 lomc Office Dmgs Inspectorate and the GMC gained a new 
medically authorised standard for prescribing which could be used in their regulatory work.
On the losing side, the AIDA, represented on the Medical Working Group by Ann Dally and Dale 
Beckett, expressed their views about the Guidelines in a document published the following year.
I "hey criticised a number o f its points, including the advice against prescribing substitute controlled 
dnigs before assessment was completed. The underlying approach suggested by AlDA’s criticisms 
was one which emphasised the individuality of patients, the high likclihtxx) o f failure in
Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence, (1984) op. at., p.7.
Senior Civil Servant, DUSS, (2001) op. (it.
101 A. Thorlcy, (2002) op. cit.
AIDA, 'Comments on “Guidelines o f  Good Clinical Practice in the Treatment o f D rug Misuse” (D1ISS 
1984)’, (1985) Ref. 44020, DrugScopc Library, London.
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detoxification, of drug dependence as a long term problem, the suffering resulting from withdrawal 
symptoms and the need to take into account addicts’ immediate need or desire for a prescription.
Perhaps reflecting the different power relationship between the private doctor and his or her 
patient, the patient was seen as determining treatment to a greater extent dian in the NHS. For 
instance, AIDA criticised the Clinics saying that ‘addict in-patients who are not given the drugs they 
feel they need and with whom no rapport is made will cither have drugs smuggjed in or will 
dischatge themselves, regardless of their physical health.’"” All this pointed to more generous 
prescribing with the balance tipping more towards the individual patient than to public health or 
dmg control concerns. In her autobiography, Dr Dally entided her experience on the Medical 
Working Group “The Misguidelines’."”
Ann Daily’s autobiography alleged that she and other ‘dissidents’ were tactically outmanoeuvred by 
the use of new committee procedures and so they were not allowed to register their opposition to 
the (Guidelines through a minority report. 'ITiis was confirmed b y  one of the consultant psycltiatrist 
members who recollected a change in the committee mles side-stepping the need for final 
agreement, attributing tltis to behind-the-scenes activity by the Chairman and secretariat."'5 While 
the secretariat was influential in terms o f members’ selection and committee procedures, its 
limitations were perhaps revealed by the content of the Guidelines, which were less liberal dian might 
have been expected from Dorodiy Black’s approach to prescribing.
The ACMD’s Yreatment and Rehabilitation expressed the intention, probably originating with Drs 
Bewley and Connell, that the Guidelines would be used as conditions for licences once the licensing 
system had been extended to cover all opioid drugs."*' As this extension never t(x>k place, the 
Guidelines had less o f a disciplinary role than originally intended. The Ixindon consultants did not 
admit defeat, however, and continued to rc-introduce the idea o f  the licensing extension to 
government through the 1980s and ’90s. 'Ihese events are explored in Chapter 7.
What would appear to be a simple provision of guidance from ‘experts’ to other professionals 
raised many ejuestions about both motives and methods. 1 ik e  the Treatment and Rehabilitation report, 
it revealed the problematic nature o f ‘expertise’ and evidence in  a polarised and highly politicised 
field, the ways in which the medical profession has regulated itself, and the roles of government.
Ibid. p.5.
"M A. Dally, A Doctor's S tory  (London: Macmillan, 1990) p.127.
,os A. Thorley, (2002) op. cit.
ACMD, (1982) op. a t., p.84.
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Why im p o se one treatm ent m od el?
A question central to these political activities and considered by Stimson and Oppcnheimer'"' and 
Spear""1 was why this particular group o f psychiatrists placed so much importance on the universal 
adoption o f their treatment model to the exclusion o f all others.
The lack o f research to support the change in the Clinics’ prescribing policies was conceded by 
some o f  the key psychiatrists involved,'"" and another psychiatrist member of the Guidelinei 
working party, and key advocate o f its recommendations on the treatment of opiate addiction, 
described how they had come into being.
There was no question of a really serious long-term option ofpresaibingjomer... That’s something we were actually 
trying to stop... Because all over Ijondon there were these geriatricjunkies to put it very rudely, people who had been 
prescribed out of the Sixties, were now into the Seventies, late Seventies, early Eighties, here we were, there’s a ntmp of 
people w/xr harejust neier changed, because, in a way they 're never had sufficient sort of multidisciplinary support 
around them, and tlx sort of framework ofprescribing to really encourage tiem to come off with tlx treatment and 
rehabilitation package tlsat wed Ixen tying to advocate tlx year before.. .So, rather than again file these people in 
1 Jordon, tlx Ijrndon Harley Street stuff, [tlx prirale prescri/xn/ a kind of green light logo on prescribingforever, we
decided to harx it self-limiting__And, of course t/xre were three-month and six-month so-called detoxifications, which
we did use in Newcastle. And, I  mean tlxy were reasonably successful. But of course this was all anecdotal. Nothing 
was tested with double-blind clinical trial. Everything was really opinion. Which of course was dangfmus at one 
lerxL""
The 1984 Guidelines themselves were not ‘evidence based’, nor did they claim to be. They have since 
been retrospectively legitimised by the evidence based medicine movement, with an updated 
edition in  1991 and a complete re-write in 1999,," -" 2 but in their first incarnation were a 
summation of personal experience, hospital testing o f treatment (not necessarily published) and 
various textbrxiks which might be the work of a single psychiatrist writing about Iris or her 
experience or what had hcen gathered from colleagues.
11,7 G .V. Stimson ami E. < Ippenheimcr, (1982) op. at., pp.215-219.
,,,M II. B. Spear (and cd. |. Mott) (2002), op. cit., pp.235-310.
Ibid. pp.245-246.
"" A. Thorlcy, (2002) op. at.
Department of Health, Scottish < )ffice I lome and I lealth Department and Welsh ( )ffice. Dry# Misuse and 
Dependence. Guidelines on Clinical Mcsnappment (1 xrndon: HMSC), 1991).
1,2 U K 1 lealth Departments, (1999) op. at.
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At that time, the personal opinions and experience of senior doctors was considered a suitable basis 
for ‘good practice’ and in this sense they did not appeal to an external body of ‘scientific’ data to 
justify their statements, as I larrison and Ahmad have described in later guidelines."’ There was, in 
fact, little published research evidence on the efficacy of treatment at that time, but what there was, 
such as the I lartnoll and Nlitcheson trial comparing heroin and methadone prescription was not 
considered in the Guidelines.m 'llie  first (Guidelines contained no references to scientific studies, only 
reports, textbooks or reference sources such as the British National Formulary.
Part of the change in Clinic prescribing policies which so influenced the Guidelines can be attributed 
to the ‘silting up’ of treatment spaces with long term maintenance patients and professionals 
frustrated at their lack of impact on their patients.'15 Yet extraordinary measures were taken 
including attempting to get doctors disciplined if they opposed the newly favoured abstinence 
based approach. Struggles for prestige and status within the medical profession may explain this.
I he new mtxlel of treatment (short term methadone detoxification and no injectable prescribing) 
described in the Guidelines allowed psychiatrists to achieve change in their patients, even if that 
change was short lived. Maintenance prescribing of injectable heroin, the dmg that would have 
been used bv the patient in the same formulation outside of treatment, could be seen as a passive 
professional approach, where any change in behaviour was initiated by the patient rather than the 
doctor, (dime psychiatrists’ favour of more ‘active intervention’ approach to treatment,"6 where 
patients were given restricted options and required to sign contractual agreements, could be seen as 
an attempt to gain greater job satisfaction and prestige for their emerging specialty.
Stephen Shortell, writing in 1974, showed that the relative prestige o f a specialty within the medical 
profession corresponded to the activity or passivity of the doctor in the therapeutic relationship. 
'Hie more active the doctor was in relation to the patient, the liigher the prestige of the specialty, 
with surgery, for instance, where the doctor would perform actively on the passive patient, scoring 
highly. 'Ihc more the doctor relied on patient participation, and acted to ‘help the patients help 
themselves’, the lower the prestige.11 Prescribing oral methadone instead of injectable heroin was
S. Harrison and W.I.U. Ahmad, (20(X)) op. ti/., pp.129-146. 
m R. I lartnoll. M.C. Mitcheson, A. Battcrsity, et til., ‘Evaluation o f heroin maintenance in controlled trial’.
Art-hives o f  General Psychiatry. 37 (1980), 877-884.
M'J . Strang, “‘The British System”: past, present and future’, Internationa/ Review o f Psychiatry, 1 (1989), 109-120, 
p.l 16.
M. Mitcheson, (1994) op. cit., p.189.
1,7 S. M. Shortell, ‘Occupational prestige differences within the medical and allied health professions’. Social 
Science and Medicine, 8 (1974), 1-9 .
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seen as more ‘confrontational’,1 '* therefore more therapeutic, offering the opportunity for addiction 
psychiatry to raise its low status in medicine and in psychiatry.
Another reason for this push towards treatment conformity arose from the social rationale for 
treatment approaches when used to control the drug supply. Since their inception, the Clinics had 
intended to prevent the spread of addiction by controlling the supply of prescribed pharmaceuticals 
and in this m ay have existed the essential incompatibility o f  the treatment approaches themselves 
when used for this purpose. While a doctor who prescribed liberally might have coexisted 
unproblematically with other services which only offered detoxificanon, one who considered that 
detoxification was the sole valid approach might view the existence of other sendees providing long 
term prescription as undermining his or her work, 'lh is desire to standardise practice was one 
reason that the Iondon consultant psychiatrists met regularly at the Home Office: ‘Most o f us took 
the view that we all needed to do much the same thing, so that people couldn’t work their way 
round to find the most liberal prescriber.’1"  It also helped overcome their isolation and enabled 
them to share practical information. Thomas Bewlev made clear that a contributing factor in 
ceasing injectable prescribing was because his colleagues were doing so, ‘It would have been quite 
difficult for one consultant to prescribe in a markedly different way to the other units.’12"
Thus Clinic services believed they needed to present a united front so that they all offered only 
short-term detoxification. Patients seeking treatment would then be forced down this path for their 
own benefit. If one service stepped out of line, patients would inevitably be attracted away by the 
offer o f prescribed drugs, risking overdose, selling their surplus drugs, or deepening their 
dependence, pushing their tolerance and dose higher and making eventual detoxification more 
difficult.
The implicit behavioural model here was one where dnig users were unable to judge their own 
interest and required a paternalist approach, and certainly one where they should not be subjected 
to the ‘temptation’ of larger scripts.121 This might have been more typical o f the specialty of 
psychiatry, where patients were more likely to be seen as not knowing what is in their best interest 
and there being greater potential for disagreement between patient and doctor on the diagnosis and 
appropriate treatment. It was, after all, one of the only areas of medicine where a patient could be 
detained against his or her will for treatment.
,,K G.V. Stimson and R. Oppenhcimcr, (1982) op. a t., pp.215-219.
T. Bewley, (2001) op. at.
,J" Anonymous, ‘Journal Interview 36: Conversation with Thomas Bcwley’, .¡M illion , ‘XI (1995), 883-892, p.885. 
121 A. Thorley, (2002) op. at.
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A treatment that provided choice regarding prescribing might instead have seen them as 
‘consumers’, more compatible with the concept of a medical market place inhabited by private 
practitioners. Some doctors such as Dale Beckett, the addiction consultant at Cane Hill I lospital, 
who was outside the I xindon psychiatric establishment and had worked in both the private sector 
and NHS, questioned the very role of the state in controlling access to drugs.1““
O f course, a united front could have offered a more libera] rather than a more restrictive 
prescribing regime across the board, but it is worth remembering that drug use was seen by some 
medical professionals as a moral issue, arousing strong disapproval. 'Ihomas Bewley, an important 
member o f  the Medical Working Group, described his own misgivings about the ‘sinfulness of 
pleasure’ from drug use in an article in 1970.12'  His comment that Sve’re not in the business of 
prescribing happiness drugs’,12 *24 *127in explanation for his refusal to prescribe cocaine or amphetamines, 
might have also explained his strong preference for methadone over heroin in the early 1980s. 
lames W'illis, a dissenting Ixindon psychiatric consultant, also attributed the move away from
maintenance heroin prescription as partially due to doctors’ tendency ‘to moralise about their fellow
, 125creatures.
Ihe tendency to standardise treatment across the Clinics towards the end o f  the 1970s was 
accompanied bv an increased application of bureaucratic rules,12,1,127 including contractual 
agreements between patients and staff regarding attendance and a number o f  other areas which had 
previously been subject to individual judgement.12" lhe  Ixindon psycliiatrists’ success in imposing 
bureaucratic rules on their Clinics could partly be attributed to the lack of counterbalancing forces. 
Demands for services to be designed around the dntg users’ preferences rather than those of the 
providers were hardly heard within the (duties at this time. Dnig users have only recently, and 
s|xiradically from the late 1980s, organised themselves to lobby for their interests in treatment. 
Indeed, some evidence has suggested that patient autonomy was actively resisted by doctors 
working in the field through the universal treatment model.1" ' Patients’ voices were weak because
122 11. D. Beckett, (2001) op. at.
121 T. 11. Bewley and R. S. Flemingcr, ‘Staff/patient problems in drug dependence treatment clinics’. Journal of 
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and 1990s’, M edian Gesellschaft and Ces,hhhte,2\  (2002), 109-23.
of their socially stigmatised status, poor collective organisation, desire for confidentiality and fear of 
losing their supply of prescription drugs. Clinic services were therefore not planned around the 
priorities o f their users.
At the other extreme, private medicine, being more market led, was more clearly influenced by 
patient preference. As very small organisations, private and general practices did not require 
bureaucratised systems and operated as individual businesses with non-standardised codes of 
behaviour. Some attempts were made to bring peer influence to bear among this disparate group in 
the 1980s by the AIDA through the expulsion of members thought to be practising poorly, but it 
failed to get concerted support among private doctors and the organisation stopped meeting in 
1988 (see Chapter 8).
Some have seen the proliferation of clinical guidelines as a symptom of decreasing medical 
autonomy and bureaucratisation resulting from employment by the state and consequent 
diminution o f professional status.1"' While the Clinics had undoubtedly become increasingly 
bureaucratic, the use of bureaucratic rules actually served the leaders o f the psychiatrists in their 
self-regulation to preserve and extend their prestige and their control over doctors outside the 
Clinics.
Concern about ‘diverted’ pharm aceuticals
‘Diverted’ pharmaceutical drugs, which were consumed by someone other than the prescribed 
patient, caused ongoing concern after the second Brain Committee attributed to them the growth 
in recorded dnig addiction in 1965. Tliey formed a major part o f the argument in favour of 
controlling the prescribing o f doctors outside the ('limes,1’1 yet during the 1980s, this market was 
dwarfed by the large amount o f trafficked heroin entering the country. One might therefore 
wonder why this relatively small market caused so much disquiet and prompted the range of 
measures proposed by the Treatment and Rehabilitation report, including the Guidelines. Was it simply 
ammunition for those doctors pressing for stricter prescribing to use against those not conforming 
to their treatment model or were there other reasons?
A visible market existed in diverted phannaceuticals in I xtndon, to which attention was drawn by 
anthropologist Angela Burr in 1983.1’2 Ibis public revelation was seen as a threat to the perceived
"" S. I larrison and W. I. U. Ahmad, (2000) op. a !., pp.129-146.
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professionalism of doctors. In addition, there was evidence that major change could be achieved in 
reducing the supply of diverted pharmaceuticals, as had occurred with the amphetamine Methedrine, 
which, with the help of its manufacturers, had disappeared from the illicit drug scene by 1968.111 
f  inally, unlike less tangible components of doctors’ practice, prescribing was quantifiable and so 
more easily subject to standardisation.
Conclusion
The origin of the Guidelines lay in the medical profession’s claim to the sole right to determine 
treatment, as asserted by a psychiatrist member o f  the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working 
Group. In this doctors successfully defended their right to collective clinical autonomy against 
potential incursions from outside medicine. At the same time they were strengthening their 
collective clinical autonomy through the control, in the form o f the Guidelines, of other doctors’ 
individual clinical autonomy.
Klein has described a similar situation after the 1991 NHS market reforms that witnessed the 
proliferation of clinical guidelines and protocols. 1 lere the individual autonomy of N1 IS consultants 
was shrinking while they accepted greater collective responsibility.1' 4 However, in this case, the 
Guidelines were aimed not at regulating the addiction psychiatnsts or the profession as a whole, but 
the small number o f private prescribers practising in London.1' 5'1"'Significantly, the Working 
Group responsible for drafting Treatment and Rehabilitation contained four consultant psychiatrists 
and one NI IS general practitioner but no private doctors.
The Guidelines were the result o f a range of interested parties stmggling to get their approach 
adopted as ‘good practice’, and appearing as a consensus statement from the profession, 'lliis was 
not new in the formation of Guidelines. |ennifer Stanton’s work on the development o f I lepatitis B 
vaccine policy guidelines showed how the epidemiology and potency o f the disease played some 
part, but were not the chief determinants of policy.” ' In the case o f the treatment of drug users, not 
only was research evidence on the efficacy of treatments very limited at that time, but there was also 
a lack o f agreement within the profession on what dnig dependence actually meant, and doctors’ 
roles in relation to the dnig supply.
,M H. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. (it., pp.218-222.
Ml R. Klein, The N e» Polities o f  the National Health Servii-e. (Iamdon and New York: laingman, first published 
1083, third edition 1995) pp.243-244.
155 A. Thorlcy, (2002) op. (it.
1,11 Senior Civil Servant, DUSS, (2001) op. ¡it.
1,7 J. Stanton, ‘What shapes vaccine policy? i"he case t >f hepatitis B in the U K ’, Social l  listory o f  .Medicine. 7, 3 
(1994), 427-446.
The Guidelines showed the struggle for dominance of one treatment model -  that o f the London 
psychiatric establishment — against a range o f interests represented in die Medical Working Group, 
and its alliance with the bureaucratic interests o f the state to achieve this. While presented as a way 
of encouraging doctors to treat drug users, they were originally intended to be used for disciplining 
doctors, particularly private prescribcrs, who did not follow them, and were later employed for diis 
purpose.
The Guidelines were the codification of a change of practice achieved informally through peer 
pressure among the I xmdon Clinics, which could offer addiction psychiatry greater professional 
prestige and sense of achievement in their work. The Clinics’ policies had not been driven by 
research on treatment effectiveness, but were justified retrospectively through the 
misrepresentation o f one particular piece o f research, the I lartnoll-Mitcheson trial. While this 
change o f practice had been achieved informally through face-to-face contact among the lxindon 
psychiatrists, it faced resistance and challenge from doctors outside, who, in turn, used little 
published evidence to justify their own positions. ITie Guidelines embodied the extension of this 
pressure towards prescribing conformity to doctors outside the Clinics, with the authority of 
medical ‘consensus’, and the threat of enforcement by the 1 lome Office Drugs Inspectorate.
Chapter 5
Major Regulatory Interventions II:
The Dally Cases (1983-88) and the General Medical 
Council
Introduction
'Ihis chapter considers the role of the General Medical Council (GMQ in disciplining doctors, and 
in particular, its activities in the relationship between private and NHS drug doctors. The high 
profile case o f Ann Dally, the best known private prescriber of the 1980s, and president of the 
Association o f Independent Doctors in Addiction (AIDA) forms the focus.
Dr Dally was first brought before the Council on charges o f serious professional misconduct in 
1983. After being found guilty and admonished, a second case was brought against her in 1986. 
Found guilty’ again in January 1987, this time she was banned from prescribing controlled drugs for 
14 months and the case was resumed at the end of this pc nod resulting in her registration to die 
medical register being hilly restored in November 1988.
Since a survey of all the cases o f private prvscribers taken before the GN1C between 1970 and 1999 
would have been too great a task for this research project, and because it could be argued that Ann 
Dally was untypical of the other such doctors, a second case has been studied for comparison. Dr 
1 lennan Peter Tamcsby was taken before the GMC in 1984, a year after the I lomc Office Drugs 
Inspectorate had taken him to a Tribunal that had found him guilty of irresponsible prescribing.1
The G eneral M edical C ouncil
In the nineteenth century doctors arranged themselves into bodies to represent and regulate 
themselves in the British Medical Association and GMC (GMC) respectively, The state supported 
this self-regulation in the 1858 Medical Act establishing the GMC as a formal medical register to 
identity c|tialificd doctors and giving the Council jurisdiction over professional conduct, with 
powers similar to a legal tribunal." The main motivation for self-regulation appears to have been
1 Home Office Inspector, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
R. G. Smith, Medical DitdpSn*. The Pmfesiional Conduct jurisdiition o jih e General Medical Council IXSS IVVO 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp.1-31.
reducing competition between health care workers in an overcrowded market over and above the 
protection of public interests.’
The mechanisms and motives of professional self-regulation have been extensively considered by 
social scientists and historians of medicine (see Chapter 1). Since the Second World War 
commentators have been notably sceptical about the profession’s lofty declared aims, seeing its 
special status mainly as a mechanism for the monopolistic restriction o f  the market. Medical ethics 
have been described as simply ‘politics by other means’, a way of gaining respectful deference from 
patients and exempting the profession from various external political and legal controls, while 
legitimising its rights to self-government and self-policing.45
During the penod under study, the G M C  underwent major changes, some inwardly driven, others 
from outside. Some of these changes derived from major cultural sliifts that took place across 
Western societies from the 1960s, influencing at different rates, a whole range of social and 
economic relationships, including those between doctors and patients. Civil rights movements 
across the world challenged accepted social norms and the intellectual anti-psychiatry movement 
asserted that many mental ‘illnesses’ w ere socially constructed, questioning the basis o f medical 
power.
Inside the medical profession, the early 1970s saw a crisis precipitated by major dissatisfaction with 
the representativeness of the Council, a new annual membership fee, and the treatment o f overseas 
doctors, lhis led to a government inquiry, the Merrison Committee, which reported in 1975, 
culminating in the 1978 Medical Act. 'Ibis Act increased the proportion of elected members on the 
Council, doubling its size and extending its function. Discipline was, for the first time, divided into 
‘professional conduct’ and ‘health’, distinguishing the ‘bad’ from the ‘mad’/’
Accordingly, the Council’s disciplinary roles from the 1980s were exercised through the Preliminary 
Proceedings Committee (PPC), the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC), and the I lealth 
Committee. 'Ihc Preliminary Proceedings Committee decided whether cases o f alleged serious 
professional misconduct should be referred to the PCC for full public hearing. The latter had the
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power to erase a doctor’s name from the register, suspend registration, impose conditions upon 
further registration or refer the case to the l lealth Committee.'
from 1970, the CM C had taken the view that prescribing or supplying drugs o f dependence ‘other 
than in the course of bona fide treatment’ constituted serious professional misconduct." From 1973 
until 1997, disciplinary action against doctors prescribing controlled drugs was dealt with by both 
the Home Office Drugs Inspectorate (the Inspectorate) and the CM C, with some ambiguity over 
responsibility. Following the 1993-97 Garfoot Case and Dr Garfoot’s successful appeal against its 
mling, the Home Office sent fewer inspectors to \isit doctors (see Chapter 6) and ceased using 
Tribunals to stop their prescribing. 'Ihe GM C continued to rely upon the Inspectorate for 
evidence against doctors, but formally enforcing professional standards for prescribing controlled 
dmgs fell to the GMC alone.
It appeared that in the 1970s and earlier, the GMC felt reluctant to get involved in cases concerning 
errors in diagnosis or treatment, or in fact any issue that bordered on doctors’ clinical autonomy.’ 
Ihis might have explained the GMC’s desire to avoid prescribing cases, even when there was no 
alternative option of a Home Office Tribunal. Ihe cause o f its greater alacrity towards alleged 
irresponsible prescribers in the 1980s may' have in part reflected wider pressures on the Council to 
scrutinize more closely its members’ conduct. Stacey described a range of forces attacking the 
GMC during the 1980s, pushing for more responsive and transparent self-regulation and at times 
for the end o f self-regulation itself.1" These were the media, patient groups, politicians and the 
radical Right.
A number of high profile journalist investigations into the Council's disciplinary workings were 
bremdcast on television, including a series by Father Rantzen in 1983 that resulted in changes to the 
GMC’s official guidance to doctors. Patient pressure groups became more radical and outspoken 
in their criticisms. In 1984 labour MP Nigel Spearing tried to get a private members bill passed to 
introduce a second, lesser charge o f ‘unacceptable medical conduct’ and thus widen the number of 
cases considered by the Professional Conduct Committee. Although successfully opposed by the 
GMC, ministers took a keen interest in the issues and the GMC was compelled to respond to 
enticisms. To forestall this externally developed legislation being passed, the GMC developed its
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own scheme to extend its own powers in disciplinary cases that was eventually passed in legislation 
in 1995." Stacey remarked of the 1984 events, ‘Neither the Houses of Parliament nor the civil 
service formerly concerned themselves with the workings of the GMC (or any other professions), 
but times had changed.’ 12
'ITiese developments pushed the GMC into a defensive position in which it increased the number 
o f cases it dealt with concerning conduct issues in the 1980s and ’90s,1' and m ay have provided the 
opportunity for those interests in the drugs held keen to exercise self-regulation for their own 
particular concerns.
Treatm ent o f  D rug D ependence: C linical Autonom y and C onstraints
'Ihe law has taken a limited role in controlling the specific treatments given b y  doctors to drug users 
in the treatment of addiction in Engjand, in contrast with the United States, where, from 1974, 
statute specified the formulation and drugs to be prescribed (oral methadone and more recently, 
buprenorphine), their formulations, the settings in which they could be prescribed and how they 
should be dispensed.
After 1973, the Home Office had statutory powers to control the prescribing of doctors through its 
Tribunal system that had been reintroduced after an absence of 12 years.14 'I'he system was used 
exclusively against GPs and private doctors and newer against any doctor working in the hospital- 
based psychiatry-led Drug Dependence Units on matters o f ‘irresponsible prescribing’ (see Chapter 
6).' ,l4’.i7 However, there were cases, such as Ann Daily’s, where evidence gathered by the I lome 
Office for a Tribunal was used instead by the GMC.
According to Bing Spear, employed at the I lome Office Dnigs Branch from  1952-86, and Chief 
Inspector from 1977, the Council was reluctant to deal with the issue o f prescribing to drug users 
from the 1940s right up to 1970, wishing the Home Office to restore its 'Tribunal system instead.1*
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In 1967/8 the G M C  had not taken action against the private prescriber, Dr John Petro, who had 
aroused great tabloid interest by prescribing in London’s underground stations and other public 
places, waiting instead for the Courts to act, and only erasing him from the register after the Home 
Secretary had withdrawn his powers to prescribe ‘dangerous drugs’. Even then, a delay between 
the GMC’s niling to  erase Petro from the register, and his appeal hearing five months later allowed 
the doctor to continue prescribing the amphetamine Methedrine. 'Hie Council had been ‘greatly 
criticised’ for the delay, and the loophole was dosed by the 1969 Medical Act.19,2"
Russell Smith’s quantitative analysis o f the GMC’s disciplinary activities led him to observe that it 
was only after 1969 that the GMC began to deal with cases o f drug prescription any more than 
rarely, and he speculated that this could have reflected the increased incidence of drug use in the 
community/1 D rug use and dependence undoubtedly became more common around this point, 
rising from initially tiny numbers throughout die 1960s,22 and it was also a time of increased public 
and media concern, which had in turn prompted a re-convening of the Brain Committee to 
investigate (see Chapter 2). Its findings, that leakage from over-prescribing doctors was providing 
the source of a b lack market in drugs and stimulating addiction, brought about the major changes 
in treatment services and legislation o f the late 1960s,21 establishing the Clinics and nurturing the 
new group of addiction psychiatrists.
Although the G M C  increased the number o f cases it dealt with after 1969, this did not reflect any 
greater enthusiasm for the issue in the early 1970s. In 1971, 1 x>rd Cohen, then President o f  the 
GMC, spoke during the passage o f  the Misuse o f Drugs Bill in the I louse o f lairds, saying that 
without an extension of its jurisdiction by statute and increased financial support the Council could 
not investigate these cases, as Sve arc not a police force; we have no inspectorate’. 1 Ie urged the 
1 louse to reintroduce a Tribunal system, which it did in the passage o f the Bill.24 It seemed likely 
that the objection o f  having no police force was a lobbying tactic to bring back Tribunals, rather 
than based in any desire to rectify this. In 1975, the Merrison Inquiry recommended that the GMC
I lansard, 1 louse o f  Lords, (14,h January 1971), Vol 314, col. 248.
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set up its own investigation unit to research allegations against do cto rs,b u t the Council rejected 
the idea as inappropriate to its role._<'
'Ihe GMC’s guidance on the treatment of drug dependence was very limited throughout the 
period. Ann Dally reported writing to the GMC in August 1982 asking for advice on the treatment 
o f  addicts in private practice. She quoted the reply as stating ‘the Council has hitherto issued no 
specific guidance’ on that subject.’ ' Smith confirmed this: the GMC’s Professional Conduct and Fitness 
to Practice only referred to ‘the prescription or supply o f dnigs of dependence otherwise than in the 
course of bona fide treatment’.211 From 1981 to 1985 the Council’s Standards Committee was 
considering issuing further advice on prescribing opioid dnigs, particularly in private practice but 
seemed unable to reach a decision. When called to account by the House of Commons Social 
Services Committee in 1985, GMC representatives dted the Department of I lealth’s 1984 good 
practice guidelines as sufficient to set out ‘a corporate view of what constinites proper practice in 
this field’.29'’"
R elations betw een the G M C  an d  the State
'Ihc ability of the medical profession to self-regulate was based upon the idea that only a doctor’s 
peers were capable of judging perfonnance. Over the last three decades of the twentieth century, 
doctors attempted to defend tliis principle, while under increasing pressure. Patients, the media and 
later die government challenged the exclusivity of medical expertise and in 1979 the GMC 
increased its lav membership (although the actual lay proportion fell). While the GMC expanded its 
areas of responsibility, the profession also became subject to a number of state and supra-state 
bodies, such as the F’uropean Union.
As Stacey has noted, the reladonsliip between the GMC and the state has been a complex one. 
Although independent of direct government control, it was also ‘part o f the apparatus of the central 
state’. '1 The NI IS would only employ doctors registered with the GMC (not technically a 278
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Regulation o fth e M edical Profession [Merrison Report] (London: I IM S!), 1075) p.87.
26 M. Stacey, (1902) op. ¡it., pp.28-39.
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requirement in the private sector),'2 and when large numbers of NI IS doctors faced erasure from 
the register for refusal to pay the new annual fee in the early 1970s, the threat this posed to the 
NHS prompted the government to set up the public inquiry under the chainnanship of A W 
Merrison. In 1974 medicine successfully defended itself from regulation by the Nl IS, and repeated 
this with the 1978 Medical Act, which was based largely on the findings of the Merrison 
Committee, but external scrutiny o f the Council continued.
'throughout the period the Department of Health and Health Authorities as employers or 
contractors could exercise certain controls over National 1 lealth Service doctors, but had no such 
powers over private doctors. In the special area o f  controlled drugs, the I lome Office’s 
Inspectorate also represented regulation by the state, but the Tribunals that delivered its ultimate 
sanctions were medical in membership and constituted to reflect the accused doctor’s area of 
practice, ie primary or specialist sectors, although witnesses could be from either. As one inspector 
stated at a GMC hearing, it was not Iris place to judge prescribing, ‘It is for the tribunal to 
determine whether a doctor has been irresponsible. W e merely gather the evidence.’ " From 1973- 
1997, unless a doctor had been convicted of a critninal offence in the Courts, the Home Office 
could therefore put no curbs on his or her prescribing without the agreement of other doctors.
Ihe seventeen years of Conservative Government and its relations with the medical profession 
revealed contradictory impulses within the British right wing. On the one hand, Margaret 
Ihatcher’s governments professed allegiance to the free market, and accordingly it clashed with the 
professions over their monopolistic practices.'4 T h e daughter of a grocer, Thatcher promulgated a 
radical social agenda that did not accept as given the privileged position of professionals and her 
stance tapped into a wider suspicion of hierarchy and deference. The Office o f Fair Trading made 
investigations into restrictive practices of the GM C, followed by referral of the case to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission and led to the C JMC revising its guidance on advertising in 
1990.
Along with the free market, came the exaltation o f  ‘choice’ and the supremacy o f the consumer. 
From 1989 the Government attempt to further extend consumer choice over the heads of the 
wishes of doctors with the introduction of an ‘internal market’ into the NHS. I Iowevcr, while
Without GMC registration it is not an offence to practice medicine, only to claim to Ik- a ‘registered medical 
practitioner’.
'' GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day ( )ne, (9*h Decemlter 1986), Case o f Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T  
A Reed & Co. [transcript], GMC Archive, I-ondon. p .1/29.
M M. Stacey, (2000) op. tit., pp.28-39.
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other areas of the NHS saw a rise of consumerism, drug treatment remained resistant to consumer 
demand. The emergence o f voluntary sector patient pressure groups and services could be 
interpreted as expanding consumer demand and choice, a role supported by state funding for many 
charities and non-profit providers in the 1980s.
However, a completely free market in health care was not politically viable and to achieve many of 
their policy goals the Conservatives moved in quite the opposite direction by centralising NI IS 
controls and bureaucracy in the 1980s and ’90s, heightening the contrast with the private sector. 
Cooter observed this as a disintegration o f the autonomous power o f the medical profession, and a 
gradual withdrawal of the state’s compliance in the profession’s own ethical governance,1’ in 
contrast with Klein’s view o f the medical profession as accepting and participating in the restriction 
of individual clinicians’ autonomy in order to strengthen collective professional autonomy.'6
Within the GMC the dominance of NHS members could be perceived, as during the 1980s drug 
treatment expertise was recognised almost exclusively as residing among the NHS Clinics. The 
dominance of N l IS doctors within the GMC was the mirror image o f  the phannaceutical 
profession, where the more numerous and better represented small business phamiacists 
dominated the salaried Nl IS employees in its professional bodies and in policy-making.1 This 
NHS dominance applied less in the Inspectorate, which, although using advice from NHS 
psychiatrists, tended to formulate its own independent views (discussed further in Chapter 6).
The 1997 Labour government withdrew many of the previous government’s market reforms as 
unpopular but the rallying cries of consumer choice and medical accountability remained popular. 
By positioning itself under the banner o f the consumer’s champion. New labour could lx- seen as 
appealing across the electorate, neither focusing on ‘old’ Labour’s ‘workers’ nor the Conservative’s 
industry and business, while antagonising neither, and under Prime Minister Tony Blair it continued 
its attempts to regulate medicine. Cooter has convincingly argued that the consumerist movement 
of the 1970s and ’80s broadened the base for participation in medical ethical thought, rhetoric and 
action, so that the turn of the twenty-first century saw the highest ever levels o f claims for legal 
redress for unethical medical procedures and calls for statutory regulation to protect against
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third edition 1995) pp.243-244.
'7 S. Anderson, *1 lealth professionals and health care systems: the role o f the state in the development o f  
community pharmacy in Great Britain 1900 to 1 ’WO’, National I loa th  Polities in  Context W orkshop, (Bergen, 
Norway, 27 28"' March 2003).
121
unethical practices.”1 Government attempts at control became more overt in the late 1990s as 
several high profile ‘scandals’, such as the high patient death rate in paediatric cardiac surgery at 
Bristol Royal Infirmary, were cited as justification for state regulation. 'ITie GMC in turn, under 
government, media and public scrutiny, wished to be seen to be doing its job of regulation, and 
stepped up its activities considerably, which by the end of the century, were having a dramatic 
impact on private doctors prescribing to dnrg users.
Relations betw een the GMC and the Inspectorate
With the GMC responsible for all medical discipline including prescribing and the I lome Office 
Inspectorate concerned specifically with controlled drugs, it was unclear during this period which 
body should take the lead. Despite I x>rd Cohen’s dedared distaste for dealing with this topic, ways 
of working seem to have developed between the Council and the Inspectorate without being made 
explicit by either side.
As has been noted, the key difference between the Ixxlics was that the GMC lacked inspectors to  
gather evidence for its hearings. Members o f the Inspectorate commented that the GMC relied 
upon it for its information and to take the lead in Tribunals. According to an inspector working 
since the early 1980s, the GMC ‘saw us as in a sense doing their dirty work’, a view  Bing Spear, 
Chief Inspector at the Home Office, reportedly shared at the time.'’ '*1 Information flowed from 
the Inspectorate to the GMC but not in the other direction/1
In spite o f Spear’s gratification over the restored Tribunal system, it was only used nine times 
between 1974 and 1982. In contrast the GMC Professional Conduct Committee heard 39 cases of 
‘improper’ prescribing and erased 18 doctors from the medical register between 1972 and 1984. 4''4, 
Between 1983 and 1989 the GMC greatly increased its non bona fide presenbing cases that reached 
4f> in 6 years.4'1 'ITiese figures arc difficult to interpret, however, since both tallies included doctors 
who had committed offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act as well as those whose manner o f  
prescribing was considered problematic but not criminal, and they do not show the spread o f cases 
within each period. Furthermore they both included self-prescribing by addicted doctors, although
4M R. Cooter, (2000) op. at., pp.458-460.
Vf Home Office Inspector, (2002) op. at.
40 eg. A. Dally, (1990) op. at., p.134.
41 Home Office Inspector, (2002) Op. at.
42 H. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. lit., p.63.
44 House o f Commons Soc ial Services Committee, (19H5) oft. (it., p.6H. 
44 M. Stacey, (1992) op. cit., p.163.
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from 1980 the GM C dealt with cases of addicted doctors by referring them to its I lealth 
Committee.
I n i  982 the ACM D ’s report Treatment and RehabiJUlaiton criticised the I lome Office for under using 
its Tribunal machinery. Bing Spear, in his evidence before the GMC at Ann Daily’s first case, 
stated that the reason for this was that the law empowered the Home Office to take action against 
‘irresponsible’ prescribing, which it had not defined, rather than ‘over-prescribing’. ‘Over­
prescribing is not necessarily irresponsible prescribing because if  it were I think we would have 
Tribunals running 365 days a year.’45 However, the I lome Office responded to the criticism and 
from 1982 the Tribunals became much more frequent, with 4 in 1984.J‘ Unlike the GMC, who did 
not visit doctors in advance of initiating proceedings, the Inspectorate could use the threat of a 
Tribunal to influence practitioners, allowing it a more informal regulatory role.
The ambiguity over the GMC and Inspectorate’s roles could produce die strange situation of a 
double trial, as seen with Dr Tamcsby (below), where the doctor was taken before a I lome Office 
Tribunal, his prescribing powers curbed, and then taken before the GMC to be tried on the same 
evidence. On occasion, as in A nn Daily’s second GMC case, the Council took up cases that the 
Home Office had declined to put to Tribunal, but the explanations for this were unclear. Much of 
the evidence given against Ann Daily in her GMC- hearings was gathered by 1 lom e Office- 
inspectors either through interviews or records o f her prescribing patterns kept by pharmacies.
While the I lom e Office automatically informed the GMC when a doctor had been convicted in 
criminal court, information about a Tribunal mling would not necessarily be provided.4' Reversal of 
GMC and I lom e Office sanctions were independent of each other, so that a doctor who had been 
erased or suspended from the medical register by the GMC and had their controlled drugs licence 
suspended by a Home Office Tribunal, could be re-registered by the GMC on an appeal or at the 
end of their suspension, and would have to apply separately to the I lome Office to regain their 
controlled drugs privileges. The I lome Office could therefore withhold controlled dmgs 
prescribing from a re-registered doctor. If working together, the GMC could re-register a doctor 
on the understanding that the I lome Office would retain its ban on controlled drug prescription.4"
“  GMC Professional Conduct Committee, Day Two. (6 July 1983), Case o f Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T  A Reed 
& Co. |transcript|, GMC Archive, IA melon, p.2/57.
46 House o f Commons Social Services Committee, (1985) op. (it.. pp. 167-187.
17 Ibid, pp.67-76.
*  R. G. Smith, (1994) op. (it., p.217.
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After the Dr Adrian Garfoot’s successful appeal against the Home Office (see Chapter 6), the 
Inspectorate ceased using Tribunals and started to move away from policing doctors, carrying out 
far fewer interviews.41 Without the threat of the Tribunal they could only hand over information 
they collected to the GMC for action. lik e  the GMC, the alacrity with which the Inspectorate 
pursued private doctors to Tribunal and through other routes varied between the 1970s and ’90s as 
the Inspectorate housed a range of views which arc discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
Ihe Inspectorate was an enthusiastic regulator throughout this period, using informal methods of 
persuasion in the early 1970s, while pressing for the return of its formal Tribunal machinery. 'Hie 
GMC supported these calls in order to relieve it o f its own obligations, though still prosecuting 
cases somewhat reluctantly. Once granted the desired formal mechanisms, the Inspectorate used 
them sparingly until the early 1980s, when both regulators increased their levels of formal 
prosecutions, with the GMC reliant on the Inspectorate for evidence. In the late 1990s the Council 
overtook the Home Office in both zeal and powers, as the Inspectorate once more lost its Tribunal 
machinery and was forced to return to its less formal methods of advising doctors and acting as the 
GMC’s intelligence arm. lhe cases o f Ann Dally and Peter Tamcsby o f 1983-88 provide a 
window onto the middle period when the GMC and I lome Office were both bringing disciplinary 
cases, sometimes against the same individual. Daily’s cases in particular fonned a turning point in 
the fortunes of private prescribes in I ingland and a focus for the issues at stake.
The Ann D ally GMC Cases
Career prior to the first GMC case (1983)
Forceful, self-assured and articulate, Dr Ann Dally was the Oxford educated private doctor who 
started up AIDA in 1981 and became its first and only president. 'Hie ‘Independent’ in ‘AIDA’ 
referred to both private doctors and NHS doctors working outside the Clinics.’" Although 
claiming to seek closer cooperation with the Clinics it was directly oppositional in both 
membership and activities (see Chapter 8) and several AIDA documents opened with attacks on 
the Clinics."
Since the 1960s Dally had been working in private general psychiatric practice (although not 
formally qualified as a psychiatrist) in partnership with her husband (and later, ex-husband),
4,1 Home Office Inspector, (2002) op. dt.
*" AIDA, ‘Management o f  Addiction’, [flier announcing formation o f  AIDA], (November 1081), File 
PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/2, Wellcome library. Dindon.
SI eg AIDA, ‘Drug Addiction: Guidelines and Standards in Management’, Pre publication edition. (February 
1082). File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/5, Wellcome library. Dindon.
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psychiatrist Peter Dally. By 1979 she was already known as a writer on medical matters and a 
respectable doctor when she started treating opiate addicts in quantity. She developed her 
philosophy that they were victims of the system of drug controls, forced into a criminal lifestyle to 
obtain their supplies, attributing most adverse health effects to the illegal market rather than to the 
drugs themselves.5'  Although she declared that AIDA members did not use the word 
‘“maintenance” because it suggested a category of “hopelessness”, she believed that long term 
prescribing would allow addicts who were unable to achieve abstinence to  live healthy, productive, 
law-abiding lives.5’ In the 1980s Ann Dally w as the subject o f two GMC cases, the second of which 
was resumed a year and a half later to check her compliance with imposed conditions.
AlDA’s first meetings took place at the I lom e Office with Bing Spear, I lome Office Drugs Branch 
Chief Inspector, attending.” ’5 He and Dr Dorothy Black, Senior Medical Officer at the 
Department of 1 lealth and Social Security (D f 1SS), provided comments and contributions to the 
Association’s draft clinical guidelines.5* Ihey were carefiil, however, to make clear that they were 
not present as ‘observers’, as they had been described in the AIDA minutes,’ and that such status 
only applied at major external meetings. Furthermore, Dorothy Black was at pains not to ‘take 
sides’ in the dispute between doctors outside and inside the Clinics. In her response to AlDA’s 
draft guidelines,5" she disapproved of the document’s criticism of the Clinics, chitling its authors, ‘A 
responsible body such as your own should stand on your own practice rather than on a 
comparative exercise with that o f others’.59 So  while civil servants concerned with dnig policy were 
scrupulous in maintaining public distance and impartiality. Dr Dally was accepted and encouraged 
inside one part o f the policy community as the respectable face of private pracuce.
Part o f Ann Daily’s intention in setting up AIDA was to raise standards among private doctors to 
which the clinical guidelines were to contribute. In the early 1980s there was great concern over 
drug users taking Diconal (the opiate dipipanonc combined with the anti-nausea dmg cvclmne) 
particularly as some were crushing up the oral tablets and injecting them with disastrous
A. Dally. (1990) op. at., pp.87-98.
" A . Dally, Letter to N. P. Da Sylva, (27* February 1984), Pile PP/DAI./B/4/1 / l/ l, Wellcome library, 
London.
S4 AIDA, Minutes o f  Meeting held at the I lomc < >ffice on 29*h July, 1982, File PP/DAL/B/4/1 /1/4,
W ellcome Library, London.
" GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day Two, (6,h July 1983), Case o f Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T A Reed 
& Co. |transcript|, GMC Archive, London, p.2/53.
** AIDA, ‘Drug Addiction: Guidelines and Standards in Management’, Prc-publication edition. (February 1982). 
File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/5, Wellcome Library, London.
57 D. Black, Letter to A. Dally, (19"> March 1982), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/5, Wellcome library, London. 
w AIDA, ‘Drug Addiction: Guidelines and Standards in Management’, Pre-publication edition, (February 1982), 
File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/5, Wellcome library, London.
v’ D. Black, le tter to A. Dally, (19* March 1982), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/5, Wellcome Library, London.
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consequences. They were often obtained from doctors unaware o f  or indifferent to the uses to 
which they were being put. In September 1982 AIDA resolved that ‘the use of Diconal.\ except in 
the most exceptional circumstances, is incompatible with membership of our Association’/’" a 
declaration that was to trip up Dr Dally later on/'1 AIDA also agreed that Dr Dally should write to 
Dr Rai, a member o f  AIDA, to expel him from the Association for prescribing Diconal, which she 
did.62*5 Rai was then disciplined by the GMC in 1984.
Ann Dally and Margaret lhatcher were contemporaries at Somerville College, Oxford. In 1983 
before the GMC initiated their case against her, Ann Dally visited Mrs Ihatchcr at 10 Downing 
Street, to express her views on drugs policy and treatment. Dr Dally was highly critical of the 
(illrues at this meeting, which was also attended by Dr Pamela Mason, a senior doctor in the Drugs 
Section of the DHSS/’4 As a good networker, Dr Dally was successful in achieving access to policy 
circles, but with little direct influence. Although impressed by her sincerity, Mrs 'lhatcher did not 
take sides, and after the GMC’s verdict in her first case, the Prime Minister wrote a reply to a letter 
from Dr Dally maintaining this line: ‘1 hope you will forgive me if  I do not say anything about the 
circumstances o f vour case. But I know that this must be a painful situation for both you and your 
husband. I know too that the strength you have always shown will carry you through this difficult 
time.’65
Opposition before the first GMC case
In the three years preceding Ann Daily’s first case, it was clear that a period o f largely peaceful co­
existence between the Clinics and the private prescribes had ceased and hostilities were polarising 
the field. Attacks came from both sides, through official channels such as the ACMD and in the 
media. Articles critical of individual doctors in the tabloid press, had appeared years earlier, with for 
instance, the Daily M a iland The Sun pursuing Dr John Petro in 1967.“  I Iowcvcr, it was not until 
1980 that the f is t  attack on private prescribes, by Thomas Bewley, appeared in the medical press. 
Dr Bewley was one of the country’s most senior (dime psychiatrists and worked at bmdon’s St 
Thomas’s and Tooting Bee DDUs. He recommended a list of safeguards to doctors, with special
AIDA, ‘Comments on: Department o f  1 lealth and Social Securin'. Treatment and Rehabilitation (HMS(). 
1982). Report o f  the ACM D’, (January 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/7. Wellcome library, London, p.7.
M GMC Professional Conduct Committee, Day Two, (6 July 1983), Case o f  Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T A  Reed 
& Co. [transcript], G M C  Archive, London., p.2/12.
1,2 AIDA, 'Meeting, I lome Office, 16.9.82’ [handwritten notcs|, File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/4, Wellcome library, 
1-ondon.
“  A. Dally, 1 .ettcr to D r D. D. P. Rai. (17'" January 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 1 o f 2), Wellcome 
library, London.
64 A. Dally, A D octor’s  Story (Iondon: Macmillan, 1990).
',s M. Thatcher, le tte r  to A. Dally, (11*  August 1983), File PP/DAL/B/5/1/1, Wellcome Library, I-ondon.
‘•'I II. B. Spear (and ed .J. Mott), (2002) op. cit., p.216.
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precautions for and about private prescribers. In order to stop ‘script doctors’ Bewley suggested 
restricting all psychoactive prescribing to licensed practitioners only’, of whom he was one/' 
which would have effectively stopped such prescribing outside the Clinics.
The debate was revisited in Thelaintrt in |anuary 1982, which said, o f private doctors prescribing 
opioids, “'I’heir rationalisation is that the patient is thereby “saved” from the black market; however, 
since most addicts can only finance their private consultation by selling parts of their prescription, 
knowingly or (with a stretch o f the imagination) unknowingly the doctor is prescribing sufficient 
drugs for this purpose/’*
Published later in 1982, the ACMD’s Treatment and Rebaln/itation report67 *9 7012*included a strong attack on 
private prescribers and recommended a range o f controls to regulate them. These included 
preparation o f good practice guidelines that could be used in regulatory procedures and the 
strengthening of controls around the prescription o f Diconal. 'Ilie most senior doctor on the 
working group responsible for Treatment and Rehabilitation was Dr Thomas Bewley (sec Chapter 3).
The lasncet returned to the subject in March and April 1983, widi 1 lamid Ghodse, a junior 
psycliiatric colleague o f Dr Bewley, defending the Clinics and attacking doctors outside. " This 
prompted D r Dally to write forcefiilly to contradict him. 1 Bewley and Ghodse then teamed up 
together in what was perhaps the most significant attack in a medical journal, due to its use of 
‘evidence’, uncompromising title and timing, the ‘Unacceptable face of private practice: prescription 
of controlled dnigs to addicts’. '
Tlus uninhibited assault on private prescribing was published in the British Medical Journal only three 
weeks before Dr Daily’s first GMC case. Dr Bewley has said that it was written before D r Daily’s 
case came to light, and that he was unaware o f the timing. It was accepted for publication on 8* 
Apnl 1983, before Daily’s first GMC hearing, and prior to the Preliminary Proceedings 
Committee’s decision on 12* May 198.3 to take the case to a disciplinary hearing. ' I lowever. Dr 
Bewley did concede that the questionnaire was ‘not a piece of serious scientific research’ but had
67 T. II. Bewley, ‘Prescribing psychoactivc dnigs to addicts’, British M edical Journal, 281 (1980), 4 9 7 —198, p.497.
“  The la n c e t ,  ‘Dmg addiction: British System failing’. The Lancet, 1 (1982) 83-84, p.83.
m ACMD, 'Treatment and Rehabilitation, DIISS, (London: HMSO, 1982).
70 A. H. Ghodse, ‘Treatment o f  drug addiction in Ixindon’, The lan cet, I (1983), 636-639.
71 A. Dally, ‘Drug clinics today’. The Lancet, 1 (1983), 826.
72 T. Bewlcy and A. II. Ghodse, ‘Unacceptable face o f private practice: prescription o f controlled drugs to 
addicts’ British Medical Journal, 286 (1983). 1876-1877.
75 Ibid.
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just been carried out to make a point.'4 'Ihe journal clearly wished to stir up controversy around 
private prescribing, featuring it, like Bewlev’s previous article, under the banner ‘For Debate’ and 
adding its own unsigned leader “Doctors for drug addicts’ which criticised both sides.'s
The questionnaire on which the article was based was methodologically weak, both in construction 
and the response rate of 69%, which Bewley himself later described as ‘completely useless’. 6 One 
question asked drug users attending two N1 IS Clinics about the reasons why drug users attended 
private practitioners, but only h a lf  of the respondents had attended a private practitioner. Despite 
this, responses from all respondents were counted as valid, so that NI IS patients were being asked 
to speculate as to the reasons for attending a private practitioner, including leading questions such 
as whether such doctors were ‘more easily conned than clinic doctors’.
The artide claimed that data from the Home Office Addicts Index showed a change in the 
previous three years so that a ‘large numbers of addicts’ were having drugs prescribed for them by 
private general practitioners. In fact, it was not possible to distinguish from the Home Office data 
used in the article whether the general practitioners were NI IS or private. No quantitative data was 
collated for the research regarding the numbers o f patients attending private practitioners or private 
prescriptions issued.
'Hie article also claimed that the reason for ‘such large numbers o f  addicts attending private 
practitioners’ was that they prescribed Dirona!and Kihil/n, the two dmgs at the centre of Ann Daily’s 
trial. It blamed ‘uncontrolled prescribing bv private practitioners’ in the 1960s for ‘a severe spread 
of addiction’, despite the fact that only one of the doctors considered the source of this in the 1965 
Second Brain Committee report was working privately (see Chapter 2). * ' The article asked
“whether it was ever desirable to  prescribe controlled dmgs to an addict when a fee is paid’.w' 
Bewley and Ghodsc described ‘an urgent need to control prescribing’ of methadone, Diconal and 
VJUiUn, either through the General Medical Council, the 1 Ionic Office Tribunal system, or an 
extension of the licensing system to include all controlled dnigs. Bing Spear described the article as 74*
74 T. Bewley, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
' British Mahnt/ Journit/, ‘Doctors fo r dnig addicts’, British Mtdica/Journal, 286 (1983), 1844.
7h T. Bewlcy, (2001) op. rit.
77 Interdepartmental Committee o n  Drug Addiction. Tht Strom/ Rtpori o f  tht Inlndrptirtmrnla/ Committrt (London: 
I IMS(), 1965) p.6.
" II. B. Spear, The early years o f  the “British System” in practice', in J . Strang and M. Ciossop (eds) I i t  nun 
rlddirtion And Drus. Bohr): Tht British Sys/tm. (Oxford; New York; Tokyo: ( >xford University Press, 1994) pp.3 
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‘an authoritative establishment attack on the private sector’ that ‘presented a wholly false picture of 
the conditions prevailing in the generality o f [Clinics]’.8'
The BA//’s leader article in the same issue accused some private doctors of effectively selling drugs 
to addicts, who in mm funded their treatment by re-selling some o f  their prescriptions on the black 
market, but it did not spare the Clinics, which ‘seem to have faded into decline’. It questioned their 
move to oral methadone, and called for ‘new policy objectives’ to contain the ‘epidemic o f dmg 
use’.*2
As intended, debate was unleashed and eight letters appeared in subsequent editions of die journal, 
both critical and supportive of the article, from across the spectrum of the drug treatment 
community, including a (private) patient which was unusual for the policy debate at this time, The 
only current London Clinic psychiatrist among them, Pamela Aylett, supported the article and its 
call for an extension of the licensing system, standing ftnn with her London colleagues.8' A former 
London Clinic psychiatrist, |ames Willis, who had stixxl out against the move away from heroin 
prescribing,84 and a provincial psychiatrist. Dr G Milner, practising at Worcester Royal Infirmary, 
both had criticisms. Although Willis thought the private prescription of maintenance drugs ‘out of 
the question’, he saw the (Trues as hypocritical and moralising in their repudiation of heroin 
prescribing.8,i Dr Milner pointed up the 1 xmdon-centnc view o f the authors, blaming the spread of 
addiction in Worcestershire on Nl IS general practitioners. (Private prescribing was almost 
unknown outside the South East). I le proposed that a single consultant psychiatrist should act as 
local co-ordinator of a district’s treatment and also supported the ACMD’s recommendation for 
district dmg problem teams to support GPs.Wl'8
Two private psychiatrists linked to Ann Dally both pointed to the methixlology as flawed anil 
condemned Clinic practices. Peter Dally, her ex-husband and contemporary practice partner, was a 
private and NI IS general psychiatrist but did not treat drug dependence.88 Dale Beckett had run a 
DDL' in the late 1960s and early 1970s anil then left for private practice. Dr Beckett was
1,1 11. B. Spear (and cd. J. Mott), (2002) op. c i t ,  p.287.
“- hri/ish M edical Journal, ‘Doctors for drug addicts’, Hrii/sh Medical Journal. 286, (1983) 1844.
M P. Aylett, ‘Prescription o f controlled drugs to addicts’ pettcr), British M edical Journal, 287 (198.3), 127.
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particularly stung by the article’s estimate of a private prescriber’s annual incomes at ¿100,000, and 
called for better communication between the two sides to overcome such misconceptions."'
At such a distance it has proven difficult to determine whether these responses were orchestrated 
by either side but correspondence from Dr Beckett, a fellow member of AIDA, to Dr Dally 
regarding his letter, suggested that she was at least aware it was being written, and it seemed highly 
unlikely that this was not also the case with the letter from Peter Dally.*"
Eillis Stungo, who had been a prescribing Harley Street psychiatrist since the 1950s, and 1 lonorary 
Secretary o f the Society for the Study o f  Addiction (1958 -64 ),perhaps surprisingly, proposed an 
extension o f the Clinic system and a highly controlled role for GPs with no place at all for private 
prescribcrs.'*2 In addition to the medical voices were two researchers, an occupational group that 
contributed increasingly to dmg policy debates in the 1980s and ’90s. 'Ihey agreed with some of 
Bewlcy and Ghodse’s points about injudicious and excessive private prescribing, but also pointed 
to shortcomings in the Clinics. Standing perhaps further outside the debate than the prescribing 
doctors, they used research evidence to argue that prescription controls were irrelevant to 
stemming the spread of opiate use because of the huge growth in the availability of trafficked 
heroin.*1 Finally the private patient, who was also a journalist, put many of the  arguments also used 
by Ann Dally and AIDA: that the Clinics were unnecessarily ngid, treated all patients as if identical 
and prescribed too little. I Iis own experience was that long term prescribing allowed him to hold 
down a job and maintain a ‘reasonably normal life’.
Aside from comments on the article’s methodology, this array of responses covered most o f  the 
points wliich were to constitute the public/private debate over the 1980s and ’90s: the impact of 
prescribing on the incidence of addiction; centralisation versus decentralisation of prescribing 
decisions; the sources of fees paid by patients; leakage from prescriptions to other users; the 
potential incomes of private prescribe!«; the role of the black market in trafficked drugs and the 
healthcare worker-patient relationship.
M'f H. D. Beckett, ‘Prescription o f  controlled drugs to addicts' |letterj, British Medical journal, 287 (1983), 127.
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In addition to these printed words, Dr Dally claimed that AIDA’s I lome Office meetings were 
forced to move to her home/practice premises in Devonshire Place after the Inspectorate was 
pressurised by Clinic psychiatrists Dr 'ITiomas Bewley and Dr Philip Connell95 as, ‘Meetings there 
had given us a respectability that was unacceptable in some quarters.’99 This coercion has been 
difficult to confirm, but Spear commented that, ‘it was quite obvious the Ixtndon consultants did 
not take too kindly to the contact the Drugs Inspectorate had with AIDA’.97 Were Dr Daily’s 
GMC cases, then, part o f  this medico-political battle, or was her daim o f  political motives an 
excuse from a doctor whose care had fallen below more widely accepted professional standards of 
the time?
The First Case Against Ann Dally (S"1-?* July 1983)
Dr Dally was charged as follows:
“That, being registered under the Medical Acts, between 1 l'h |une, 1981, o r earlier, and about 25'*’ 
November, 1981, you abused your position as a medical practitioner by issuing to Brian Sigsworth 
a number of prescriptions for dipipanone hydrochloride with cydizine \Dicondl\ and 
methvlphenidate |R/ta/rn] otherwise than in the course of bona fide treatment, including the 
prescriptions listed in the schedule which was sent to you with the Council’s letter o f 20lh April, 
1983. And that in relation to the facts alleged you have been guilty o f serious professional 
misconduct.*9"
At the end of the hearing, the PCC took the view that Ann Dally had disregarded her special 
responsibilities as a doctor by prescribing dnigs o f addiction and dependence in large quantities; 
having taken insuffident steps to establish that there were adequate therapeutic reasons for doing 
so and for failing adequately to monitor the patient’s progress and the use to which the dnigs were 
being put. She was judged guilty of serious professional misconduct and admonished. Because 
Ann Dally was not suspended or erased from the register, she was unable to appeal against the 
verdict.
this case concerned in particular the prescription o f the oral tablet DitonuJ, the injected use of 
which had been the subject of so much concern in the preceding years. It was clear, however, that 
Daily’s patient was not injecting the dnig and the Council failed to trace back to Dr Dally the
n  A. I>ally. Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
A. Dally, (1990) op. .V/., p.100.
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Dtconalhe had sold. In  1981, when Ann Daily’s prescribing occurred, there were no official 
guidelines on the treatment of addiction, no legal rules on specific matters such as dose, and the 
guidance given by the British National Formulary on Diivnul related only to the treatment o f pain 
and terminal disease."" Ann Dally was also criticised for not taking urine tests to check on her 
patient’s consumption o f the prescribed Diconal. I ler defence argued that such tests were easily 
falsified by patients.
Critically, and in an apparent extension of the GMC’s definition of a doctor’s duty. Dr Dally was 
considered responsible for the fate o f dntgs prescribed. She had only prescribed Dicorni/ to five 
patients,1"" and had discussed the dose she was going to prescribe with a 1 lome Office drugs 
inspector, Mr I leaton, although he was not medically qualified and the decision remained her 
responsibility."" The question o f serious professional misconduct therefore seemed to turn upon 
the extent to which a doctor could be held responsible for the drugs she prescribed and to what 
extent she could be expected to predict their diversion from the patient to another person.
The Second Case against Ann Dally (1986-1988)
Not long after the first case, Dr Daily felt apprehensive that a second was brewing. She had 
received a visit from two Home Office Inspectors who warned her that the Clinic doctors or 
‘dnig dependency establishment’ were trying to get a Tribunal brought against her.1""'1"' In June 
1984 she wrote a letter to Margaret Thatcher, ostensibly about deficiencies in DHSS policy, 
writing, ‘I believe mv views are shared bv an increasing number of interested and informed 
people. Perhaps partly because o f this I have aroused much hostility in powerful circles. I believe 
that I am again in danger of being “fixed” as happened last year.’’"4 Mrs Thatcher was sympathetic 
in her reply but did not refer to the GMC issues and again refused to take sides in the dispute.1"’
As Dr Dally predicted, a few months later. Dr Bewley made a complaint against her to the GMC 
after she had taken on  two of his former patients. I lowcvcr, on this occasion the GM C decided
«  Ibid  p.40.
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not to pursue the complaint. Early the following year a complaint by two of Dr Daily’s patients 
against Dr Bewley was also disregarded by the GMC.
Perhaps reflecting a general scepticism over the seriousness of the first case, its ruling does not 
seem to have damaged Dr Daily’s standing as in 1984 the Department o f  1 lealth and Social 
Security invited her onto the Medical Working Group charged with producing good practice 
guidelines."*’ The working group included representatives from all the main relevant medical 
bodies, including two from AIDA (Ann Dally and Dale Beckett). However, AIDA made little 
headway on the working group, and the opposition Dally and Beckett expressed to the treatment 
modalities recommended by the Guidelines was not reflected in the final document. Although Dally, 
Beckett and some other dissenters considered writing a minority report, the Chairman and 
secretariat introduced a new committee procedure to prevent them breaking the appearance of 
consensus (see Chapter 4 ) . Ironically the idea for the guidelines m ay have originated with 
AIDA, whose own guidelines were circulated to the Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group 
during its final deliberations."”
lhe  Guidelines played a role in the second case,11" but were quoted by both Counsels in their 
arguments. The prosecution referred extensively to their warnings against long tenn prescribing, 
particularly of opioids, without specialist collaboration (ie from the Clinics).'" But when a 
consultant psychiatrist from a DDU in Brighton gave evidence for the Council, Dr Daily’s defence 
compared ltis filmic’s prescribing and showed that some of his patients received maintenance 
prescriptions against the C, aide line s’ advice."2
Donald McIntosh, a senior inspector from the I lome Office, during an  interview with Dr Dally, 
questioned whether she agreed with the Guidelines, but he also conceded under cross-examination at
106 Medical Working G roup on Drug Dependence, Guidelines o f  Good Clinical Practice in tin Treatment o f  Drug 
Misuse, DIISS (Dmdon: HMSO, 1984).
"’7 A. Dally, (1990) op. <»/., pp. 127-132.
"* A. Thorlcy, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
"" AIDA, TRW G(82)10, ‘Drug Addiction: Guidelines and Standards in Management. Pre-publication edition, 
(February 1982), File D AC  7, DH Archive, Nelson, laincashire.
"Il A. Dally, (1990) op. a t., p.196.
1,1 GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day One, (9,h Dcccmlier 1986), Case o f Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T 
A Reed & Co. |transcript|, GMC Archive, I on don. p.1/12.
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her second hearing that a doctor favouring a different treatment regime would not necessarily be 
acting irresponsibly.1'1
After interviews, a report and some correspondence the Home Office took no action against Dr 
Dally but the C M C  decided to use the evidence the 1 lome Office Inspectors had gathered to put 
forward its own case. The reasons for this difference in approach were unclear, but the 
Inspectorate’s decision may have been influenced by Bing Spear who generally supported Daily’s 
work.114'" 5 W hile taking action against some of the prcscribers he considered less responsible, Spear 
seems to have recommended D r Dally to at least one patient."6 The GMC may have been 
influenced in the opposite direction by Philip Connell, one of the most senior Ixrndon Clinic 
psychiatrists, an active Council member from 1979 representing the Royal College of Psychiatrists, 
and strong opponent of private prescribing.
In September 1986, the GMC accused her of professional misconduct for a second time on two 
charges:
Between February 1985 and or earlier and August 1986, or later she had been guilty of 
irresponsibly prescribing numerous controlled drugs in return for fees and 
(a) Irresponsible prescribing in return for fees in relation to a particular patient, A (i) in that at 
the initial consultation in Febmary, 1982, she had failed to conduct a conscientious and 
sufficient physical examination, (ii) had not adequately monitored Iris progress on each 
occasion w hen a further prescription had been issued, and (b) that in October, 1985, when she 
decided not to issue any further prescriptions, she had discharged him without making 
arrangements for him to receive on-going care and treatment from another doctor.
After a gniclling eight days o f hearings, the case was decided in January 1987 finding Dr Dally guilty 
of serious professional misconduct in relation to the specific charge about M r A but not in relation 
to the general allegation o f irresponsible prescribing. She was suspended from prescribing 
controlled drugs for the treatment of addiction for 14 months. I ler appeal against the verdict to 
the Privv Council was unsuccessful.11
m GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day ( Inc, (9,h December 1986), Case o f  Dally. Ann Gwendolen. T 
A Reed & Co. (transcript), GMC Archive, I-ondon. p.1/59.
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'Ibe Council failed to prove the first general charge o f irresponsible prescribing, and the appeal 
conceded that medical opinion was divided on the issue of long term prescribing of controlled 
dmgs to addicts."* In this Dally may have been assisted by the British policy responses to concern 
about 11IV which strengthened the position of those advocating maintenance o r long term 
prescribing, although the dominance of ‘harm reduction’ in treatment did not take hold until several 
years later (sec Chapter 2). In the four individual cases the Home Office Inspectors highlighted in 
the first charge, they were unable to prove irresponsibility, but on the second charge she was found 
guilty of serious professional misconduct. 'ITie patient had admitted to selling methadone 
ampoules prescribed by D r Dally and the police had also proven this.119131 O ne of the accusations 
was that Dr Dally had failed to provide a referral after discharging him as a patient. I lowcver, the 
patient had turned up late and was afterwards abusive. Furthermore, the patient went to his GP 
two days later and got a referral to Hackney Hospital DDU, but decided not to take it up. To 
consider this ‘serious professional misconduct’ seemed harsh, particularly as her practice was 
exonerated of the general allegations in the first part o f the charge.
At least one commentator has characterised Dr Daily’s second trial as an inappropriate attempt by 
the GMC to adjudicate over different sch<x>ls of thought of medical practice, namely long tenn 
versus short tenn prescribing, when agreement or even relatively stable opinion were lacking in the 
field.'21 There was much discussion of the appropriateness o f long term prescribing during the 
hearing, but the fact that D r Dally was cleared of the general charge of irresponsible prescribing 
partly vindicated her approach. Although the second charge was proven, most of the issues in it 
were matters of fact. W hat was more questionable was whether they were serious enough to 
require a disciplinan' hearing, and could reasonable lx.- considered ‘serious professional misconduct’ 
by the standards of the day.
The Second Case Resumed (4'*’ July 1988)
Ihis followed on from Ann Daily’s 14 month suspension from prescribing controlled dmgs the 
previous year. The same charge as the Second 1 fearing was made and the Chainnan of the PCC 
judged that Dr Dally had failed to comply with the condition that was imposed on her registration 
when she had last appeared before the Committee as she had prescribed substances which were 
controlled under the Misuse of Dmgs Regulations 1985 and subsidiary regulations, lhesc were
"• ¡bid. pp.2*3.
GMC, Professional Conduct Committee. Day Two, (10* December 1986), Case o f  Dally. Ann Gwendolen, 
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D F  I 18s (which included dihydrocodeine), Dalmane (flurazepam), Robjfmol (flunitrazepam) and 
Valium  (diazepam). However, no further penalties were imposed due to confusion over which 
drugs were covered by the term ‘controlled’ and the chairman concluded ‘I have been asked to 
make it clear that the Committee regard the term “controlled drugs” in that condition as meaning 
all dmgs which are specified in Schedules 1-5 of the Misuse o f Drugs Regulations 1985.’122 She 
regained her fiill registration and ability to prescribe controlled drugs on 14,h November 1988, but 
bv then had retired from practice.
The conflicting nature o f  the advice given to Dr Dally by the GMC and various official sources as 
to which drugs were ‘controlled’ was attested by one o f  the I lome Office inspectors involved.12'
The British National Formulary and similar prescribing handbooks only marked with a ‘CD’ 
denoting ‘controlled drug’ those in Schedules 1-3, which were also the only ones subject to 
requirements for prescriptions to be handwritten, leading one commentator to remark. This case 
demonstrates nicely the great care and precision which is required in imposing conditions, and the 
desirability' o f explaining precisely what is intended to the practitioner.’,24
Motives behind the cases
Ann Dally has argued that the dmg dependency ‘establishment’ made up of psychiatrists working in 
the London Clinics led by Dr Philip Connell and Dr Thomas Bewley, were instrumental in the two 
GMC cases against her,12' with the intention of silencing or discrediting a vocal critic. Dr Dally had 
been warned in April 1984 that the drug dependency establishment were ‘still trying to make 
trouble’ for her and w ere trying to have her charged before a Home Office Tribunal. According to 
Dally, and one of the Inspectors present, she was advised, ‘You will lie judged by the standards o f 
the clinics and if found wanting you will lx- deprived o f  your right to presenbe controlled drugs. It 
will all depend on how much you conform to what the clinic doctors want.’124 *127’-127
While it has been difficult to trace the behind-the-scenes activities and complaints that led to the 
GMC cases, there w ere some pieces o f evidence that were suggestive. 'Ihe first case seemed to 
support Dr Daily’s argument of malicious intent towards her as it concerned a fairly trivial matter, a 
single patient to who had sold some Ditvinilwhich may or may not have been prescribed by Dr
122 GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, (4lhJuly 1988), Case o f  Dally, Ann Gwendolen (Resumed case) T 
A Reed & Co. (transcript], GMC Archive, l-ondon. p.48.
123 Home Office Inspector, (2002) op. tit.
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Dally. Although there was considerable concern at the time that Diivna!w as being injected with 
dangerous results,12* it was clear from the case that the patient to whom Dr Dally had prescribed 
the Diconaldid not inject it.
Home Office inspectors confirmed that extensive checks had been made by D r Dally with the 
Home Office Drugs Branch regarding the patient at the centre of the first case when she agreed to 
take on his care.12'' She had obtained information about his criminal record, finding that he had no 
records for supplying controlled drugs, and discussed the dose of Diconal that she was intending to 
prescribe. It appeared that attempts to get Dr Dally taken to a Home Office Tribunal may have 
failed and a medical body, o f which one o f her critics, Dr Connell, was a member, was used instead. 
Favourable testimony was given by the Inspectorate about Dally, although Bing Spear did say that 
he did not remember so high a Dicvnaldosage as she had prescribed.”"
However, considering Dr Dally was aware that she was under scrutiny, she may not have helped 
herself in the subsequent years before the second case for which the evidence was a little stronger. 
ITiis time the police did prove that Ann Daily’s patient was supplying drugs she had presenbed, 
after marking ampoules dispensed to him. Although difficult to predict or prevent this, she did 
ignore evidence that at least one of her patients was unemployed and so considered by regulatory 
authorities at risk o f selling on part of his prescription. She had also discharged a patient, albeit one 
who had been abusive towards her, without arranging any follow-on care and had carried out 
minimal examination of a patient before prescribing to him, although no harm had come to him.
do in g  against the ‘conspiracy’ interpretation was Don McIntosh, a senior I lom e Office inspector 
who acted in Spear’s place during his frequent sickness absences in 1985. I le  was «»/part o f the 
‘drug dependency establishment’, but rather one o f a range o f voices within the Inspectorate. 
Coming from the Bradford Office in the North of F.ngland, where private prescribing was virtually 
unknown, he felt that different standards were being allowed in the South Fast in tenns of the 
quantities and range of drugs prescribed to addicts. In 1984 or ’85 on moving to the London office 
o f the Inspectorate, he stepped up interviews of private doctors and in liis report on Ann Dally 
recommended a Tribunal.111 I Iowever, Peter Spurgeon, Spear’s immediate successor, has l
l-M GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day Two. (6th July 1983), Case o f Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T  A  
Reed & Co. [transcript], GMC Archive, London. pp.2/55-2/56.
,2*’ GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day Two, (6th July 1983), Case o f Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T A 
Reed & Co. [transcript|, GMC Archive, I-on don pp.2/61-2/6.3.
Ibid, p.2/53.
1,1 Home Office Inspector, (2002) op. ¡it.
137
suggested a contrary view that McIntosh may have been reflecting pressure from the Clinics that 
Spear had been able to resist1’2
Dr Dally has atgued extensively that the GMC was unfair in its conduct of the cases against her, 
believing it showed favouritism to its own members, vindictiveness and inconsistency.1”  One of 
her points was supported by Dr Michael O’Donnell, a member o f  the GMC’s PCC, who argued 
that the Committee members were allowing themselves exemption from their own ethical 
guidelines by letting information from patients’ notes to be used without their permission (provided 
the patients were not named) in Dr Daily’s second case, and he withdrew from the case in 
protest.”4
A memorandum submitted by the GMC to the House o f Commons’ Social Services Committee 
on 20lh February 1985 suggested that the Council had taken its own line on appropnatc treatment 
for drug users prior to  these cases. It read:
//*• Council bos hitherto eschewed tlx promulgation of specific news on tlx correct regime of treatment fora particular 
condition: if  the Councilpromulgated such news it wordd tend to inhibit advances in therapeutics. Netrrt/x/ess, 
disciplinary inquiries into cases of this kind hare all too plainly demonstrated tlx spedal hazards of medical practice in  
tlx field ofprescribing to addicts, particularly wlxn a dot tor is in practice on his own. The prescribing of opioid drugs to 
adebct.s, unless it is strictly controlled try tlx practitioner, mtry foment tlx grandng problem of drug abuse, try increasing 
supplies of tlx illicit drug markets, rather than achieve tlx therapeutic aims of control, alienation and detoxification. In  
tlx public interest, tlx Committees hate felt bound to take agraie view of cases when it was pnwed that a doctor had 
undertaken such prescribing irresponsibly or otherwise than in good faith.1' ’
A clear injustice against Dr Dally could be seen in the PCC’s final judgment delivered by the 
Chainnan, who restricted Dr Daily’s prescribing, in the light o f  her ‘blatant failure to heed the 
warning conveyed’ bv her ‘previous appearance before this Committee in 1983 in relation to similar 
matters’, since part o f  the charge proven in the second case - the inadequate examination of her 
patient “Mr A” -  occurred in 1982 before her first hearing.”*' 152
152 P. Spurgeon, Interview In' Sarah Mars, (2004).
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I f  D r Daily’s opponents wanted her G M C  cases to make an example of poor practice among 
private prescribers, the weakness of the charges and evidence against her made her a bad choice.
D r Tamesby, whom the GMC erased from the medical register in 1984, would have made a much 
stronger case against private practice. H e had prescribed Diurnal to an injecting addict, had four 
patients die and, in some cases, provided additional prescriptions after death. If, as Dr Dally 
claimed, they wished to silence a vocal critic or drive her from the field, then the second GMC case 
was successful, but although this is probable, it is still unproven.
W ith the departure of Dr Dally from the scene, private prescribers lost their strongest 
representative, but in some senses, Dr Colin Brewer, founder of the Stapleford Centre, a private 
drug and alcohol clinic employing several doctors and other staff in London, inherited Dr Daily’s 
mande. He was a member o f AIDA, and like Dr Dally saw prescribing as a broader political issue 
touching major social questions. He too  wrote on medical matters in the press and saw addicts as 
victims of an overly restrictive regulatory system for controlling the availability of drugs. When Dr 
Dally ceased her practice after the second GMC case, he trxik on many of her patients, and 
ironically in 2(X)4 he and his practice became the subject of the largest GMC disciplinary hearing of 
private doctors ever held.
D r H. Peter Tamesby, Second C ase, 1984
'I h e  story o f the 1984 Guidelines (see Chapters 3 & 4) was one where a mechanism for maintaining 
and raising standards of care and identifying cases o f poor practice was hijacked by one ideology to 
dominate another. Some o f the same tendencies could be seen in the Dally cases, but was this the 
case for all the Council’s discipline against private prescribers over this |xnixl? A detailed review of 
every case has not been within the scope of this study, but a contrasting case study of Dr I lerman 
Peter Tamesby suggested that in its dealings with private doctors the Council also had a role in 
protecting patients from incompetent o r negligent practitioners.
Dr Tamesby was highly qualified, w ith a doctorate in psychological medicine and extensive 
experience as a psychiatrist. He had trained at the Maudslev I lospital from 1951-53 at the same 
time as Dr Bewley, and at the respected Tavistock Centre (1952-59). 1 Ic had been appointed 
consultant psychiatrist at the British I lospital for Functional Nervous Disorders and he had 
worked with some dntg dependent patients as a consultant at Paddington I lospital although it was 
not clear whether this had involved any prescribing. Dr Tamesby then worked as a priv ate
psychiatrist, with consulting rooms in and around 1 larley Street, with only a litde contact with drug 
users until he started treating them in quantity from 1981."7,13*
Ihe GMC charged him with prescribing both irresponsibly and otherwise than in the course of 
bona fide treatment in 1984. Since a Home Office Tribunal had already proved him guilty of 
irresponsible prescribing the previous year, he only contested the second part o f the charge, that his 
prescribing was ‘otherwise than in the course o f bona fide treatment’.1 v> 1 lis first brush with the 
GMC, it was revealed at the end of the 1984 hearing, had occurred in 1969 when he was found 
guilty o f serious professional misconduct for advertising abortion services.141'
Although DrTamesby had a high level o f professional qualifications and experience, and went to 
some lengths to research and refine his treatments for drug users, even commissioning the 
production of special methadone suppositories to avoid the need to prescribe injcctables, he also 
seems to have made some serious errors o f procedure and judgment.141 He prescribed drugs to a 
patient whom he had not examined thoroughly and turned out later to be an undercover reporter 
for the Daily Mirror, treated several patients who subsequently' died of overdoses using drugs he had 
prescribed, and kept inadequate records.14"141'144
There were a number of similarities with Dr Daily’s cases, which have pointed up the difficult 
position dmg doctors could lie put in bv the regulatory authorities, such as whether to discharge a 
patient who was not meeting their fees for fear that they could be selling some of their script. Also, 
the practice of the Clinics seems to have been taken as the ideal against which other treatment had 
to be measured, reflecting the stronger position of the Clinics within establishment txxlies such as 
the GMC.145-144’ But overall, the evidence did show a carelessness that turned out to have serious. 147
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even fatal consequences for his patients. However, considering the fact that he had already been 
stopped from prescribing substitute drugs by the I lome Office, he probably posed no continuing 
threat to drug users.
D efin in g  Term s
The lack of definitions o f the GMC’s code of practice regarding ‘bona fide’ and ‘irresponsible 
prescribing’, the latter term also undefined in its inclusion in the Misuse o f  Drugs Act 1971, had left 
much latitude to doctors’ clinical judgment, but this freedom could also be a trap as it allowed 
regulators, whether the state or professional peers, equal scope to interpret these terms as they 
chose. Smith noted various attempts to clarify the meaning o f ‘bona fide’ at GMC hearings, with it 
usually being left to the discretion o f individual committee members.14' Clarification could be 
brought by the legal Assessor, a lawyer advising the PCC, as was the case with the final definition 
o f ‘bona fide’ used in the first Dally case.1 JM
I lowever, his definition did not quell concern among commentators. D iana Brahams, a barrister 
writing for the luimrt after Daily’s admonition, considered ‘disquieting’ the way in which the charge 
o f prescribing drugs ‘otherwise than in the course of bona fide treatment’ was interpreted by the 
PCC.14’ Brahams was concerned that the term was only defined as ‘recklessness’ at a late stage, but 
then this was found to be unsuitable. Definitions were then provided for ‘bona fide’ which seem to 
have amounted to recklessness, making the ruling inconsistent. If the ten n  meant, in literal 
translation, ‘grx»d faith’, Brahams further argued that the evidence against Dr Dally seemed ‘to fall 
well short of proof o f a lack of gtxxl faith’. Certainly considerable care seems to have been taken 
by D r Dally to prevent the prescribed Dicona! from falling into unintended hands and Ms Brahams 
concluded her criticism of the GMC by calling for ‘more positive guidelines and procedures... for 
tlie private management of dmg dependence.’15"
In spite of the legal Assessor’s definition, confusion continued in subsequent cases. In the 
Tamesby case, held in March 19K4, the defence spent considerable time trying to define the 
charges, including the meaning o f ‘bona fide’ noting that ‘the charge uses words which are difficult 
to define and which the Committee may have had problems with on other occasions’, The legal
1 GM C, Professional Conduct Committee, Day Five, (10* March 1984) Case o f  Tamesby, Herman Peter, T A 
Reed & Co. |transcript|, GMC Archive, I a melon, p.8S.
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Assessor stepped in again, but not, as one might have expected, to refer back to the earlier ruling in 
the Dally case, but to state that no additional wording was required to clarify the term, only a simple 
English translation o f ‘good faith’.'’1
Dr Tamesby’s defence also had difficulty over whether reference to the quantity of dmgs meant 
prescribed overall or per patient, over the time period covered by the charges; and the significance of 
‘prescribing in return for fees’,1 a phrase also used in Dr Daily’s first case. Since private doctors 
charged fees and provided prescriptions during the course of their consultations, it would seem 
difficult to distinguish clearly when a fee was being charged for a prescription and when for a 
consultation, possibly weighting the system against private prescribers.
Ambiguity arose yet again in the terms o f Dr Daily’s penalty in the second case, when forbidden ‘to 
prescribe o r possess controlled dmgs’, which were never made explicit, with darification only given 
at the end o f  the period o f suspension.1’1
Although the GMC had failed to advise its members on how thev should prescribe to dmg users 
and avoid regulatory attention, after 1984, as a spokesperson explained to the I louse of Commons 
Sexual Services Committee in 1985, there were other sources o f guidance. By the time of D r Daily’s 
second case, doctors working privately had, according to the GMC’s prosecution, four key sources 
of written advice: the 1984 Guidelines, the passing reference in the GMC’s ‘Blue Book’, and two 
articles by 1-ondon Clinic psychiatrists in the British Medical Journal. I lowcver, none of these were 
based on research evidence and like Dr Daily’s practice and beliefs, they were effectively the 
product o f  personal experience and opinion.1’ '1,1” '116'1’7
In the Tam esby case the role of witnesses pointed up the problems around ‘expertise’ in this 
polarised, politicised field, and the potential conflict this could prtxluce within a system of 
regulation based upon professional consensus. Dr Bewley, a vcx:al opponent of private prescribing,
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was called as a witness for the Council. Dr Tamesby had prescribed to one of Bewley’s long­
standing patients, causing Dr Bewley to write him a vigorous letter of complaint. A second patient 
o f  Bewley’s who went to Dr Tamesby for treatment died of a Diconaloverdose and Bewley had 
given evidence against Tamesby at his I lome Office Tribunal the previous year. In spite of Dr 
Bewley’s clearly opposing position, he was treated as a neutral ‘expert’ by the committee, who saved 
a question o f pharmacology arising earlier in the proceedings for him to answer.15"
Uncertainty also characterised the nature o f the GMC’s disciplinary powers. It had the legal powers 
o f a tribunal, and required the level of proof to be the same as a criminal court, “beyond reasonable 
doubt’, but the charges could be specific or like the first charge o f ‘irresponsible prescribing’ in Ann 
Daily’s second case, very general and unattached to any particular patient. The dates to which these 
charges applied could also float freely, a point picked up by Dr Tamesby’s defence; his charge was 
situated “Between about 13 October 1981 or earlier and about 10 February 1983 or later.. .’I5'' 
Reading the transcripts of these hearings one is given the impression that the committee members 
themselves were unsure of their roles, perhaps unsurprising in view of the minima] preparation they 
were given."’" Ix-gal counsels too might be inexperienced in the ways o f the GMC: Dr Tamesby’s 
defence was unused to the niceties of medical confidentiality and repeatedly revealed the identities 
o f  patients through the proceedings.
T he M ed ia
ITte media acted as both a conduit for the views of either side o f the debate and as an actor in its 
own right. There was an important contrast in the way that Ann Dally and the London consultants 
used the media, which may have had implications for the actions taken against her. The 
consultants published articles and letters in the medical media,"’1 but very rarely took the debate to 
a general audience through press, television o r radio. Already an established medical commentator, 
Ann Dally was outspoken and particularly prolific, and in the 1980s began to write many letters to 
the general press and appeared on the radio and television.
Stinison and Dirt have identified the style o f  policy making visible in the dmgs field in the 1960s 
and the 1970s as carried out behind the scenes in ‘an essentially private work! where policy was
’*• GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day Three, (8lh March 1984), Case o f  Tamciby, Herman Peter, T. 
A. Recti & Co. [transcript], GMC Archive, London. p.S4.
,w GMC. Professional Conduct Committee. Day C Inc, Tuesday 6,h March 1984, Case o f  Tamesby, I Icrman 
Peter, T. A. Reed & Co. [transcript). GMC Archive, London, p. 1/1.
,W1 See M. Stacey, (1992) op. ci!., p. 141.
",l cy. I- Strang, ‘Personal View’, British Main'll/Journal, 284 (1982), 972.
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made by accommodation between experts and civil servants’. The ACMD, established in 1971, 
continued in this tradition162 and its discussions were subject to the Official Secrets Act.
In the 1970s, policy changes among the London consultants, such as the switch from heroin to 
methadone prescribing, took place through committees (the Iajndon Consultants Group, discussed 
in Chapter 8) which met in private and in discussions at medical conferences, rarely involving 
public campaigns, and almost never involving patient participation. Treatment policies were seen 
as largely a private affair, and it is the conclusion of this research that it was the public nature of 
Ann Daily’s attacks on the Clinics that so  embittered the Ix>ndon consultants as much as the 
content of the attacks themselves. Raising in public what the London consultants saw as matters 
for private discussion broke their code o f  discreet, private policy-making, and involved the public 
and patients in the issues.
On a rare occasion, Dr Philip Connell, o ther London Clinic consultants, and some representatives 
of voluntary services wrote to Tlx Times proposing that all prescribing doctors should be supervised 
by the Clinics.16’ In response, Ann Dally wrote to the editor one of her earliest expressions in the 
media on this topic:
Recently I  questioned 30 Ixroirt addicts who were seeking treatment. . A ll but one said that under no circumstances 
would they tip (or, in some cases, return) to a detoxification unit... What they olyecl to is the way t/xse units are run. 
These patients hair much tlx same feelings about out-patient Drug Dependence L1nits or ‘clinics ’ whose authority D r 
Connell now wishes to extend over doctors outside. Nearly all my addict patients have at some time attended such a 
clinic. A ll are critical}1'*
While Dr Daily continued to raise these questions with the ordinary’ public, her key opponents, Drs 
Connell and Bewlcv, rarely did so, restricting their opinions to medical fora, such as the British 
MedicalJournal and Tlx lajruet.
In response to Daily’s letter to The Times, she received one fn>tn William Deedes, editor o f the Daily 
Telegraph, congratulating her, but in the early 1980s, journalists in the general press, and particularly 142
142 G. V. Stimion ami R. I art, ‘The Relationship Between the State and Local Practice in the Development o f 
National Policy' on Drugs between 1920 and 19 9 0 ’, in J. Strang and M. Gossop (cds). Heroin Aiidtchon And P rvg  
Policy: The British System (Oxford, New York, Tokyo, Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.331-341, p.336.
IM M. Ashton, Conference (almost) agrees on  central funding, licensed GPs, more detoxification’, PrugUnk. 
Information latter, 15 (1981), 6.
,M A. Dally, ‘National resources for drag abuse’, lamer to The Times, (27"1 January 1981), File 
PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 1 o f 2), Wellcome I .ibrary, London.
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the tabloids, were often hostile.'63 Although widely featured in the media, Dally often felt 
misrepresented.166
As well as the medical press and general media criticising both the Clinics and private 
d o c t o r s , 7,1 the tabloid press took a mote active approach using undercover reporters to 
pose as drug dependent patients to test the ease with which they could obtain prescriptions from 
private prescribers, continuing these sting operations into the 1990s. In the case of Dr Tamesby the 
resulting article in the Dai/y M inor prompted investigations by the Home Offtce Drugs Inspectorate 
and were also heavily featured in disciplinary cases before the GMC.1 'I l72'171'174
The article by Bewley and Ghodsc and the correspondence that followed was provided as 
background material to the medical working group responsible for producing the 1984 Guidelines' 
which played a role in Ann Daily’s second case. Around this time Dr Dally was also participating in 
a Ihames Television programme ‘Reporting London’ on the prescription of Diconu/.' 6 So here, 
private was ‘public’ and public was ‘private’.
hollowing the verdict o f the first case, Dr Dally received sympathetic letters and coverage from 
Klinor I larbridge o f World Medicine, lan Monro and Diana Bra hams o f the I unite/ and also Penny 
Chorlton o f The Gtumlian, who wrote ‘I do feel you were made a scapegoat for challenging the 
establishment’s appraoch |sic] to drug addiction.’ 1 Michael O’Donnell, a member of the
GMC, also wrote in the British AledicalJonmnlagainst the verdict.""
,hS eg |. Ritchie, ‘Drug crazv Britain*. The Sun, London, (17,h December 1980), 14-15.
A. Dally, le tte r  to M. Bishop, (5'" July 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 1 o f 2), Wellcome Library, 
London.
167 eg. The I ante/, ‘Drug dependence in Britain: a critical time’. The Lancet, 2 (1983), 493 494.
'f,K eg. The Lance/, ‘Drug addiction: British System failing’. The Lancet, 1 (1982), 83-84.
,M eg M. 1 lonigsbaum, ‘The addiction arguments that divide the doctors’, Hampstead and Highgate I i.\prtss, (6lh 
May 1983), 2.
17.1 eg. Anonymous, ‘Doctor Death’, The l js t en e r (29,h July 1982), 22.
1.1 SceJ. Merritt, ‘Doctors who trade in misery’, Dai/)' Mirror, (18lh February 1982), 7-8.
172 GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Dav Three, (8'1' March 1984), Case o f Tamesby, Herman Peter, T. 
A. Reed & Co. |transcript|, GMC Archive, London, pp.39-85.
,7' GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day Four, (9,h March 1984) Case o f  Tamesby, Herman Peter, T A 
Reed & Co. |transcriptj, GMC Archive, I a union, pp. 11-12; 34-39.
177 GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day Five, (10,h March 1984) Case o f  Tamesby, Herman Peter, T A 
Reed & Co. (transcript], GMC Archive, Ixtndon. pp. 13-19;48-51.
17s Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence, Guidelines o f 'C.ood Practice in the Treatment o f  Drug Misuse, 
(I-ondon: DHSS, 1984).
,7t A. Dally, Letter to S. Perrins, (7»> March 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 1 o f 2), Wellcome Library. 
London.
177 I. Munro, le tte r to A. Dally, (day and month missing, 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 1 o f  2), 
Wellcome 1 ibrarv, London.
I7" P. Chorlton, Letter to A. Dally, (20"' July 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 1 o f 2), W ellcome Library. 
London.
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The second GMC case against Ann Dally aroused much more attention both from the public and 
in the medical world. At a time when the prevention of HIV/AIDS was becoming part of a public 
policy debate and the government had already started to sponsor needle exchange schemes, a great 
deal o f discussion regarding appropriate prescribing appeared in the media, which was becoming 
more sympathetic towards long term prescribing.,l'2'"'," ,4" ‘’ The prosecution feared that the 
publicity would ‘mm the inquiry into a political debate.’184' In the dmgs field, Mike Ashton, editor of 
the Institute for the Study of Drug Dependence’s DrugBnk, characterised the two Daily cases as 
political in origin: “'Ihe powerful tide of medical opinion that wants prescribing more tightly 
controlled’ was extending the G M C’s powers from assessing treatment of the individual patient to 
the question o f whether any dmgs o f  dependence prescribed might be redistributed and harm 
other members of the public.'87,188
If they had wanted to silence her, the media attention that both Dr Daily’s GMC cases drew rather 
backfired on her detractors. Press and public were able to sit in on the hearings and they and Dally 
drew the debate into the public realm, beyond the medical media, widening the debate beyond the 
dmgs issues to include the GMC process itself as well as the justice of its decision.
Doctors not only had their own publications, which also had a standing outside o f  their 
professional circles, but also easy access to the non-medical media. l ;urthcnnore there was 
considerable public interest in medical issues throughout this period and as a medical professional, 
a writer or broadcaster held an automatic authority. For the tabloids, the shock value in 
undennining an apparently respectable figure by duping him in an undercover operation was all the 
greater. Since dnigs were a particularly emotive topic, dividing the public as m uch as the 
profession, media coverage was ensured. All aspects of this output fed the public-private debate 
not only at the rhetorical level, but in its expression through regulatory action, whether by the 
Medical Working Group responsible for the 1984 ClftideBms, the Inspectorate or the GMC itself.
,7'’ D. Brahams, (1983) op. (if., pp.979 981.
,WI E. Harhridge, Letter to A. Dally, (14 ,h July 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 1 o f  2), Wellcome library', 
1-ondon.
,MI M. ( VDonnell, )nc man’s burden’, British MedicalJournal, 287 (1983), 990.
IH- eg. M. Ashton, ‘Doctors at war’, Oruplink, 1 (1986), 1.3-15.
11,3 eg. J. Laurance and A. Dally, ‘Racketeer or rescuer?’, N ew Society, 1256 (1987), 18-19.
IH4 eg. Anonymous, ‘Heroin on the NHS’, NewSociety, 1269 (1987), 3. 
eg. Panorama, BBC1 (1987).
GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day C lne, (9lh December, 1986), Case o f  Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T  
A Reed & Co. [transcript|, GMC Archive, London, p.1/21.
11,7 M. Ashton, (1986), op a t  13-15, p .15
"" M. Ashton, ‘Doctors at War’, Dmg/ink, 1(2) (1986), 14-16.
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Conclusion
'Ilie rale of the GMC w as problematic in the Dally cases for a number of reasons. A key plank in 
medicine’s self-regulation was the idea o f professional consensus, something clearly lacking in the 
dmgs field during the 1980s, and to a slightly lesser extent in the adjoining decades. Added to this, 
the lack of guidance as to what could lead to disciplinary steps and even on the conditions imposed 
on prescribing after a verdict, created an unfair situation for doctors, and scope for redefining 
ambiguous terms to suit personal or professional animosities.
Ambiguity arose as a m ajor theme of prescribing regulation in England regarding the jurisdiction of 
different regulatory bodies and in the guidance given to doctors about prescribing to drug users. 
Baker has traced back British medical ethics to a code o f honour o f  the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, where, by virtue o f being a gentleman, a doctor was not deemed to require precise, 
crxlified guidance. Indeed the need for such explicit instruction on ethics and conduct could mark 
one out as unsuited to practising medicine.1"1 Gentlemanly status, however, was something most 
doctors aspired to rather than achieved at this time. Particularly before the 1858 Medical Act and 
the establishment o f the exclusive Medical Register, most ordinary doctors in England were o f low 
s<x:ial status.1"'
After the Second World W ar the British medical profession developed a more codified set of 
medical ethics but resistance to explicit advice continued. Ihe Merrison Inquiry rejected the idea of 
a cixle of practice to give doctors a better idea of what might lead to disciplinary actions in favour 
of building up ‘case law ’ as had been done in the past.1 M But ‘case law’ seems to have been used 
inconsistently, with rulings at one hearing not carried over to subsequent ones, and the same 
confusions arising repeatedly. The GMC’s reluctance to be pinned down in giving guidance to its 
members could also be seen in the laggardliness o f its Standards Committee to decide on whether 
to expand its advice on prescribing opioids.
Ihe GMC’s repeated reluctance to state definitively what constituted non-bona fide or 
irresponsible prescribing, the lack of guidance from either the British Medical Association or GMC 
on the treatment of drug users, and the uncertain meaning o f the Misuse ot Drugs Act term
,K'’ R. Baker, 'British and American Conceptions o f Medical Ethics, 1847-1947’, Anglo American Medica) 
Relations: Historical Insights Conference, 19,h-21" June 2003, The Wellcome Building, London, UK.
1 13. Porter and R. Porter, Valient's Vrvtpess: P o tion  and Podorint, in Eig/Heentb- Century I inalim i (Stanford, C A  :
Stanford University Press, 1989).
1,11 M. Stacey, (1992) oft. a t., p.57.
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‘irresponsible prescribing’ reflected both the profession’s discomfort at judging the clinical decisions 
o f other doctors and the uncertainty o f the dmgs field itself in the 1960s, 70s and early ’80s.
Competing schools of thought with different treatment goals, the lack of a robust scientific 
evidence base, and a relatively low level of technical expertise required for treating dnig users all 
made competence difficult to define. This vagueness, particularly when the GMC was increasingly 
being called to be specific during the 1980s, led to a situation exploitable by forces keen to restrict 
prescribing particularly over those in private practice.
The profession had a poor record of concern for regulating the treatment of patients, particularly 
when these patients were sodo-economically disadvantaged.11“ During the 1970s and ’80s, the rise 
o f patients’ rights and consumerism outside of the profession increasingly pressurised the GMC to 
address issues o f clinical decision making, especially when it involved neglect, harm or death caused 
bv practitioners.1 Stacey noticed a rise in disciplinary cases concerning doctors’ conduct in the 
1980s and "90s and the case of DrTamesby showed that the GMC did fulfil some role in 
protecting drug-using patients from private prescribers whose practice was dangerous, however 
reluctantly.
Whether there was a conspiracy to remove Dr Dally as a thorn in the side of the dnig dependency 
establishment has been difficult to prove for certain, but some of the evidence pointed in that 
direction. Bing Spear, although not impartial, seemed convinced this was the case. I ler first case 
was brought on a slim pretext, and the procedure itself was flawed. Ihe second case, though a little- 
stronger, was still not damning, and she was doubly condemned for failing to heed the warning of 
the first, when some of its charges pre dated it. Dr Dally was exonerated of the second case’s 
general chaige of irresponsible prescribing, which pointed against the idea that she was condemned 
for following a different ‘sch<x>l of thought’. Yet the fact that the minor misdemeanours proven in 
the second part of the chaige were defined as ‘serious professional misconduct’ and brought 
suspension o f  her prescribing rights, has suggested a bias against her.
Although Dr Dally was effectively driven out of the prescribing field by the two GMC cases, the 
media attention from outside medicine that they brought to the debate and to the Council's 
treatment o f her rebounded on her critics. If part of their irritation was her high profile as a critic
',’2 R. Cooler, (2000) op. iif., pp.457-460. 
m M. Stacey, (1992) op. (it., pp.173; pp.181-199.
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of the Clinics, the cases only brought her more publicity, and some of the sympathy she received 
from the media was at the expense of her opponents.
While much attention has been given to the question of whether Dr Dally was being judged by the 
standards o f the Clinics, there was also the issue of how much the GMC had absorbed the interests 
of the state in the form o f the Inspectorate. Dally and Tam esby’s cases have shown that the 
Inspectorate’s responsibility to control the flow of prescribed dmgs within authorised channels had 
effectively been incorporated into the body of medical ethics for professional self-regulation. In 
their practice, private doctors were expected to distinguish between patients likely to divert dmgs, 
to prevent their prescribed dmgs reaching the hands of others and to keep monitoring their 
employment status.
Although advised by the Inspectorate, doctors were responsible for their own prescribing decisions, 
and the priorities o f the state in controlling the circulation o f  drugs would not necessarily concur 
with the therapeutic or practical needs o f the patient, regarding which they were also answerable. 
Kthical decisions about whether to treat had to take into account the patient’s ability to pay from 
legitimate sources o f income. I lere, private doctors’ practice had developed a criminal policing role 
that was not imposed upon Clinic doctors, while leakage from the Clinics, admitted by the 
Inspectorate, was being overlooked.'
'Ihe low level of technical skills and limited research on which knowledge could be based and 
measured against in the dmgs field left those wishing to distinguish between the acceptable and 
unacceptable treatment o f addiction in need of other criteria to maintain their authority, The co­
opting o f these criminal concerns bv the GMC as (tart of its body of ethics in these cases perhaps 
reflected the need o f Clinic elements within and around die Council for an alternative measure of 
competence as part o f their professionalizing strategy.
lhc Dally and Tamcsbv cases therefore arose as the focal points of a range o f  historical forces.
Dnig use, particularly o f opiates, was rising dramatically in the 1980s, along with the number of 
doctors treating it, particularly outside the Clinics. In response to several forces of outside pressure, 
the GMC had begun to take greater notice of cases concerning doctors’ clinical conduct, and more 
such cases were brought forward for disciplinary action during the 1980s. Its reluctance to act on 
such matters, and preference for each case to be judged by its members as it arose, was expressed in
GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day < )nc, (9,h Decemlx*r 1986), Case o f  Dally, Ann Gwendolen, '1'. 
A. Reed & Co. (transcript), GMC Archive, Iaindon. p.1/47.
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its distaste for giving specific guidance on appropriate prescribing. Together, these conditions 
offered a window of opportunity for those doctors who wished to cut through the fog of 
controversy and exert their authority as the arbiters o f drug treatment. At the turn of the twenty- 
first century, even greater pressures upon the Council and the profession were similarly employed 
to devastating effect on private prescribes.
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Chapter 6
The Role of the Home Office Drugs Inspectorate and the 
Misuse ofDrugs Tribunals
Introduction
This chapter concerns permanent, formal regulatory systems dealing with the prescribing of 
controlled drugs. It focuses in particular on the Home Office Inspectorate (‘the Inspectorate1 2*), its 
relationships with other regulatory bodies with cross-cutting concerns and how these regulatory 
systems changed over the period. It reflects on their impact on the regulated, particularly the 
doctors treating drug users.
Very little has been published about the Inspectorate or these relationships. Historian Virginia 
Berridge has considered the social, legislative and policy changes that surrounded the development 
o f these stnicturcs, but not the development of the Inspectorate itself.1"’' H. B. “Bing’ Spear, Chief 
Inspector at the Drugs Branch from 1977 to 1986, has written a rare historical account of its 
origins, placing them in 1916 when the Home Secretary authorised a temporary administrative 
assistant, A .). Anderson, to inspect records o f cocaine supplies which phannacists had been 
required to keep from earlier the same year. However, the rest o f his book on the ‘British System’ 
took a broader policy scope, leaving the Inspectorate’s development somewhat on the sidelines.4 *'
ITtc Tribunal system used by the Inspectorate to enforce the law against prescribes, has attracted 
some attention, with articles by sociologist Philip Bean and also by Spear, but were written before 
major developments in the 1990s/’'7'* The Independent Public Inquiry into the case of Dr I larold
1 V. Berridge. ‘Drugs and social policy: the establishment o f drug control in Britain, 1900-30’, British Journalof 
Addiction, 79 (1984). 17-29.
2 V. Bcmdgc, ‘W ar conditions and narcotics control: the passing o f Defence of the Realm Act Regulation 4t)B‘, 
Journal o f  Social PoSçy, 19 (1978), 28.S .404.
' V. Berridge, Opium and the People (Free Association Books, London: 19*49) pp.235 270.
* 11. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), / teroin Addiction l  itre tend Control: The 'British System' IV16 tVS4 (London: 
DrugScope, 2002) p.35.
' 1920 was the year o f the Dangerous Drugs Act which required pharmacy inspections, and Gerald Rhodes 
gave that year for the establishment o f the Inspectorate, but provided no source, sec G. Rhodes, Inspectorates in 
British Government. I a tv  Unfonrment and Standards o f  Hfliriemy, Royal Institute o f  Public Administration (Inndon: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1981) p.253. Margaret Stacey seemed confused by what she called the Home Office’s 
‘drug squad’ the origins o f which she placed in the late 1960s, see M. Stacey, Re^ulstinx British Mediant: the General 
M edical Council, (Chichester. John Wiley and Sons, 1992) p.32.
f‘ P. Bean, ‘Policing the medical profession: the use o f Tribunals’, in D. K. Whyncs and P. T. Bean (cds.), Pohany 
and Prescribing. The British System o f  Pritg Control (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991) pp.60-70.
7 11. B. Spear, ‘British experience in the management o f  opiate dependence’ in M. M. Cilatt and |. Marks (cds.). 
The Dependente Phenomenon, (1 .ancastcr: MTP Press, 1982), pp.51-79.
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Shipman carried out extensive research into how the regulatory systems for controlled drugs had 
developed since the nineteenth century, and published its findings in its Fourth Report.J Given the 
nature o f its interest, the Inquiry focussed on details of the legal and regulatory changes themselves, 
rather than seeking to explain the causes or wider effects o f  such developments.
'ITie Home Office itself, through a combination of poor archiving practice and refusing the author 
access to Tribunal documents, has provided little in documentary material for study. Four annual 
reports were produced for a limited circulation in the mid-1980s and lodged with the library of the 
Institute for the Study of Drug Dependence (now DrugScope) in London, and a set o f draft 
guidelines for Inspectors produced in 1983 were given to the author. In addition, a range of 
documents and oral evidence produced by the Inspectorate and police relating to the history of the 
supply o f controlled pharmaceutical dnigs considered by the Shipman Inquiry were made available 
on the Inquiry’s Internet web site. Although reticent to provide documents, the Hom e Office were 
generous in granting extensive interviews. Four inspectors, including the current and most recent 
Chiefs, were interviewed for this chapter as well as a police Chemist Inspecting Officer and a 
former Chief of the Royal Pharmaceutical Society. As a result of the source materials available, the 
chapter gives greatest weight to the 1980s.
I be Inspectorate’s main concern through most of the twentieth century was to prevent diversion 
of an increasing range of controlled substances from authorised medical channels to unauthorised 
suppliers or users. It did this through a staff of inspectors originally based in London, and then 
with two additional regional offices from 1974.1" Spear attributed its origins to ‘the belief that from 
time to time it might be necessary to make special enquiries, probably involving medical 
practitioners, for which it would be better not to employ the police.’" The police w ere to take a role 
in pharmacy inspection from 1917 but this sensitivity over who should patrol the medical 
profession recurred throughout the twentieth century. A preference for avoiding the criminal 
justice system when dealing with doctors’ practices was certainly seen in the establishment of the 
Inspectorate’s system of medical Tribunals. T his was intended for disciplining doctors (and also 
vets and dentists) independent o f the GMC if the Inspectorate thought they were supplying or 
prescribing dangerous dnigs inappropriately. In addition to  regulating prescribing doctors, the
H 11. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. at., pp.62-64; 278-279.
9 The Shipman Inquiry, Fourth Report — The Regulation o f  Controlled Drops in the Community (London: HMSO, 2tX)4) 
pp.43-56.
"’ A. Stcars, Witness Statement, (31M August 1999), Document W S  34 (KKK)l, The Shipman Inquiry,
www.thcshipmaninquiry.org.uk.
11 II. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. at., p.35.
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Inspectorate was responsible for policing the import, export, distribution and manufacture of 
controlled pharmaceutical drugs.12 *
'l ir e  Inspectorate was just one strand in a web of control systems, both state and professional, 
which emerged over the twentieth century to regulate the fate of pharmaceutical ‘dangerous drugs’, 
known from 1971 as ‘controlled drugs’.15 In addition to the GMC discussed in the previous 
chapter, tliis included the police’s Chemist Inspecting Officers, the Regional Medical Sen-ice 
employed by Health Authorities, the Medicines Control Agency and the Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society’s inspectorate, with professional and state systems working independendy and cooperating 
informally with each other.
Early history o f the Inspectorate
Prior to 1868, opium and other psychoactive substances were available for purchase through 
grocers’ shops without any professional or state controls.14 The 1868 Pharmacy Act introduced 
minor restrictions on their sale through phannacy shops, bringing a combination o f  state and 
professional control through the Pharmaceutical Society under the general supervision of the Privy- 
Council Office.15
Berridge has noted a gradual tendency towards increased controls around availability and sale 
during the late nineteenth century, but that possession and use did not arouse concern. Ibis light 
but rising professional/state regulation continued into the early twentieth century, with additional 
substances being brought under control, while opiate use was diminishing. At this time the addict 
population was small, made up largely of elderly opium users buying their supplies from chemists; a 
middle class section of morphine users whose dnig use had usually originated with either medical 
treatment or occupational proximity to medical supplies; and a tiny artistic and Bohemian 
subculture, mainly in London, who smoked cannabis and opium.16
.American influence on the international stage had led to Britain’s reluctant involvement in the 
development o f an international control system for narcotics, expressed in the I lague Conventions 
(1911-12, 1913 and 1914) which restricted opiate and cocaine use to that described as ‘medical and
12 J . Scullion, Witness Statement, (10* March 2003), Document W S 35 00001, The Shipman Inquiry, 
www.theshipmaninquiry.org.uk.
n  Under the Misuse o f Drugs A ct, 1971.
1 * V. Berridge and G. Pdwards, Opium unit tht People. Opiate l h e in Nineteenth Century linp/aml (first published 1981 
I-ondon: Allen bane; this edition New Haven and 1 .ondon: Yale University Press, 1987) p.3.
•» /hiit. p.120.
16 V. Berridge, (1999) op. tit., p.238.
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legitimate’, although this was not defined.'7 Their implementation in Britain was initially proposed 
through professional regulation in alliance with the state, similar in style to the existing control 
mechanisms, but World War One invigorated the state’s interest in narcotics control, as it did in 
other areas of personal behaviour, including alcohol consumption.
Concern about international smuggling and use of cocaine by soldiers led to an inter-departmental 
meeting in 1916 at which Sir Malcolm Dclcvingne, Under-Secretary dealing with aspects of dnig 
issues at the I lome Office since 1913, emerged as the dominant force. The meeting designated the 
drugs issue to be a police matter with central controlling authority at the Home Office,1" and 
Delevingne cemented his position over the next 20 years.
Trie legislation resulting from this meeting, Regulation 40B o f  the Defence of the Realm Act, 
passed in 1916, was much stricter than anticipated pre-war, making it an offence for anyone other 
than medical doctors, pharmacists and veterinary surgeons to possess, give or sell cocaine and 
opium (although not morphine), and it was the I lome Office, not the phamiacv profession who 
became ‘the initiator and arbiter o f restriction’.17 *192From then on cocaine could only be supplied on 
prescription and importing cocaine and opium came under new I lome Office controls. Hcrridgc 
has characterised these legislative changes as resulting from a combination o f press agitation 
through sensationalised, often inaccurate portrayals of the drug scene, a lack of opposition from 
leaders of the medical profession, under representation o f grass rtx»ts medical opposition to greater 
regulation, and a I lom e Office spurred on by Delevingne favouring a penal approach to drugs.2""'
Further amendments to the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) empowered the 1 lome Secretary 
to withdraw a doctor’s power to prescribe cocaine if he was convicted o f an offence under the Act 
and controls on opiates followed. 1 lome Office officials were detailed to monitor compliance and 
in 1917 this authority was extended to senior police officers. Pharmacists were for the first time 
required to keep records for inspection of the prescriptions they dispensed. 22 The system of 
inspection was further developed by the Dangerous Dmgs Act, 1920 and the Dangerous Drugs 
Regulations 1921. "4 It was these legislative changes that gave the Inspectorate its powers and
17 /b i d pp.241-245.
¡bill, pp.247 248.
19 V. Bcrridgc, (1984) op. (it., p.21.
Ibid.
21 V. Bcrridge, (1978) op. a t ,  pp.285-304.
22 11. B. Spear (and cd. J. Mott), (2002) op. a t .  p.37.
21 The Shipman Inquiry, (2004) op. t i t ,  pp.43-56.
1 II. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. t i t ,  pp.35-36.
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created the control system it enforced. 'Hie I lom e Office Inspectorate also had a precedent in a 
regime of Home Office inspection under the unsuccessful Inebriates Acts of 1888 and ISOS.2’
After the Versailles Peace Treaty (1919), the new League of Nations took on responsibility for 
international narcotics agreements, and the powers given to the state under DORA were extended 
in the 1920 Dangerous Drugs Act to cover heroin, morphine and ‘medicinal opium’.2 6 27Police 
officers, who later became designated as ‘Chemist Inspecting Officers’, were responsible for 
inspecting records maintained by retail pharmacies from 1921 when the Dangerous Drugs Act 
came into force.“ ^  Berridge portrayed the I lom e Office as successfiilly defending its penal 
approach in 1920 with the new Ministry o f 1 lealth, representing a more liberal medical policy, 
coming off the worse from inter-departmental infighting. Potential opposition from phannaceutical 
manufacturers was weak due to prxir organisation and representation.“1'"
Spear has contested this interpretation of events, denying that the DORA regulation impinged 
upon medical freedom and downplaying the addition of later regulations as bringing greater 
restriction. Spear himself opposed a penal approach and defended the Home Office from being 
perceived as the source of this. As Chief o f  the Drugs Inspectorate, it was his role to sec that these 
substances did not leak into the ‘wrong hands’, 11 taking as self-evident this division between 
legitimate medical and illegitimate use.
A major change, brought bv the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1920, and its regulations, was the effect on 
ordinary members of the public, to which S ir Malcolm drew the attention of Chief Constables in 
1921:
Chemists tiare hitherto /seen free to sett morphine, heroin, medicinal opium and their preparations to members oj the 
public, without any restrictions other than the restrictions specified in Section 17 of the Pharmacy .Act 1968. In  
future, sates to persons not specifically licensed or authorised will only he permissible on a prescription.
2S V. Berridge, (1984) op. at., p.21.
M. Dclcvingne, Ixttcr to Chief Constables re the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1920, and the regulations made 
thereunder, I lome ( Ifficc, Whitehall, (20,h August 1921), Document WM  17 00736, 'Ihe Shipman Inquiry, 
www.thcshipmaninquiry.org.uk.
27 Ibid.
“ J . E. 1 lay/elden, Letter to Chief < Iffiecr o f Police, Re 1 lomc C Ifficc Circular 25/1980 Inspection of 
Pharmacies, (12,h March 1980), Document WM 17  00062, *I*hc Shipman Inquiry, 
www.thcshipmaninquiry.org.uk.
V. Berridge, (1978) op. ¡it., pp.285 304.
Wl V. Berridge, (1984) op. at., pp.17-29.
71 11. B. Spear (and cd. J. Mott), (2002) op. at., p.6.
M. Dclcvingnc, (20,h August 1921), op. at.
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Although some pharmacists continued to dispense opium-based preparations to elderly customers 
without prescription after the Act was passed.”  Underlying these moves against free access to 
drugs were also cultural changes in the early twentieth century that, to some extent, diminished the 
acceptability o f opiates and cocaine in society.'4 This can be compared with patterns seen in later 
settings, such as the United States in the 1980s, where restrictive legislation followed an existing 
decline in drug use.’5
Rolleston and  beyond
At the time o f  the Rollcston Committee’s deliberations (1924-26), it was not Home Office 
Inspectors or the police w ho inspected the supply o f ‘dangerous dmgs’, as they were then legally 
termed, but medical officials in the form of the Regional Medical Service of the Ministry of 1 lealth, 
in I England and Wales, and the Medical Staff and District Medical Officers o f the Board of 1 lealth 
in Scotland. (Sec Chapter 2 for more background on the Rolleston Committee). Regional Medical 
Officers (RMOs) had been given these powers in 1922, and although employed by the Ministry of 
I lealth, they were to act at the request of the I lome Office to maintain doctors’ compliance with 
the 1920 Dangerous Dntgs Act and Regulations.v>
Doctors seemed able to claim preferential self-regulation over phamiacists, as according to the 
Rolleston Report, l'lh e  records kept by wholesale chemists and by pharmacists arc inspected by 
I lome Office Inspectors o r by the police; but it was considered preferable that those kept by 
medical practitioners should be inspected by medical officials.” Furthermore, doctors employed 
by the state as RMOs were expected to give their primary loyalty to the profession over that owed 
to the state as Spear recorded that they were not expected to undertake any enquiry that could 
impair their relationship with general practitioners, for instance if it involved their giving evidence in 
court against a fellow member of the medical profession.'"
RMC )s could lx- notified o f  a doctor in their area prescribing dangerous dnigs by the Inspectorate 
or by police Chemist Inspecting Officers (CIOs) who inspected pharmacists’ records. The RMOs
" S. Anderson and V. Berridge, Ipium in 20th century Britain: pharmacists, regulation and the people’.
Addiction, 95 (2000), 23-36.
M V. Berridgc, (1999) op. at., pp.236-239.
”  See Working Party o f the Royal College o f Psychiatrists and Royal College o f Physicians, l>rn£t. Dilemmas unit
Chot a t  (Gaskcll: Ixmdon, 2000) pp.206-210.
w‘ II. B. Spear (anded.J. Mott), (2002) op. at., p.39.
'7 Departmental Committee on  Morphine and Heroin Addiction, Report [Rollcston Report| (lamdon: IIMSO, 
1926) p.5.
'"II. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. at., p.39.
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had been authorised since 1922 regularly to inspect records required by the 1920 Dangerous Drugs 
Act and Regulations and on the particular request of the Home Office.39
In 1921, Sir Malcolm Delevingne explained that medical practitioners who dispensed their own 
medicines would be required to keep records of supplying dangerous drugs to patients and that,
T lx Stentary ofSUtlt Ixrpes that be will be able to arrangp for occasional visits to be made by the M edical Officers of 
tlx Ministry of Health with a new to ensuring lire observance ly practitioners of the requirements of tire Regulations, 
and t!>at it will not be necessary as a genera! rrtte for tlx police to visit tlx residences of such practitioners for tlx purpose 
ofinspecting tlxir records.
It is not clear when 1 lomc Office inspectors took over the inspection o f doctors entirely, but Spear 
noted that by 1952 Regional Medical Officers were seldom involved in drug enquiries, with the 
Inspectorate writing to doctors when pharmacy records revealed they had been prescribing 
dangerous dmgs. The RMOs then returned to this activity in 1964 and continued until 1991 when 
the Regional Medical Service was abolished.*1'41 Spear attributed these switches from using lay state 
employees to professional state employees and back in order to police prescribers to varying 
workloads o f the different parties at given times anil to sensitivities around lay and professional 
expertise.4'  Certainly these sensitivities anise throughout the twentieth century in regulatory issues.
R cfrida to ry N e tw o rk s
L ay 1' State M echan ism s and Pm cesscs
In 1970 three mechanisms o f state control dealing with prescribing controlled dmgs existed: the 
1 lome Office Dmgs Inspectorate (‘the Inspectorate1), the police’s Chemist Inspecting Officers 
(‘CIOs’), and the Regional Medical Service (see Table 6.1). From 1989 the Medicines Control 
Agency also inspected pharmaceuticals for quality but was rarely involved in matters o f  controlled 
drug prescription and so is not discussed here." The police and Inspectorate continued through 
the last decades o f the twentieth century, with expansion o f the Inspectorate and varying provision
”  Ibid. p.39.
40 Ibid. p.40.
41 The Shipman Inquiry, (2004) op. at.
13 II. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002), pp.39-40.
44 Although the term ‘lay’ is used here to differentiate professional medical or pharmaceutical regulators from  
non-mcdical/pharmaccutical regulators trained 'on the job’, it is clear that Home Office inspectors developed 
extensive expertise o f  their own which corresponds to the bureaucratic expertise described by W eber in M. 
Weber, (1964) op. rit., pp.232-239.
44 G. E. Appelbc, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2004).
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of Chemist Inspecting Officers, but the RMOs faded out during this period. Liaison between these 
different agencies was informal.
The Inspectorate
In the early 1970s, inspectors visited doctors who were thought to be over-prescribing and they 
were still seeking advice from  Regional Medical Officers (RMOs). From 1970 to 1973, if not 
dealing with the cases more informally themselves, the Regional Medical Sendee, in conjunction 
with the I lome Office Inspectors and the police referred cases o f irresponsible prescribing to the 
GMC, which was resistant to  trying such doctors.4S 467*512
Table 6.1 Regulatory Bodies in the Supply of Controlled Drugs 1970-99
Home Office*474849 P o l i c e d Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society (RPS)55-54
Inspectors Drugs Inspectorate Chemist Inspecting 
Officers (CIO)
Pharmacy Inspectorate
Staff Civil Servants Police C )fficers Mostly pharmacists employed by the 
Royal Pharmaceutical Society. 
Pharmacies only inspected by 
pharmacists.
Source of
Regulatory
Powers
1916 Defence o f the 
Realm Act amendments 
1920 Dangerous Drugs 
Act and 1921 Regulations; 
1971 N lisuse of Drugs Act
1920 Dangerous Drugs 
Act and 1921
Regulations;
1971 Misuse o f Drugs 
Act.
Pharmacy and Poisons Act 1933, 
and Poisons Act 1972,
Medicines Act 1968 and Misuse of 
Drugs Regulations, 1985.
Areas of 
Responsibility
1 x-gitimafe pharmaceutical 
industry
Illicit drugs industry 
Medical profession 
Veterinary and Dentistry 
Professions
Pharmacies Mostly community pharmacies. 
Some hospital pharmacies (those 
registered with the RI*S). Powers to 
inspect other retail premises where 
medicines or poisons were sold.
No responsibility for wholesalers or 
manufacturers or premises o f 
doctors.
45 Hansard, House o f Lords, ( 1 4 ,h January 1971), Vol 314, col. 245.
46 A. Macfarlanc, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
47 I lome Office Inspector, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
4M V. Berridge, (1984) op. at.
4,) The Shipman Inquiry, (2004) op. at.
N. Tilley, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2(X)2).
51 H. Hampton, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2(X)2).
52 The Shipman Inquiry, (2(X)4) op. at.
s' S. Lutencr, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2003). 
w G. E. Appclbc, (2(X)4) op. a t .
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Home Office Police Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society (RPS)
Areas of Concern Diversion from legitimate 
medical use:
Criminal supply 
“Irresponsible prescribing” 
Also criminal manufacture.
Diversion from 
legitimate medical use: 
Pharmacies 
Doctors
Professional conduct of pharmacists. 
(Criminal matters other than 
medicinal matters were referred to 
police.)
Regulatory
Action
Visits by inspectors 
Tribunals (from 1973-97) 
Via GMC 
Via the courts 
Not a prosecuting 
authority itself.
Visits by inspectors 
Via Home ( )ffice 
Inspectorate 
Via GMC  
Via the courts
Visits by inspectors. Referral to RPS 
Disciplinary Committee which could 
give:
Advice, Warnings, or Disciplinary 
action and removal from RPS 
register.
Inspection of Prescriptions 
Pharmacies’ controlled 
drugs registers 
Doctors
licensed manufacturers/ 
distributors
Pharmacies’ 
Controlled drugs 
register 
Prescriptions 
Doctors
Pharmacies and other retailers o f 
pharmaceuticals.
Sources of 
information
Reports from:
Doctors 
Drug users 
Public
Chemist Inspecting 
< >f fleers
C )thcr inspectorates. 
Addicts Index (up to 1997)
C Xvn index.
I lome ( )ffice
Inspectors
( >ther inspectorates.
Any concerned professional, the 
public, police.
liaison with Chemist Inspecting 
( )fficers and occasionally I lome 
( )ffice Drugs Inspectorate.
Changes
between 1970 and 
1999
Diminishing o f fools 
available for Inspectorate 
to gather information and, 
after 1994, to take 
disciplinary action. 
Removal of some duties to 
other agencies eg NCIS 
and GMC during 1980s 
and 1990s. Loss o f role as 
key advisor to ministers.
1985-99: No major 
changes to system o f 
pharmacy inspection, 
though some changes in 
focus.55
1999: formal training 
under 1 lome C )ffice 
I nspectc »rate cstal ilished.
Increase in formal training.
ss J. Scullion, ((l(),h March 2003) op. at.
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Spear described the Inspectorate’s frustration when they lacked a Tribunal system, but also 
his powers of persuasion, in dealing with Dr Brennan, an elderly Portsmouth doctor who 
had been supplying local heroin addicts with DtconaL He ‘would have been an ideal candidate 
for the Tribunal procedures for dealing with “irresponsible prescribing” included in the 1971 
Act. But as these did not come into operation until July 1973 there was litde the Drugs 
Inspectorate could do except try to persuade him to be more circumspect in his prescribing. 
After I “had a word” with Brennan he decided to have nothing further to do with addicts.”*'
After the Tribunal system was reintroduced, the role o f the Regional Medical Officer diminished, 
but he or she could continue to advise the Drugs Inspectorate.5' The focus of RMO enquiries, 
however, was to establish why the patient needed these drugs — whether for pain relief, which 
necessitated no further enquiry, or if  the patient was addicted, which resulted in monitoring the 
case.5"'59 This contrasted with the Inspectorate’s later interests in the potential of drugs to be resold 
on the black market, the safety of quantities or formulations to the user, and, in private practice, the 
ability o f the patient to pay doctors’ fees.
After many years housed entirely in Central London, the I lome Office gained two regional offices 
in 1974, dividing Britain into the Northern Region, policed from Bradford, covering the North of 
1 England and Scotland, the Midland Region, including W ales, the Midlands and the South West of 
England, with its office in Bristol, and the South East Region based in Dindon. lTie purpose of 
rcgionalising the Inspectorate is not currently clear. Was it intended to respond more efficiently to 
prescribing outside I xindon or was it perhaps unrelated to drugs issues, for instance a civil service 
management decision to create jobs outside Dindon? The régionalisation did result in the 
establishment of meetings for groups of consultants working in the régit mal DDL's, perhaps 
counterbalancing the dominance of the Dindon Clinics and their expertise.
I he 1970s also saw the Inspectorate offer the 1 lome Office as the new venue for the Dindon 
Consultants Group (LCG) meetings. The IXXI was composed o f  (usually consultant) psychiatrists 
representing the Dindon Clinics and surrounding area and had been meeting since 1968. 'lh cy  had 
moved from their initial meeting place of the Department o f I lealth due to perceived interference 
from civil servants in their decision-making (see Chapter 8). These meetings were attended regularly 
by either Spear or one o f  his inspectors who received information on problem prescribcrs working
11. B. Spear (and cd. J . Mott), (2002) op. at., p.260.
,7 L. I lay, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2003).
“ //>/>/.
WH. 13. Spear (and cd. J . Mott), (2002) op. at., pp.40 41.
160
outside the Clinics and provided advice and information.6" Inspectors could also advise the L.CG 
o f any difficulties with their own members which they might wish to address themselves, although 
this was rare. Unlike doctors outside the Clinics, they seemed to enjoy the privilege of informal self- 
regulation while trying, often successfully, to set the standards by which other doctors were judged 
(see Chapter 8).61
The Association o f Independent Doctors in Addiction (AIDA) might have performed a similar 
function. It was set up with Bing Spear’s encouragement and initially met with Spear in attendance 
at the Home Office, until it was forced to move from government offices and AIDA broke up 
after Daily’s second GMC hearing in 1988. Unlike the Clinic doctors, who worked in the same 
medical hierarchy, private doctors had no interdependency or perceived shared self-interest; the 
reasons for this are discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
In addition to this attempt to encourage self-regulation among doctors outside the Clinics, the 
Inspectorate’s state regulation continued. In 1985 228 practitioners were visited by inspectors,6’ 
and this increased from that year. According to one inspector, more visits were made after 1985 
because ‘it was one o f our operational priorities and we were trying to encourage doctors to 
prescribe responsibly’.6' TTiis also coincided with the appointment o f Donald McIntosh as Senior 
Inspector in the South East Region who raised the number of interviews with private prescribers. 
By 1988 Peter Spurgeon, Chief Inspector from 1986-89, claimed that ‘in any one year my 
Inspectors interview some 300 doctors a lx H it the safeguards necessary to minimise the risk o f  
diversion.’64
lh e  difference in approach taken by Don McIntosh towards private prescribers has been attributed 
to the disparity between 11 >nd<>n and Bradford, and Mr McIntosh’s desire to see equal standards 
applied in the South East I le  was dubious about the role of private prescribers in the treatment 
field and once in post as Senior Inspector in the South East Region, launched a campaign to 
regulate the private prescribers more rigorously.65 lh is included writing a report recommending 
that Dr Dally be taken to a Tribunal (see Chapter 7). I lowever, Spurgeon saw McIntosh as simply I
I lome ( ifftce Inspector, (2002) op. til.
61 Ibid.
1,2 I lome ( ifftce Drugs Branch Inspectorate, Anmutl Rrport I98S (Uxulon: 1 lome ( )fficc, 1986) Ref. 52186, 
DrugScopc Library, London, p. 11.
M J . Scullion, Transcript of Day 149, (27,h June 2003), The Shipman Inquiry, www.theshipmaninquiry.org.uk. 
w P. G. Spurgeon, le tte r  to all Chief Police ( ) i  fleers Re Notes for id le m ist Inspecting ( ifficcrs, (17,h March 
1988), Dtxument WM 17 00163, Idle Shipman Inquiry, http://www.thcshipmaninquiry.org.uk.
I lome < iffice Inspector, (2(X)2) op. lit.
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reflecting established treatment orthodoxy, which Spear, with the exceptional respect he was 
accorded, was able to speak out against.66
The Inspectorate was the first arm o f British government to develop extensive expertise in drug 
misuse, before the Ministry of Health. Prior to the expansion of external research on dmg misuse in 
the 1980s, it was one o f the few agencies able to gather data on drug misuse ‘on the streets’, 
employing roving inspectors in the years before the proliferation of street agencies for drug users. 
For this reason it played an important role in providing policy advice to ministers, and constituting 
a major influence in the regulatory battles between private and NHS prescribes during the period 
up until the departure of Spear in 1986, after which the Inspectorate’s influence waned. The 
uniqueness of the Drugs Inspectorate should not be overstated though: the role o f policy advisor 
to ministers was one which was also developed by other central government inspectorates, such as 
the railway inspectors advising the Department of Health on wider transport policy,67 and was in 
accord with Weber’s description o f self-perpetuating bureaucracies.6"
Within the policy community, the Inspectorate gathered and relayed information about all aspects 
of prescribing controlled drugs. Although perceived, at least during Spear’s time, as a neutral force, 
tmsted by all sides, the Inspectorate had its own policy goals, which it fostered through the 
encouragement of particular d<x:tors working outside the Clinics, and by opposing the extension of 
opioid licensing in 1984 in advice to ministers (see Chapter 4). While at the Inspectorate Spear was 
circumspect in expressing his views he became more outspoken in retirement, describing the w ay 
the Clinics were implemented as ‘an unmitigated disaster’.6 ’ " The power o f the ( Titles’ leaders was 
perhaps reflected in the extent to which the Inspectorate was bound to accept them as setting the 
standards of acceptable treatment, despite Spear’s own views and, as Bean has observed. Tribunals 
were never used against Clinic doctors for irresponsible prescribing. 1 On the converse side, they 
sometimes failed to gain policy changes opposed by Spear.
H om e O ffice L icences
In addition to Tribunals, the Inspectorate wielded another regulatory tool: the licensing system 
which controlled who could prescribe certain dnigs in the first place, rather than stopping them, as
“  P. Spurgeon, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2004).
"7 G. Rhodes, (1981) op. cit., p.171.
M. Weber, From Max Webtr. Essays in Sociology, 11.11. Gcrth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946, this edition, 1964) pp.228-240. 
m H. B. Spear (and cd. J . Mott), (2002) op. til., p.310.
70 13. Nlusto, ‘Bing Spear: Appreciations’, in II. B. Spear (and ed. J . Mott), (2002) op  at., pp.viii ix.
71 P. Bean, (1991) op. cit., p.65.
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the Tribunal system did, after the fact. From 1968, on the recommendation of the second Brain 
Committee, doctors wanting to prescribe heroin or cocaine (and from 1984 dipipanonc) for the 
treatment of addiction were required to apply to the 1 lomc Office for their licence (see Chapter 
2). ’ Although the Home Office seemed to have the power to decide who received licences, their 
ability to rescind them was successfiilly challenged.
The I lomc Office almost exclusively granted the licences to psychiatrists working in the new NHS 
(.limes and only two or three doctors were ever licensed to prescribe heroin privately. ' 7-1 One of 
them, Dr Kanagaratnam Sathananthan, consultant psychiatrist at Croydon DDU, received his 
licence in the 1980s, probably with Spear’s support, ’ and although the Inspectorate later tried to 
withdraw his licence, the doctor’s appeal to the Home Secretary succeeded and he continued to 
prescribe heroin privately throughout the period .'’'77
From 1968, there had been a series of unsuccessful attempts using different policy fora and 
originating with the Dindon Clinic consultants, to extend the Home Office’s licensing powers and 
further restrict the prescribing powers of doctors outside the Clinic system, with the I lome Office 
at first opposing and then supporting these moves (see Chapters 4 and 7).
It is likely that Spear opposed the extension o f  licensing in 1984 and certainly the advice given by 
his department to ministers w as intended to dissuade them and seemed to succeed. '* A further 
effort to extend licensing to cover all injectable opiates and restrict licences to ‘doctors working in, 
or under the direct supervision of, a consultant or equivalent in a clinic’ was made in 1985 through 
the Social Services Committee. 1 In its response the Government cited rather misleadingly 
optimistic trends in prescribing from figures prepared by Spear’s department (see Chapter 4).1“""'""
72 Interdepartmental Committee on  Drug Addiction, The Setond Report o f  the Interdepartmental Committee (1 .on don 
II.MSt), 1965) pp.7-9.
71 Department o f I lealth and Social Security, Department of education and Science, Home ( )ffice and 
Manpower Services Commission, Misuse o f  Drugs with Special Reference to the Treatment and Rehabilitation o f  Misusers o f  
I lard Drutjs: Government Response to  the Tourth Report from  the Social Services Committee Session 1984-85 (1-ondon: 
HMSO, ¡985) pp.18-19.
71 A. Macfarlanc, (2002) op. cit.
75 Spear wrote sympathetically about Sathananthan in his h<x>k and was Chief Inspector when the licence was 
granted. See II. 8. Spear (and ed. J .  Mott), (2(X)2) op. cit., p.245.
76 A. Macfarlane, (2002) op. tit.
77 K. Sathananthan, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
7H I lome ( )ffiec, MWG (84) .53, ‘Power to restrict licences to prcscnltc under Misuse of Dmgs Act 1971’, (1984) 
Private archive.
70 I louse of Commons Soc ial Services Committee, Misuse o f  l  hilt’s noth Special Reference to the Treatment and 
Rehabilitation o f  Misusers o f  Hard Drugs. Tourth Report o f  the S oda ! Services Committee, Session 1984 85 (I-on don:
I1MSO, 1985) p.xxv.
Anonymous, ‘Prescription analysis: opioids 1974 1983’, Annex to R. Witney, (22,kI November 1985) op. cit.
1,1 D. Mcllor, le tte r  to R. W hitney, (10lh December 1985), File 16/DAC 28/2, DH Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
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Under Spear the Inspectorate was a key source of advice to ministers on drug policy and used its 
position to push a harm reductionist agenda and prevent the Clinics gaining a stranglehold on 
prescribing. In the 1990s the Inspectorate took a very different view. Alan Nlacfarlane took over 
as Chief Inspector in 1990 and under his leadership the Inspectorate made alliances with Ixindon 
consultant psychiatrists and the Department o f Health in order to extend opioid licensing and 
increase its regulatory powers against private prescribes and GPs.
Unlike Spear, who was well known for his personal interest in the welfare of dmg users, and 
doctors’ clinical autonomy, Macfariane’s interest was more heavily weighted towards controlling the 
dmgs supply, and preventing diversion, and less to the provision of treatment. Under Alan 
Macfariane’s leadership the Inspectorate pursued a Misuse o f Dmgs Tribunal against private 
prescribcr Adrian Garfoot that turned into something o f a fiasco as it wore on from 1993 to 1997. 
Presumably frustrated by tliis lengthy and expensive attempt at regulation, Macfarlane expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the Inspectorate’s existing tribunal procedures for tackling ‘irresponsible 
prescribing’, describing them as ‘cumbersome in the extreme’."'
Macfarlane saw the preparation of the third edition of the clinical guidelines (1996-99), backed up 
by (another attempt to extend) licensing, as an opportunity to streamline these procedures and 
acquire an enforceable standard for prescribing."4 Dr Anthonv Thorley, the Senior Medical Officer 
responsible for dmgs at the Department o f I lealth in 1996, was in accord with Alan Macfarlane on 
this issue, along with Professor John Strang, Chairman o f the Clinical Guidelines W orking Group 
(see Chapter 7).
Despite some opposition within the Clinical Guidelines Working Group,"7 the principles of the 
licensing extension were proposed in 1999 by the Working Group in its confidential report to 
ministers, as intended by the I lome Office, Department o f I lealth and Professor Strang. The 
o|x-rational details were then drawn up bv the I lome C ifficc Drugs Inspectorate anil sent to a range
*- J. Patten, I-ctter to D. Mcllor, (15lh May 1985), Pile 16/DAC 28/2, D ll Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
A. 19. Macfarlanc, CGWG (97) 3, ‘Pharmaceutical Diversion and the Prescribing Dimension. Note by the 
I lome ( )fficc Drugs Inspectorate’, (3rd March 1997), Private archive.
w Ibid.
A. Thorlcy, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
K,‘ A. 'Ihorley, CGWG (97) 17, ‘Clinical Guidelines Working Group (attached to CGWG(97)17 ‘Note by the 
1 lome ( tffice on Licensing’), 1 lome < Iffice 1 accusing: Ihe < Iptions for l aicouraging Good Clinical Practice1), 
(May 1997), Pile 16 TFD-46 Vol. 5, DM Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
H7 C. Ford, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
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of organisations for consultation.“  Ibis alliance brought the licensing proposals further along the 
path to implementation than ever before but five years on the consultation had come to nought 
and the proposals had yet to be implemented.
Self-regulation, albeit under the threat of state regulation, seems to have won out. The perceived 
need for licensing may have been lessened by the Royal College o f General Practitioners 
establishing a ‘Certificate in the Management of Drug Misuse’ in 2000 to improve levels o f  training 
among their members. In 1984 the same licensing proposals may have been dropped due to two 
factors which were also present in 2001: opposition from GPs keen to guard their clinical 
autonomy and fears in government that greater restrictions on prescribing would put off reluctant 
GPs from treating drug u s e r s . " ’I"he history of the licensing issue may also point to the 
Inspectorate’s shrinking influence within the policy community after Spear’s departure. Aside from 
die loss of Spear’s personal knowledge from the Inspectorate, expertise on dmgs proliferated both 
outside and inside government independent of the Inspectorate. Furthermore, GP opinions gained 
greater weight as they provided a larger proportion o f dnig treatment compared with die specialist 
(Trues, so their prescribing freedoms were not to be withdrawn lighdy. Government alliances with 
psychiatry were therefore less effective than they might have been in the late 1960s and 1970s.
Tribunals a n d  H om e Secretary’s m lings
Under the Regulations o f  DORA and the later 1920 Dangerous Dnigs Act and 1921 Regulations, 
the I Iome Secretary had the power to withdraw medical practitioners’ (and dentists and veterinary 
surgeons’) authority to possess and supply drugs for their professional purposes if they had 
contravened the legislation. While some diversion of dmgs from intended recipients could be 
identified fairly easily as non-medical and therefore as criminal by contemporary definitions, 
resulting in action taken by the I lome Office through the courts, there was uncertainty over what 
sort o f prescribing could be considered as not for the purpose o f medical treatment: did this 
include dnigs purely to satisfy the cravings of addiction? Did it cover sending prescriptions in the 
post to patients not seen for long peritxls o f time?
In the early years o f the Inspectorate, there was uncertainty over whether a patient who had 
originally been prescribed dmgs for a medical condition and had become dependent upon them
"" A. Macfarlane, ‘(Tanges to the misuse of drugs legislation of controlled drugs prescribe in the treatment of 
addiction’, [Consultation document! (Ixindon: Action Against Drugs Unit, Home Office, 17,h March 2(X)0). 
eg. A. banks, le t te r  to N. Fowler, MP, (1983), Ref. 40117, DrugScope Library, London, 
eg. B. Beaumont, T. Carnworth, W. (dee, et a/., 'licensing doctors counters the National Strategy’, Dntgfmk, 
15(6) (2001), 25.
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once the medical condition had passed should still receive them merely for the relief of addiction. 
According to the Rolleston report, this uncertainty over matters which ‘must turn largely on 
questions of medical opinion’ made the 1 lome Office reluctant cither to prosecute doctors or to 
bring a case to the GMC for conduct “infamous in a professional respect”.11 Preference for a 
Tribunal system was also expressed by the British Medical Association.
While avoiding the courts had obvious advantages for a doctor, who could not be given a criminal 
record by a Tribunal, it was not so obvious why a Tribunal should be preferable to a hearing in 
front o f the GMC. Both panels were manned by doctors. 'ITiere may have been two reasons: the 
Home Office Tribunals were held in private, while the GMC hearings were open to the press and 
public and before 1970, when the penalty of suspension of registration was introduced,92 the 
GM C’s only sanction was the drastic one of erasure from the register. By contrast the harshest 
penalty the I lome Office could apply was removal o f the right to prescribe dangerous drugs, 
leaving the doctor still able to practice most areas o f medicine.
’lire  Rolleston Report therefore advised that for these cases, special medical Tribunals be set up so 
that a doctor could be judged bv his peers instead of the courts, a proposal which offered ‘several 
advantages, both administratively and from the point o f view of the medical profession’, The 
benefits to the profession over criminal prosecution were clear, as the Tribunals were in part to 
enable the withdrawal of authorisation ‘without recourse to those penalties of fine and 
imprisonment which the magistrates have the power to inflict.’ These Tribunals again maintained 
the idea of exclusive professional expertise considered by the Committee to be lacking in a lay 
magistrate.”
lh e  law was amended to include these new regulations under the 1926 Dangerous Drugs Act so 
that the Secretary o f State could refer the case of a doctor to a Tribunal if  they were supplying, 
administering or prescribing any o f  the dnigs other than for the purposes of medical treatment.
I lowevcr, the provisions were never used and then removed in 1953 pending agreement with the 
medical profession about new procedures. ’4 Neither Spear nor liean could produce evidence to 
explain this, but Bean speculated that ‘the hand o f the General Medical Council will be seen to be at
Departmental Committee on Morphine ami Heroin Addiction, (1926) op. at., p.8.
1,2 R. G. Smith, M edical Discipline: The Professional Conduct Jurisdiction o f  the General Medical Council, I S iS  1990 
(< Ixford: Clarendon Press, 1994) pp .168-169.
n  Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction, (1926) op. at., p.24.
M P. Bean, (1991) op. a t., pp.62-63.
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work here, for the Tribunals would have controlled the profession’s prescribing activities, almost 
unheard of at that time.’9’
'Ihe first Brain Committee thought the Tribunal system unnecessary and it was not reintroduced 
until the Misuse o f Drugs Act, 1971, which came into force in 1973.96 Under this Act, directives by 
the I lome Secretary could be applied under Section 12, for criminal offences, most of which 
concerned dependent doctors diverting supplies for their own use, and Section 13, for non-criminal 
prescribing issues. Spear saw the reintroduction of Tribunals as essential, ‘plugging this gaping hole 
in our control machinery’97 and credited it to the Amphetamines Sub-committee o f the Advisory 
Committee on Drug Dependence which had recommended bringing back the system originally 
described by the Rolleston Committee. Tribunals were considered necessary by Parliament 
because the Government accepted the GMC’s complaint that its own machinery was inadequate 
and therefore declined to discipline irresponsible prescriben: itself.'”'’99,1"" As shown in the previous 
chapter, the GMC was later to become more enthusiastic in prosecuting such prescriben: itself, 
despite the lack o f a relevant change in its jurisdiction or the addition of any surveillance function.
Injudicious or irresponsible prescribing was defined during the passage of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
as ‘careless or negligent prescribing o r unduly liberal prescribing w ith bona fide intent’."" lhe  law 
itself contained no definitions, and the GMC’s similarly vague statement ‘the prescription or supply 
o f thugs of dependence otherwise than in the course o f bona fide treatment’1"2 enabled both 
regulatory authorities to interpret the term subjectively and according to the changing trends in 
treatment. To facilitate its task o f enforcement in an ambiguous situation, the Dnigs Inspectorate 
was to make a number of strategic alliances with the Department o f  I lealth and senior members o f 
the medical profession throughout the period.
Ihe Tribunal itself consisted o f four medical members nominated by a number o f medical bodies: 
the Royal Colleges, the GMC or the BMA and a Queen’s Council barrister acting as chairman. It 
was considered a quorum at the chairman and two members. The proceedings, unlike those of the 
GMC disciplinary committee, were held in private, with a format similar to a law court: a lawyer
',s Ibid. p.62.
Ibid. p.65.
1,7 H. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. at., p.62.
I lansard, 1 louse o f lairds, (14'1' January 1971), Vol 314, col. 245.
99 1 lansard. House o f lairds, (14,h January 1971), cols 229-30, quoted in P. Bean, (1991) op. til., p.64.
111,1 H. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. at., p.62.
,m I lansard, (25 March 1970), cols 1457-8, quoted in P. Bean, (1991), op. tit., p.64.
102 R. G. Smith, (1994) op. at., p.39.
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each representing the doctor and the Home Office, with evidence being presented and cross- 
examined.
Tribunals could be used in a variety of ways: the threat o f tribunal proceedings could be used to 
persuade doctors to change their practices, as with Dr Dally in 1986;"” doctors summoned to a 
Tribunal might remove themselves from the medical register before the proceedings got underway 
so that they did not have to suffer the ordeal itself, or in their full manifestation followed by an 
acquittal or a ruling by the Secretary of State to modify prescribing powers."” A successfiil 
prosecution could also be appealed. Between 1973 and 1999 the system was used only once against 
a Clinic doctor, and this was for criminal offences relating to the supply o f dnigs rather than 
irresponsible prescribing."’5'"*
The system came to an end as a result of one particular case — that of Dr Adrian Garfoot — a 
private G P who had worked with dnig users for several years and had developed views similar to 
Dr Daily’s regarding reform of the drug control system and what he saw as the oppressed position 
of dmg users in society. Although the 1 lome Office, after delays over several years, had succeeded 
in proving its charges during the Tribunal, a successfiil appeal on procedural grounds by Garfoot’s 
lawyers overturned the mling in 1997. After what was for the I lome Office a humiliating and 
costly defeat. Tribunals were never used again. The Home Office’s official account o f  the reasons 
for their ceasing to use the Tribunal mechanism was given in the 2<K(2 edition of its Guidance to 
Chemist Inspecting Officers:
It  became clear during t/se 1990s that these powers [under sections 13-16 of the Misuse of Drugs Act/ were no longer 
an effective mechanism and tlx List cate was referred for Tribunal action in 1993. The practitioner involved D r 
[Garfoot], was able to delay tlx bearing for m er a year, try which time he bad engetged other doctors to undertak e 
prescribing at Ins clinic. Subsequently it bat Income apptmnt that tlx legislation is deficient in several aspects of 
I Inman Rights, tlxrelry removing any remainingpossibility that tlx powers could be reactivated"'1
Ibis left the Inspectorate in a siinilar position to the early 1970s, able to advise doctors, and gather 
evidence, but without its own disciplinary function. Yet this time the GMC took a much more 
active approach to regulating prescribers, taking non-Clinic doctors to its Professional Conduct
A. Dally, (1990) op. ¡it., pp.149-151.
"u L. I lay, (2003) op. (it.
118 Home ( Ifficc Inspector, (2002) op ¡it.
"» L. Hay. (2003) op. ¡it.
107 Home ( Ifficc, Guidance to Chemist Inspecting Officers, (I Ionic ( Ifficc, I a melon: 2002), Document WM 17 00388, 
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Committee and by the turn of the twentieth century was erasing quite a number of private 
prescribers from its register, including Dr Garfoot in 2001. With a reinvigorated GMC, the 
Inspectorate reduced its work with doctors, cutting down the number of interviews to ‘a 
handfi.il’.'1,8 Although there remained co-operation between the state and the profession in 
regulating non-Clinic doctors, the processes were more weighted towards self-regulation, albeit 
under the watchful eye of politicians.
The A d dicts Index
The Addicts Index was a list o f patients believed dependent on opiates or cocaine who were known 
to the Home Office. The Dmgs Inspectorate was the ‘custodian and principal user’ o f the Addicts 
Index, which had been kept centrally as a formal record since 1934, probably at the request o f the 
Opium Advisor)' Committee o f the I .cague o f Nations in 1930."” Inspectors also had a role in 
ensuring that doctors were notifying patients dependent on opiates or cocaine to the Index, as they 
were legally obliged to do from 1968. In that year, the annual addict statistics and the drug offence 
statistics that the Inspectorate had produced was passed to the I lome Office Statistical Branch."" 
ITie name, dmg(s) o f addiction and anv controlled dmgs prescribed were listed on the Index so 
that, in theory, any doctor prescribing to the notified addict could check with the Index to see 
whether they were already receiving a prescribed supply from another source, and so prevent 
patients from ‘double scripting’. In practice there was often a long delay between notification and 
entry o f the data onto die Index, with computerisation in the 1980s only adding to these difficulties. 
In 1982 there was about a three month delay between notification by a doctor and entry onto the 
Index when staff was cut at the same time as an increase in notifications. "
Notification could form the first indication o f a new doctor treating dmg users or checking a 
patient’s previous notification. Although doctors phoning up the Index would speak to lay 
administrative staff, not inspectors, the information reached was used by the inspectors. The Index 
was closed in 1997 as a cost-cutting measure, against the advice of the ACMD,11“ and statistical 
infonnation on dnig users in treatment was gathered instead from non-compulsory notifications to 
the Regional Dmg Misuse Databases without the names o f patients, which were then published 
centrally by the Department of I lealth.
"" 1 lome ( ifftce Inspector, (2002) op. lit.
H. B. Spear (and cd. ). Mott), (2002) op. ¡it., p.41.
"" Ibid. p.41.
1.1 GMC Professional Conduct Committee, Day Three, (8,h March 1084), Case o f Tamcshy, 1 lerm an Peter, T. 
A. Reed & Co. jtranscriptj, GMC Archive, I .ondon. p.9.
1.2 ACMD memlxrr. Personal communication, (1997).
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The end of the Addicts Index meant the loss not only o f a source of statistical data on trends in 
drug use and treatment, but also a regulatory tool from the Inspectorate as it provided a window 
onto doctors’ prescribing and an early warning system for any new doctor who might require an 
inspector’s visit.
C hem ist Inspecting O fficers (C IO s)
Police were empowered to monitor compliance with DORA in 1917, and it was the 1920 
Dangerous Drugs Act that gave them responsibilities to inspect retail pharmacy records in 1921. 
CIOs were charged with inspecting the controlled drug registers of pharmacies to check for any 
irregularities in stock and the dispensing of dangerous dmgs. The Shipman Inquiry traced a change 
from 1921, when CIOs focussed mainly on compliance with the 1921 Dangerous Dnigs 
Regulations, to 1939 when police were also instructed to look at what individual patients were 
receiving and were seeking to identify addicts."’ After 1971 their power to carry out these duties 
derived from Section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act."'1 It was not until 1999 that they received 
formal dedicated training," 5 although the Home Office had told police chiefs that it was ‘willing to 
assist’ with the police’s own training o f  CIOs in 1980."*
Ih e  controlled drug registers in chemist shops recorded all the controlled dmgs dispensed and the 
patients to whom they were prescribed; it was the task o f CIOs to check these registers to ensure 
that all the dmgs processed by the phannacist were accounted for and none could have leaked out 
to an unauthorised party. Any inconsistencies would be investigated and could lead to criminal 
prosecution for the pharmacist or referral to his/her professional body, the Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society o f Great Britain (RPS). These registers also allowed CIOs to discern prescribing patterns, 
passing information to the Inspectorate for possible further action if it matched those considered 
questionable by the 1 Iome Office, who might then contact the doctor involved. " ( Criminal 
matters detected by CIOs would be dealt with by the police, rather than the Inspectorate, but issues 
o f prescribing style would be referred to either the I iom e Office or GMC.
Tension between the police and the Inspectorate over chemist inspections bubbled up almost 
immediately with the police reluctant to undertake these dudes."" On the other side, the 
Inspectorate, reliant on CIOs for information from pharmacists’ controlled drug registers, were
113 The Shipman Inquiry, (2004) op at., pp.45-48.
IMJ . E. Hayzcldcn, (I2 ,h March 1980) op. at.
,,3J. Scullion, (10,h March 2003) op. at.
"*J. K. Hayzcldcn, (12lh March 1980) op. at.
117 Ibid
1111 The Shipman Inquiry, (2004) op. at., pp.45-46.
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often frustrated with the inconsistency o f the data supply. The regional structure of the British 
police meant that each police force determined the resources allocated to Chemist Inspecting 
Officer posts. Many regional forces saw the provision o f CIOs as a low priority, leading to patchy 
cover across the country and a back and forth debate as to whether the Inspectorate should relieve 
the police of responsibility for pharmacy inspections. In 1979 the issue was put to the police’s 
Central Conference Committee, who endorsed continued police provision o f CIOs.
However, despite central policy, the problems seem to have persisted as Spear complained in 1986 
that Sve cannot rely on the police inspections of retail pharmacies to provide the essential 
information of what has been prescribed and to whom, particularly in the Metropolitan Police 
District where most of the cases occur.’"'’ The question o f whether pharmacy inspection should 
be the duty of police or the Inspectorate w as still being discussed in 1989 and 1993, with police 
officers, in North Wales at least, considering that the main beneficiaries of their workload was the 
Inspectorate.12"'1' 1 The Inspectorate still considered much o f the CIO inspecting unsatisfactory in 
1996 and approached the Association o f C hief Police Officers with its concerns.122
'ITie reluctance of police forces to appoint dedicated CIOs was probably partly because it was the 
Inspectorate who had overall responsibility for CIO inspections and set their investigative priorities, 
rather than the chief police officers of the regional forces; it was the I lome Office who drew up 
guidelines for CIOs.121 More than one regional police force commented in 1993 that little or no 
userid intelligence was gained from these inspections and the only people who benefited from them 
were the I lome Office Drugs Inspectorate.’12412’ Peter Spurgeon (Chief Inspector 1986-89) 
attributed the low priority given by forces to  the CIO role partly tc> the huge expansion in the 
trafficked and illicitly manufactured market, in the light o f which police officers with any expertise 
in controlled dnigs were transferred to dealing with that criminal market, rather than the smaller 
and perceived lesser issue of pharmaceutical drugs.12'1
1 lome < )ffice Drugs Branch Inspectorate, (1986) op. tit., p. 12.
12,1 North Wales Police, Memorandum on Inspection of Retail Phannacies, (.S'1'January 1989), Document GA 
22 00078, I he Shipman Inquiry, www.theshipmaninquiry.org.uk.
121 Nonh Wales Police I Icadquarters Drugs Branch, Inspection o f Retail Pharmacies, (28'h Septcmlter 1993), 
Document GA 22 00076,'Ihc Shipman Inquiry', www.theshiptnanmquirv.org.uk.
122 Shipman Inquiry, Transcript of Day 148, (26,h June 2003), The Shipman Inquiry, 
www.thcshipmaninquiry.org.uk.
122 Home Office, Inspection o f  Retail Pharmacies, (London: Home < Jffice, 1981), Document W'M 17 00082, The 
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Professional Mechanisms and Processes
WTiile the Inspectorate and police provided state supervision over prescribed controlled drugs, the 
Royal Pharmaceutical Society and the G M C regulated their own professional members.
The R o ya l P harm aceutical Society a n d  the G eneral M edical Council 
The Royal Pharmaceutical Society’s inspectorate inspected all pharmacies in Britain.1' 7 Unlike the 
GMC, which lacked its own inspectors, the RPS established its own disciplinary procedures in 1935 
and its inspectorate in 1936 following the 1933 Pharmacy and Poisons Act. Under the Act only 
registered pharmacists could inspect pharmacies for the Society to check their compliance with 
professional standards, although non-pharmacists were later employed to inspect other retail 
premises selling pharmaceuticals. Pharmacist-only inspection would seem to protect the self­
regulation model but the fact that they were simultaneously being inspected by police officers 
undermined this, and the result was combined professional and state regulation, as had existed to a 
lesser degree from 1868. RPS inspectors often worked together with police officers, and 
occasionally I lome Office inspectors. W hile there was frequent criticism of CIOs from the Home 
Office, Peter Spurgeon remembered the RPS as ‘a highly professional lot’ with whom the 
Inspectorate’s relations were good.1"*
lik e  the Inspectorate, the RPS inspectors had the role of both advising and potentially disciplining 
the pharmacists they visited. Professional guidelines and legislation provided the standards, as well 
as formal and informal training. If these regulations or guidelines had been breached, RPS 
inspectors could either warn a pharmacist on site or follow up with more formal procedures.
Unlike the GMC, the RPS not only used its own tlisciplinary lxxly, the ‘Stamtory Committee’, but 
could also ch<x>sc to prosecute through the law courts. I ike the GMC, a criminal conviction could 
then result in a disciplinary hearing before die Statutory Committee to see whether the phannacist 
should remain on the register.
The GMC and its role in regulating prescribing were discussed in detail in Chapter 5. In relation to 
the other bodies discussed here, the Council’s main role was to prosecute, through its disciplinary 
prtxicdures, cases brought to light by the I lome Office Inspectorate, the Chemist Inspecting 
Officers, or occasionally, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society’s inspectors. It also suggested ‘experts’ 127
127 G. E. Appclbc, (2004) op. i t .  
I2" P. Spurgeon, (2004) op. i t .
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from the Clinics to advise Chemist Inspecting Officers about acceptable prescribing, at least from 
the mid-1980s onwards.1' 1
Between 1968 and 1999, there were fluctuations in the levels of disciplinary action against doctors 
by the CM C and the Inspectorate, and in which organisation took the lead. Until 1968, the GMC 
had dealt with a mere handfi.il o f cases o f ‘non bona fide prescribing’ of controlled drugs. After 
that date, the numbers increased, but remained at less than 10 per year until at least 1990.lv' From 
1968-73, the GMC was the only regulatory body able to take disciplinary action for ‘irresponsible 
prescribing’, although warnings could be given by the Inspectorate and the Regional Medical 
Officers (see above).
It seems that during the 1980s and for much o f  the 1990s, the Inspectorate took the lead in 
disciplinary cases against doctors prescribing controlled drugs.111,1'2 I lowever, after the 1997 
“watershed’ o f Adrian Garfoot’s succcssfiil appeal against his 1994 tribunal niling, the G M C took 
over the job of prosecuting all the cases made by the Inspectorate’s investigations and the Tribunal 
machinery was left unused. Compared with 1968-72, the GMC was this time much m ore willing to 
take on the role of prosecuting errant prescribers, and this may have been due to government and 
public pressure on the profession to prove its ability to self-regulate (see Chapter 5).
Internal and External Expertise
Ihe Inspectorate’s work focused entirely on controlled dnigs, rather than the whole range of 
doctors’ professional behaviour, and it developed its own internal expertise and views on  
appropriate prescribing and the implications for the demand and supply o f both pharmaceutical 
and trafficked dnigs. These included the particular formulations and substances likely to  be 
diverted, their black market values, and the health risks particular drugs posed when not used as 
prescribed. I lowever, the Inspectorate newer employed any doctors or pharmacists and as lay 
inspectors without medical or phannaceutical training, they were keenly aware of the sensitivity of 
commenting on the well-defended turf of doctors’ clinical judgement, relying upon external sources 
of medical advice to support anil legitimise their judgements.
Willie there was no official definition of the ‘irresponsible’ prescribing that the Inspectors were 
supposed to police, they had drawn up their own guidelines on what to lixik for when visiting
129 N. Tilley, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
IV' R. G. Smith, (1994) op  a !.. p.104.
1,1 I lomc ( )fficc Inspector, (2002) op. at.
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prescribes.1” During the 1980s, advice was sought from some of the I-ondon consultants and their 
publications, such as those by Martin Nlitcheson, consultant psychiatrist at University College 
Hospital.114 In 1984, South East Regional inspector John I .awson, was asked at a GMC hearing 
what features of a particular doctor’s prescribing led to the setting up of a Misuse o f Drugs 
Tribunal. He replied that it was the amount o f drugs prescribed for individual patients, but that they 
did ‘seek expert advice’ on that.11’ After 1984, the Inspectorate could also use the medically 
produced Department of Health clinical guidelines.116,11 41"'111
I lowever, when considering whether to take Dr Dally before a Tribunal in 1983, the Inspectorate 
decided against, while the GMC pursued what was a rather weak case amid attacks in the medical 
press on private prescribing by I^ondon Clinic psychiatrists (see Chapter 5).14" 'ITie GMC, in its 
self-regulation model, was free to make clinical judgements but relied upon its medical members for 
guidance. The main medical expertise in the drugs field was represented by one o f the most 
powerful Ix>ndon psychiatrists, D r Pliilip Connell, who was a particular critic o f private prescribing 
and a member of the GMC and its Executive Committee.
Describing her experience of visits from Chief and Senior Inspectors Bing Spear and )ohn Dawson, 
Ann Daily recalled, ‘1 learned far more from them than from so-called specialists or from the 
medical literature. I tried not to say this to them because it embarrassed them, 'llie y  were not 
supposed to be regarded as “medical experts”.’141 Spear in particular was one o f the most 
knowledgeable individuals about the ‘dnig scene’ and prescribing during his time at the I Iome 
Office, 142*14’ '141
m Home < )fficc Drugs Inspectorate, ‘ Irresponsible prescribing enquiries: Investigation, preparation and 
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Advising doctors involved an intricate dance for the Inspectorate, unable to tell clinicians how to 
treat their patients, using professional peer opinion to justify their advice and yet holding over 
prescribers the threat of judging their behaviour. Here, Donald McIntosh, an inspector visiting 
Ann Dally in December 1985, advised her that a former patient from the North o f England 
should, if  he needed further treatment, receive it locally and not from Dr Dally. This was the 
exchange noted,
,dD. ‘f  would be reluctant to take him back if  you disapprove. ”
DM . “It  is not for us to approve or disapprove. You could be criticised by your medical colleagues. . . 145 647
Inspectors had to give the appearance o f not dictating acceptable treatments to a doctor, yet it was 
the Inspectorate who would refer cases to a Tribunal. Ihe Tribunal itself was medical in 
membership, but the evidence would be supplied by the Inspectorate. The medical profession 
therefore retained an overarching power over the Inspectorate’s regulatory authority, and each was 
dependent on the other to achieve a disciplinary result.
Ihe publication of the first clinical guidelines by the Department of I lealth’s Medical Working 
Group in 1984,141' assisted the Inspectorate by prov iding further official medical support, but did 
not fundamentally change their approach. 'Hie Inspectorate had their own internal view on 
prescribing before the good practice guidelines appeared. These new guidelines drawn up by the 
Medical Working Group were used by the Inspectorate to increase its leverage in enforcing its 
existing views when visiting prescribers,14 rather than accepting the views of the most influential 
addiction psvehiatrists wholesale. One inspector commented, ‘Once we had some guidelines we 
could actually point to something, sav “You should do tliis, you should do that, your colleagues said 
all that.’”14"
ih e  Inspectorate’s own internal guidelines, which were drawn up in the early 1980s,14’ dealt mostly 
with pragmatic procedural matters, but included an appendix which showed what inspectors were 
l<x>king for. The thrust o f the questions, such as “What steps did the doctor take to satisfy himself 
that the patient was addicted?’ aimed at finding out whether a doctors was willing to prescribe drugs 
regardless o f the patient’s condition, and so potentially act as a supplier o f drugs for non-medical
145 CMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Day ( )nc, (9* December 1986), Case of Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T 
A Reed & Co. |transcript|, GMC Archive, Iaindon. p.1/50.
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reasons ie not in the treatment of addiction. A check-list of practices indicative of appropriate or 
inappropriate prescribing was set out as follows: 
a Physical examination? — complete or merely arms? 
b Blood/urine tests? 
c Observance of withdrawal symptoms? 
d Observance of self-administration? 
e Checks with previous doctors/ contacts ? 
fProof of the addict !r claimed identity?
s; Notification? and response to information provided ly  the Addicts Index?
h. A ry  additional ducks in respect of patients from outside his area?
i. Was a prescription issued before or not until the results of these checks were known? ' 5,1
'lhese criteria did not seem aimed at imposing a single model of treatment, as the 1984 good 
practice guidelines did, and the document seemed to bear out its claim that the purpose o f 
investigations was ‘not to stop a doctor from prescribing controlled dmgs to addicts if  that is being 
done in a controlled and responsible manner, nor to force him to conform to a particular treatment 
regime although advice about consensus trends in treatment may be offered in conjunction with 
the names and locations of specialist treatment facilities.’ 1,1
Ibis mention o f ‘consensus’ was rather surprising, as it was clearly lacking in the medical profession 
at that time. In 1986, the I lomc Office was clearer about different approaches, when discussing 
Tribunals. In Peter Spurgeon’s first Annual Report, after taking over from Bing Spear as ( ihief 
Inspector, he wrote:
Neither tire pursuit ofindiridua! cases, nor tire I lome Office policy underlying the Inspectorate's genera! approach is 
coloured by one medical school of thought or another on prescribing philosophy, which remains a highly variable 
commodity rangingfrvm strict non-prescribing of substitutes in some areas through to open acceptance of long-term 
maintenance prescription as a last resort in others. Ora basic concern is quite simply to ensure as far as is practicable 
and reasonable thstt the styles adopted ly  medical pratlitioners in their treatment of drug misusers are consistent with 
the need to preterit significant leakage of controlled drugs into the illicit market.' ' '
,v‘ Ibid.
141 Ibid.
,s2 Drugs Branch Inspectorate, A nnual Report I'JRO (London: I lome < MTlcc, 1987), Ref. 49910, DrugScopc 
library, London
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'ITte extent to which the Inspectorate expressed views independent of the Clinic treatment 
orthodoxy varied over the period. The early to mid-1970s was a time of experimentation in the 
Clinics, with relatively little concern about private prescribing.1,1 As lines of allegiance hardened, 
Spear stood out against the methadone and short-term detoxification model held up by the Clinic 
leaders of the late 1970s and 1980s, but according to his successor, Peter Spurgeon, he was only 
able to do this because of the special respect he had built up within the policy community, and the 
length of his service, joining the Inspectorate in 1952 long before the Clinics were established.1’4
In 1985 and ’86 Spear was absent from the Inspectorate for long pcricxls due to illness, and newly 
appointed Senior Inspector for the South East Region, Donald McIntosh, who had moved from 
the Bradford office, acted in his place. He took a key role in advancing regulatory action against 
Ann Dally and at her GMC hearing reported asking her, D oes not long-term prescribing give a 
soft option to carry on taking drugs?’,15’ and suggesting that the fact that her patients were unwilling 
to go to their local NHS Clinics indicated that they were only coming to her for a supply o f drugs. 
His questions seemed to reveal a view that prescribing was ‘perpetuating’ patients’ ‘addiction and 
problems’.154
By the 1990s, the Inspectorate’s enforcement policies took into account the longer tenn prescribing 
patterns that had emerged from the hann reduction movement following 11IV/AIDS.15 
1 lowever, in some respects they could be said to have reflected the aims o f the 1-ondon Clinics, 
many of which, although influenced by hann reduction, remained resistant to the idea of long tenn 
prescribing.1 ’* Despite the apparent widespread acceptance o f oral methadone maintenance during 
the 1990s, the overall aim of reducing patients’ prescribed doses continued to ap|x-ar in criticisms 
of doctors, as in the Tribunal’s charges against Dr Adrian C iarfoot in 1994, which included 
prescription ‘without instituting a reducing regime’ and prescribing not according to the (1991)
m  eg Thomas Bewlev, who became one of the fiercest opponents o f private prescribing, only mentioned GPs, 
not private prcscrilxtr, as a source of diverted pharmaceuticals in his 197.5 article: T. Bcwlcy, **1110 Illicit Drug 
Scene*, Brititb Medical‘ Journal, 2 (1975), 318 320.
,VI P. Spurgeon, (2004) op. at.
GMC, Professional Conduct Committee, Hay < Inc, (9,h December 1986), Case of Dally, Ann Gwendolen, T 
A Reed & Co. |transcript|, GMC Archive, I.nndon. p.1/45.
'*  Ibid, p.1/45.
141 A. Macfarlanc, (2002) op. at.
,Sii 11 I ludebine, ‘Applying cognitive policy analysis to the drug issue: harm reduction and the reversal of the 
devianti/ation of drug users in Britain 1985-2000*, Addiction Rriranb and I'beory (forthcoming).
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clinical guidelines. A further charge was that he had not consulted ‘experts in the treatment of drug 
misuse, such as a local drug dependency unit’.159
Leadership o f the Inspectorate
C harles Je ffre y  (C h ieffro n t a t least 1970 u n til 1977)
Charles Jeffrey left few accessible documentary sources for the historian to assess his contribution, 
but seems to have taken a personal approach to the welfare of addicts that has often been credited 
to Spear alone. Ken Leech, community theologian at St Botolph’s, Aldgatc, and active with drug 
users since the 1960s, mentioned that drug users often invited themselves to tea at the I lome 
Office under |effrey’s leadership and an inspector of the Royal Pharmaceutical Society remembered 
Jeffrey as a very sociable man.16"'161 For many, though, his memory seems to have been 
overshadowed by the more charismatic figure o f Spear.,62,161
From Spear’s references to Jeffrey, they sounded of a similar mould. For instance, he reported a 
meeting with the Ministry o f Health and medical representatives at which an important remark was 
made either by Jeffrey or himself, but he was unable to remember which.164 I low ever, this may 
simply have been Spear’s tendency to portray civil servants as pursuing the policy o f  the 
Inspectorate, rather than bringing distinct personalities to their work.
H .B. ( ‘B ing’)  Spear (C h ie f1977-1986)
Spear joined the I lome Office Drugs Inspectorate in 1952 and became its Chief in 1977 until ill 
health forced him to retire in 1986. Spear was perhaps die most celebrated civil servant in the dmgs 
field during the twentieth century. I lis b<x>k, / dentin Addiction C an and Control,\ published 
posthumously, was prefaced with warm appreciations, and he was remarkable in Iris ability to gain 
the trust and respect of fiercely divided parties in the treaunent and control arenas.I6' ' '66,167 1 lis 
personal concern for addicts, and encouragement of doctors to take on their care, including those 
in the private sector, showed an interest beyond the mechanics of regulating the drug supply.
,s,; In the WtUter o f  the Misuse o f  Drugs Art l ‘l~ / ami In the Matter o f  D r John Artrian Gatfoot. Minutes o f  Proteethngs at a 
Misuse o f  Drugs Tribunal (lingtand and Wales), (22’"1 Jun e 1994), W. B. Gurney and Sons |transcript), GMC 
Archive, lamdon. p.10.
K. I ct-ch, ‘Bing Spear: Appreciations’, in H. B. Spear (2002) op. tit, pp.ix-xi.
"•I G. E. Appclhe, (2004) op. cit.
IM cg. M. Mitcheson, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2003).
145 eg. J . Mott, Personal Communication, (2005).
Iw II. B. Spear (and cd. J. Mott), (2002) op. tit., p. 156.
I6S c8 -1*. Bcwlcy, (2001) op. cit.
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In his last couple o f years at the Inspectorate, Donald McIntosh’s stricter and less permissive 
attitude towards private doctors, including those, such as Ann Dally, who had previously been 
visited by Inspectors on a ‘friendly’ basis, dominated. IM Dally considered that it was Spear’s 
frequent absences in hospital which ‘gave an opportunity to harder and more traditional 
bureaucrats’, 69 but others saw McIntosh as Spear’s preferred successor.1'"
Spear complained that the Clinic psychiatrists had ‘succeeded in imposing their own ethical and 
judgemental values on treatment policy’,171 *but he himself was far from morally or politically 
neutral. From his position in the Inspectorate he was able to sway government policy to modify 
the influence of the Clinics and he attempted to diversify prescribing and treatment provision for 
drug users, while retaining and in some cases strengthening the Home Office’s own regulatory 
mechanisms.
P eter Spurgeon, C h ie f Inspector 1986-89
Spurgeon followed Spear as Chief Inspector from 1986, moving straight into the post from 
criminal polio1 work within the I lome Office. Spurgeon was keenly aware of the respect in which 
Spear was held both within and outside the Inspectorate and his annual reports suggested a similar 
approach to his predecessor.1'2,1'11'4 It is not certain why Spurge-on rather than McIntosh got the 
chief post but the former attributed his appointment from a managerial post outside the 
Inspectorate, rather than the promotion o f an internal candidate, to the tendency towards a more 
managerial approach across government in the mid-1980s.1 '
Certainly his appointment does not seem to have been an attempt to alter the political direction of 
the Inspectorate. Spear was sytn|>athetic towards drug users, highly critical o f the enforcement 
dominated US approach, and wary of claims for what could Ik - achieved through policy as ‘sooner 
or later society will have to reach an accommodation with dnig use’.174’ Spurgeon’s attitudes hugely
I lome < )fficc Inspector, (2002) op. tit. 
w ' A. Dally, (1990) op. tit.
™J. Mott, (16* March 2005) op. tit.
171 11. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. tit., p.310.
172 P. Spurgeon, (2004) op. tit.
171 I lom c < Ifftcc Drugs Branch Inspectorate, A nn oo l Rr/totl t'SN~ ( lam d n n : I Ionic < )fficc, 1988), Ref. S2I50, 
DrugScopc Library, lamdon.
,7< ibid.
,7'  P. Spurgeon, (2004) op. tit.
I7f- Home t ifflcc Drugs Branch Inspectorate, (1986) op. tit., p.2l.
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matched these. He had a historical sense of his place within the traditions o f the Inspectorate and 
was happy to follow Spear’s ‘compassionate approach to the problem’.1 ,7K
A lan  M acfarlane (1990 to the p resen t)
W hen Macfarlane took over as Chief Inspector, like his predecessor Spurgeon, he was a career civil 
servant with no previous experience in the Inspectorate. His approach to prescribing differed 
sharply from that o f Bing Spear’s. I le was higlily critical o f private prescribers, the majority o f 
whom  he considered “wicked’,1 '' and unsympathetic towards the views o f drug users themselves.11’" 
At the end of the century, drug users were organising into activist groups that were beginning to 
receive recognition from charities and local government,1"11"' but under Macfarlane the 
Inspectorate took a hostile view to the participation of such groups in the policy process.1"’
The success of Dr Adrian Garfoot’s appeal against the Tribunal’s railing was a serious blow to 
Macfarlanc, after a lengthy and expensive process for the I Iomc Office. It signalled the end o f  the 
Tribunal system, which had also emerged as contravening I luman Rights I legislation.1"4 
Macfarlane had chosen the wrong private prescriber to pursue in Adrian Garfoot, whose heavy 
weight defence fought a far harder battle than anticipated by the I lame Office prosecution who 
were used to easy, uncontested admissions from the accused.1"5
Macfarlane had hoped to extend the I lome Office’s licensing scheme for doctors prescribing 
certain controlled drugs but despite recommendations in favour from the Department o f I lealth’s 
Clinical Guidelines Working ( in>up, the necessary legislation was not passed anil the protesting 
(IP s won out (see Chapter 7). Under Macfarlane’s leadership the Inspectorate lost two important 
regulatory tools: the Addicts Index and the Tribunal system, while suffering diminislting influence 
over policy.
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M otives fo r R egulation
Although the Inspectorate’s mission was the prevention of drugs being diverted from the 
authorised channels throughout this period,1"'’ it pursued additional policy goals and priorities, 
being guided by its changing internal views on the needs of patients, appropriate treatment and the 
doctors who provided it. For instance, Inspector John Lawson, on his visit to Dr Tamesby’s 
practice in December 1981, claimed to have advised him that prescribing Diconai to drug users 
could be dangerous as it this oral tablet was often hazardously crushed and injected.1"' Here, 
concern about the health of patients, as well as the destination o f  prescribed drugs, influenced 
regulation. A number of sources also showed that the I Iome Office placed emphasis on the 
motivations of drug doctors, rather than simply the type of prescribing they were undertaking, 
suggesting an interest in the care given to addicts going beyond their remit o f controlling diversion, 
and a degree o f moral judgement.
Charles Jeffrey, writing in 1970, referred to two types o f drug doctors on the scene a decade earlier 
‘script doctors’ and a new kind of ‘dedicated practitioners’ whose motives were ‘unimpeachable’, 
although despite their different motivations, Jeffrey attributed to both the overflow of dmgs onto 
the black market.1"" Spear maintained this d is t in c tio n ,an d  according to an inspector with 20 
years’ experience, Spear directed the powers o f the Inspectorate accordingly:
7 think Dal/)' mu then to help people in tlx same way that C¡afoot uu< then, They in n  a hit misguided, hut that 
was what they wen doing. If'henas [X ] and [Y ] wenjust evil men... 7 hey wen different type of people... [X ] and
[ i]  urn being taken hefon Tribunal— a hit evil and in it for the money. Then inn  other doctors pnserihing to 
addicts who wen seen on a regular basis but man in afriendly advisory way and Dally was one of these. S ix  mu 
emouraged to get involved ly  Bing.i w
Although a Tribunal was brought against Dr Garfoot, it was after many years o f advice anil 13 oral 
and written warnings given between 1982 and 1992,1 ” and with Dr Dally, although a Tribunal w as 
threatened in 1986, seven years after she accepted her first drug addict patient, it was never brought. 
DrTamesby, cast as motivated bv greed, by contrast, was served with Tribunal papers in 1983 only
"“ J. Scullion, (27,hJune 2003) op. at.
11.1 CM C, Professional Conduct Committee, Day 'Ilirec, (8,h March 1984), Case of Tamesby, I lerman Peter, T. 
A. Reed & Co. |transcript|, GMC Archive, Ixmdon. pp.12-15.
lw* C. G. Jeffrey, ‘Drug control in the United Kingdom*, in R. V. Phillipson (ed.). Modern Tnnds in Deny 
Dependence and Alcoholism  (1-ondon: But tc-rsvorths, 1970) pp.60-74, p.67.
II. B. Spear (and cd. |. Mott), (2002) op. at., pp.42-62.
I lomc < )fftce Inspector, (2002) op. at.
1.1 I lome < ifficc. Report o f a Tribunal Set Up Under the Misuse o f Drugs Act 1971 to enquire into the 
Conduct of Dr John Adrian Garfoot MB BS MRCS LRCP, 1994, (Dr Garfoot, Private archive) pp-4 3.
181
a year and a half after his first addiction prescribing. Theoretically, this also applied with the GMC, 
where ‘bona fide’ intention was considered in prescribing, but in practice, good intentions, even 
where proven as far as they could be, could be disregarded, as occurred in Dr Daily’s two GMC 
cases (see Chapter 5).
In addition to direct regulation, visits by the Inspectorate had an intelligence gathering role, at least 
during the 1980s. Spear remarked.
Not all visits to practitioners. ..an in nspect of some offences or irresponsible prescribing. Then an a fetv general 
practitioners who an taking a particularly keen interest in drug misuse problems and who ivelcome periodical visits 
from tire Inspectorate. In  turn much valuable information about tire local drug scene is obtained from these 
practitioners."2
O f course, a doctor at one time considered in this intelligence giving capacity, like Ann Dally, could 
become one o f the regulated under a change of leadership.
Although the Inspectorate directed the practice o f doctors towards controlling the drug supply, it 
could also be seen as having a training role for practitioners new to the field in a dearth o f other 
sources. Treatment and Rehabilitation (1982) remarked on the lack o f training opportunities for 
doctors faced with addicted patients.1 ” During the 1970s and ’80s there was very little time spent 
on addiction in the undergraduate medical curriculum and little opportunity for training for 
postgraduates other than psychiatrists specialising in addiction. Testifying before the Social Sen-ices 
Select Committee in 1985, Dr Stuart Came, Senior Tutor in General Practice at the Royal 
Postgraduate Medical School, agreed that the basic general practitioner training was not sufficient 
for a GP to be able to recognise an addict. Dr John Cohen, a G P member o f the first Guidelines 
Committee and a Senior I x-cturer in General Practice at Middlesex 1 lospital Medical School, 
considered there were insufficient experienced psychiatrists in drugs to provide a network for 
training.1,4
Some doctors starting to treat dnig users had minimal knowledge of treatment modalities, and the 
Inspectorate could be the most knowledgeable sources available to them. Dr Tamesby, for
1,2 Home < )ffice Drugs Branch Inspectorate, (1986) op. at., p.12.
ACMD, (1982) op. at., p.63.
,,M I louse of Commons, Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Social Services Committee, (6"’ February 1985), 
Misuse o f  D rug with Special Reference to lire Treatment amt Rehabilitation o f  Misusers o f f  Iant D rug. I 'north Report from the 
So,rat Services Committee Session 19X4/15 (I A union: HSMO, 198.5) pp.14-21.
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instance, learnt about prescribing methadone and Diconalduring his first visit from an inspector in 
December 1981, before which he was unaware that he could prescribe them, and Dr Dally 
commented on how much more she had learnt from the inspectors than from medical ‘experts’.195
E ffects o f  R egulation on the T reatm ent o f  A ddiction
While the Clinics were largely left by the Inspect!irate to self-regulate, a critical effect o f the Home 
Office’s activities on doctors treating drug users outside the DDUs was to extend and delegate 
policing of the drug supply from the 1 lome Office to doctors themselves working outside the 
Clinics, with penalties for not doing so. The GMC case against Dr Tamesbv, at which the 
Inspectorate gave evidence for the prosecution, showed a range o f issues doctors were supposed to 
be aware o f  to maintain control over the drugs supply, aside from and sometimes in potential 
conflict with the doctor’s own perceptions o f the patients’ needs. For instance the patient should 
be of known provenance, with a referral from a GP or other doctor. Spear wrote to Tamesby 
reminding him of
the need for extreme caution in prescribing for patients preciously unknown to tlx practice who claim, hut cannot 
readily confirm, that the)' hate been in regular receipt of controlled drugs. A s  you no doubt appreciate from your merit 
experienie, a doctor who is prepared to accept such patients nury soon find himselfinundated try similar reeprests and 
miry well unwittingly become an important source of drugs circulating in tlx illicit market} " '
Tamesby, although clearly trying to make a good account of himself under cross-examination 
before the GMC, described the change in his practice resulting from this regulatory attention:
. . .  when tlxre was a G P I did enquire and tlx difficulty about it is when the patient states lx does not hare a GP, and 
I  then thought if he has not git a G P  and lx says lx  hat never attended anybody for treatment what can I  do I  Hut 
nowadays 1 would say. “Then in that case 1 w ill not accept him. ’’Indeed, ifhow I  were faced with that same choice 1 
would say: 'W ell, it is just too bad I cannot accept him’’, but at that time Ifelt I  must bend oirr backwards to accept 
him. and that, I  think, can lead to undesirable results, and I  would not do it again.'11
Whether this was accurate or not, it indicated the direction of the pressures on these doctors. On 
the question of patients losing their jobs once in treatment, Mr McIntosh, when giving evidence
1,5 A. Dally, (1990) op. lit., p.134.
11. B. Spear, le tte r  to 11. P. Tamesby, (I7 ,h June 1982), quoted in GMC, Professional Conduct Committee. 
Day Three, (8,h March 1984), Case of Tamesby, I lerman Peter, T. A. Reed & Co. [transcript], GMC Archive, 
larndon. p.20.
m  GMC, Professional Conduct Committee. Day Four, (9,h March 1984) Case o f  Tamesby, Herman Peter, T A 
Reed & Co. [transcript], GMC Archive, London, p.77.
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against Ann Dally, explained ‘it was incumbent upon her to make the most stringent continuous 
inquiries to satisfy herself that this person had a legitimate means o f  meeting the costs without 
resort to some criminal activities’. And although not explicit, it seemed expected that a private 
prescriber should discharge any patient found to have lost their job.1 ,,i Tamesby claimed that most 
of his patients owed money but were still seen.'”  Doctors were also discouraged from accepting 
patients outside the locality o f their practice, as the Inspectorate were concerned about the 
geographical spread of patients, not as a treatment or medical issue, but one concerning the market 
in diverted drugs. |ohn Lawson, an Inspector giving evidence at Tam esby’s GMC hearing, stated, 
‘Most doctors who prescribe for addicts tend to attract addicts from their own area. Once a doctor 
starts to attract addicts from other parts, the whole of London, or the Home Counties, we become 
suspicious that he is a “soft touch”.’ '"" The Inspectorate was also concerned that, through “long­
distance prescribing’ markets in diverted prescribed dmgs could develop in areas outside I /rndon 
that had been previously unaffected.'1"1
An unexpected role o f the Inspectorate was in finding doctors for patients who were in difficulties, 
including those of doctors who had been disciplined and were no longer able to prescribe, lh e  
I Iome Office directed Dr Daily’s patients to both an Nl IS Clinic and another private prescriber 
after her second case.'1""'2"' According to Peter Spurgeon, lias function was a result o f ‘the 
relationship with the drug using community built up by Bing Spear’, but may have preceded Iris 
tenure. The criteria for ch< x >sing these doctors for referrals were, according to Spurgeon, who 
could not be seen to show preference for particular treatment modalities, logistics and practicalities’ 
rather than treatment modalities.2"*
Other R egulatory P ressures
When visiting doctors, the Inspectorate not only expressed its own concerns, but also made them 
aware of the interests of the press, particularly the tabloids, in their practices. In this, the popular 
press acted as an additional regulatory pressure upon doctors, particularly those in private practice, 
who constituted targets for negative publicity in the ItiHOs and ’Ws, and a potential source of 
information to the Inspectorate and GMC.
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Inspector John I .awson reported that in a conversation in December 1981 ‘I mentioned to Dr 
Tamesby in my experience he would have to be careful when dealing with addicts because the 
press once  they became aware a doctor is dealing with addicts can see headlines and they are apt to 
put in reporters claiming to be addicts.’3’5 Despite this warning Dr Tamesby was hcxxlwinkcd by a 
Daily Atirror reporter posing as a drug dependent patient to whom he prescribed. After this 
Tamesby claimed to have instituted greater checks such as physical examinations o f the patient to 
check for signs of injecting, and ‘I decided 1 will never use sclf-injcctables again, and never did’,31'’ 
although this latter claim was disputed by another inspector.317
Alerted b y  the reporter’s article,3* the Inspectorate interviewed Dr Tamesby after the journalists’ 
accusatory article appeared in the Daily M invr, but were satisfied with his answers and did not 
pursue th e  matter further.3’', In Tamesby’s GMC hearing it was not made explicit why this was the 
case, but cross-examination o f the Home Office Inspector and the reporter suggested that some 
aspects o f  the newspaper’s account might have been fabricated.'1"
T h eoretical Interpretations
From a m ore theoretical perspective, the workings o f  the Inspectorate can be seen as those o f a 
bureaucracy. Max W eber’s influential work described the basis of bureaucratic power as technical 
expertise and knowledge developed through experience in the service, clearly characteristics o f this 
Inspectorate. I Ie also saw bureaucracies as having an interest in perpetuating themselves into 
permanent institutions, rather than serving the ends for which they were originally designed. " This 
too can b e  seen in the Drugs Inspectorate, which developed into a source o f policy advice for 
government, training for prcscribcrs, an occasional referral agency for patients, and policy actor in 
its own right.
Similar processes were also observed by Rhodes in his wider examination o f inspectorates within 
British government, which often did more than their original task o f inspecting. Rlvxles found that 
other central government inspectorates, as well as enforcing legislation among those they inspected,
GMC, Professional Conduct Committee. Day Four, (9th March 1984) Case o f Tamcsby, f lerman Peter, T  A 
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had developed into professional advisors to ministers and departments.“1'2 He saw inspectorates as 
not only enforcing standards, but setting them too, which also matched the Home Office case and 
similarly he found division made by the inspectors between those they inspected on a friendly basis, 
who were considered reputable, and the dishonest who were prosecuted.
i l i e  act of surveillance has received particular attention in the history of medicine and beyond since 
Michel Foucault’s ideas on the place o f the body in modem medicine and on ‘disciplinary power’ 
became influential.211’21'' However, the impersonal nature o f  Foucault’s surveillance did not fit the 
very individual imprint left by the Inspectorate’s changing leadership or die personal relationships 
between observer and observed. Furthermore Foucault’s denial of personal agency as a historical 
force has been hard to square with this picture.
However, Foucault did not necessarily intend his ideas to be taken as a general or consistent theory, 
or to be applied to other historical contexts.21’ 1 lis followers were more imperialist in their claims, 
and some of their work may inform this one. David Armstrong’s expansion on Foucault’s ideas to 
medical surveillance in the twentieth century has provided an interesting comparison. I le described 
the archetype o f a tuberculosis Dispensary’ which acted as a central clearing house for information 
about sickness and potential sickness in the wider community, mapping the spread of disease and 
gaining the consent of the well population to undergo policing and surveillance.2,<’ 'litis contrasted 
with the institutionalised surveillance o f prisons and schcxds in that it looked into the spaces 
Ix-tween bodies in their community environments creating a new concept o f social space taking 
groups of people to lie the reservoirs o f disease.
The infectious disease model of dmg addiction that was overtly expressed to justify the compulsory 
notification requirements for the Addicts Index, a key tool for the Inspectorate’s surveillance of 
doctors and patients, showed clear parallels to Armstrong’s Dispensary. 1 .ike the Dispensary, the 
Inspectorate was a central clearing house for information and intervention among the community, 
in this case one made up o f doctors and dmg users, with varying degrees o f consent. The
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movement of drugs, which could equate with agents o f infection in the communicable disease 
model of the second Brain Committee, between patients and other dnig users, had taken the place 
o f the tuberculosis bacilli. However, although Armstrong’s model o f the Dispensary may have 
illuminated the development o f social space in infectious disease, it has not substantially added to 
our understanding of the I lom e Office Inspectorate or the Addicts Index, the roles o f  which were 
openly declared to be part o f a public health system of control of dnig addiction in which health 
care and disciplinary processes were combined.
C onclusion
Throughout the last three decades of the twentieth century, the Inspectorate’s regulatory gaze fell 
on the doctors working outside the Clinics, despite evidence that dmgs leaked also from the Clinics 
onto the illicit market.21 While the Clinics’ leaders united successfully to largely self-regulate, 
private prcscribcrs failed, and GPs, although starting off weakly, by the end of the cenmry appeared 
to be fending off further state regulation through their Royal College.
Ih e  regulatory ttxrls available to the Inspectorate, and their use, passed through several different 
phases over the period: 1970-73 was a period o f frustration; the Tribunal system had passed into 
legislation in 1971 but was awaiting die ‘on’ switch to be flicked, with a GMC reluctant to take 
action itself; from 1973 to ’82 the Tribunal system was used, but only occasionally, probably due to 
unwillingness by I lome Office lawyers to accuse doctors o f itrespr insible prescribing, while the 
G M C took some action itself.21* After 1982, the GMC continued to discipline private prescribers 
anti the use of Tribunals became more frequent until the mid-1990s Garfoot ‘watershed’.
C iarfix it’s was the last Tribunal, initiated in 199.3, and finally overturned on appeal in 1997, from 
which point on Tribunals fell into disuse, partly as a result o f supra-national regulation, followed by 
the Inspectorate shrinking its work with doctors and the GMC taking over as sole prosecutor o f 
‘irresponsible’ prescribe«, gathering momentum at the turn o f die century. Although the 
Inspectorate and the GMC continued to co-operate, with the Inspectorate providing some o f  the 
information used for the GMC cases, the weight was on professional rather than state regulation.
Until the mid-1980s the Inspectorate, like some other central government inspectorates, played a 
key role within the policy community, both in advising ministers and other policy btxlics such as 
the ACMD, and also by supporting and protecting doctors who differed in philosophy from the 
Ixtndon (dirties where they were judged to be well-motivated. Under S|scar, the Inspectorate
217 A . Burr, T he Piccadilly drug scene’, Hritiib Jou rn a l ofA ddiction, 78, 1 (1983), 5-19.
2IH H. B. Spear (and cd. J. Mott), (2002) op. at., p.63.
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worked to maintain diversity in treatment sendees by opposing the extension of licensing in the 
mid-1980s (see Chapter 4). Bing Spear was particularly influential because of his own highly 
respected knowledge, personal charisma, perceived neutrality and because of the narrower policy 
community o f  his time. Spear fostered the internal expertise of the Inspectorate, mostly using 
medical advice to support and legitimise existing lay-developed policy, rather than relying upon 
them for direction.
Once Spear had gone, there appeared to be an opportunity for the Clinics to strengthen their 
position and curtail the prescribing of other doctors. After manoeuvres against private prescribers 
initiated by McIntosh, policy was pushed in the opposite direction by events outside the 
Inspectorate. The emergence of a near consensus for harm reduction treatment policies which 
developed after HIV/AIDS became a policy issue, and the diversification of the policy community 
to include more non-medical influences weakened claims of the (illrues to be the sole source of 
expertise and gave opportunities to those pursuing a more liberal prescribing policy outside the 
Clinics.
Outing the 1990s the Inspectorate’s leadership sought greater control over non-Clinic prescribers, 
but failed to pmtect its sources of strength, losing two regulatory mechanisms: the Addicts Index 
and the Tribunal system. By the end o f the twentieth century, the Inspectorate was a much 
diminished force. After an initially heightened status as the main advisory source of ministers, it 
had failed to capitalise on the growing political importance of the drugs issue, losing out to other 
more specialised agencies and cost-cutting exercises. ( idler developments such as the government 
and media pressure on the GMC to increase its regulatory activity across all o f medicine, and the 
questioning o f  doctors’ ability to self-regulate, in addition to the costly failure ol the Garfoot case 
and the end to Tribunals, left die Inspectorate dependent upon the GMC to enforce the findings ol 
its much reduced inspections.
( )ne source o f pressure surprisingly absent from the Inspectorate was that o f public opinion. ih e  
Inspectorate was noteworthy in its low public profile, rarely heard o f outside the dmgs field, ITiis 
meant that, unlike some of the inspectorates considered by Rhodes, public opinion had little 
influence on its policing priorities. Drug policy in the 1960s and 70s had been largely determined 
behind closed dtxirs between civil servants and members of the policy community. From the mid- 
1980s, public opinion and (rolitical interest had a little more influence although in a scattered and 
inconsistent fashion, but the priorities of the Inspectorate continued to reflect its own internal 
views and elements o f the policy community until the end of the century.
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Throughout these three decades, the Inspectorate informally cooperated with the other strands in 
the regulatory network, both state and professional, to gather intelligence, and to advise and 
discipline those non-Clinic doctors it found wanting. To influence policy according to its own 
agenda, the Inspectorate made strategic alliances with medical professionals, other government 
departments and policy bodies, with varying degrees o f success.
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Chapter 7
Major Regulatory Interventions III:
1999 Guidelines and the Licensing Question
Introduction
After a long and somewhat troubled delivery, the third edition of the clinical guidelines on drug 
misuse — the ‘Orange Book’ — emerged into the world in April 1999.1 2~ Following on from the first 
edition in 1984 and its 1991 revision, this was a substantial piece of work: it was the biggest, the 
most heavily referenced, with the longest production period and the largest Working Party.
’Ihe 1984 Guidelines were considered in detail in Chapter 4. A conservative revision was made of 
them published in 1991, but the text retained much o f  its first edition. Some small concessions 
were made to ‘harm reduction’, for instance giving advice for patients on cleaning syringes with 
bleach in the absence of sterile replacements, but major change did not happen until the late 1990s.' 
Furthermore, it was only the first and third guidelines working groups that considered the 
extension o f licensing that had particular implications for private prescribes.
’Ihe VJ (Guidelines repeated concerns that dated back to the policy changes of the late 1960s and also 
reflected the changed treatment environment o f the late 1990s. Past continuities could be seen in 
the attempt to regulate prescribing by private doctors and NI IS general practitioners, particularly 
with regard to scripts for injectable and other opioids. 'Ihis chapter addresses these developments 
in two parts: the CGuidelines themselves and the licensing proposals that accompanied them.
Before considering them, however, some understanding o f the backgnmnd is needed.
D evelopm ents in  hcidth se rv ic e  policies
Ihe major changes from the previous two versions o f  the guidelines reflected wilier political 
changes, developments in the country’s dnig misuse, in treatment policies and services, and in the 
nature of clinical guidelines themselves. Ihese included the relentlessly increasing scale of UK dnig
1 UK I Icallh Departments, Pn/f M imie and D epntdrmr C .uidrhnrs ok CSmcalMamiffmtKl, (1.011 don: The Stationery 
( Ifficc, IWI]
2 Department of Health, ‘Government to improve care for drug misusers - New Guidelines for Doctors’, Press 
release reference 1999/0220, (12"’ April 1999), www.dh.gov.uk.
1 Department of I Icalth, Scottish C Ifficc Home and I lealth Department and Welsh < lfficr. P ru t Misuse « r f  
Pependemr. C.uidelines on ClinicalMiintipemenl. (1/tndon: 11 MS( 1, 1991).
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use; expansion of treatment sen-ices trying to meet the rise in panent demand; the increasing 
participation of GPs and non-medical professionals in treating drug misuse; the Department o f 
Health’s more developed role in treatment policy; the emergence of HIV and the policy responses 
around it, particularly the new international orthodoxy of methadone maintenance; the policy aim 
of a ‘primary care-led’ National Health Sen-ice; changes in key policy personnel at the I lome Office 
and Department of I lealth; the growth o f sen-ices, expertise and drug use outside the traditional 
1 xindon centres; the cause of ‘evidence-based medicine’; and a run o f medical scandals resulting in 
calls for tighter regulation of the profession (see also Chapters 2 and 5). The tliird edition of the V9 
Guidelines grew out of a number o f these changes.
1984-5 had seen the introduction o f general management into the NHS and the overt 
encouragement of l<x:al decision-making. Paradoxically, the government saw this devolution as 
requiring extensive central co-ordination and encouragement through its provision o f a multitude 
o f guidelines, directives and circulars. This could be seen in the drugs field trxi a little earlier, where 
efforts to develop local services, often in the voluntary sector, through the Central Funding 
Initiative (1983-89), were orchestrated by Whitehall (see Chapter 2). As well as stimulating the 
voluntan- sector, file government provided modest incentives for people to take up private health 
insurance and ended labour’s opposition to private beds in NHS hospitals. Ch er the 1980s, the 
number o f private hospitals providing abstinence oriented treatment for drug dependent patients 
grew considerably.'
A boost to the trend for clinical guidelines came with the intrtxlucdon o f the internal market into 
the Nl IS from 1989. Without the levers o f a tme market, all kinds o f government mechanisms 
were developed to try- to make health care more measurable and comparable for contracting 
decisions between GP purchasers and hospital or community service providers. Questions about 
what constituted gtxxl quality care fuelled a new guidelines industry. Clinical audit, introduced in 
1990 with generous Department of I lealth funding, was a new t<x>l for measuring the outcomes of 
treatment, and for changing treatment where it was considered deficient. Doctors’ leaders 
participated grudgingly and practitioners were obliged by government to do so.' In order to define 
g<xxl treatment, guidelines were needed here tcx>.
< D .( 'urson, ‘Private treatment of alcohol and drug problems in Britain’, British jou rna l o f  Addiction, 86 (1991), 9 
11.
5 The author worked for the British Medical Association’s Clinical Audit Working Group in the early 1990s.
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To meet this demand, academics and professional medical bodies developed expertise on the 
development of guidelines, encouraged by Department of I lealth binding.6 Ib is, along with the 
movement for ‘evidence based medicine’, partially arising from the medical profession, led to 
greater formalisation o f the production of guidelines and an insistence that they be based upon 
formal research studies. The evidence based medicine movement helped to legitimise the use of 
guidelines within the profession and although most elements of the internal market were dropped 
by the I -abour government, the revival o f managerialism as a driver of change found favour in their 
continued use.
In the 1990s, responsibility for guidelines became more corporate and statutory. New standards 
were set for clinical guidelines by the Department of I lealth’s Clinical Outcomes Group, requiring 
greater formal use o f research evidence and an external system of review. Previous guidelines, 
published prior to or in the early stages of the ‘evidence-based medicine’ movement, had made little 
reference to published research evidence: the 1984 Guidelines, probably the first official guidelines 
document in UK health services, contained no references to scientific studies, only reports, 
textbooks or reference sources such as the British National Formulary, while the 1991 edition 
referenced fewer than five research studies. " The 1999 edition, by contrast, contained almost one 
hundred research references/
Accompanying these changes came a number o f moves that strengthened the position of GPs 
within the health service, such as fundholding that gave primary care doctors greater control over 
their budgets and enlarged their scope to provide additional services, F'undholcling also changed 
the balance of power between hospital consultants and their GP customers.1" There were 
disincentives for GPs to send their patients to hospital, leading to primary care provision of services 
such as minor surgery, anti the emergence o f ‘GP specialists’, who had developed particular 
expertise in the treatment o f a particular patient group or condition. For the treatment o f chronic 
diseases, such as diabetes, GPs were encouraged to enter into ‘shared care’ arrangements with 
hospitals. These could follow a wide range o f models, but the essential idea was that specialists and
'• For instance, the Royal College o f Psychiatrists’ College Research Unit, reliant mainly on  outside project 
funding, received a number of grants from the Department of I lealth to develop clinical guidelines.
7 Medical Working Ciroup on Drug Dependence, Guidelines o f  Good Practice in the Treatment o f  Drug Misuse 
(London: D lls s ,  1984).
" Department of I lealth, Scottish < Ifftce I lome and I leallh Department and Welsh ( Ifftce. Drug Misuse and 
Dependence. Guidelines on (dinieatManagement. (1-ondon: I IMS*), 1991).
’’ UK I lealth Departments, Drug Misuse and Dependentr. Guiilehnes on Clinical Management, (la indon: Hie Stationery 
< )ffice, 1999).
1,1 R Klein, The New Politics o f t  he National I lealth Semite (first published 198.4, lamdon and New York: Umgman; 
fourth edition, Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2001).
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GPs would plan a patient’s care together, explicitly sharing out various aspects of the work between 
them."
'Ihe development of consumerism both outside and inside the NHS was increasingly important 
over the whole period, and was discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Standing out against this trend, the 
99 Guidelines were more typical of NF IS drug treatment policy-making that showed minimal 
consumer input. lik e  other expert committees in the dmgs field, such as the Advisory Council on 
the Misuse of Dmgs (ACN1D), the working group’s membership lacked any patients, although 
there were two ex-users on a subgroup.
The 1999 Guidelines 
Origins of the Third Edition
It might be expected that any clinical guidelines would need updating every few years to reflect 
changing circumstances and knowledge, and the source o f the particular impetus for the 1999 
edition seems to have been Professor John Strang, Chairman of the 1991 and 99 Guidelines working 
groups, with the support o f  Anthony Thorley, a Maudsley-trained psychiatrist and Senior Medical 
Officer at the Department o f Health, and Alan Macfarlane, Chief Inspector of the I lome Office 
Dmgs Branch.
In 1996, the Department o f  I lealth had published the report o f the Task Force to Review Services 
for Drug Misusers in England, known as the ‘Effectiveness Review’, which, as well as 
commissioning new research, attempted to review all the evidence on treatment and services for 
dmg users in the largest such undertaking at that point.1'  In its introduction, it had made clear that 
the Department of 1 lealth was already intending to issue new guidelines on the clinical 
management of dmg misuse to replace the 1991 edition, lit is  may have been to reflect the newly 
reviewed literature, and perhaps also in response to the Review’s own recommendation about the 
need to restrict prescribing of injectable dmgs to particular doctors, which had originated with John 
Strang.11 12
In addition to producing the 99 Guidelines document itself, the W orking Group was asked to make 
a number of unpublished recommendations to ministers, covering four areas:
11 UK Health Departments, Dm# Misuse und Dependence. Guidelines on Clinical Management, (London: The 
Stationery ( )fficc, 1999) p p .9 -15.
12 The Task Force to Review Services for Drug Misusers, Report o f  an  Independent R enew o f  Drug Treatment Serviirs 
in ling/and, (laindon: I "he Stationery < Ifficc, Department o f I lealth, 1996).
" Ibid. p.67.
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a system for licensing doctors to prescribe controlled drugs for the treatment o f drug 
misuse;
training of clinicians; 
monitoring prescribing practice and
improving the supervision o f  consumption o f prescribed controlled drugs.14 
Selection o f the Working Party
A number o f  important differences strike the reader when comparing the membership o f  die 1999 
( Clinical Guidelines Working Group with its predecessors: the membership was not exclusively 
medical. I Tie letter of imitation from Sir Kenneth Caiman, Chief Medical Officer, said that there 
was a need to ‘acknowledge the active role now played by other professionals’.1' Nurses, 
pharmacists, social workers, psychologists and the voluntary sector had been widely involved in 
drug treatment well before the first guidelines were written, so it is pertinent to ask why this had not 
been reflected until the late 1990s.
Among expert committees in dmgs policy, the ACMD had become less medically dominated since 
its origins in  1971, and the Effectiveness Review’s Task Force (1994-1996) had been 
overwhelmingly drawn from the non-medical world. With the wider rise in consumerism and the 
questioning of the bases o f  many kinds o f authority and privilege since the 1960s, the areas in 
which doctors could claim ‘medical autonomy’, free from the influence of outsiders, were under 
constant pressure over this period, but they had successfully defended prescribing as their sole 
preserve. In dmg treatment services, doctors remained the only professionals able to sign 
prescriptions for controlled drugs.
In 1982, the ACMD’s Treatment uni! Rehabilitation working group had recommended that the first 
guidelines be produced by an all-medical group, feeling unable to comment on presenbing issues 
itself (see ( chapter 3). I lowever, despite medical attempts to hold off increased non-medical 
influence, sometimes successfully, prescribing eventually succumbed to at least a public 
acknowledgement of non-medical input in 1996.1*’o r the V9 ( ¡uidetims this t< x >k the form of Roger 
I loward, Chief Executive of the Standing Conference on Drug Abuse representing voluntary 
services. Professor Jean Eaugier, a nursing specialist in dnig treatment, and an academic at
N Department o f I lealth, ‘Paper CGW G(97)42 Recommendations to accompany clinical guidelines’, (C Jctober 
1997) Private archive.
" Sir Kenneth Caiman, I-cttcr to Working Group Members, (5* November 1996), Private archive.
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I jverpool University, and D r Janie Sheridan, a senior research pharmacist, and long time 
collaborator with psychiatrist |ohn Strang at the National Addiction Centre, I.ondon. Roger 
Howard seems to have followed in the traditions of the voluntary sector in the drugs policy 
community, speaking on behalf of the absent users, among other issues.1,0'
The Working Group also included for the first time representation from Northern Ireland in 
consultant psychiatrist Dr Diana Patterson, a representative from the GM C, Professor Andrew 
Sims, and two public health doctors, Dr I^aurence Gruer, from Greater Glasgow I Iealth Board 
(also a member o f the ACMD) and Dr Sally 1 Iargreaves from Kensington and Chelsea and 
Westminster Health Authority. In continuity with the 1991 version, Professor )ohn Strang,
Britain’s most senior dmg dependence psychiatrist, Director of the National Addiction Centre at 
the Maudslev 1 lospital and Institute of Psychiatry, chaired the group for the second time.
Addiction psychiatrists had managed to maintain their position as the expert authorities in the dmg 
treatment field, and this was reflected in the balance of the group, where they made up the largest 
specialism, numbering seven out of the eighteen members. In addition to those already mentioned 
were l-.ilish Gilvarry from Newcastle, Philip Fleming from Portsmouth, Mary Rowlands from 11M 
Prison, Bristol and Duncan Raistrick from I eeds, who was also the C h ie f Medical Officer’s Clinical 
Advisor on Alcohol Misuse, and chaired the V9 Guidelines subgroup on  injectable prescribing.
lh c  four general practitioners, Clare Gerada (London), Christine Ford (I xindotl), William (dee 
(Cardiff) and Judv Burv (Fldinburgh) all had special experience in dm g problems. Dr Gerada was 
to become a part-time senior polict' advisor at the Department of 1 Icalth, and with Michael Farrell 
tixik on the drafting of the Guidelines from 1998 after Anthony Thorley’s departure.1* Professor 
John 1 lenrv, a clinical phannacok gist and authority on ecstasy was also a member.
Private medicine was represented by Dr David Curson, also a member from 1991. The Association 
o f Independent Practitioners in the Treatment of Substance Misuse (AIP), representing private 
prescribe», had hoped that psychiatnst Colin Brewer could join the Working Group,1’’ but made 
the suggestion too late after the group had Ixen set up as it was not until December that year that
1,11.. Grucr, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2003).
1 S. Mars and V. Berridge, ‘Social Science Small Grant End o f Project Report R ef No: SGS/00742/G, The 
impact o f drug user patient groups (‘user groups’) on UK drug treatment policy since the 1070s.’ (unpublished)
(2002).
IK Anonymous, ‘Clinical Guidelines W orking Group -  Note o f the meeting o f  16th March 1998’, File 16 DRU 
323/12 Vol 1. 1)11 Archive, Nelson, I-ancashire.
’ ’ AIP, ‘Private prescribing and treatment for dnig users’, |Minufes o f meeting] (13,h March 1997), Private 
archive.
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the AIP’s first meeting took place.2" Dr Brewer ran the Stapleford Clinic, a large private prescribing 
practice that also carried out rapid opiate detoxification under sedation/anaesthesia, the practice of 
which Professor Strang was publicly critical.21
The Association of Independent Prescribes (AIP) commented that ‘if private prescribes were left 
out of the policy and decision making in respect of the Guidelines then it would not be viewed as a 
collaborative effort’,22 and the private prescribes were minimally involved in the process. 'Ihe 
chairman Itad in fact opted for representation of the private sector, but not o f private prescribes: 
David C u so n  was employed by The Priory hospitals, whose practice lay outside the private 
prescribing controvesy as it did not involve substitute prescribing on an outpatient fee-paying 
basis. In-patient treatment in private hospitals and residential facilities was associated with the 
abstinence based Minnesota Model, also known as ‘12-step’ and familiar through Alcoholics 
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous.2’ A member o f the secretariat described Dr Curson as 
‘the acceptable face of private practice’ who was in favour o f  ‘getting the rogues in I larlev Street’. '4 
'I"hc choice o f  David Curson therefore gave the Working Group representation from the private 
sector while avoiding internal opposition from private prescribcrs, against whom John Strang, like 
his predecessor Philip Connell, also a consultant psychiatrist at I .ondon’s Maudslev 1 lospital, had 
long been active.25-26
While Dr Brewer would have been an unlikely choice for the chairman to make, the likelihood o f 
the chairman or Department of 1 lealth feeling compelled to invite a private prcscriber onto the 
committee suggested a certain naivete about the selection process, and perhaps an over-estimation 
of their own importance in the 1990s. Added to this, in contrast with 1984, when the Association 
for Independent Doctors in Addiction (AIDA) was a prominent organisation, the position of 
private prescribcrs in November 1996, when the letters o f invitation were sent out, was further 
weakened b y  their lack of a representative Ixxiy. 31
31 AIP, ‘Private prescribing and treatment for drug users’, |Minutcs o f  meeting| (10*  Decemlter 1996), Private 
archive.
21 |. Strang, |. Beam, M. Gossop, ‘< )piatc detoxification under anaesthesia’, British MedicalJournal, 3 15  (1997), 
1249-1250. ‘
22 AIP, (13,h March 1997) op. at.
25 D. Curson, (1991) op. at., pp.9-10.
24 A. Thorley, Interview by Sarah Mars (2002).
25 egj. Strang, J . Shendan and N. Barber, ‘Prescribing injectable and oral methadone lo opiate addicts: results 
from the 1995  national postal survey o f community pharmacies in I England and Wales’, British M edical Journal 
313 (1996), 270-272.
21 In addition to  Professor Strang’s published criticisms o f  pnvate presenbing, he has also appeared as an expert 
witness to g ive evidence against private practitioners in a numlx'r o f  disciplinary hearings by the GMC anil 
I lome ( ifficc Drug Tribunals.
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ITic membership of the 1984 Guidelines working group, formed under Philip Connell’s 
chairmanship, had aimed to incorporate within it the ‘opposition’, in the form of two private 
prcscribers and representatives o f  AIDA, Drs Ann Dally and Dale Beckett, although this did not 
mean that their views were represented in the final publication. By 1996, when the ’99 Guidelines 
Working Group was being formed, the divisions within the dmg treatment field had changed.
In the early 1980s, allowing for a little simplification, the field was divided between those who only 
supported prescribing regimes aimed at achieving abstinence from opiates within a relatively short 
time, using oral formulations, and those who saw some place for longer term prescribing or 
maintenance and favoured a choice between oral and injectable dmgs, whether heroin or 
methadone. These issues had been played out in the first guidelines working group, resulting in 
strict advice against long term prescribing, and presenting oral methadone detoxification as the only 
option for opiate dependence.
By the late 1990s, the influence o f ‘harm reduction’, a pragmatic response intended to reduce HIV 
transmission from injecting dmg use, and seen by some as a lever to liberalise the drug laws, had 
made methadone maintenance much more widely accepted in the treatment policy community in 
Britain and many other countries. Although methadone maintenance still provided controversy on 
the V 9  Guidelines working group,2' with the accumulation o f strong research evidence and the 
support of those in influential positions, including the chairman, opposition proved ineffective. 
Furthermore, some of the Clinic system’s most vocal critics, including Dr Ann Dally and Dr John 
Marks, the outspoken Iiverptxil Clinic psychiatrist who practiced publicly and advocated heroin 
prescribing for opiate addicts, had lost their platforms. Ann Dally had ceased treating dnig users 
after the GMC’s second mltng against her and had stopped participating in the debate in the late 
1980s, while John Marks had moved to New Zealand after health authority funding was withdrawn 
from his Clinic.
The issue of private prescribing had also become relatively less significant, remaining concentrated 
in the South Hast while NI IS drug services had spread in density across the country, involving 
increasing numbers o f the medical profession. No longer was the cause of ‘hann reduction’ heard 
mainly from private doctors and a small number of GPs working outside the hospital-based 
Clinics. A greater consensus had emerged following the policy response to 11IV/AIDS between 
doctors inside and outside the Clinics, and although divisions remained, strong differences of view 27
27 C. Ford, Interview by Sarah Mars (2002).
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to those dominant in the policy community, such as those held by many doctors practising 
privately, had become more marginal and a smaller minority of those providing treatment.
The importance o f patients achieving abstinence from all illicit and substitute drug use had 
been a central principle among those dominant in  the treatment policy community o f the 
1980s, and was expressed through the ’84 Guidelines. Small steps towards the more 
pragmatic approach o f harm reduction were evident in the ’91 Guidelines, with apparent 
consensus regarding these goals on the ’99 W orking Group, whose second meeting was 
minuted as follows: ‘There was general agreem ent that the primary role o f the doctor is not 
to ensure that individuals become drug-free — that is a moral issue — but to reduce the harm 
to individuals. However, where abstinence is essential to, or an efficient means of, reducing 
harm, that will be one o f the goals of treatment. This message will inform the drafting o f the 
Guidelines.’2*
‘General agreement’ may still have allowed some room  for dissent. Some disagreement on these 
principles, and in particular methadone maintenance prescribing, came from Dr Diane Patterson, 
Chair o f the Nonhem Ireland Committee on Drug M isuse.'’In spite of the greater consensus on 
the content o f treatment that had followed policies around HIV, areas of disagreement still existed 
within the Working Group. One dimension along which there was a range o f views could be 
described as the extent to which the demands of public health or the individual patient were seen as 
paramount in prescribing decisions, a familiar theme in drugs policy across the UK. For instance. 
Dr 1 .aurence ( iruer, a consultant in public health medicine with Greater Glasgow I lealth Board, 
favoured indefinite supervised consumption of methadone bv patients to protect others from the 
risks from diverted supplies.'" Chris(tine) Ford, a w est Ixindon N l IS GP and passionate advocate 
for the rights o f drug users, who had been described as an ‘Nl IS private prcscriber’, thought there 
should be no such stipulations, commenting, ‘If you keep people on supervised consumption 
forever then they aren’t allowed to move on or grow in any way. If you treat them like a child they 
behave like a chilli.’' 1 C iruer himself agreed that the primary care side showed more o f a sense of 
direct engagement with individuals, whereas the psychiatrically oriented members took a more 
intellectual approach.'2
Department o f Health, 'Clinical Guidelines Working G rou p  Note o f meeting held on I r I l i a c  7,h November 
1997 at Watcrbridgc House’ (Ululated). Private Archive.
"  C. Ford, (2002) op  (it.
“  Ibid.
51 ¡bid.
a  L. Gruer, (2003) op. cit.
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It could be argued that the greatest disagreement existed between doctors on the Working Group 
and those GPs outside who refused to prescribe substitute drugs to drug users unless they received 
additional payment, which with the exception o f a few local arrangements, was not forthcoming. 
The split this caused between ‘experts’ and ‘ordinary’ GPs (or their GMSC representatives) had 
erupted on the British Medical Association’s Working Party on Drug Misuse between 1995 and 
1997 and produced almost complete paralysis for a portion of its fraught existence.” )ohn Strang, 
an approachable man with an unconfrontational approach to committee discourse, had found the 
BMA Working Party a jarring experience which may have determined him to choose GPs for his 
own working group not for their representativeness, but for their expertise and enthusiasm.14'11 
While the first guidelines working group had brought inside the opposition, in the form of Ann 
Dally and Dale Beckett, but then ignored its views,v’ membership of the third working group not 
only represented the greater degree of consensus o f its time, but was also chosen for their ability to 
work together productively.17
As well as the Working Group itself, there were a number of sub-groups brought together to 
examine particular issues and report back. Some o f  these, such as the private prescribing sub­
group, were made up of existing members and secretariat or observers.1* Others, like the injectable 
prescribing sub-group brought in outsiders including, for the first time, some patient 
representatives. Ibese were two ex-users who were ‘adamant against injcctables’ after experience 
of such prescribing, according to one member. They had been chosen by Duncan Raistrick, the 
subgroup’s chairman, described as ‘not a keen lover o f injcctables’ himself.1'
In addition to the members were a number o f medical observers representing the Welsh Office, the 
Department of I lealth and Social Services, Northern Ireland, the Scottish I lome and I lealth 
Department and the Prison Service 1 lealth Care Directorate. Particularly important to the licensing 
issue was Alan Macfarlane, the non-medical Chief Inspector at the I lome Office Drugs Branch. 
Reflecting the proliferation o f dntgs agencies within central government, there were also observers
" The author was researcher to the British Medical Association's Working Party on Drug Misuse (1995-97). 
UJ. Strang, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
“  L. Gruer, (2003) op. at.
v* S. Mars, ‘Peer Pressure and Imposed Consensus: Hie Making o f the 1984 “Guidelines o f Good Clinical 
Practice in the Treatment o f Drug Misuse’” in V. Berridge (cd ). Making I lealth Polity: Nehnorks in Research and 
Polity A fter 1945 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005) pp. 149-182.
” J. Strang, (2002) op. (it.
’* Department of I lealth. C G W G  (97) 26, 'Private practice and the prescribing of controlled drugs’, (June 
1997), Private archive. 
w C. Pord, (2002) op. (it.
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from the Central Drugs Coordination Unit or UK Anti-Drugs Coordination Unit. Ihe secretariat 
also included non-medical civil servants, Rosemary Jenkins and Fred Pink.
What the V9 Guidelines said
Unlike the first Guidelines, these opened by providing some context about prevalence and trends in 
drug use in society and contemporary government strategies. All three editions prominently made 
the point that every doctor should treat drug users for both general medical and dmg related 
problems. In the years before the ’99 version, this had become a topic of disagreement between 
the Department of Health and the British Medical Association’s General Medical Services 
Committee (GMSQ, the GPs’ main trade union. From 1996 the GMSG had argued that treating 
drug problems lav outside their obligatory workload (core general medical services) and should be 
separately remunerated as a specialist activity,4" but had failed to persuade central government of its 
case.
like  the 1984 document, a key aim of the V9 Guidelines was to allocate appropriate activities to 
different doctors as a basis for extending licensing and for disciplinary action. To do this it 
introduced a new category, the ‘specialised generalist’ in between the ‘generalist’ and the ‘specialist’, 
ib is  super-GP was not restricted to the drugs field but reflected the increased power, status and 
domain o f general practice that had accompanied the flow of resources into primary care in the 
1990s. The three categories were differentiated by experience, the proportion of their patients who 
needed treatment for drug problems, levels o f training that they should receive (including 
t|ualificadons for the specialists) and give to others, and the requisite degree of autonomy or 
collaboration with others. The kind o f prescribing to be undertaken was also specified, with 
specialists the only group to prescribe injectable*, for which they would require a new I lome C office 
licence.
The aims o f treatment showed a balance between hann reduction and abstinence oriented 
approaches, by stating that the ultimate aim was a dnig-frec patient, but intermediate goals should 
lx- pursued until this was possible. Criminal justice or public health concerns such as preventing 
diversion o f drugs onto the illegal market were also included as a treatment goal, as well as reducing 
‘the need for criminal activity to finance dnig misuse’.41 The absence of patient representation and 
influence on the Working Group was reflected in some statements such as, ‘Due notice should lx
British Medical Association. General Medical Services Committee, (.'on Sr n s  n s: Taking ih r  Initm tivt (Iamdon: 
British Medical Association, 1996).
" UK I lealth Departments, (1999) op. at., p.7.
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given of a reduction regime’, suggesting that change should not be imposed suddenly and without 
warning on patients, but neither was the patient’s agreement necessary.42
Considerable space was given to describing ‘shared care’ arrangements, an approach favoured by 
the Department of 1 lealth. Voluntary dmg services were included in the overall picture of available 
services, 'lhe chapter on assessing patients’ needs and situations repeated the V I Guidelines’ 
wanting that in private practice the doctor should ‘establish that the patient is able to pay for 
treatment through legitimate means’. Despite the mantra repeated in the '9 9  Guidelines and in official 
documents since the second Brain Report,4'  that prescribing was only part o f an overall approach 
to treatment and rehabilitation requiring psychological and other input, prescribing remained the 
focus here, taking up four o f  the seven chapters. Prescribing remained the most controversial area, 
and perhaps the one seen by addiction psychiatrists and policy makers as having the potential to 
cause the greatest harm. O nly one page was devoted to ‘broader approaches to psychosocial 
support and treatment’.44
Opiate prescribing had long been the mainstay of prescribing debates, and it occupied the most 
space here. Possibly the most significant prescribing changes from previous editions o f  the 
Guidelines were the endorsement of methadone maintenance as an activity suitable for primary care 
and the much strengthened and more specific recommendations for daily ‘supervised 
consumption’, where patients’ prescribed drugs would be taken under the observation o f a 
pharmacist or doctor. Although containing manv caveats, the advice on amphetamine substitution 
was also a new departure, for the first time conceding, “There may be a limited place for the 
prescription of dexamphetamine sulphate 5 mg (five) in the treatment o f amphetamine misuse.’4’
1 -ess new was the proposed licensing system for prescribing doctors that sought to restrict 
injectable prescription to specialists. Although not publicised in 1984, this had also been advocated 
by that guidelines working group (see Chapter 4).
lhe revival o f international interest in heroin prescription, partly influenced by the positive results 
from a rigorous clinical trial in Switzerland,44' may have prompted the first ever appearance of a 
section on this topic in the 99  Guidelines. Strangely no evidence was cited in the single paragraph
« Ibid. p.31.
*’ Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, Drug Addiction. The Second Report o f  tin Interdepartmental 
Committee [second Brain Report], Ministry o f I Iealth, Scottish I lome and Health Department, (I-ondon: HMSO, 
1965) p.9.
“  l ’hi Health Departments, (1999) op. at., p.63.
4* Ibid. pp.42-44.
1,1 A. Uchtenhanen, I*’, (nit/wilier and A. Dobler-Mikola, 1‘roeramme fo r  a Medical Prescription o f  Narcotics: P inal 
Report o f  the Research Representatives. Summary o f  the Synthesis Report (Zurich: University o f Zurich, 1997).
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which concluded, “With the availability o f injectable methadone, there is very little clinical indication 
for prescribed diamorphine.’4 A similar section appeared on injectable prescribing, describing it as 
a specialist only activity.47 8
The extensive annexes covered a range of technical, legal, procedural and practical issues such as 
drug interactions, prescribing to minors, special prescription requirements for controlled drugs, 
dealing with potentially violent patients, and special considerations such as pregnant patients. They 
also included ‘harm minimisation’ advice for patients, such as how to clean a syringe with 
household bleach, an updated and extended version o f the 1991 guidance. The tone of these 
Guidelines did not seem designed to make the tasks described appear easy or straightforward as the 
first edition had and were scattered with numerous cautions on risks, pitfalls and safety precautions.
Evidence-based M edicine
Although the 1999 edition o f the Guidelines was the most densely referenced o f the series, and 
‘relied substantially on the major undertaking of the Task f  orce to review the evidence base for 
services for dmg misusers’, they were not the dramatic departure from the past that might have 
been expected in an age o f ‘evidence-based medicine’.4' Many previous reports published in the 
1980s and 1990s from expert committees in the drugs field had relied heavily upon the authority of 
their contributors’ body, such as the ACMD’s Treatment and Rehabilitation, or the first two editions of 
the Guidelines, and contained very few references to published research evidence. In 1999, despite a 
considerable increase in publication on clinical dmg research in the UK and across the world, the 
Guidelines’ introduction, under the heading, ‘Evidence-based Guidelines’, stated that they were 
‘primarily based on evidence obtained from expert committee reports and the clinical experience of 
respected authorities.’5" Indeed, the section on maintenance prescribing, although referencing 
research reviews, looked to a quotation from an ACMD report for support, a document which 
contained only 36 references, several o f  which were policy documents and other ACMD 
publications.’ 1 Once again, it seemed, treatment policy was to be determined by ‘respected 
authorities’ allx it with some extra research backing.
47 UK Health Departments, (1999) op. a t., p.57.
«  Ibid p.55.
41 Ibid, p.xiv.
Sn Ibid, p.xiv.
'* ACMD, AIDS and Dmg Misuse l Ipdiste. Department o f  1 lealth (Dmdon: I IMS( ), 1993) p.53.
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Purpose of the 1999 Guidelines
Ihe H4 Guidelines had a number o f dear-cut aims in the minds of the key movers behind them, 
from the original recommendation in the ACMD’s Treatment and RelkdnllUition, to the final 
document. These were the strengthening o f the position o f the Clinic psychiatrists and the 
authority of their model of treatment and the control o f  prescribing by doctors working outside the 
Clinics, most specifically private practitioners, through greater regulation (see Chapters 3 and 4).
At the 99 Guidelines working group, prescribing outside the Clinics remained a concern, and was 
addressed through the group’s recommendations on licensing.’2 The emphasis here was slighdy 
different to that o f  the post-1968 heroin and cocaine licensing. Instead o f doctors’ suitability for 
licensed prescribing being based upon their spedalty and  location of work, something it was hard 
for GPs, for instance, to change, under the new system’s design a doctor who was able to gain 
sufficient extra training and experience should have been able to qualify for a specialist licence.
One important diem e of the 99  Guidelines themselves, and the meetings o f the working group, was 
ilefining primary and specialist treatment more clearly. 'I liis  seems to have served a number of 
functions. The Department o f I Icalth’s favoured approach for encouraging greater CIP 
participation in drug treatment was the promotion o f ‘shared care’ where GPs and specialists 
collaborated over a patient’s care (see footnote 84). Such definitions could remove ambiguities and 
help show GPs what was involved in this work. Also, in  his evidence against Adrian Garfoot at 
that doctor’s I lom c Office Misuse of Drugs Tribunal in 1994, |ohn Strang spent some time 
wrestling with the appropriate distinctions between specialist and generalist addiction services, and 
this may have inspired him to seek firmer, formal definitions.’ ' Marking clearly what was suitable 
prescribing for primary care would also prevent what w as perceived as undesirable prescribing in 
the first place and make disciplining those who stepped outside the definition easier, either through 
GMC hearings o r through the withdrawal o f any licence.
It might have lx-cn expected that the changed view towards maintenance prescribing as suitable for 
primary care, which came about with the 99  Guidelines, would bring with it greater autonomy for 
GPs, but the reverse seemed to have been the case. D ie move toward methadone maintenance as
'2 Macfarlane, A. ‘Changes to the misuse o f ilmgs legislation o f  controlled drugs prescribe in the treatment o f  
addiction’, (Consultation document] (I a mil on Action Against Drugs Unit, I Ionic < Ifficc, 17,h March 2000).
“ In the Matter o f  th e Alisuse o fD ru ff A it 19^1 and In the Matter o fD r John Adrian Clarfoot. Minutes o f  Proceedings at a 
Misuse t f  D raff t r ib u n a l(T.ngland and W ales), (22***1 June 1994), W. B. Gurney and Sons |transcnpt|, GMC 
Archive, I-ondon. pp.42-58.
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a widely accepted treatment approach could be traced from the ’84 Guidelines to the ’99 edition.
The first Guidelines ruled out maintenance entirely from primary care,’4 and the ’91 post-HIV 
edition refused to describe it, considering it ‘a specialised form of treatment best provided by, or in 
consultation with, a specialist service,”5 going on, ‘A doctor who feels that a patient is likely to 
require prescription o f an opioid drug for more than a few months should seek advice and support 
from the local specialist in drug misuse.’ The V9 Guidelines put great emphasis on the proven 
efficacy of methadone maintenance, but still expressed caution about the ability of ordinary GPs to 
prescribe any substitute drug unsupervised: ‘Only in exceptional circumstances should the decision 
to offer substitute medication without specialised generalist or specialist advice be made.’
In spite of the more consensual nature of the ’99 Working Group, a last disagreement seems to 
have almost upset the whole process. After the final meeting, three o f the four GPs, Chris Ford, 
|udv Bury and William Glee, wrote to the secretariat, threatening to remove their names from the 
final document. ITtev protested that the draft produced by the secretariat after the final meeting o f 
the group on 16* March 1998, from which Drs Ford and Clee had been absent, was radically 
different to previous versions.
An examination of the drafts prior to and following the final Working Group meeting did reveal 
substantial changes both in structure and content.’' -’ ' Methadone maintenance was newly given 
much greater emphasis than anv other intervention, many of the chapters, such as “Young People 
and Drugs’, ‘Pregnancy and Neonatal Care’ and ‘Managing Dntg Misuse Kmergcncies’ were 
reduced in size and turned into annexes. Other controversial topics, such as stimulant and 
injectable prescribing, were altered to sound less positive. But minutes o f  the final meeting 
recorded that these changes had in fact been suggested by the Working Group, " rather than 
effected through the secretariat conspiracy suggested by the GPs’ letters.’ v’" One might speculate 
that in the absence o f some of the group’s more liberal individuals who opposed greater regulation 
and controls, the other members took advantage to press through their own preferences. 
Supporting this view was the fact that the secretariat took on board some of the complaints made
“  Medical Working (¡roup on Drug Dependence, (1984) op. tit., p.l.
" Department o f I lealth, Scottish < tfficc I Ionic and I lealth Department and W elsh ( tffice, (1991) op. <r/, p.22. 
51 Department o f I lealth. Draft sent to Clinical Guidelines Working Group on 5lh March 1998, (undated) 
Pnvatc archive.
”  Department o f I lealth. Draft sent to Clinical Guidelines Working Group on 3rd July 1998, (undated) Private 
archive.
SH Anonymous, 'Clinical Guidelines Working Group -  Note o f the meeting o f 16th March 1998’, File 16 DRU
323/12 Vol 1. DM Archive, Nelson, lancashirc.
v’ W. (dee, le tter to M. Davies, (30lh July 1998), Private archive.
C. Ford, le tter to M. Davies, (18,h July 1998), Private archive.
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about these changes to the satisfaction o f the GPs/'1 and they decided to endorse the document. 
Consensus was therefore achieved more democratically inside the group than at the 1984 guidelines 
working group: Ann Dally and other ‘dissidents’ had intended to produce a minority report in 1984, 
but the opportunity was circumvented by the chairman and secretariat through a sudden behind- 
the-scenes change in committee procedure so  the final document gave a false appearance of accord 
(see Chapter 4).
One member leaked the V9 Guidelines before they were finalised, along with quotes from the 
minutes of a Working Group meeting to Dn/glink, the bulletin of the Institute for the Study of 
Drug Dependence, in what seems to have been an attempt to whip up opposition ter the licensing 
recommendations and get them modified. The response to this leak from the chairman was 
reportedly quite tolerant/ '  The Department o f  Health was aware that ‘the culprit w as a member of
the independent working group__on the grounds that the article quotes directly from the minutes
of the last meeting of the group which were sent only to members/1' It is not clear whether the civil 
servant knew or suspected which member was responsible, but if he did, no action was taken/14
Ilie main opposition to methadone maintenance arose from Belfast psychiatrist D iane Patterson, 
lliis  was the first time that the guidelines had included Northern Ireland, where there was neither 
methadone prescription nor official needle exchanges/” While Northern Ireland had been happy 
to copy the first guidelines almost to the letter, bnnging out their own edition, the developments o f 
tlie intervening years in the direction o f harm  reduction had been resisted in Northern Ireland. Dr 
Patterson claimed that the emphasis on substitute prescribing for opiate addiction ‘would place 
Doctors in Northern Ireland in an impossible position’, and consequently she w ould be advising 
the Chief Medical Officer o f Northern Ireland not to adopt the guidelines pending the final 
publication/4. This disagreement pointed up geographical differences in prescribing traditions, 
which Laurence Grucr considered one o f the main sources of divergence across the working 
group/'7 61*37
61 cgJ* Bury, Ixrttcr to F. Pink, (12,h October 1998), Private archive.
('2 Working Group member, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
63 M. Davies, Memo to K. Jarvie, ‘Drug Misuse Clinical Guidelines -  Leak o f  Working Papers’ (P'July 1998), 
bile 16/DRU 323/22 Vol 1, DM Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
M Working Group member. Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
,,s K. McElrath ‘Heroin Use in Northern Ireland: A  Qualitative Study Into Heroin Users’ lifestyles. Experiences 
And Risk Behaviours (1997-1999)’, (Belfast: Department o f Health, Social Services and Public Safety, 2(X)1).
66 D. Patterson, Letter to M. Davies, (8'1' July 1998) File 16 DRU 323/12 Vol 1, DH Archive, Nelson,
I .ancashire.
67 L. Gruer, (2003) op. cit.
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Dr Patterson’s stand over the document seemed to have been prompted by the peculiar placing of 
a section entitled ‘Methadone maintenance — the evidence’ in the introduction to the dtjeument 
circulated after the last meeting. The text appeared before the discussion of any other aspect of 
treatment, as if transplanted, giving it an unnatural prominence.''8 The medical secretariat, Claire 
Gerada and Michael Farrell, tried to respond to these issues by arranging a meeting with the chief 
critics, Diana Patterson, Chris Ford, William (dee and possibly |udy Bury the following month.''1
Although placated with regard to the Guidelines, Ford and Clee remained unhappy about the 
licensing proposals and both signed a letter to DrugBnk opposing them. 'Ihey saw these as 
specifically aimed at curbing ‘the prescribing habits o f a few private doctors in London’ and being 
harmful to all dmg users trying to access treatment.7" Although suspicious o f pnvate health care in 
general, (dins Ford echoed many of Ann Daily’s arguments in the 1980s. Both expressed concerns 
about treatment for patients suffering withdrawal symptoms during assessment — the period when 
a patient had presented for treatment and the appropriate course o f action was being decided 1 
Both were critical of the N1 IS Clinics and saw priv ate treatment not as an ideal but as legitimately 
revealing shortcomings in existing NI IS provision. '■ '1- ’ After the final meeting o f the Working 
Group which had endorsed an extension of licensing, Chris Ford wrote to the chairman and 
secretariat in words that could have been written by Dally herself asking, ‘What is going to happen 
to many dnig users being provided services bv the private sector, and perhaps many GPs who do 
not prescribe like the local specialist services? Many users are managed in general practice and the 
private sector because the NHS can’t or won’t provide the care they want or require.’ 6 They also 
shared concerns about the dignity o f patients in drug misuse treatment, expressing greater trust in 
them than many of their colleagues.77,7* Ford commented of her patients, ‘If you believe people, 
they tend to tell you the truth.’ '
,lK Clinical Guidelines W orking Group, Draft guidelines, (3nt July 1998) [draft B).
w Anonymous, 'Clinical Guidelines — Action Points 22"*' July ’98’, File 16, DRU 323/12 Vol 1, DH Archive, 
Nelson, Lancashire.
7,111 Beaumont, T. Carnworth., W. Clce, et al. (2001), op. tit., p.25.
71 AIDA, AIDA Comments on  "Guidelines o f  Good Clinical Proctite in  the Treatment o f  Drug Misuse" DH.S'S tVR4 (July 
1985), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/8, Wellcome Dhrary, London.
' C. Ford, (2002) op. tit.
' A. Dally, Letter to I. M unro, (22'"* January 1982), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (F'ile lo f  2), Wellcome Library, 
Iamdon.
71 C. Ford, Facsmilc to D. Raistrick Re D o ll Injecting Subgroup, ( l” June 1997). Private archive.
‘ C. Ford, (2002) op. tit.
70 C. Ford, le tter to j. Strang, C. Gerada, M. Farrell and M. Davies ‘Re: Clinical Guidelines Working ( in>up -  
Notes of the meeting o f 16 ,h March’, (24,h May 1998), Private archive.
77 C. Foni, (2002) op. tit.
7* sec A. Dally, A Doctor’s  Story, (London: Macmillan, 1990).
79 C. Ford, (2002) op. cit.
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Hovering around the issue o f these Guidelines was the question o f  whether they were, in fact, 
intended to be ‘guidelines’, to suggest a path to doctors or rather tools for disciplining them. In 
both 1984 and 1999 there were attempts to introduce statutory regulations to make the Guidelines 
compulsory, but both failed. The ACMD had expressed the intention, in Tnealmenl and 
Relialnlitation, for the prospective ’84 Guidelines to be used as conditions in licensing once it had 
been extended to cover all opioid drugs.1”1 Similarly, the first proposals from the Home Office and 
Department o f Health to the 1999 Working Group for an extension of licensing was presented as a 
system of statutory control to enforce the Guidelines
Regulatory control seems to have been a strong impulse in both 1984 and 1999 but perhaps less so 
in 1991 when the second edition was published. 'Hie ’84 edition hoped that ‘these guidelines would 
help to identify those cases where prescribing practices might be regarded as irresponsible.’“2 The 
^1 edition made no mention o f any regulatory role, but the ’99 Guidelines gave a stem  warning 
that although they had ‘no defined legal position.. .any doctor not fulfilling the standards and 
quality of care in the appropriate treatment of drug misusers that are set out in these Clinical 
Guidelines, will have this taken into account if, for any reason, consideration o f their perfonnance 
in this clinical area is undertaken.’“'
I .ike the ’84 Guidelines, the ’99 document was intended to control private prescribing (see Chapter 4) 
but this was a much smaller part of its wider concern to define and regulate the appropriate 
practices of primary and secondary sendees with a view to both encouraging and controlling 
treatment outside the psychiatrist led Clinics. While the issue o f  private prescribing played a part in 
the 1999 group’s considerations, particularly in the questions o f  licensing and the prescribing of 
injectable opiates, the prominence of this almost exclusively south eastern phenomenon in the 
wider drug treatment scene had diminished with the expansion o f  Ni IS services across the country 
and the participation o f many more general practitioners treating dnig misuse.
Ihe V9 Guidelines were in fact intended not just for the guidance or discipline o f doctors, but also to 
reshape services they provided. While the ’84 Guidelines were primanlv aimed at doctors working 
outside the (dimes, the Inspectorate and the GMC, the V9 Guidelines were addititinally targeted at 
the lx idles responsible for medical training and resourcing, including the Department of I lealtli.
"’ACMD. Treatment and Rehabilitation. DHSS, (Ixindon: HMS( >, 1982) pp.57-60.
Kl A. D. Macfarlanc, CGW G (97) 17, ‘Clinical Guidelines Working Group. Note by the Home Office on 
licensing’. Home ( )ffice, (8lh May 1997), Private archive.
"J Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence, (1984) op. ¡it., p.3.
UK Health Departments, (1999) op. tit., p.xv.
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'ITtev made recommendations, such as those around supervised consumption o f methadone, that 
had spending implications, and expected government to respond accordingly. 1 n this respect the 
’99 Working Group was given a wider remit than its forebears.
E xtending L icensing  
Before the 1990s
Ihe three categories o f doctor laid out by the V9 Guidelines represented ‘a continuum by which the 
development of shared care arrangements,*4 training, provision o f  resources and Home Office 
licensing arrangements can be targeted.’*’ While the licensing implications were touched on only 
lightly in the Guidelines, more details were sent in the Working G roup’s confidential 
recommendations to ministers.“’ But although this triadic division was new in regulatory terms, the 
concept o f extending the licensing system introduced in 1968 had been around as long as the 
Clinics themselves. A Department of Health meeting of the Ix>ndon Clinic psychiatrists had 
proposed that all dependency producing drugs to known addicts, not just heroin and cocaine, 
should be removed from GPs and limited to the Clinics, but the proposal had been rejected by the 
Department as too expensive.*
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the idea was revived in 198<I, and pushed forward in the 
ACNlD’s Treatment and Rehabilitation report, this time aimed more at controlling private doctors than 
general practitioners. In 1984 a vote on the issue by the first clinical guidelines working group 
found a majority in favour, but the government delayed taking action. A year later, in 1985, the 
Social Services Committee (SSC), whose remit of scrutiny included the expenditure, administration 
and policy of the DHSS, looked into dnig misuse, treatment and rehabilitation, and made similar 
recommendations. These were to extend licensing to cover all injectable opiates and restrict 
licences to ‘doctors working in, or under the direct supervision o f, a consultant or equivalent in a 
clinic’."*
1,4 ‘Shared care’ is described by the '99 Guidelines as ‘a model that can !>e applied to any close cooperative work 
Itetween agencies or services, which directly improves the treatment o f  the individual drug misuser. It most 
often involves arrangements lictwcen specialist and general practitioner services’, p. 10.
15 UK Health Departments, (1999) op. cit., p.4.
m Clinical Guidelines Working Group, ‘Prescribing and licensing Regulations’ |attached to minutes o f 1 <>,h 
March 1998], Department o f  Health, (1998) FUe 16/DRU 323/12 Voi 1, DH Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
47 J. !.. Reed, “Meeting o f  Doctors Working in Iondon Drug Dependency Treatment Centres, November 25*. 
1969 at St Bartholomew’s 1 lospital” (Minutes), Private archive.
“  I louse o f  Commons Social Services Committee, Misuse o f  Drugs with Specia l Reference to the Treatment and 
Rehabilitation o f  Misusers o jI  la rd  Drugs. iou rth  Report o fthe Social Sendees Committee. Session <9X4 S i, (London: 
HMSO, 1985) p.xxv.
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The SSC had been advised by Dr Martin Mitcheson, Consultant at University College Hospital 
Dmg Dependency Unit, a strong advocate of oral methadone prescription, member of the 1 xmdon 
Consultants Group, and opponent o f private prescribing where the doctor was directly paid by 
patient fees."'1 The committee itself expressed great respect for the reports o f the Advisory Council 
on the Misuse of Drugs,9"91 and seemed to have taken its line on prescribing regulation from these. 
At this stage, the government was yet to come to a decision about extending licensing and the 
Social Sendees Committee urged it to do so. It did, resolving that it was unnecessary and possibly 
likely to deter GPs from treating drug users.9' ' '1
'Hie licensing recommendations of 1969, 1980, 1982, 1984 and probably 1985 came from senior 
psychiatrists seeking to contain and control prescribing, particularly o f injectable or maintenance 
opiates, w ithin the centralised state-funded Clinics, where the addiction psychiatrists developed and 
tried to maintain their monopoly o f expertise. A similar pattern emerged in the late 1990s, but this 
time boosted by strong civil sendee support.
The 1990s
In the 199()s a new generation of politically active doctors had taken the reins, but shared many of 
the same concerns and had passed through the same training instimtion. ITie psychiatrists who 
pushed for greater regulation of doctors working outside the Clinics had been trained in the 
Maudslev I lospital under Philip Connell. John Strang, chainnan o f the ’99 Guidelines working 
group was one of these doctors, following Connell into a number o f his policy and clinical posts. 
Whereas in the 1980s these medical men lacked the support of key' civil servants at the Department 
of I lealth and I lome Office, in 1999 the psychiatrists and administration were united.
•Man Macfarlane, was frustrated by the I lome Office's existing mechanisms for controlling 
prescribing and the lack o f  enforceable standards. Referring to ‘a current tribunal case where the 
doctor’s position was that the needs o f his particularly difficult patient gre nip justified an approach 
which involved enormous quantities o f dmg cocktails’, he complained of the inadequacy o f the '91 
Guidelines for use in regulation: ‘it is significant that the existing guidelines did not provide the 
Tribunal w ith a cut and dried benchmark.’9491 Macfarlane saw the new Guidelines, reinforced by
M. Mitcheson, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2003).
90 ACMD, (1982) op. (it.
ACMD, Prevention, (I-ondon: HMSO, 1984).
D. Mcllor, le tter to R. Whitney, (10* December 1985), bile 16/DAC 28/2, D ! I Archive, Nelson, I .ancashire 
'M J. Patten, le tte r  to D. Mcllor, (15* May 1985), File 16/DAC 28/2, D ll Archive, Nelson, Lancashire. 
w A. D. Macfarlane, CGW G (97) 3, ‘Pharmaceutical Diversion and the Prescribing Dimension. Note by the 
I lome ( Ifficc Drugs Inspectorate’, (3rd March 1997), Private archive.
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extended licensing, as the solution to these problems. Anthony Thorley was in accord with /dan 
Macfarlane on this i s s u e , b u t  his departure may have altered the balance once again, weakening 
Macfarlane’s position.
The idea o f restricting injectable methadone prescription to particular doctors, however, had been 
in the mind o f the chairman, Professor Strang, at least as far back as 1996 when attending the 
meetings o f the Effectiveness Review in his capacity as Consultant Adviser to the Department of 
Health’s Chief Medical Officer."1 1 le had written to its chairman, Reverend |ohn Polkinghome, 
about the possibility of extending the licensing system to cover injectable drugs. In his attached 
draft, which was included largely unchanged in the Task Force’s report, written after discussion 
with the Reverend Polkinghome,w he discussed concerns about the prescription of injectable 
methadone, especially in private practice, and concluded:
We recommend that specialist dntg misuse services (with doctors with appropriate training and expertise in tins area) 
should direct more of their energies/ activities to the patients who require this more specialist treatment. We then 
recommend that suet) prescribing of injectable drugs to drug addicts should Ire restricted to doctors uith this appropriate 
training and expertise, working in services with adequate multidisciplinary input, and with systems in plate to 
safeguard against abuse of this sendee and to prevent diversion of tlx prescribed injectable drugs into tlx black 
m arket}"'
Finally, the draft recommended, ‘that the Department (if I lealth should arrange for the 
development o f guidelines on how these specialist clinicians should apply the necessary tnage as to 
identify the more complicated cases for whom they will then have a particular responsibility to 
provide this specialist care.’ This letter and draft were copied to Anthony Thorlcy at the 
Department o f I lealth and the Effectiveness Review published a recommendation that 'The 
Department o f I lealth should explore ways to ensure that injectable addictive drugs are only
Ibid.
1,1 A. Thorley, (2002) op. at.
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I lome ( )ffice on licensing’), 1 lomc ( )ffice I accusing: The < Iptions fo r Fincouraging ( iood Clinical Practice’), 
(May 1997), Pile 16 TP'D-46 VoL 5, DM Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
‘m 'i' Waller, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
'” J. Strang, le tte r  to j .  Polkinghorne, (29,h Novemlrer 1995), File 16/TFD-45 Vol 1, 1911 Archive, Nelson, 
I-ancashire.
J. Strang, ‘Draft outline for conclusions and recommendations alxmt the prescribing o f tablets and ampoules 
o f methadone’, (undated; attached to j. Strang, letter to J. Polkinghome, 29,h Novcmlx*r 1995), File 16/TF19 
45 Vol 1, D ll Archive, Nelson, Lancashire.
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prescribed for drug addicts by doctors (including GPs) w ith appropriate training and expertise 
working with adequate multidisciplinary input and by specialist drug misuse services.’""
Ihe addition o f  the bracketed indusion of GPs hinted at a significant area of debate on the 99  
Guidelines working group: what prescribing should be carried out by GPs, particularly those with 
additional training and experience (several of whom were members of the Working Group)? And 
should such G Ps be able to prescribe in the same way as specialist psychiatrists in hospital-based 
settings? Right up to the final two drafts o f the 99 Guidelines, there were changes between including 
only consultant psychiatrists as ‘specialists’ and allowing other doctors into this definition.
The significance of describing injectable prescribing as a spedalist activity, and subject to a new type 
of I lome Office licence, should not be missed. 'Ihe appropriateness of injectable prescribing in 
private practice was an important part of the public-private debate and one that aroused John 
Strang’s disapprov al. His surveys of pharmacies were critical of doctors who prescribed injectable 
drugs in non-specialist settings."12 Data from a draft paper by Strang and Sheridan, comparing 
methadone prescribing in private and N1 IS practice, was also used in 1999 as evidence in the Royal 
College of Psycltiatrists and Royal College o f Physicians’ criticisms of private doctors."'""
lhe  99 Guidelines group was asked to make recommendations but not to consider details of 
implementation, which was the realm of the Dmgs Inspectorate. Although the Working Group 
specified that the Director o f Public 1 lealtli should lx- the countersigning officer for any licence 
application, it did not decide who should make the actual decision about the award o f a licence.
I lere lay a large area of potential ambiguity that caused disquiet among doctors in the field.1"’
Ihe proposed extension o f licensing in 1999 was intended by the I lomc Office and Department of 
I lealth to reduce diversion o f pharmaceuticals and ‘monitor good practice’."*1'1" John Strang’s aim 
seems to have been similar, with particular interests in restricting injectable prescribing and 
enforcing the supervised consumption and daily dispensing o f methadone. I Ie had already 10
101 Task force If> Review Services for Drug Misusers, (1996) op. a t . ,  p.67.
,"2 J. Strang, J. Sheridan and N. Barlx-r, (1996) op. cit., pp.270-272.
J. Strang and J . Sheridan, ‘Methadone prescribing to opiate addicts by private doctors: comparison with Nl IS 
practice in south east England’, Addiction, 96 (2001), 567-576.
IIM Royal College o f  Psychiatrists and Royal College of Physicians, Druff, Dilemmas and Choices, (laindon: C iaskcll,
2000) pp.236-237.
eg Doctor 0 1 0 , Interview by Sarah Mars, (2000).
1"f‘ A. D. Macfarlane, (1997) op. cit.
1117 A. Thorley, ‘Clinical Guidelines Working Group (attached to C G W G (97)17 ‘Note by the I lomc ( )ffice on 
Licensing1), Home < )fftce licensing: The Options for Encouraging Good Clinical Practice’), (8,h May 1997), 
file 16 TED-46 V ol. 5, D ll Archive, Nelson, laincashire.
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expressed his concern about doctors failing to follow existing advice. Strang and Sheridan’s 1995 
national survey o f  community pharmacies found prescribing practices that did not observe earlier 
clinical guidelines and ACMD advice, to be widespread, pointing to the absence of any legal 
enforceability:
D aily dispensing and supervised consumption of methadone one lire norm internationally. British guidelines 
recommending such practice carry no statutory authority. N o data hart preciously been presented on doctors’
compliance with these guidelines. We find tire option of daily dispensing to Ire widely disregarded, thus increasing 
known dingers of misuse and diversion to the black market. , "1
1 Department of Health, Scotlish C )ffice Home and I Icalth IXpartment and Welsh Office. Drug Misuse amt Dependence. 
Guidelines on CtmcnlManagment. (London: HMSf ), 1991).
" N Icdical Working Group on Drug Dependence, Guidelines o f  Good Prudice in tire Treatment o f  Drug A lisuse (London: 
Department of Health and Social Security, 1984).
” A C M D , AIDS and  Drug Misuse: Update Report. (London: HMSO, 1993).
Such moves seem not to have been aimed primarily at private prescribes, but would have 
addressed many o f  their practices that Professor Strang and the Dmgs Inspectorate found 
unacceptable. A note from the ’99 Guidelines W orking Group’s secretariat written towards the 
end o f  its lifetime, summed up the Group’s intentions, describing
. ..a particular problem with inappropriate methadone prescribing leading to dmtrdon onto the illitil market in a small 
number ofprivate practices, particularly w/rerr practitioners work alone and where a majority of their work invokes 
substituteprescribingfor heroin and other drug misusers. 7 'he Working C¡roup will be making particular 
recommendations to the I department of I iealth and the I tome (dffice I drugs Inspectorate about how all practitioners 
who prescribe inappropriately might be more effectively monitored and controlled " ”
Members of the AIP voiced concern at the prospect of licences for prescribing injectable 
methadone when they first heard o f this in 1997,"" and when the I lome Office was attempting to 
implement the licensing proposals after its consultation exercise, some private doctors feared that it 
could lx- used to eradicate private prescribing. There were concerns that licences for injectables 
would be given only to psychiatrists working in DOUs, as had been almost exclusively the case
"" J .  S trang, J . Sheridan  and N. Barber, (1996) op. cit. 270-272.
M . Davies, M em o to K. jarv ic , ‘Drug M isuse C linical G uidelines — le a k  o f W orking Papers’ (P 'Ju ly  1998), 
File 16/DRU 323/22 Vol 1, DH Archive, N elson, U ncash irc .
"" A IP , (13* M arch 1997) op. .it.
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with heroin and cocaine licences since 1968, and that daily dispensing and supervised consumption 
of methadone might be unaffordable for private patients compared with a weekly or fortnightly 
pick-up from a pharmacy as they would have to meet the cost of the additional dispensing fees 
themselves. ,, , 'n 2
Anthony Thorley, the Department of Health senior medical officer and key member of the 
secretariat to the Working Group, briefly considered the possibility that private doctors might be 
excluded from injectable licences ‘for not being able to fulfil the specialist criteria’. 1 le had sketched 
the characteristics of a specialist doctor in an earlier working party document as including (though 
not requiring) the ‘capacity to provide specialist support to generalists in shared care setting’, ‘active 
use of specialist professional inputs from a multidisciplinary team’, ‘fast turn around access to 
pathology and drug testing services’ and ‘use or provision o f specialist treatment techniques: clinical 
psychology, counselling, etc.’, all of which could be seen as outside the scope of most private 
doctors who often worked alone, outside the hospital setting and in isolation from medical 
colleagues."' I lowevcr, most of the considerations around licensing submitted to and produced by 
the Working Group seemed to have assumed that at least some private prescribes would apply for 
and receive licences."4115,116 Furthermore, the V9 Guidelines even saw a role for private doctors in 
NI IS shared care arrangements, recommending, ‘Where there are tier local specialist services with 
which a shared care agreement can be developed, it is the responsibility of the health authority to 
ensure that appropriate services are in place. This might mean, for example, developing a shared 
care arrangement with a service in the independent or private sector.’" Such collaboration 
between private and NI IS or voluntary sector services were not unheard of in the 1990s"* and 
characterised a blurring of boundaries between public and private.
A sub-group of the ’99 Working Group was set up to consider private doctors in the licensing 
system and it reported two possible options: an equivalent requirement for private and NI IS 
prescribing, and a stricter licensing requirement for private prescribing, to include oral methadone 
because, “This recognises the fact that as this is a unique situation where, in particular, payment is
1.1 Doctor 011, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
Doctor 005, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2000).
111 A. Thorley, CGWG (97) 5, ‘Approaches to the definition o f a specialist’ , (Feb 26,h 1997), Private archive.
Department of I lealth. CGW G (97) 26, 'Private practice and the prescrib ing o f controlled drugs’, (June 
1997), Private archive.
11 ’  A. D. M acfarlanc, (8,h M ay 1997) op. rit.
1.1 Department of I lealth , ‘M eeting to discuss Misuse o f Drugs regulations and private practitioners’, ()une 
1997) Private archive.
117 UK I lealth  Departments, (1999) op. ¡i/., p.9.
"" M. Jo hnson, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
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received for a prescription of a controlled drug with potential financial advantages from long term 
prescribing, it therefore requires more comprehensive controls than the NI IS’.119 Ultimately, the 
Working Group recommended additional controls for private doctors to prescribe oral methadone 
and they also endorsed the contemporary unwritten policy of Home Office Drugs Inspectorate 
restricting licences for cocaine, heroin and dipipanone to NHS prescribing.12"'1' 1
The fate o f the 1999 Guidelines licensing proposals
Ihe principles o f  the licensing extension were proposed in 1999 by the Working Group in its 
report to ministers and the operational details were then drawn up by the Home Office Drugs 
Inspectorate and sent to a range o f organisations for consultation.122 However five years on, the 
consultation had come to nought and the proposals had yet to be implemented.
In 1984 opposition to additional licensing from doctors guarding their clinical autonomy and the 
fear of deterring GPs from treating drug users may have played a part, and the same response was 
seen in 2001.121,124 Anthony 'Ihorley’s departure from the Department o f Health in 1998, where he 
had been a strong advocate of the licensing system, may also have weakened the forward thrust of 
the policy. Michael Farrell, his replacement was ‘m ore o f a clinician than a civil servant and less 
interested in the regulatory side.’12’
Ihe perceived need for licensing may have been lessened by the Royal College o f General 
Practitioners establislting in 2001 a ‘Certificate in the Management o f  Drug Misuse’ to improve 
levels o f training among their members. The threat o f  government regulation could have prompted 
this move to greater self-regulation. At the same tim e, the GMC had become very active in 
disciplining private prescribcrs, removing several from the medical register, which may have 
dimmed the sense o f urgency for the I Iome Office to act.
Conclusions
If working bv committee means that no one gets exactly what they want, the V9 Guidelines were a 
case in point, representing successes, accepted compromises anil failures for their members. While
"" Department o f  I lealth , ()une 1997) op. at.
,2" Clinical G uidelines W orking G roup, ‘Prescribing and l ic e n s in g  Regulations* [attached to m inutes o f  I6,h 
March 1998], D epartm ent o f Health, (1998) File 16/DRU 3 2 3 / l2 V o l 1 ,D epartm ent o f  Health Archive, 
Nelson, latncashire.
121 A. M acfarlane, (17 ,h March 2000) op. at.
122 Ibid.
121 eg. A. Hanks, I.e tte r to N. Fowler, MP, (1983), Ref 4 0 117 , DrugScope l ib r a r y , London.
122 eg. B. B eaum ont, T . Garnworth, W . Clee, f t  til. (2001) op. at., p.25.
121L. Gruer, (2003) op. at.
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getting closer than ever before to the goal of extended licensing, by 2005 the Home Office’s 
consultation document on its implementation was still just that. 'ITie apparent failure of the 
proposed licensing system could be attributed to similar forces to the attempts o f the 1980s, namely 
the government’s desire to re-engage primary care in the treatment of drug problems and GPs’ 
defence of their clinical autonomy.
In addition, the 1999 threat of greater state regulation of doctors may have galvanised the Royal 
College o f General Practitioners into setting up its training and accreditation, and so fulfilling some 
of the working group’s training aspirations. As in the case of the GMC in Chapter 5, the profession 
under pressure from the state, this time accompanied by some o f  its own members, brought about 
an increase in its self-regulation.
Similar developments around Ireland’s 1998 ‘Methadone Protocol’ saw the successful introduction 
of licensing o f GPs to prescribe methadone and an increase in GP participation.1"'' 'ITie Irish 
licenses required GPs only to prescribe substitute drugs for opiate dependent patients with the 
support of specialist services, but wliilc many circumstances bore striking resemblances to the 
I English simation, the offer of a lucrative payment scheme to the licensed doctors, something for 
winch the UK’s General Medical Services Committee had lx-cn campaigning, may have provided 
the significant difference in gaining doctors’ support.
During its deliberations, the Working Group saw movement back and forth between the range o f 
prescribing that was considered suitable for primary' care and tire extent of any safeguards tliis 
required. A portion o f the GP members seemed to be the main advocates o f greater autonomy 
and less central control, showing more trust in their own judgement and their patients, while those 
direedy employed by the state, such as the psychiatrists and public health physicians, put their trust 
in central government and those doctors who, like themselves, had received more extensive formal 
training. Indeed, most of die operational details, including who exactly would make the decision of 
whether to award a licence, were entrusted to the 1 lome Office Dnigs Inspectorate to settle.
’I he prospect of greater regulation of prescribing was initially greatly assisted by the turnover of civil 
servants. Key figures in the Department of 1 lealdi and the 1 lome Office, who had been influential 
in the first guidelines and licensing debates, had since moved on. Bing Spear joined the I lome 
Office Drugs Inspectorate in 1952, becoming its Chief in 1977 but his ill health had compelled him
,2‘* S. liutlcr. The making of the Methadone Protocol: the Irish system?’, Dmjfs: Intimation. P m vn fion  am i Po/rty, 
2002, 9(4): 311-324.
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to retire in 1986. Dr Dorothy Black, a consultant psychiatrist who had headed a drugs clinic in 
Sheffield, left her post as senior medical officer responsible for drugs and alcohol at the DH SS at 
the end o f  the 1980s. Bing Spear had been wary o f handing too much control to the powerful 
Ixindon consultant psychiatrists and, along with Dorothy Black, was against extending licensing in 
1984 (see Chapter 4).l:7'12l< By 1997, when the idea was being reconsidered, 'Ihorlcy and Nlacfarlane 
had taken their places. Unlike Spear, who was well known for his personal interest in the welfare of 
drug users, and doctors’ clinical autonomy, Macfarlane’s interest was more heavily weighted 
towards controlling the chugs supply, and the prevention o f diversion, and less to the provision of 
treatment.
Neither patients nor private prescribers were invited onto the ”99 working group, although some of 
its policies were directed at each, perhaps revealing that those selecting the membership saw them 
as requiring regulation rather than consultation. The absence of consumerist influences in this part 
of the NMS compared with other areas of health services, including the production of mental 
health guidelines, was notable here. The potential for conflict that these absences removed may 
have made the meetings mn more smoothly, but other, perhaps less grave fault lines emerged.
ih e  expansion o f geographical representation to include for the first time Northern Ireland 
emphasised the divergence o f prescribing traditions across the nation, including differences 
between Scotland and the South Hast of England. Divisions between public health or dn ig control 
issues on the one hand and individual health concerns on the other, a long running theme, emerged 
here once more, but not along a 1 lome Office/Department of I Icalth split. Indeed, the two 
departments were allied in their attempts to control prescribing outside the Clinics, and those 
psychiatrists in favour also benefited from support from the new addition of public health doctors.
Despite the fact that the V9 (tuidelims inserted the term ‘evidence-based’ into the text on several 
occasions, and referenced many more research studies than the previous two editions, they were 
also frank that this was not the sole determinant of policy, living ‘primarily based’ niton expert 
committee re|torts and the ‘clinical experience of respected authorities’. In this the C,uitielines 
followed the tradition o f the previous editions and o f other expert committees in the dnigs field. 
Evidence also seemed to be used rather unevenly. While the section on methadone maintenance, 
which was encouraged by the CiniMnes, was given several references to research and evidence 
reviews, more sensitive topics such as heroin prescribing which the Ciw M 'm s seemed to lie trying to 137
137 Senior C ivil Servant, 151ISS, Interview by Sarah M ars, (2001).
H. B. Spear (and cd. J .  M ott), (2<X>2) of,. a t., pp.279-283.
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deter, had no references at all. Although methadone maintenance could boast a much larger 
evidence base, a large scale, well-publicised and respected clinical trial o f heroin prescribing had also 
been recently carried out but was not mentioned.
The policy-making process of the working group bore similarities to the old style o f behind-the- 
scenes doctor and civil servant negotiations of the 1960s and TOs, particularly with the licensing 
proposals. However, the leak of confidential Working Party pa|xirs to the medical and drugs policy 
press went against the ‘gentlemanly’ code of private policy-making. Although it breached the 
agreed secrecy of the group, the leak may have been tolerated because it did not bring out these 
dnig policy debates out into the general, public media but only to the drugs field. Alternatively, the 
chairman and secretariat might simply have been in the dark about who was the culprit.
Tile 99 Guidelines appeared to endorse a more liberal approach to prescribing, for instance with its 
recommendations for methadone maintenance in primary care and cautious recognition of 
injectable and amphetamine prescribing, but they maintained a restrictive view of who was qualified 
to carry out this work, and proposed additional controls such as supervised consumption, 'lh e V9 
Guidelines and accompanying recommendations to ministers fell more toward increasing the state 
regulation and control of those working outside the Clinics, and consequently of the patients, and 
reducing autonomy than the previous edition. I lowever, just as in 1984, the failure of the licensing 
proposals greatly weakened their intended impact.
In contrast to previous guidelines, the larger number of participating GPs and their strengthened 
position both in drug treatment policy and in the NI IS more broadly were reflected in the concept 
o f the ‘specialised generalist’, a GP with additional experience and tmining, capable o f treating more 
complex cases outside the Clinic system, and in the idea that doctors outside the hospitals could be 
specialists too.
I be wider geographical spread o f services and reduced prominence ot the London prescribing 
scene in treatment policy debates strengthened voices from outside the metropolis and reduced the 
concentration on private prescribing issues. Hus worked both for and against the interests of 
private prescribers: less attention was given to controlling their prescribing practices than was the 
case in the 1980s, but their scope for representation anil participation in the policy process was also 
diminished. Instead, some of the GP members, who although not necessarily in favour of private 
prescribing per se, shared many o f  their interests and fears, acted as proxies for private prescribing 
on the Working Group, mitigating the centralising urges of other members.
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Chapter 8
Organisation and Representation: 
Three Professional Groupings
Introduction
The GMC, the Home Office Drugs Inspectorate, and the working parties which produced the 
clinical guidelines for the treatment of drug misuse all form part of the formal regulatory apparatus 
around prescribing controlled drugs, representing both state sponsored self-regulation and direct 
regulation by the state. This chapter considers three less formal mechanisms o f  self-regulation 
developed bv the I xmdon Clinic doctors, the private prcscribers and NHS general practitioners. 
Ihese are the Association o f Independent Doctors in Addiction (1981-1988), the Association o f  
Independent Prescribes (1996-98) and the London Consultants Group (1968 to the present). By 
comparing the history of these three groupings, I hope to show how and why the London 
consultants succeeded in fending off outside regulation, and set the standards by which other 
doctors were judged, while the private doctors succumbed to extensive discipline.
Ihe documentary sources for this chapter have been the committee papers and associated 
correspondence of AIDA and the AIP. 'ITiose of AIDA were deposited by Dr Dally at the 
W ellcome I jbrarv for the I listory and Understanding o f Medicine, while one of the founders o l the 
AIP gave the author access to the Association’s papers. Documents from the 1 xmdon Consultants’ 
Group have been much more elusive. A single document published in the journal 1 ¡¡diction 
claimed that the Department o f I Iealth, wliich originally provided the secretariat for the group, had 
not kept copies o f the minutes, 'lh e  secretariat was later provided by St George’s I lospital, but 
they t(x» denied having kept any minutes. A number o f documents were then found by a member 
of the group, but access to them was denied by its 2( H A membership on the grounds that the 
meetings were private. I lowcver, a small number o f early minutes o f meetings held at the Ministry 
of I lealth and D11SS written by civil servants had already been shared with the author. Interviews 
were also conducted with members o f all three groups and civil servants from the Department o f  
I lealth and I lom e Office.
218
O rigins
The earliest grouping was that o f the London Clinics consultants, brought together in 1968 by the 
Ministry of I lealth' when the new Clinics they headed were set up. The Regional I lealth 
Authorities were intended to take on these fonnal meetings after 1974 but never did so/ In the 
early 1970s, the consultants broke away from the Department of Health, and after a period o f 
homelessness, during which they rotated between hospital sites, moved to the Home Office in 
1977 at the imitation o f Bing Spear, then Deputy Chief Inspector at the Drugs Branch.’ 4 Running 
in parallel, at least for some of this period, were informal and exclusively clinical meetings, initially 
hosted by St Bartholomew’s I lospital and held during the evenings.’ Both informal and fonnal 
groupings are referred to collectively as the Tondon Consultants Group’ o r LCG, as they shared a 
great deal of business, membership and perceived identity. Indeed members of the groups give 
conflicting accounts as to which meetings were which/'
'lh e formal LCG, called together by Ministry of Health, was initially chaired and minuted by Dr 
Alex Baker, a medical civil servant, and held in London. According to one member, ‘the idea was 
there that policies would be determined.’" 'Hie LCG’s meetings at the Ministry of Health followed 
on from central government’s direct nilc over the Clinics, a result of the funding arrangements for 
London teaching hospitals that bypassed the Regional I lealth Authorities, although this later 
changed. Meetings seem to have been held initially about every month, attended also by DI1SS and 
I lome Office Dmgs Branch staff. ’
The infonnal meetings, in the absence o f civil servants, were more relaxed and ‘a place where we all 
got together and sort o f said “Well mv patients are worse than yours.”1 *6" Membership o f both were 
restricted to the lxindon area, where most of the Clinics were simated in 1968. Later on groups 
were formed, with I lome Office Inspectorate involvement, to encompass treatment centres in the 
rest o f Britain corresponding roughly with the Inspectorate’s own regional divisions."
1 The Ministry o f I lealth  lx-came the Department of 1 lealth and Social Security in NovemlxT 1968.
’ 11. B. Spear (and ed. J .  Mott), Heroin ArhUition Care anil C ontrol: The 'British System ’ 1916-1984). Mott (ed .), 
(Ixtndon: Drugscopc, 2002) p.286.
' J .  M ack, Interview hv Sarah Mars, (2003).
1 11. B. Spear (and ed. J . M ott), (2002) op. tit p.243.
s ‘M eeting o f doctors working in drug dependency treatment units in Ixtndon, 20 ,h January 1970 at St 
Bartholomew’s H ospital’, [fragment] Private archive.
6 See J . Willis, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2003); M. M itcheson, Interview by Sarah M ars, (2003); J .  M ack, (2003)
op. cit.
1 T . Bcwley, Interview by Sarah M ars, (2001).
"J. W illis, (2003) op. cit.
*’ DI ISS, ‘Drug dependence; clinical conference’, [Minutes o f  meeting] (28,h N o vem lic r 1968), Private archive. 
" 'J . W illis, (2003) op. (it.
"  M. Mitcheson, (200.3) op. lit.
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For most of the 1970s, Clinics’ policies were relatively uncontested, treating small numbers of 
addicts receiving substitute drugs. I lowever, when the Clinics began to change their policies to 
ones less appealing to patients, doctors found dmg users seeking supplies from the private sector or 
NHS GPs. N ew  doctors outside the Clinics became involved, including the outspoken Dr Ann 
Dally, the Oxford educated private doctor working in Devonshire Place, near I laricy Street. Dr 
Dally started AID A in November 1981, with encouragement from Bing Spear, who initially 
allowed the group to convene at the Home Office,12 until they were forced to move to Dr Daily’s 
flat in Devonshire Place.11 Unlike the formal LCG, this state involvement was much more discrete 
and tentative. A s an ‘impartial’ civil servant, Spear had to be careful of being seen to give 
endorsement to  anv group, particularly erne which aroused the hostility o f the London consultants.
I le later defended his role, saying that while the London consultants were hostile to the Drugs 
Inspectorate’s contact with AIDA and the private prescribcrs, “dhat contact was perfectly 
consistent with our long-established policy of keeping in contact with anyone working in the dmg 
dependence field. It did not imply approval, or disapproval, o f  the clinical judgement of those 
concerned.’1'1
Ih e  ‘independent’ o f the title was a self-proclaimed descriptor of doctors working outside the 
Clinics, both as NHS GPs and private psychiatrists, ib is  was a significant distinction, as doctors 
inside and outside the Clinics had different prescribing privileges, and doctors outside had been 
discouraged from  involvement in the treatment of addiction until official policy changed after the 
1982 Treatment and Rehabilitation report (see Chapter 3). It was a division perceived by doctors on 
both sides of the divide, and Treatment and Rehabilitation, to which four N1 IS psychiatrists 
contributed, addressed prescribing in terms of doctors inside and outside the Clinics.1 ’
The AIP also cam e together with encouragement from the state in its local form, this time through 
Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster I lealth Authority (KCW11A) and in response to grass 
roots concerns about diverted pharmaceuticals, which was coincidental to a move by private 
doctors and their allies to defend themselves in the face of adverse publicity.16,1 The original 
meeting from which it developed had been called bv KCWIIA and organised by Siwan Lloyd 
I lavward, then project manager for Westminster Drug Action Team, re-presenting local services
12 A. Dally, A  D octo r 's  Story (la>ndon: M acm illan, 1990) p.85.
”  Ibid. pp.85-86.
"  H. B. Spear (an d  cd. J . Mott), (2002) op. at., p.287.
15 ACMI3, T rea tm en t and Rehabilitation, D H SS (I-ondon: IIMSC), 1982) pp.51-62.
16 S. L. 1 layw ard . Interview by Sarah M ars, (2003).
17 M. Johnson, In terv iew  by Sarah Mars, (2(K)I).
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and interests, with encouragement from public health director Dr Sally Hargreaves. It included 
representatives invited from die Home Office and Department of I iealth, medical and 
pharmaceutical professional regulatory bodies, local councillors, police officers, social services 
representatives and residents o f areas concerned about the street dealing."' Dr Matthew Johnson, 
part NHS GP and part private prcseriber, Michael Audreson, Practice Manager at the private 
I lanway Clinic, and Gary Sutton, a private patient and activist, were instrumental, but the AIP 
proved to be the shortest lived and the least influential o f the three groups.
Initially an association of private doctors, it widened its borders to encompass other clinicians 
involved in treating drug users ‘since common ground in respect to the treatment of patients 
should form the criteria for membership.’12 What was the Association o f  Independent Prescribers 
in 1997, by the following year had become “The Association o f Independent Practitioners in the 
Treatment of Substance Misuse’, presumably to reflect more accurately this multi-disciplinary 
membership. 'litis  expansion would suggest that although most of their activities were aimed at the 
regulation o f private prescribing, an important defining factor was not only the sector in which 
members worked, but, like AIDA before it, a belief in the value of maintenance prescribing to 
addicts and in their differences from the N1 IS Clinics:2" '1" ' Its declared aims were
a) To define, describe and support prescribing outside traditional NI IS dmg dependency unit 
standards.
b) To set up positive communication between practices.
c) To develop self defence policy in case of problems with GMC or I Ionic Office.'
The multi-disciplinary, but above all non-NI IS Clinic membership, also reflected a reality of private 
practice in the 1990s, which far from a discrete sector, had many ties with the voluntary and 
statutory sectors. Matthew |ohnson, for instance, worked in both as an NI IS GP and private 
doctor. I le received referrals from an NI IS dnig dependency unit anil prior to that, trotn a 
voluntary sector project in north Ixindon.24
,H ‘Pnvate Prescrib ing and Com m unity Safety’, [M inutes o f m eeting] (29th August 1996), Private archive.
AIP, ‘Minutes o f  second m eeting regarding p rescrib ing and treatment for d rug  users’, |Minutcs o f mreung| 
(23"1 January 1997), Private archive.
C . Brewer, Interview  tty Sarah Mars, (2003).
’ ’ D. Samways, Letter to  A . D ally, (9"1 August 1982), Pile PP/D AL/B/4/1/1/I (Pile 1 o f 2), W ellcome Library,
I xmdon.
22 AIP, ‘A IP proposed guidelines, 2ml D raft’, (31” Ju ly  1997), Private archive.
2‘ AIP, ‘Regarding prescribing and treatment for drug users’ |Minutes o f m eeting] (I3 ,b March 1997), Pnvate 
archive.
1 M. Johnson, (2000) op. a/.
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Purpo se
AIDA’s purpose in the beginning was to raise standards among doctors working outside the 
Clinics, share information and campaign for policy changes. At its first meeting at the Home 
Office, the group’s stated self-regulatory intention was ‘to define accepted standards o f practice.0’
In the following year, it developed rules for its members and then expelled a Dr Rai for apparently 
failing to follow them.2<'
lhcre was considerable concern at the time that Diconal.\ a preparation o f the opiate dipipanone and 
the anti-nausea drug cyclizine, was being prescribed in tablet fomi and crushed and injected with 
dangerous results.'1 AIDA decided that D iivn a l should be prescribed only in exceptional 
circumstance. Dr Rai, who was accused of persistently prescribing the drug, protested that he had 
changed nearly all his Diconalpatients over to either medications and felt ‘rather hurt’ as had had 
‘tried at all times to comply with the wishes o f  the Association’,38 but the Association seems not to 
have relented, 'lhat same year Dr Dally, its president, admitted that she was still prescribing the 
dmg herself: ‘For a long time I have pressed and campaigned for the prescribing o f Diconal to be 
restricted. I treat only four Diconal addicts. C ine of them will lx- off this drug within a week or two. 
One has never had any other drug than D ksn a l and is therefore a “pure” Diconal addict.’"’
Similar inconsistencies happened within the I xindon Clinics, where some long term patients 
continued to receive heroin and injectable methadone in the 1980s after the Clinics had moved 
away from such prescribing, but without the regulatory consequences that afflicted Dr Dally. In 
1983, Dr Dally was brought before the Professional Conduct Committee o f the GMC for her 
Diconal prescribing (sec Chapter 5).
AIDA’s ambitious and confident aspirations to  sha|x events perhaps reflected the sense in the 
1980s that this was a crucial transitional pericxl. Some of the biggest changes in the scale and nature 
of l aigland’s drug use, and particularly opiate consumption, happened during this time. I leroin 
smoking, previously unseen in I'.ngland, became popular, a huge black market developed where
''' AID A, ‘Notes o f first meeting, Tuesday 24'*' N ovem ber, 1*181*, (}anuary, 1*182). File PP/D A L/B/1/1/2,
W ellcome Library, London.
-*' A. Dally, Letter to Dr D. D. P. Rat, (17"* Jan uary  1983), File PP/D A L/B/4/1/1/1 (File 1 o f 2), W ellcome 
Iabrary, D indon.
27 C M C , Professional Conduct Committee, Day T w o , (6th Ju ly 1983), ( ’use o f D ally, Ann Gwendolen, T  A 
Reed & Co. [transcript], GM C Archive, D indon. pp.2/55-2/S7.
31 D. D. P. Rai, U tte r  to A. Dally, (30"* January 1983 ), File PP/D A L/B/4/1/1/1 (File 1 o f 2). W ellcome 
Library, Dindon.
2‘* A. Dally, U tte r  to S. Perrins, (7'h March 1983), F ile  PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File I o f  2), W'ellcomc lib ra ry . 
Dindon.
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previously most users had taken the overflow from doctors’ prescriptions, much larger numbers o f 
users were turning up for treatment, and the Clinics were inundated (see Chapter 2). Significant 
numbers o f doctors outside the Clinics were being drawn into the field for the first time since the 
1960s, and in the mid-1980s 11IV/AIOS emerged to change the picture further.
The LCG’s original aims included mutual support and sharing useftil information. 'Ihomas Bewley, 
consultant at the Tooting Bee Hospital Clinic recalled them as ‘rather jolly meetings’, and that 
DDU psychiatrists tended to be rather isolated, especially within psychiatry where they were already 
looked down on by other doctors.'" 'This need to discuss the work they were undertaking resulted 
partly from the sense o f experimentation and uncertainty detectable in the early years o f the Clinics. 
Before treannent allegiances solidified, many types o f  prescribing were tried out, including 
amphetamines and cocaine, which w ere later abandoned. Prior to a clinical trial o f oral methadone 
and injectable heroin carried out by Martin Mitcheson and Richard 11 art noil at University College 
I Iospital Drug Dependency Unit, between 1967 and 1974 preferences for oral methadone had yet 
to coalesce and a DDU nurse recalled
We actually prescribed all kinds of drugs; it was almost like a kind of oriental bazaar. People would come from far 
and wide to the Clinii and they would actually say M e are mine, three or Jour or five trains' of heroin” and the 
doctor would sap “No, no, no, that’s too much, but we file yon there, and if  yon can’t manage, we five yon some 
pbyseptone methadone ampoules, and if  yon can't ep to sleep, we five yon some barbiturates and if  you can’t wake up, 
we five you some amphetamines. ” It was this kind of bargaining at the beginning until I V A liti he.son had the 
research going.'2
Dr Bewley, who attended LCG meetings until his retirement in 1988 concurred: ‘No one had 
the faintest idea o f what they were doing |at the ( duties) and were all expected to solve the 
problem o f  dmg dependence, so it helped to swap notes.’"  Practical matters, such as useful 
innovations in drug formulations w ere put forward. A formulation o f methadone mixture 
including blackcurrant syrup developed by Dale Beckett, was discussed, as the blackcurrant 
would apparently show up in patients’ urine to show whether they had consumed the drug as 
p r e s c r i b e d . T h i s  later became the accepted basis o f the oral methadone formulation.v'
vn T. Bcw lcy, (2001) op. cit.
"  Prior lo  British Pharm acopoeias’ standard ised  to m etric measures in 1068, the ‘g ra in ’ was the lowest m easure 
of weight in the Apothecaries system equivalen t lo just under 65 milligrams.
M. Sharpe, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001),
"  T. Bew ley, (2001) op. at.
'• II. D. Beckett, Interview  by Sarah M ars, (2001).
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According to one member, there was an awareness o f prescribed dose differentials between the 
different Clinics from the beginning o f the DHSS meetings, and a peer pressure on keeping them 
low.17 The influence of the Second Brain Report, and its concerns to curb the development of a 
market in diverted pharmaceuticals could be seen here.
The formal LCG meetings also provided an opportunity to share information with civil servants 
about forthcoming legislation, providing informal consultation with the doctors.1*'19 At one 
meeting, the Home Office’s representative Mr Becdle ‘agreed to consider the possibility o f the early 
introduction of regulations under the 1967 Dangerous Dmgs Act restricting the prescribing of 
methadone. 1
Ihe A1P had narrower ambitions than AIDA, perhaps reflecting the more stable policy period of 
the mid-1990s. Furthermore, its origins in the complaints of a number o f  regulatory bodies and 
concerned parties, was based partly in a need for self-defence, meaning that it was more concerned 
with changing the behaviour of its members and communicating these changes titan with wider 
dmgs policies. lik e  AIDA, it also expelled members, partly because it needed a sanction by which 
to enforce its standards, but also because some members felt tainted by association with particular 
prescribers and threatened to withdraw if this action was not taken.41
Both the A IP and AIDA meetings admitted to poor standards among some of their members, 
with particular concerns about financial motivations. Discussing the possible new clinical 
guidelines from the Department o f I lealth at a meeting of the A1P, Dr Brewer conceded, ‘the 
essence of the problem was due to some private doctors increasing their patient loads to increase 
their financial gain and this could be the main motivation for treatment’.4 Dr Beckett recalled liis 
concerns about some o f  his fellow private prescribers: ‘I remember lhat I used to go up to I ondon 
to |Ann Daily’s] consulting room, to her flat at the top o f her house every so often and meet with 
other doctors who were prescribing because it was a worry really. A lot o f  doctors didn’t seem to
" Dl ISS, ‘Heroin dependence: clinical conference, I*1 December 1969’, [Minutes o f  meeting], (January 1970), 
Private archive.
H. B. Spear, (2002) op. tit., p.236.
17 M. Mitchcson, ‘Drug clinics in the 1970s’ in J. Strang and M. Gossop (eds.), / leroin Addiction and Dne& Polity: 
The hritish System (< )xford, New York and Tokyo: < Ixford University Press, 1994) pp. 178 191.
M. Mitchcson, (2003) op. cit.
w DHSS, ‘1 leroin dependence: clinical conference’, [Minutes o f mccting| (18,h ScpfcmlHT 1969), Private archive. 
« Ibid.
41 M. Johnson, (2001) op. at.
41 AIP, (13"- March 1997) op. at.
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be doing right by their patients — giving them enormous prescriptions, extraordinary, and raking the 
money in — it was ghastly.4'
O rganisation an d  S tru ctu re o f  the G roups
Working in independent small businesses, private doctors could be characterised as entrepreneurs. 
This term refers to their forms of organisation, ways of working and belief systems, but does not 
imply that profit was their main motive. In Cultural Theory terms, such individuals have been 
described as practising in a context dominated by competitive conditions, control over other people 
and individual autonomy, and where the definitions and boundaries through which they related to 
the world were weakly drawn and tlexible.44 As independent contractors general practitioners 
shared some o f  these characteristics, but with their greater dependence upon a single client, the 
National I lealth Sendee, had less autonomy and were less competitive among themselves. AIDA’s 
struemre and experiences reflected these characteristics.
Throughout its lifetime, AIDA’s fonvard thrust was powered by a single charismatic leader, rather 
than shared among equally motivated members. Dr Dally, as AIDA’s first and only president, 
seems to have chaired most of the meetings, and undertaken the largest part o f  the work arising, 
such as writing letters and policy documents. When her involvement and interest in the dmgs field 
came to an end, there was no one to replace her.
Dr Daily’s ability to network, a characteristic of the successful entrepreneur, was largely behind 
AIDA’s high profile, given its small membership and the hostility of the opposition. She had 
Oxford University connections with one member, Dr Susan Openshaw, and also with Mrs 
Thatcher, then Prime Minister, which she used to lobby for her own and AIDA’s cases. She t<x>k 
an opportunistic approach to recruitment, inviting diverse people to join who shared her viewpoint, 
such as American academic Arnold Trebach. As might be expected o f a small organisation with 
limited resources, the secretariat was provided in-house by Dr Dally.
Its purpose also laigelv reflected Dr Daily’s concerns. At the outset she gained considerable 
publicity for AIDA, with announcements on the BBC’s six o’clock news and in a number o f 
medical journals. She campaigned for changes to the C Times’ approach to prescribing, changes to 
the law, and for greater involvement in prescribing by doctors outside the Clinics.
44 H. D. Beckett, (2001) op. tit.
44 M. Douglas, C.ultunilHun, Occasional Paper No.35 (Diiulon: Royal Anthropological Institute, first published 
1978, second impression 1979) p.21.
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Its degree of formal organisation seems to have diminished, starting out with both a president and a 
secretary and a working group set up to draft its own guidelines. As time went on there was a 
merging of her own personal difficulties with the GMC with the wider concerns of her colleagues, 
partly as a result o f her view that the personal was political in this case,4'  and partly because of her 
dominant role in what became a relatively unstructured organisation. By the end of its life in 
1987/88, Dr Colin Brewer described the Association as a support group for Dr Dally ‘in her time 
o f trial’.44 I le recollected no regulatory role or intentions in the late 1980s. By 1987 AIDA was 
unstruemred with no committee. Eventually the Association folded ‘for lack of interest’.4
lik e  AIDA, the AIP was a small organisation whose secretariat was provided by the administrative 
staff of one of the member organisations — the I Ianway Clinic -  and which had little internal 
structure. The Association also functioned as the first register of doctors providing private 
treatment to drug users. This was achieved by Dr Johnson, the leading doctor involved in 
establishing the AIP, Michael Audreson, practice manager at the I lanway Clinic, and Gary Sutton, a 
patient and drug user activist, pooling their knowledge for invitations to the first meeting, talking to 
other private prescribes and to pharenacists.4“ They limited their scope to dix;tors with significant 
involvement in the area, rather than those with one or two dmg using patients on the grounds that 
they would have been harder to find and probably less committed.4'4 The lack of any such register 
prior to this reflected, in contrast to the Nl IS, the lack of a central bureaucracy employing doctors 
in this field, and little economic impetus to group together. I laving said this, data held by the 
Ministry of I lealth or D1ISS on the existence of Nl IS dmg clinics was more than once found to be 
inaccurate.’" In addition, some doctors had been wary about publicising their services for fear of 
Ix-ing inundated by addict patients seeking prescriptions.'1
Just as the entrepreneurial character of the ‘independent’ doctors revealed itself in the organisations 
they developed, so it was with the Dindon Consultants. These doctors worked within the 
hierarchy of hospital medicine with the Nl IS as employer. They shared a strong sense of identity 
as a group, perhaps partly engendered by their lowly stanis within psychiatry, and consequently 
drew themselves inside a boundary against outsiders. 'ITiev were also motivated by a desire to keep 
at bay government involvement in what they saw as clinical decisions.
44 See Ann Daily’s description o f the cases in A Doctor's Story, (Dindon: Macmillan, 1990) pp.99-281.
C. Brewer, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2003).
47 C. Brewer, U tte r to A. Dally, (27">Junc 1988), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 2 o f 2). Wellcome Library,
I aindon.
4* M. Johnson, (2001) op. tit.
«  Ibid.
4,1 See II. B. Spear (and ed. J. Mott), (2002) op. cit.. pp.151-176 and ACMD, (1982) op. at., pp.97-102.
41 eg M. Johnson, (2(HK)) op. cit.
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While not competing for fees or patients, they were to some extent rivals for prestige and 
resources, but steps were taken to minimise competitive behaviour in the interests o f the group.
For instance, the rivalry between Philip Connell, Director of the Maudsley Hospital’s drug 
treatment unit, and Griffith Edwards, Director o f the Addiction Research Unit at the Instimte of 
Psychiatry, was not allowed to prevent the group from sending a letter o f  congratulations when 
1 '.chvards was awarded an academic chair.’ : Furthermore, to ensure that no one individual gained 
too much power over the group, the role of chair revolved between members. I ikewise after a 
period during which the meetings had been held at the workplaces of members in the 1970s, the 
Home Office was taken up as a permanent venue when offered, as it was geographically central 
and ‘neutral ground’ not being the base of any particular consultant.’ ' The allocation o f tasks 
according to rank is also typical of hierarchy.’'1 According to Dr Martin Mitcheson, the most senior 
members or ‘elder statesmen’ Drs Connell and Bewley were deputed to visit Dr Dally to discuss 
with her the group’s concerns about her practice.’5
The fight to guard clinical autonomy emerged early on. The secretariat and chair for the formal 
LCG was initially provided bv the Department o f  I lealth’s Dr Alex Baker and in his minutes of the 
first meetings recorded, erroneously according to D r Bewley, that they hail all agreed to reduce 
their prescribed doses of heroin: There was general acceptance that complete uniformity in 
prescribing practice was impossible. It was agreed however that, as a general guide, each clinic 
should seek to reduce progressively the total quantity of heroin prescribed.’ '*’
Thomas Bewlcy objected, seeing this as Dr Baker pulling in his own opinion which had not been 
discussed.’ Philip Connell had already expressed the desirability o f the ( Times cutting down their 
doses through concerted action, ‘ . . .it is necessary to  recognise that there is a need to cut down the 
dose of dmgs already being prescribed to addicts. This could best be effected by agreement by 
those working in the treatment centres that when they are working smoothly and preferably on an 
appointed day all clinics will reduce the amount o f  heroin prescribed over a |x nod of, say a month 
to about half.’'"
,2J. Mack, (2(103) op. at.
» Ibid.
M M. Douglas, (1979) op. at., p.20.
"  M. Mitcheson, (2003) op. at.
DIISS, |Minurcs o f meeting held on 28'1' November 1968] op. at.
57 T. 11. Bewley, (2001) op. at.
s* 1’. 11. Connell, ‘Drug dependence in Great Britain: a challenge to the practice o f  medicine' in II. Stclnlierg 
(cd.), Siientrfii■ liaj/s o f  Drpfndrna (I .ondon: J&A ( Churchill, 1969) pp.291 299, p.297.
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And although soon after this became the group’s own policy, it may have been the government 
source o f the proposal that made it unacceptable in the minutes o f that first meeting. A stmggle for 
control then developed between the Department o f I lealth and the doctors, with the doctors 
victorious. Early in the 1970s they wrote a letter telling the Department o f Health that they wished 
to break away and form their own independent group.31 They were later offered rooms by the 
Home Office, where the)’ remained. John Mack, consultant in I lackney DDU and the longest 
serving member o f  the group, expressed the consultants’ determination for independence of 
government. ‘At the very early meetings we wanted to make it quite clear that they were our 
meetings, they were not Department of I lealth meetings. We were happy for the senior medical 
officer from the Department of 1 lealth to be there and Bing Spear to be there, but we wanted them 
to be our meetings, not official meetings/“1
Some years later, in the late 1970s or early 1980s, another small batde took place, as one 
member recalled, ‘There was a bit of an awkward scene from one tim e.. .Dorothy Black was 
Senior Medical Officer [at the Department o f Health) and she was from outside London and she 
came to the meeting and she tried to take it over and she had to be quite rudely told that it was not 
her meeting, that she was the Senior Medical Officer at the Department of 1 lealth being invited to 
our meeting/’1 At the same time, the informal EGG meetings took place in the evenings at medical 
venues without any m il servants, but included discussion of points raised at the formal D11SS 
meetings, and agreed points to feed back to the DI1SS secretariat/’"
M em bership a n d  critica l m ass
A problem afflicting both AIDA and the AIP was falling membership. Dr Dally described the first 
AIDA meeting as well attended:
The meeting was organised try myself after talking partit rtlarly to D r A . II . Heard (Consultant Psychiatrist, 
Middlesex Hospital). Apart from ns there ¡vert some psychiatrists in private practice, eg D r Anthony T/ood and D r 
Michael a ’Brook, and some N H S  G Ps (such as D r Margaret McNairv, D r Tessa I lane, D r Susan Openshatv 
and D r R Robertson). The meeting was M d at the I lame ( iffice and altogether there were about / 6 doctors, also
WJ. Mack, (2003) op. at.
Ibid
" J. Mack, (2003) op. at.
1,1 ‘Meeting o f  doctors working in drug dependency treatment units in I o il don, 20lh January 1970 at St 
Bartholomew’s Hospital’, op. cit.
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BjVfg [sic] Spear, the Cltief Drug inspector at the Home Office, one of tlx ot/xr Inspectors, Ian Heaton, and D r  
Domtlry Black from tlx D H SS. 63
But after that, numbers seem to have diminished, with attendance at meetings generally only three 
or four.64,63 Its president remarked in December 1982, ‘I can’t say that we are inundated with 
applications for membership’.“’ The cost of membership in 1986 was £25 a year. At this stage they 
were meeting ‘every few weeks’/”
'ITie AIP also started with wider enthusiasm than it managed to maintain, and in a bid to set 
standards of practice, expelled the two members thought to be most problematic. Matthew 
Johnson explained, ‘Well first o f all we did throw a couple of people out of the group, who shall 
remain nameless. S o .. -trouble is after that what was left wasn’t a very big group and.. .then people 
stopped coming an d .. .the group that was eventually left were people who had been abiding, who 
had been well within the guidelines that had been set anyway, originally.’<'''
Views a n d  p o lic ie s  o f  the g ro u p s
Key differences revealed by the three groups’ policies were not only their content but their ability to 
reach and implement agreements. Although the focus o f AIDA varied over the years. Dr D aily’s 
essential message remained the same. I Icr own and AIDA’s professed policies were that:
(i) ‘the proper person to treat an addict |was] his or her own GP or a doctor to whom  
that GP has referred him or her’,'1'4
(ii) I a >ng term prescribing was necessary to allow stable addicts to maintain a law-abiding 
lifestyle, and the polic\’ o f the Clinics offering only short term prescribing and 
detoxification was forcing such addicts onto the black market to obtain a dnig supply. "
(iii) That NI IS treaunent was the ideal, but that until it was provided in a manner m ore 
acceptable to patients, private practice would continue to be necessary.'1 (AIDA tried
“  A. Dally, le tter K» I. Munro, (3"‘ December 1981), l ile PP/D.M./B/4/1/1/1 (l ile 1 o f 2), Wellcome I abran. 
Dindon
'•* C. Brewer, (2003) op. tit.
(,s II. D. Beckett, (2001) op. (it.
“  A. Dally, le tte r to A . Trebach, (3"‘ Decemlxrr 1982), l ile PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (bile I o f 2). Wellcome 
1 .ibrarv, London.
*7 A. Dally, le tte r to D r A P Gray, (21" November 1986), Pile PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 2 o f 2), W ellcome 
library, London.
M M. Johnson, (2000) op. at.
A. Dally, le tte r to the Editor. C P  M attan e, (8lh April 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File I o f 2).
Wellcome library, l-ondon.
A. Dally, Letter to The Guardian newspaper, (8th April 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File I o f 2), Wellcome 
library. Dindon.
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unsuccessfully to set up a non-profit clinic for those unable to afford private fees, and 
applied for funding under the Central Funding Initiative o f  1983.]
(iv) That prescribing injectable methadone had therapeutic value.
(v) That Dicotui!should only be prescribed in exceptional cases. 2
(vi) That drug treatment should take into account the role played by the criminal black 
market in the drug supply. 1
Unlike AIDA, the AIP considered private treatment valuable in itself, rather than simply as a 
supplement where the NHS was inadequate, wishing to emphasise die fact that it did not burden 
the taxpayer and provided choice. 41 jk e  AIDA, it supported maintenance prescribing, including 
injectable methadone.
One of the spurs to the AIP’s project in self-regulation was the anger and fear felt by residents of 
Sherland Road in west Ixindon towards the open street market in diverted prescribed drugs around 
Maguire’s chemist'5 supplied bv private prescribes. Diversion, it was admitted by the Association, 
was ‘a reality’ and ‘the Achilles heal for private prescribing’. 6 'Iliis prompted a number of the 
AIP’s policies, including the use of test dosages, where a patient took their f is t dose under the 
doctor’s observation to ensure it was safe and that they were not asking for more drugs than they 
needed in order to sell on. The AIP tried to produce guidelines laying out its policies, and 
although these allowed considerable latitude, such as not setting restrictions for how often patients 
should pick up their presenbed dmgs, an  area o f contention throughout the |xri<xl, the Association 
was unable to reach agreement and they remained, like AIDA’s guidelines, forever in draft fonn. "
The LCG’s policies extended over the entire |xn<xl under study, and changed during that time. 
Due to the denial of access to the minutes o f the meetings, key policies are discussed here rather 
than a complete review. During the later 1970s and early 1980s, there was a spectmm of opinion 
about being more or less lilx-ral in prescribing, but the majority seemed to follow Dr Bcwlcy’s view 71*
71 A. Dally, letter to I. Mumo, (22»' January 1982), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (I'lie I o f 2), Wellcome library. London.
AIDA, ‘Comments on: 1 Apartment o f I Icalt h and Social Security: Treatment and Rehabilitation (I IMS< ). 1982). 
Report o f the Advisory Council on the Misuse o f  Drugs’ (lanuary 1983), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/7, Wellcome library,
1-ondon.
7' AIDA, ‘AIDA Comments on “(¡uidclincs o f  ( rood Clinical Practice in the Treatment o f Drug Misuse” Dl ISS 1984
(July 1985)’, File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/8, Wellcome library, laxidon.
71 A ll’, ‘Private Prescribing and Treatment fo r Drug Users.’ (Minutes o f  meeting] (10* Decemlier 1996), Private 
archive.
77 S. L. Hayward, (2003) op. at.
'' AIP, (10* December 1996) op. at.
77 Ibid.
* M. Johnson, (2000) op. at.
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that prescribing should be standardised to present a united front to patients, so the aim of the 
meeting was to try to synchronise practice.1 There was disagreement over the prescribing of 
heroin and injectable drugs, but, as shown in Chapters 3 and 4, peer pressure successfully reduced 
heroin and injectable methadone prescribing in the 1970s and replaced it with oral methadone.
The move away from prescribing injectable drugs, and methadone in particular, which took place in 
the late 1970s, was foreshadowed in an LCG meeting as far back as December 1969: ‘Although it 
was agreed that methadone undoubtedly had some value in the treatment o f heroin addiction there 
was disagreement about the extent to which it should be used, particularly in its injectable form.’ *"
While AIDA and the AIP both attempted to develop guidelines with the aim of improving existing 
poor practice, the LCG seems to have produced guidelines early on with the aim o f  coordination.
A document entitled “Practical matters relating to the treatment of dmg-dependent patients’ was 
submitted by Dr Connell to a meeting in September 1969 at the Department of I Iealth."' This may 
have been the same document minuted as ‘Principles of Treatment’, about which ‘the meeting 
accepted the value o f  a document on the lines of Dr Connell’s paper’ but ‘there was some 
disagreement with specific points’. A further draft was to be presented to a future meeting 
incorporating amendments from the group."" It is not clear whether the document published in 
Addiction in 1991 is the same one as that mentioned in the minutes, and if so, whether this was the 
revised version or the original.
At a meeting in 1969, the LCG determined to protect their prescribing expertise declaring that,
T"he prescribing o f methadone to addicts bv general practitioners was unanimously condemned 
and it was agreed that a letter expressing this view to the medical press signed on behalf o f those 
present as representing a body of authoritative medical opinion on dnig dependence, might help to 
curb the practice.’"'
On a number o f policy developments Drs Connell and Bewley dominated. As with Dr Dally, tlris 
may have partly rested on personal qualities — one member remarked
"Philip Connell could walk into this room right now and take over; that was Connell’s style’,"4 but a 
stronger source o f power was their extensive involvement in medico-political life and the 79
79 T. Bcwlcy, (2001) op. cit.
8n DHSS, (January 1970) op. at.
*' IMI.Connell, Treatment o f drug-dependent patients, 1968-1969’, lin tnh journal o f Addiction, 86 (1991), 913  
915.
K-’ DHSS, [Minutes o f  meeting held on 18,h September 1969] op. cit.
H' DIISS, (January 1970) op. at.
M,J. W illis, (2003) op. at.
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prestigious offices it yielded. Both were, at various times, members o f the GMC and special 
advisors to the Chief Medical Officer, Dr Bewley became President of the Royal College o f  
Psychiatrists and Dr Connell chaired the influential Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs.
The class system also seems to have been a strong influence in hospital medicine at least in the 
1970s. Selection for consultant posts at St Bartholomew’s consisted not only of the formal 
interview, but was preceded by a ‘trial by sherry’, essentially an informal drinks party at which the 
candidates were assessed ,w ith  social experience and skill clearly playing a role. This Itint at upper 
class, Oxbridgian preferences, is maintained by the note from an early informal LCG meeting, 
stating that an initial payment o f five shillings would be charged ‘to cover the cost o f sherry for the 
meetings’.1"’ The Home Office, by contrast, offered a more bourgeois tea and biscuits.
Successes an d  F ailu res 
Internal Influence
Both the AIP and AIDA attempted to produce clinical guidelines for their own organisations and 
neither got beyond the drafting stage because o f an inability to agree. According to the AIDA 
minutes, ‘There was a good deal o f discussion about the way in which patients should Ire assessed.’ 
Dr Poncia, a private doctor ‘felt that routine urine testing in all cases might lx- counter-productive. 
This highlighted a certain amount of disagreement about the clinical management of patient |sic) in 
which members agreed to differ.’" ’
AIDA and the AIP’s inability to agree on guidelines reflected, in part, the fact that doctors outside 
the Nl IS hospital setting may have chosen an ‘independent’ path because they did not like working 
to corporate policies, guidelines and protocols.7" Furthermore, being to some extent in competition 
with each other for patients, they also had something to lose by working to the same patterns, 
particularly with the market sensitive issues o f  cost and dosage.
J. Mack, (2003) op. at.
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Unlike the three editions of the official Department o f  Health guidelines, '1'2 ''1 which chose to 
limit the discussion of controversial topics, such as heroin, stimulant and injectable prescribing, the 
AIP’s draft guidelines focused on regulating existing controversial practices. While the Department 
of Health’s documents were aimed partly at encouraging the participation o f doctors not already 
treating drug users, the AIP’s document was intended to tackle the aspects o f  treatment that were 
gaining negative publicity and regulatory attention for doctors already involved. Other aspects of 
private treatment, such as the use o f  clonidine and lofexidine in detoxification were used by some 
of the private doctors but were not in dispute and so went unmentioned.'4 Matthew Johnson also 
proposed that a prescribing limit o f  2(X)mg methadone be implemented between members, and 
There was a consensus of agreement that there could be an agreed upper limit, which all doctors 
involved in the group could work to ,’"  but it was never implemented. 'Hie AIP ‘disintegrated in 
sort of people disagreeing too much w e couldn’t get proper consensus going.’"'
Although both die AIP and AIDA finally collapsed. Dr |ohnson and Dr Dally both felt that they 
had had a positive impact on their members. Dr Dally claimed ‘I am quite sure that some of the 
less ethical doctors have improved their ways as a result of membership’, '' and Dr Johnson, while 
fmstrated with the process of disagreement and fragmentation, believed that by bringing people 
together, prescribed dose levels had been reduced, even among the two suspended doctors, 
although neither claim can be verified without further data.'"
External influence
AIDA focussed not only on changing practice among doctors, but also the view of the public and 
government. Ann Dally engaged in much media acthnty, including radio and television. She wrote 
letters to government and, with D r Dale Beckett and Dr Tessa Hare, presented evidence to several 
committees. Articulate, intelligent and a good networker. Dr Dally had an impressive ability to gain 
the attention of influential individuals. She also benefited in this from promoting a consistent 
message, in which she held no doubts. 1 lowever, this access and conviction did not bring with it 
influence. AIDA’s position, although of interest to the media, expressed dissatisfaction with the
" Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence, Guidelines o f  Good Clinical Practice in ll>t Treatment o f  Drug Misuse 
(London: DHSS, 1984).
‘i: Department o f I lealih, Scottish ( Ifftce I Iome and I lealth Department and VC’clsh C 1 filer Drag Misuse and 
Dependence. Guidelines on Clinical Management. (1-ondon: HMSC1, 1991).
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Stationery ( )fficc, 1999). 
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wider regulatory system o f drug control in Britain, a view that, in the 1980s niled it out of serious 
policy consideration.
Perhaps AlDA’s biggest opportunity came when Prime Minister Margaret 'Ihatcher, with whom 
Dr Dally had been at Somerville College, Oxford, minted her to discuss the drug problem at 
Number 10. Dr Dally visited Margaret Thatcher at Downing Street early in 1983 but failed to 
convince her of her position. Indeed she speculated later that this high profile meeting may have 
encouraged her opponents to construct the GMC case against her.” Although she received some 
warmly worded letters from the Prime Minister, Mrs Ihatcher made no interventions on AlDA’s 
behalf, writing, ‘I know very well how deeply you feel about this. But I hope you will understand 
when I say that 1 diink it would be wrong for me to comment on the disagreement between 
yourself and the Department of I leaith and Social Security. 1 have read every word o f your letter — 
but I cannot judge who is right.’""1
AIDA, although maintaining a high profile for several years, achieved very little in influencing 
formal policy-making bodies. Chapter 4 showed how, although invited onto the 1984 DI1SS good 
practice guidelines working group, A lD A’s representatives Drs Dally and Beckett were sidelined 
and outmanoeuvred by London consultants Thomas Bewley and Philip Connell and the 
Secretariat. Although AIDA opposed the extension of licensing under which all doctors would 
have required I Iome Office permission to prescribe opiates, and was pleased to find that, after 
some delay, the proposal was dropped by government, A lD A ’s opposition was less likely to have 
been critical than that emanating from the I Iome Office and the additional government concern 
that the arrangement would require extra spending and risk alienating GPs (see Chapter 4).
AIDA was also invited to give oral evidence to the Social Services Committee’s enquiry into the 
misuse of dnigs in 1985. I lere again, the role of the London Nl IS psychiatrists may have 
neutralised any positive impact, for the Committee’s special advisor was Dr Martin Mitcheson, 
consultant in charge o f  University College 1 lospital’s DDU and a prominent member of the LCG, 
who t<x>k credit for inviting Dr Daily as a negative example. Dr Mitcheson claimed liis strategy was 
successful, describing the committee as ‘appalled’ by Dr Dally,1"1 and its findings and 
recommendations would seem to support this. Sounding almost like a parrot trained by the 
Ixindon consultants, their report pressed for an extension o f licensing to all injectable opiates, for
”  A. Dally, (1990) op at., pp.100-102.
M. Thatcher, Ieucr to A. Dally, (7,h June 1984), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File 2 o f 2), Wellcome I.ibrary, 
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licences to continue to be restricted to doctors working in or under the supervision of a consultant 
in a clinic, and for particular attention to be paid to restricting private doctors.1112
During the AIP’s short life, the group made only one attempt to influence an outside policy making 
body and failed. The Department of Health’s guidelines working group, whose final output would 
be published in 1999, had already drawn up its membership and started meetings when the AIP 
met for the first time and proposed nominating (uninvited) Dr Colin Brewer as their 
representative.'1"1 However, it seems unlikely, had they emerged earlier, that they would have 
gained access since relations were poor between Dr Brewer and the chairman Professor John 
Strang, who had skilfully made a nod in the direction of private sector representation bv inviting the 
non-prescribing Dr David Curson. Perhaps if the AIP had established itself prior to the start of the 
Clinical Guidelines Working Group a representative would have been chosen for the sake o f 
appearance, as occurred in 1984 with AIDA, but the need to be seen to be consulting this group of 
doctors was considerably less in the 1990s when they represented a far smaller proportion o f  the 
expanded drug treatment world, and neither were they the main advocates o f  maintenance 
prescribing.
'Ihe changes which followed the Second Brain Report, on wliich certain 1 .ondon psychiatrists who 
became Clinic consultants had been highly influential, had succeeded in handing over heroin 
prescribing and the medical treatment o f dnig users over to NI IS consultant psvcliiatrists in 1968, 
and they clung keenly to their prescribing privileges over the next three decades, Their attempts, 
however, to extend their monopoly to other dmgs of dependence were unsuccessful. Ibis 
disappointed aspiration was first recorded at an informal LCG meeting in 1969, when, ‘It was 
regretted that the suggestion that prescription of all dependency producing drugs to known addicts 
should be limited to treatment centres had been dropped by the Department o f  I lealth on grounds 
of cash.’1"4 After this came moves to own the prescribing of methadone or other opiates, and 
although gaining support from many influential bodies, such as the Social Security Committee, the 
ACMD and the Department of 1 Icalth’s 1999 Clinical Guidelines Working Group, the consultants 
remained unsuccessful here t<x> (see Chapter 7). 102
102 House o f Commons Social Services Committee, Misuse o f  Dm# noth Special Reference to the Treatment ant! 
Rehabilitation o f  Misusers o f  i  \ard Dm#. Fourth Report o f  the Social Services Committee. Session / 984 85 (lxmdon: 
HMSO, 198.S) pp.lvi-lvii.
1113 AIP, (10,h December 1996) op. cit.
,,M J. L. Reed, “Meeting o f  Doctors Working in London Drug Dependency Treatment Centres, November 25,h, 
1969 at St Bartholomew's Hospital” jMinurcs o f  meeting]. Private Archive.
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Aside from these disappointments. Dr Connell and Dr Bewley, the most politically active members 
of the LCG during the 1970s and early 1980s, acliicved some successes in protecting the interests 
o f the NHS Clinic psychiatrists and extending their discipline over outside doctors. Both were 
members of the ACM D’s Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group, and its report 
recommended a number o f curbs on the prescribing o f doctors outside the Clinics."15 Although 
not all of these w ere implemented, the proposed good practice guidelines for doctors did become a 
reality in 1984. D r Connell won the right to chair the committee responsible for the first guidelines, 
and |ohn Strang, the most senior addiction clinician at London’s Maudsley Hospital, chaired the 
second two in 1991 and 1999. Specific measures to protect the privileged position of NF IS Clinic 
psychiatrists were included in both the 1984 clinical guidelines and the 1999 re-write,"*'1" and both 
were used in disciplinary cases against doctors working outside the Clinics before both the GMC 
and the I lome Office’s Drugs Tribunals.1"1'""
Ihe successes o f the D»ndon Consultants’ Group in influencing outside policies was not simply 
through decisions taken at its meetings, but because o f the involvement o f  many o f its members in 
other important bodies. It was therefore less the meetings themselves, than the perceived sense of 
tx'ing a group with shared interests that could be promulgated in different arenas. While the AIP 
and AIDA members rarely met outside their own Association meetings, several of the London 
consultants were colleagues at the Royal College o f  Psychiatrists, responsible for the postgraduate 
training of psychiatrists and influential over a range o f psychiatric policy. The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists was also  empowered to nominate a member to the GMC, first sending Dr Philip 
Connell in 1979, and then his replacement Dr Bewley in 1981. Several members were also on the 
ACMD, and on Department o f I lealth working groups.
Influencing the M edia
Access, rather than influence, seems to have been Dr Daily’s forte, and her access to the media 
allowed her to gain publicity for her views. She was friends with and had some support from the 
editor of the Lancet, Ian Munro, whose journal published a strongly written attack on the GMC’s
"* ACMD, (1982), op. at., pp.51-62.
I"'1 Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence, (1984) op. at.
107 UK Health Departments, (1999) op. at.
" " eg General Medical Council, Professional Conduct Committee, I5ay < >nc, (9th December 1986), Case o f Dally, Ann 
Gwendolen, T A Reed & Co. (transcript), GMC Archive, London, p.1/12.
I,w in  the Matter o f  the Misuse o f Drugs Act 1971 and in the Matter o f Dr John Adrian Garfoot’, Day ( )nc. 
(Minutes o f proceedings at a Misuse o f  Drugs Tribunal, Wednesday 22"*1 June 1994], W  B Gumey anti Sons, 
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handling of Dr Daily’s first disciplinary hearing. "" He later indicated his support for Dr Daily’s 
criticisms o f NHS drug treatment stating that ‘the inflexibility of the present system is 
deplorable.’111 However, one gets the impression that some of the medical press, rather than take 
sides, merely enjoyed provoking debate on its pages.
Dr Munro, in a letter to Dr Dally described how his ‘misgivings.. .from the rooted belief that 
treatment in this area must be separated from any kind of private practice’,11: had prompted him to 
write a leader article which took an opposing line to Dr Dally. He invited her to respond, saying, 
“This Lancet contains a leader on drug addiction. The line it takes will hardly meet with your 
unreserved approval. Why not offer me a letter for publication? Anyway, let’s hope we can stir up 
some debate on this shambles.’11'
A controversial attack on private prescribing by Thomas Bewley and 1 lamid Ghodse, another 
NHS Clinic psychiatrist, was published by the British Medicaljournal the following year under the 
banner ‘For Debate’, a suggestion eagerly taken up by a number of its readers (see Chapter 5),114, 
including a member o f AIDA, with Daily’s knowledge."5,116 O f the wider media, Dr Dally 
complained i  talk to many reporters. Only about 1 in 10 writes down anything that seems 
remotely like what I said.’"
llie  media had in part acted as a spur to the creation o f  the AIP. A Alew of tl)e World sung on 
private psychiatrist Dr Dzjkovsky, where a reporter had posed as a patient to test the ease with 
which he could obtain dnigs, encouraged the bad image of private prescribe*». 9 In general the 
AIP received and courted little media attention, although its work was highlighted in Radio Four’s 
‘File on Four’ broadcast in 1997 when the Association was attempting to write its own guidelines. 
The programme gave some recognition to their intentions to self-regulate but overall reflected 
badly on the behaviour o f private prescribers.12"
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Although individual consultants occasionally appeared in the media, both fonnal and informal 
incarnations of the I.CG themselves kept low public profiles. For instance, in 1969 a formal 
Department of Health organised meeting agreed to write to the medical press to express its 
‘unanimous’ condemnation o f GPs prescribing methadone.'"11 The letter was published in the 
British Medical journal on 16,h May 1970, although Bing Spear later accused the Clinics of 
misrepresentation, and that excessive quantities of injectable methadone available for sale on the 
streets originated principally from the Clinics themselves.1’2
The LCG, in contrast with the two Associations, did not generally publicise their own rules as a 
group. For instance, it was not until 1991 that the 1968/69 guidelines were published by Philip 
Connell, and then only as a document o f historical interest.12’ W hile the London Consultants did 
not observe all their own rules or agreements this quieter approach gave them fewer ‘hostages to 
fortune’ than AIDA, whose publicly announced rule on the prescribing of Dicvnal was to trip up Dr 
Dally during her first GMC hearing in 1983.124 Furthermore, where mles were published by the 
Ixtndon consultants, they still managed to fend off outside intervention or scrutiny and 
accomplished the feat o f setting rules for other doctors to which they themselves did not have to 
adhere.
Dr Dally took a different approach to the media to Drs Connell and Bewlcy that reflected their 
Cultural Theory characteristics and the traditions of policy-making in the drugs field. Dr Dally, an 
entrepreneurial networkcr, wished to gamer support from any quarter that could help her case. She 
did not perceive a strong barrier around those inside or outside her group. The 1 xtndon 
Consultants Group, a group reflecting the hierarchical stmeture o f  hospital medicine, by contrast, 
was restricted to doctors practising in the Clinics. With a strong boundary between insiders and 
outsiders, members did not usually publicise their views to the general media, preferring to keep the 
debate on dmgs within the medical realm, including medical journals. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
Dr Connell and Dr Bewlev rarely appeared in the general media to rebuff Dr Daily’s accusations 
and criticisms. 12
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Policy making in the drugs field in the 1960s and the 1970s was carried out behind the scenes in 
private by accommodation between experts and civil servants.125 This held true for the Ixindon 
Consultants Group and it may have been the public namre of Ann Daily’s attacks on the Clinics 
that so embittered the London consultants as much as the content of the attacks themselves. 
Discussing in public what the Ixjndon consultants saw as matters for private or medical only 
discussion broke their code o f private policy-making.
R elation s Between the G roups
Relations between private prescribcrs and the I -ondon Clinics were generally antagonistic during 
much o f  the 1980s, and this was the case between AIDA and the LCG. The minutes o f the AIP 
revealed no references to the Ixtndon Consultants as a group, and their concerns were directed 
more at self-regulation and self-defence. It has not been possible to trace whether the LCG was 
aware o f  the AIP during its brief existence, or what its reaction might have been to its activities. 
Although there was no chronological overlap between AIDA and the AIP, some members and 
even a draft of AIDA’s guidelines were shared between the two.
AIDA supposedly wanted closer cooperation between the doctors outside and inside the Clinics 
and in response to |ohn Strang’s ‘Personal View’ article in the British Medical Journal, ' D r  Dally 
wrote a letter to its editor for publication, explaining that, ‘Clinics can also provide what 
independent doctors usually cannot provide, for example, group decisions in patient treatment and 
group psychotherapy’. She concluded in conciliatory tone, ‘It is vital that the Clinic and 
independent doctor co-operate with each other. Failure to do so along the lines suggested by Dr 
Strang can only harm the patients.’1'
In a letter written to the Lancet for publication, as AIDA’s ‘Founder and Organiser’ she suggested a 
number o f measures to help the dmg treatment situation, first of which was ‘Concerted efforts of 
doctors and others who work in the field to co-operate and not to descend to slanging matches 
about how awful, stupid, indifferent, greedy or wicked the other groups are,’ a standard she was not 
herself able to maintain.'“" She wrote to the newspapers criticising the Clinics’ approaches, and
l2< G. V . Stimson and R. I art, ‘i"hc Relationship Between the State and laxral Practice in the Development o f 
National Policy on Drugs between 1920  and 1990’, in J. Strang and M. Gossop (eds), Iteroin Addiction And Ontjt 
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individual doctors such as Connell.1' '  The constant criticism aimed at the Clinics by AIDA 
suggested that a spirit of cooperation was not being fostered. AIDA’s draft guidelines themselves 
opened with a number of volleys aimed at the Clinics, and several of the letters written for 
publication contained attacks too.11"1''
In 1982 Dr Dally sought a meeting with the Clinic doctors, but apparently with no success. Writing 
to Ted I Iillier in the DI ISS’s drugs branch, on the suggestion o f Bing Spear, to establish 
communication with the ‘Clinic doctors’, she complained, W e  have made a number o f overtures to 
them but have met with no success. We would very much like representatives of this Association 
to meet with appropriate people to discuss matters of common interest.’14" Martin Nlitcheson did 
not recall these ‘overtures’, but took the view that they would have been resisted had they been 
received.11'
R egulating O ther D octors
Both AIDA and the AIP’s regulatory gazes were directed mainly at their own members, but the 
LCG set the rules by which other doctors were regulated. Consultants with concerns about the 
practices of other doctors could take a number o f  paths. They might contact the Regional I lealth 
Authority whose advisors could visit a doctor, write to the individual doctor themselves, or 
mention their concerns to a Dmgs Branch Inspector.1'4 I his third approach could arise through an 
LCG meeting at the 1 Iome Office, or through a range of other contacts doctors had with the 
I lome Office. Martin Mitcheson, for instance, used to visit Bing Spear in the course of his research 
at the Addiction Research Unit of the Institute o f Psychiatry, and doctors phoning the Dnigs 
Branch to notify- the Addicts Index could also discuss regulatory action.
Before the 1984 Guidelines had been published, over which the London Consultants had been 
decisive, the I Iome Office Drugs Branch relied in part on advice and publications from the 
Ixtndon consultants as to the appropriate practice standards they should enforce.1' ’ 1 •urthermore, 
there were no cases of I lome Office tribunals being used against the London Clinic doctors for 
inappropriate prescribing, litis was not because they achieved total uniformity of practice, but
12.1 eg A. Dally, le tte r  to The Times, (27* January 1981), Pile PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/1 (File I o f 2), W ellcome 
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because they were left to self-regulate. According to an inspector who worked in the Drugs Branch 
since the late 1980s,
They allprescribed somewlrat differently.. .there is a  core of activities that are common to tl>em all but then there are 
otl>ers; Strang would do injectables, [St] George’s don’t do injectables and things like that... there are slight differences.
1 think they tend to see t/jat they sliould be field up as the model prescribers.. .Seeing as John Strang chairs most of 
lliese committees anyway, in a sense fie sliould be doing what they said and other consultants accordingly.'M'
The process of regulation was described as follows:
The laondon consultants have a quarterly meeting is lield here [Home Office], which 1 ’re attended since 1987. .And 
part of that is sharing ofit;formation about drug misuse, prescribing, and sorts of things like that. So if  I ’d hare, 
which I  didn’t have, if  I ’d said I ’d got concerns about a particular doctor who was a consultant, I ’d  have probably 
spoken to 11 amid Glxtdse initially [convener of London Consultants Group]. .And lx would /rare, orJohn Strang or 
someone like that, andperhaps pers/uuled them or perhaps asked them to perhaps hare a quiet word in tlxir ear ¡drout 
what's going on. Certainly drey alwaysfelt that tlrey sIron Id be support ire to each otlxr, and that ifbrings, llxre was 
one of tlxir doctors gring out of line tlrey sltou/d try and put them on the straight and narrow. '1
l lic  idea o f doctors being ‘supportive to each other’ shows the shared sense o f a group interest and 
identity that was weak in AIDA and the AIP. The inspector answered the question ‘W hat if  one of 
the Drugs Branch had concerns about a consultant’s prescribing?’ as follows:
I  tome Office Inspector Well, if tlrey did, I  never Ireard about it. I here was this one occasion when I  can think of 
wherr tlx otlxr consultants had concents alrout someone prescribing and tint/ needed to look at tlx boundaries of 
tlxir... ’
SM: So the consultants were self-regulating in that sense, they kept an eve on each other.’
I tome Office Inspector "i’es.
So here was the LCG informally reporting non-Clinic doctors to the I lome Office Dnigs 
Inspectorate for regulatory investigation, apparently immune from challenge by the Inspectorate, 
while concerns about their own members were dealt with among themselves, lhe  single exception 
to this reliance upon informal, internal regulation was the case of Dr Kanagaratnam Sathananthan, 
who was not only an advocate of continued heroin prescribing on a maintenance basis after the 
Clinics had changed their practice, but the only doctor licensed to prescribe heroin privately. ITic 
GMC anil the I lome Office Inspectorate became interested in liis private and Nl IS prescribing
Ibid. 
' «  Ibid. 
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respectively, but he retained his freedom to practice and his Home Office heroin licence. If it was 
Dr Connell, as has been suggested,1 19 who was behind these inquiries, it seems likely that Dr 
Sathananthan was treated differendy by his colleagues because he was a private prescriber.
Whether his outsider status was also due to being originally from Sri 1 .anka is unclear.
R elations with th e State
The role of the state in each organisation was different and acted not as a monolithic entity w ith a 
single interest, but part of a complex policy network itself reflecting and pursuing a number o f  
different interests. AIDA’s encouragement from the Chief Inspector of the Drugs Branch, 
represented Spear’s support for doctors to be free to give injectable and maintenance prescriptions 
and his concerns about the monopoly of treatment provided by the Clinics. Spear contributed a 
factual section o f AIDA’s draft guidelines describing the legal position of doctors prescribing for 
addicts and the notification procedure for the Addicts Index,,J" but his news on treatment policy 
were very discreedy held while employed. During his sendee he promoted liis own preferences 
dtrough quiedy supporting others, such as AIDA, behind the scenes, but after retirement he began 
to campaign more openly. In 1987 he wrote to one of Dr Daily’s supporters, praising Dr |ohn 
Marks, a dissenting NHS psychiatrist who was a vocal proponent of heroin prescription at his 
Liverpool DDU:
I  am not too despondent as then art signs that a rethink is around the ivmer and a more flexible approach [to 
prescribing] may be adopted. I  think me should all do what me can to support time doctors, like D r M arks in 
IJivrpool, mho are proposing tins and I suggest, when the election is orer, you should put your point to your local 
M P V '
In the memoirs published after his death, Bing Spear lamented,
W ith the benefit of hindsight there is no doubt that the treatment centre era mis an unmitigated disaster, not because 
the basic idea mas wrong but because of the way in which that idea mas deir/oped and implemented What happened 
mas that the moral high ground mis seiged try a small group within the medical establishment, and try psychiatrists in 
particular, mho, orer the years succeeded in imposing their oum ethical and Judgemental values on treatment policy. .4 s 
a consequence there is now very little prescribing of heroin, or any injectable drug to addicts.142
Whilst quiedy encouraging AIDA, M r Spear was also wary o f  becoming tix> closely involved, 
writing, ‘I remember, after attending an AIDA meeting at which a very doubtful prescriber was
l w C. Fazey, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
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present, noting that we should be carefi.il in our dealings with the Association because it was by no 
means unlikely that some o f those who applied for membership might in due course be regarded as 
candidates for tribunal action.’144
Dorothy Black, while senior medical officer at the DHSS, attended the first AIDA meeting and 
commenting upon its draft guidelines. She too was careful to distance herself, writing to Dr Dally 
to correct the minuted description of herself as an ‘observer’, a status apparently restricted to civil 
servants attending major external meetings.'44
Spear’s support for AIDA did not represent ministers’ direction o f  policy. Indeed the lack o f 
a strong interest from politicians in the finer points o f  prescribing left civil servants to form 
their own policies within their wider brief. In this way, Spear w orked to his own agenda, 
which included support for prescribing heroin and alternatives to the Clinics. I Ie knew 
almost everyone in the drug treatment field and formed alliances to  push through his 
policies. For instance, when a complaint was made against Dr Kanagaratnam Sathananthan, 
he sought out researcher C indy Fazey to assess his private clinic. As a sociologist, Fazev was 
an unusual choice, but known to be sympathetic to D r Sathananthan’s styde o f  prescribing. 
According to Professor Fazev, it was Philip Connell who was behind the attacks on Dr 
Sathananthan, and with his hatred o f Connell, Spear interpreted th is as a vendetta, motivated 
by personal dislike.14' Fazey’s report exonerated Sathananthan’s prescribing. She also 
appeared as a witness for the defence at C M C  hearings o f both D r Sathananthan and Dr 
Dally. Along with John M arks she formed part o f an anti-I.ondon-Clinic, pro-maintenance 
faction. Professor John S trang conducted an investigation into D r Sathananthan’s NHS 
clinic but also found no unprofessional conduct.144’ 14
The A1P had little contact w ith  central government but had originated from a meeting with 
the local government and local statutory agencies. The Director o f  Public 1 Icalth for 
Kensington and Chelsea and W estm inster Health Authority, Dr Sally  Hargreaves,14* 
continued to liase with m em bers o f the AIP about progress on self-regulation. This 
culminated in a joint project between the NI IS and the private secto r, where KCW11A 
funded the I lanway Clinic to provide a drugs clinic for homeless patients in Soho, a sign o f
m Ibid, p.287.
144 D. Black, le tte r  to A. Dally, (19"> March 1982), File PP/DAI./B/4/1/1/5, Wellcome Iabrarv, London.
1,4 C. Fazey, (2002) op. at.
’J. Strang, Personal communication, (2000).
K. Sathananthan, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
,4H ‘Private Prescribing and Community Safety’, (29lh August 1996), op. (it.
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the blurred boundaries between public and private more common in the 1990s.149 However, 
there w as little sense that government wished to consult these doctors on policy changes. 
Although Anthony Thorley, Senior Medical Officer at the Department o f Health, stated that 
there would be a consultation on the draft clinical guidelines that were being revised, and that 
their input would be welcomed, the absence of any private prescribers on the committee 
itself reinforced the impression that this was mainly cosmetic.150In the event, there was no 
consultation on the draft guidelines, which were published in their finalised form in 1999. As 
the L C G ’s origins were tied to central government, its relationship has already been 
discussed above.
Stren gth s and W eaknesses 
U nify ing  factors
Both AIDA and the AIP had diverse memberships, but shared a belief in the value of maintenance 
prescribing and treatment outside the N1 IS Clinics. The working arrangements of the members 
were probably less important than their beliefs about dnig control and supply. For instance. Dale 
Beckett had been an N l IS Clinic consultant psychiatrist before going private, but he believed in far 
more liberal access to dmgs and free prescribing of heroin. Dr Diana Samwavs resigned from 
AIDA, protesting about its emphasis on maintenance prescribing, and the charging of fees, writing, 
‘I feel very concerned about the prescribing of drugs (and for money) to addicts, it seems to me 
that AIDA is a forum for the justification of this. I also felt that any other views on the treatment 
were heresy, and not for discussion at AIDA.’151 As well as the treatment approaches that members 
of the AIP favoured, they were also drawn together by a sense of threat from the media and 
regulatory bodies.
In addition to the views that developed on prescribing outside the Clinics, many members o f the 
LCG, such as Drs Willis, Bewlcv, Nlitchcson, Ghodse and Connell, specifically opposed private 
prescribing where a doctor was paid direedy by patient fee.152'151,154 Where private prescribers were 
thought to be a problem, they were discussed and it was then for the I lome Office to decide on 
whether to take action.155 I lowever, Martin Mitcheson recalled a deputation of Drs Connell and 
Bewley to be sent on behalf of the group to visit Ann Dally and express their concern. Iliere was
S. L. Hayward, (2003) op. at.
Is‘ 'Private Prescribing and Community Safety’, (29lh August 1996), op. at. 
1 Sl D. Samways, (9,h August 1982) op. tit.
'« J . Willis, (2003) op. tit.
IM M. Mitcheson, (2003) op. tit.
T. Bewley and A. 11. CJhodse. (1983) op. ¡it., pp. 1876-1877.
T. H. Bewley, (2001) op. at.
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some uncertainty over this event however, as Dr Dally made no mention o f this in her 
autobiography. What is more certain is that Dr Bewley reported Dr Dally to the GMC in 1984, 
although it decided to take no action.156
'I he Ixindon Consultants Group seems to have had the strongest sense oflocality, which it drew 
around itself as a boundary to outsiders. Within London the members defined catchment areas for 
their patients, and there was a strong sense that the I London scene was unique in scale and patterns 
of drug use. W'ith this came a rather unreceptive attitude towards their peers working in the 
provinces, one of whom recalled, ‘I can remember as a clinician coming down from Sheffield, in 
the late, probably about ”79 and talking about Diconaland I can remember the London consultants 
looking at me as if  1 had no idea what I was talking about, because they’d never heard o f the drug, 
because it wasn’t being used in D>ndon whereas it was a major problem in the north of England’.1’ 
Equally, a member of the LCG explained, ‘'Ihcrc was also the feeling that we had a lot happening 
between ourselves with our patients and most of the activity around treatment was around the 
centre of I xindon anyway and quite frankly, I think some o f us got rather fed up hearing someone 
like [consultant from outside London] telling us what type o f tablets were popular with his ten 
addicts.. AVc had a lot of tilings to talk about amongst ourselves.’1’"
lh c  AIP inevitably drew its membership from in and around Ixindon, as large scale private 
prescribing was virtually unknown outside the south cast o f England, and AIDA, wliich 
encouraged national membership from GPs had a much wider spread. iTiis may have made it 
more difficult for its members to meet, as they had further to travel.
An ability to mist each other gives the members o f a group an advantage in working together as 
infonnation can be shared openly. As might be expected from a group with a greater sense of 
shared purpose, a strong boundary drawn against outsiders and less direct competition between 
members, there was greater mist within the Ixindon Consultants Group than with the AIP, whose 
members were in competition. For instance, at the AIP’s meeting on 13lh March 1997, those 
present discussed the possibility o f  forming a consortium to buy urine tests and detoxification 
units,159 but this never came to fruition, probably because buying as a consortium would have 
revealed sensitive infonnation such as which doctors were not using unne tests. A year earlier 
forms had lx-en distributed in order to collect information from doctor members on their patient
A. Dally, (1990) op. at.. p.141.
157 Consultant Psychiatrist, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2001).
'“ J.M ack, (2003) op. at.
,w AIP, (13* March 1997), op  at.
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caseloads, fees, and other details. There was reportedly some reluctance to complete these partly for 
commercial reasons, and also because one could work out a doctor’s gross income by multiplying 
fees by numbers of patients.16,1 In contrast John Mack described an implicit confidentiality of the 
meetings of the LCG; an understanding that you could speak freely in front of your colleagues and 
civil servants.'61 I he fact that an individual member did not feel free to share papers until the 
group had been formally consulted, reinforced the sense of trust and basis for confidentiality. 
Unfortunately the data available on AIDA did not give a clear picture of the degree o f trust 
between members.
D ivisive Factors
'Ihe antagonistic position AIDA began to take towards the Clinics may have reduced AIDA’s 
strength and appeal both within and outside its membership. While they were serving together on 
the DUSS’s Medical W orking Group, Ann Dally invited GP Arthur Banks to join her Association. 
Dr Banks was well respected in the drugs field and had considerable experience in treating drug 
users, receiving praise for the booklet he co-wrote on the subject.162,165 Although in agreement with 
Dr Dally on many issues, both opposing the proposed extension o f licensing for prescribing 
doctors in 1984 (see Chapter 4), and keen to attend a meeting of AIDA, he declined to join, 
explaining. There seem to be very widely divergent Mews in the drug treatment world, with clinics 
and independents and social-model workers often strongly condemning each others’ policies. I am 
tom between the various views, or perhaps trying to remain neutral; I share many o f the criticisms 
o f the clinics but am not happy about being “independent” either.’164 I laving a member such as Dr 
Banks would not only have helped in terms of achieving external influence, but he could also have 
helped train and advise AIDA’s less experienced members.
Dr Diana Samways remarked in her letter o f resignation from AIDA, ‘I am sorry to hear the 
negative attitude AIDA members have to the Treatment Centres, and having worked in the St 
Bernard’s Unit, I am aware of the problems we all face.’16 Dr Dorothy Black, Senior Medical 
Officer at the DJISS, chided Dr Dally for her oppositional stance in AIDA’s draft guidelines.166
M. Johnson, (21X11) op. cit.
•a' J . Mack, (2003) op. cit.
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IM A. Banks, U tter to A. Dally. (15"> March 1984), File PP/DAL/B/5/1/2, Wellcome library, London. 
,M D. Samways, (9* August 1982) op. tit.
D. Black, (19"' March 1982) op. til.
246
The LCG suffered disagreements within its ranks too, with a range o f opinion on, for instance, the 
prescribing of injectable drugs, but the proponents of a particular point of view, such as Drs 
Connell and Bewley regarding the opposition to heroin and injectable methadone, were able to get 
their views adopted by most of the group and achieve a change in practice across the Clinics (see 
Chapter 4).
A problem that seems to have occurred with both AIDA and the AIP was a feeling among some 
members that disreputable doctors were using the associations as a ‘cloak of respectability’ and had 
no intentions o f changing their practice. A letter from an NI IS GP and AIDA member earlv in the 
organisation’s life expressed concern that ‘AIDA might act as a front for potentially unscmpulous 
doctors wishing to benefit from prescribing privately for drug addicts.’''1' Dr Dally herself was 
concerned about this possibility from the outset. Writing to GP member and friend Susan 
Openshaw, she asked her for advice on Svhat we should do with people who quite definitely are 
using it as a blanket o f respectability and who are not attempting to keep up high standards of 
practice.’16*
Matthew Johnson felt that this syndrome afflicted the AIP and undermined the other doctors’ 
willingness to lend support. Ihc expulsion o f two doctors might have helped this, but then, given 
that the organisation had no other sanctions to apply, the expelled doctors could continue to 
practice outside the association, which then had no influence on them at all.16' One w as eventually 
struck off the medical register by the GMC.
The private prescribers o f the AIP seemed to divide into three groups: those attracting adverse 
publicity who wanted to improve their respectability through association; those with no regulatory 
difficulties, who wanted to ‘keep their heads down’ and perceived that they had nothing to gain 
from associating with less respectable doctors, and those who wanted to achieve change, and 
improve the standing o f private prescribing through group action.
Doctors with no trouble from the regulatory authorities, such as Dale Beckett and Jeremy Bullock, 
did not attend the AIP, as they perceived no need to club together for protection. Being 
individualistic operators they did not take the view that to ‘attack one of us is to attack all of us’.
B. Jarman, U tter to A. Dally, (7«> April 1982), File PP/DAL/B/4/2/1. Wellcome Library, London.
"* A. Dally, U tte r to S. < Ipenshaw, (1 l lh February 1982), File PP/DAL/B/1/1/1, Wellcome 1 -ibrary, London. 
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This inevitably reduced the number o f ‘respectable’ members.17" Furthermore, once the first two 
groups were not attending — those not interested, and those using it for their own purposes — the 
remaining doctors were few and it was a case o f ‘preaching to the converted.’171
Competition between doctors for patients was also divisive to the group. At one AIP meeting, ‘It 
was noted that clients can and do change doctors if  they can access higher levels o f  prescribing 
even though they have managed well on lower doses. This was an issue of concern.’172
Most o f  the London Consultants already had respectability within government and among the 
public from their positions within the NHS and ‘establishment’ organisations, although they 
complained of low status within psychiatry.' '  Promotion within the NHS relied upon being 
acceptable to one’s peers and superiors, criteria missing from the private doctors, w h o  could work 
in their own businesses regardless o f selection procedures. With the exception o f L)r Sathananthan 
in Croydon, members who were perhaps more unorthodox, and continued to prescribe heroin, 
such as James W illis, either left ot their own accord or were subjected to other external pressures;’ 4 
Dr Dale Beckett’s NHS clinic was closed down reportedly because of the hospital’s dislike of drug 
user patients.175'1"'
ITie position and role o f the LCG during the 1990s is less clear due to the inaccessibility of any 
documents from those meetings. Unlike Philip Connell in his day, the most senior consultant at 
the end o f  the century, Professor John Strang, rarely attended the meetings, and it seemed that a 
greater diversity of approaches to prescribing was tolerated inside the London Clinics, but 
determining the reasons for this would require greater access to source materials than is currently 
possible.
Conclusion
Comparing the AIP with AIDA points up the changed policy environment facing private 
prescribes in the 1990s. Hie A IP ’s origins in local concerns reflected the dim inishing 
significance of the private prescribing issue on the national policy agenda, and the increase in 
local policy responses to drug issues. The AIP still attracted some interest from  the
170 M. ¡ohnson , (2001) op. cit.
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Department o f Health and Home Office, and psychiatrists and central government civil 
servants were still using opportunities for national policy making to regulate private 
prescribers in the 1990s, as in the attempted extension o f licensing in 1999/2000. Yet the 
origins o f and response to  the AIP showed the growth in significance o f local policy-making 
in the drugs field and the marginalisation o f private prescribers.
Overall, the weaknesses o f  the AIP and AIDA were that they had no sanctions that could be 
applied to non-conforming members, other than expulsion, and so could not enforce their policies, 
but this could equally be said o f the I.CG, so what made the difference? 'Ibe London Clinics, 
created by the Ministry o f  Health to address the problems identified in the Second Brain Report,1 
already had a stronger relationship with the state than the private doctors, and its leaders embedded 
themselves further within establishment bodies, such as the GMC and Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, which they could then marshal against perceived threats outside.
Strong leadership from the forceful Dr Dally could not bring consensus within AIDA, which failed 
to produce consensus guidelines, ‘agreeing to disagree’. By contrast the LCG was willing in the 
1970s and ’80s to make the sacrifices in individual autonomy required by its leadership to increase 
its corporate autonomy. This can be explained through the wider institutional power bases o f the 
dominant Drs Connell and Bewley beyond their personal qualities, the hierarchical nature of 
hospital medicine, and the multi-stranded relationships within the LCG.
Max Gluckman, in his analysis o f feuding societies in Africa and their settlement mechanisms, 
identified different allegiances across a number of settings as the root of social cohesion: a feud 
with someone in tine arena threatened that relationship across several settings and therefore more 
was at stake and there was a greater interest in settling the dispute.1 "  The Dindon consultants 
encountered each other in the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Dmgs, at the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, at the Society for the Study of Addiction, and on working parties. AIP and AIDA 
members rarely encountered each other in different occupational settings, and felt they had less to 
lose by staying true to their own preferences. I listory suggests they were mistaken.
177 Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, I he Second Report of the Interdepartmenlal Committee (Dindon: 
HMSO, 1965).
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Chapter 9: Summary and Conclusions
Introduction
The ‘public’ and ‘private’ terms that began this journey have evolved in meaning as their limitations 
have become clear, so before reflecting on the main conclusions of the research, their use needs 
some clarification. When presented in the fonn of published literature, the debate between doctors 
working privately and those working for the NHS in the drugs field has been denoted as a clash of 
sectors — ‘public’ against ‘private’ — particularly when seen from the viewpoint of consultant 
psychiatrists working exclusively in the NHS. Official documents also distinguished private 
prescribers from NHS doctors as individuals. However, the interviews carried out revealed that 
many of the doctors involved in the private sector also worked in the NHS and some have had 
lengthy careers in the NHS before their private practice. O f the private doctors prescribing to drug 
users and paid by fee interviewed between 2000 and 2(X)3 more than half (8/14) had been or were 
still working for the NHS (see Appendix A).
Furthermore, the private ‘sector’ was much wider titan those doctors involved in the ‘public- 
private’ debate, with significant provision of drug free care by private psychiatric hospitals. Since 
private hospital care rarely involved the prescribing of substitute pharmaceuticals such as 
methadone it could not be held responsible for supplying the illicit market in prescribed drugs or 
for overdose deaths and it has remained uncontroversial and outside the debate.
This research therefore has used the term ‘private prescriber’ to denote the doctors whose 
treatment involved prescribing substitute drugs and who accepted fees for their services and 
‘drug doctor’ for someone significantly involved in treating drug problems with o r without 
prescribed drugs; the word ‘sector’ has been avoided as the overlap between ‘p ub lic ’ and 
‘private’ was greater than at first supposed. Blurring these boundaries further, it transpired 
that in the 1990s private doctors also received patient referrals from the N1 IS, and 
occasionally might be paid by social services or from other public funds to carry o u t their 
work.
Private prescribing has been virtually unknown outside the south east of England being almost 
entirely concentrated in Iamdon. While much private health care has trailirionally been focused in 
die metropolis, it was surprising to find such a stark contrast between the south east and the rest of 
the country in this field. A market explanation did not seem convincing, as large populations of
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drug users were present in cities outside London from the 1980s, and grew steadily. Furthermore, 
private practice could be undertaken by NHS GPs on a small scale if demand was low. Despite 
extensive enquiries, no conclusive answer to this puzzle has been found, but it might have been 
explained by differences in policing by the Home Office Inspectorate and the police. Both had 
regional structures, and some interviewees have suggested that tolerance of private prescribing was 
greater among Home Office inspectors in the south east than outside. Yet although private 
prescribing was a metropolitan phenomenon, it was usually discussed as a national issue, with 
national policy implications.
The research has been organised around twin axes, looking at the debate both chronologically, 
through historical penodisation, and thematically, through cross-cutting issues that developed 
across time. The results have shown three major phases in relations between public and private:
C hronology
1968-mid 1970s: Experimentation and co-existence
Major regulatory changes in the late 1960s had moved prescribing to dmg users away from pnmarv 
NI IS care and into the (dimes. Private doctors, both specialist and generalist, continued to 
prescribe, but the numbers o f addicts were very small and the Clinics seemed able to meet 
demand.1 2Characterised by fluidity in treatment regimes and some degree o f co-existence between 
the public (dimes and private prescribes, this was a time of experiment and uncertainty."
Before treatment allegiances solidified in the mid-1970s, the Clinics tried out many types of 
prescribing, including amphetamines and cocaine, which were later abandoned. I leroin and 
methadone were prescribed in injectable form on a long term maintenance basis. Prior to a clinical 
tnal of oral methadone and injectable heroin carried out at University College I lospital Dmg 
Dependency Unit, when psycliiatric preferences for oral methadone started to coalesce, prescribing 
could involve cocktails of stimulants and depressants, bargained over by dix:tors and patients.
One of the concerns of the D melon consultant psychiatrists was the range o f prescribing ste les 
both among their own members, and outside. 'Hie London Consultants Group, initially a policy 
fomm and information exchange widi the Ministry o f I lealth, developed an informal regulatory 
role.
1 D. Hawks, T he dimensions o f drug dependence in the United Kingdom’ in G. Hdwards, M. A. 11. Russell, D.
1 lawks tt. a !  (eds.), D n y  und P n i f  DeptnHrnce (F'amborough, I lants., England: Saxon I louse and Lexington, 
Mass., USA: Ixtxington Books, 1976) pp.5-29.
2 T. Bewlcy, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2(X)I).
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At this stage, when Clinics prescribed generously to addicts with few of the restrictions that were 
later introduced, their approach was closer to the private prescribers. Patients had less to gain from 
‘going private’ and there was less conflict between the different doctors. The drugs policy 
community was small, consisting o f civil servants, politicians and other concerned individuals; rith 
an interest in drug users, and NHS psychiatrists, concentrated around the Home Office rather than 
the Department of I lealth, and did not attract much ministerial interest.
Late 1970s to 1982: Hardening lines of allegiance
th is phase saw the development o f strong allegiances to particular treatment approaches, a 
widening gap between NI IS and private prescribing styles and a shift of drug users seeking help 
among private and NH S doctors outside the Clinics. The Clinics’ prescribing changes were 
corralled and reinforced through the hierarchical London Consultants Group, while individualistic, 
autonomous doctors outside tried unsuccessfully to unify through their own new association. 
Medicine’s dominance o f  the drugs policy community softened, as the growing voluntary sector, 
which tended to represent a more social and less medical model o f dmg misuse, gained greater 
recognition. At the end o f this phase dmgs began to assume a higher political profile, attracting 
renewed ministerial interest.
Although licences to prescribe heroin had been almost entirely restricted to psychiatrists running 
the Clinics, their services voluntarily moved away from this practice at the end of the 1970s, 
replacing maintenance prescribing with short term oral methadone detoxification. These changes 
were achieved across the Clinics through a process of face-to-face peer pressure exercised through 
the I-ondon Consultants Group, and attempts to extend this process outside the Clinic system 
involved moves to increase the regulation o f private doctors and NI IS GPs.
Despite an original aim o f  undercutting the black market through ‘competitive prescribing’, the 
Clinics had abandoned this model by the late 1970s. The near monopoly o f treatment they held, the 
|x ilitically weak and stigmatised status o f their patients, and the absence o f market forces had 
allowed the Clinics to become unresponsive to the preferences of their patients, while the private 
doctors, practising on a more consumcrist model, were able to supply unmet demand. Although 
the voluntary sector had been providing dnig services for many years, these were typically not 
medical and did not prescribe.
252
With the change in the main source of illicit opiates from doctors’ prescriptions to trafficked drugs 
at the end of the 1970s, doctors found that instead of being die chief guardians o f the drug supply, 
they now faced major competition from a fully fledged black market in imported heroin, and a 
growing pool of demand across the country. The Clinics found they had insufficient treatment 
places and drug users were increasingly looking elsewhere for treatment. Over the 1970s the 
proportion of patients seeing GPs practising privately and on the NHS grew in both absolute terms 
and as a proportion of all those seen by doctors. NHS GPs had had litde involvement in the 
treatment of addiction since the establishment o f the Clinics, and minimal training. Private doctors 
continued to offer long term maintenance prescribing of methadone, both injectable and oral. Bing 
Spear dated disquiet over these perceived incursions into the Clinics’ territory to 1979, when they 
were discussed at a Ix>ndon Consultants Group meeting.'
Attacks on private prescribing started to appear in the medical press from 1980,* and the issues 
were remarked upon by the ACMD’ Treatment and Rehabilitation report two years later. This research 
has proven that particular Clinic doctors already opposed to private prescribing influenced the 
drafting of Treatment C~ Rehabilitation to propose extensive curbs on prescribing bv doctors outside.3 
’Ihey recommended a raft of corrective measures that included the preparation of ‘good practice’ 
prescribing guidelines by an all-medical working group.
Among psychiatrists across the London Clinics, there were a range o f views on the wisdom of 
maintenance prescribing. I lowevcr, those in the most powerful positions favoured abstinence- 
oriented treatment over longer tenn prescribing, methadone over heroin and oral over injectable 
formulations; Dr Philip Connell and Dr Thomas Bewlev seemed successhil in convincing the 
majority of their peers to follow their views. Both held influential clinical and medico-political 
positions, including on the GMC and later on the first guidelines working group.
The I .ondon Clinics’ unified approach to prescribing was facilitated bv their consultants’ regular 
meetings where they shared information and standardised practice from 1968, described bv one 
member as ‘typically English, discreet peer gnmp pressure tending to moderate the prescribing of 
heroin’ in order to prevent dmgs being traded illegally/’
' 11. B. Spear (and cd. J. Mott), Heroin Addiction Carr and Control: The ‘British System ' 1916 19/td (1-ondon: 
Drugscope, 2002) pp.275-276.
1 T.H. Bcvvley, 'Prescribing Psychoactivc Drugs fo Addicts’, British Medical Journal, 281 (1980), 49 7 —498.
1 ACMD, TnatmntandRehaln/itatuw, DHSS (London: HMSO, 1982).
6 M. Mitchcson, ‘Drug Clinics in the 1970s* in J. Strang and M. Gossnp (cds.). Heroin Addiction a n d  Hru^ Policy: 
The British System (( )xford, New York. Tokyo: ( >xford University Press, 1994), pp. 178-191, pp. 178-180.
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W ith the encouragement of a senior civil senrant sympathetic towards private prescribes and 
maintenance prescribing, drug doctors outside the Clinics, both NI IS and private, set up their own 
‘Association of Independent Doctors in Addiction’ (AIDA) in 1981, and attempted, ahead o f the 
field, to produce their own good practice guidelines and other policies to raise standards and self- 
rcgulate. In contrast to the hierarchical psychiatrists, whose group dynamics allowed them to 
sacrifice individual for the sake o f  corporate autonomy,7 the individualistic doctors o f AIDA were 
unable to achieve unity and gained little influence either internally or externally.
Perhaps one o f the most remarkable aspects o f  the public-private debate and the accusations 
o f over-prescribing levelled at private doctors, is how they intensified during a period when 
the trade in prescribed pharmaceuticals had become so overshadowed by the dramatically 
growing market in trafficked drugs. This reinforced the sense that the debate was more about 
the control o f doctors than the actual fate o f  the dmgs and the dm g users themselves.
1983-1999: Guidelines and regulatory battles
(i) 1983-87: ‘Harm reduction' outside the policy com m unity
lTiese years saw the first clinical guidelines on the treatment o f  drug users emerge from a group o f 
policy actors strongly committed to abstinence based treatment. Although included for the sake o f  
appearance in the policy process, private prescribers advocating a more pragmatic approach, later 
termed ‘harm reduction’, remained on the outside of policy-making.* Under the Conservative 
Government, drugs became a highly political issue, with substantial resources allocated to services, 
high profile media campaigns and the first comprehensive government strategy document for 
dmgs policy in 1985. The details o f  prescribing, however, were left to doctors. The battle between 
private prescribers and NI IS psychiatrists heated up and Ann Dally, the outspoken voice o f  AIDA, 
was the subject o f two GMC disciplinary hearings, ejuitting her practice in 1987. Although the 
voluntary sector had taken some o f  the medical profession’s seats in the dmgs policy community, 
doctors successfully defended prescribing as solely their domain.
The control of private doctors w as a major, and possibly the primary motivation for the first good 
practice guidelines that involved a process designed to achieve the appearance o f consensus across
See also R. Klein, The Nem Politics o j  the National Health Servitr, (London and New York 1 xmgman, first 
published 1983, third edition DOS) p p .51-62.
* S. Mars, ‘Peer Pressure and Imposed Consensus: The Making o f the 1984 “Guidelines o f  Ciood Clinical 
Practice in the Treatment o f  Drug Misuse"’ in V. Berridge (ed ). Making I lealth Polity: Netnnrikj in R ejeanh ami 
Policy A fter I ’M ! (Amsterdam: Rixlopi, 2005) pp.149-182.
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a divided profession. For the first time, the claims made in Dr Ann Daily’s autobiography about 
changes in committee procedures that facilitated this apparent consensus have been proven.'1,1"
After the official reversal of policy to reinvolve GPs in treating drug users, the perceived urgency of 
attracting drug users into treatment was heightened in the years when the issue of HIV/AIDS and 
its transmissibility through sharing injecting equipment began to influence drug treatment policies."
While the London consultants continued to be a strong force through this phase, effectively 
exercising regulatory influence over private doctors such as Ann Dally, her own organisation 
struggled to attract support or gamer influence. In AIDA there was a merging of Dr Daily’s own 
personal difficulties with the GMC with the wider concerns of her colleagues, partly as a result of 
her view that the personal was political in this case," and partly because o f her dominant, 
charismatic role in what became a relatively unstructured organisation. By the end of its life in 
1987/88, it aimed less at raising standards among doctors outside the Clinics and more at 
supporting Dr Dally in her time o f trial. By 1987 AIDA was unstructured with no committee, and 
the following year folded ‘for lack o f interest’.11 Strong leadership was not enough to bind together 
a group o f  independent individualists, working outside the hierarchical hospital system, who were 
unwilling to compromise their autonomy for longer-term gains.
(ii) 1988-99: ‘Harm reduction ’ inside the policy community 
With IIIY/AIDS high on the policy agenda, this period dated from the official endorsement o f a 
policy o f ‘harm reduction’ and coincided with Ann Dally leaving the scene. Regulatory battles 
continued, but the issue of private prescribing became less prominent as ‘hann reduction’ was 
absorbed into the mainstream drugs agenda and NI IS services expanded, dwarfing the private 
prescribers’ contribution that was still concentrated in the South East. The policy community 
diversified further with more representatives from the criminal justice system at central and local 
level, reflecting a strong legislative emphasis on penal responses to drug issues." By the late ’90s, 
dmg doctors had even conceded their last bastion of medical exclusivity, prescribing, to at least an
’’ A. D a l l y , 1  Doctor's Story (London: Macmillan, 1990) pp. 127-132.
'"S. Mare. (2005) op. at., p.169.
11 V. Berridge, s i  IDS in the UK Vhe Stakjny o f  Po/hy. I9XI-I994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp.223- 
224.
12 See Ann Daily’s description o f the cases in A Doctor's Story (1990) op. cit., pp.99-218.
" C. Brewer, Letter to Ann Dally, (27"> June 1988), File PP/DAL/B/4/1/1 /I (File 2 o f  2), W ellcome Library, 
London.
11 V. Berndge, ‘AIDS and British dmg policy: continuity or changer'’ in V. Bcrndge and P. Strong (eds.), AIDS 
anil Contemporary History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) pp. 135-156.
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appearance o f non-medical input, although they still held out successfiilly against patient 
membership.15
The wider geographical spread of services and reduced prominence of the London prescribing 
scene in treatment policy debates strengthened voices from the rest of the UK and diverted 
attention from private prescribing. ITiis worked both for and against private prescribers: less 
attention was given to controlling their prescribing practices than was the case in the 1980s, but 
their scope for representation and participation in the policy process was also diminished.
The demise o f AIDA, although never powerfid, removed a conduit through which official 
representations could be made. In 1996, the similar Association of Independent Prescribers was 
set up, too late to influence the next round of clinical guidelines, and collapsing only two years later. 
The rise o f local policy making on drugs issues and the marginalisation o f private prescribers 
were both seen in the origins o f the Association o f Independent Prescribers. Instead of 
central government, as in the case o f  AIDA, it was local government and services that were 
the instigators, keen to see private doctors organized and self-regulating. However, like 
AIDA, they were similarly unable to protect it from internal conflicts and private doctors 
remained outside the policy community.
Through the 1980s and ’90s further moves were made by NI IS consultant psychiatrists to regulate 
private prescribers. These included attempts to encourage the I lomc Office to further restrict the 
prescribing o f opiates and injectable dnigs by GPs and private doctors. Changes in kev civil 
servants, both medical and administrative at the Department of I Icalth and 1 lome Office, were 
initially more favourable to these regulatory aims but the ground gained by the harm reduction 
movement in the wake o f the IHV/AIDS crisis and the continuing increase in drug users seeking 
treatment worked to counter this.
In a reversal o f the anti-maintenance orthtxloxy of the early 1980s, long term prescribing o f oral 
methadone was seen as a way o f enticing patients into treatment and keeping them away from the 
risky practice o f injecting. Policy makers were fearful that the greater restrictions desired by the 
Dindon NI IS psychiatrists and civil servants could discourage reluctant CîPs from involvement 
with these unpopular patients anti they were not implemented. Meanwhile, the introducuon of 
management into the Nl IS brought increased regulation, including clinical audit, within the whole
15 eg U K  1 Icalth Departments, Drug M isuse a n d  Dependents. Guidelines on CSssical Managfeuent (1-ondon: The 
Stationery ( )fficc, 1999).
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National Health Service. Consequently by the 1990s the differential regulatory control over public 
and private drug doctors was more marked.
Two further editions of the ‘good practice’ guidelines were produced, with expanded contributions 
from general practice;16,17 these reflected the diminished concern about private prescribers, but the 
issue was still important enough to spur the writers o f the third guidelines to propose a new system 
of prescribing controls, with particularly strict requirements for these doctors. By 1999 NHS drug 
services had become integrated into wider developments in health services, with emphasis on the 
‘primary care-led NHS’ and ‘evidence-based medicine’.
Although government attention fell dirccdy on the public sector, bv the end of the century the 
increased pressure on the GMC also increased scrutiny of ¿///doctors. As the period closed, private 
prescribers’ arguments had been subsumed within the wider concerns of health services, patient 
choice, and professional self-regulation and, unable to organise either as an effective lobby group or 
to sclf-rvgulate, dieir influence and very survival lrxvked threatened.
Thematic Findings
Two main weapons were used to fight the batdes over private and NI IS prescribing, and to express 
differences o f  opinions between the different camps: the media and the various systems o f medical 
regulation.
Regulation an d  the public-private relationship
Medical regulation has been described as a way o f  protecting consumers of services when the 
market place cannot or docs not work due to unequal knowledge' between consumer and 
supplier."1 Self-regulation in Kngland has been based on the idea o f professional consensus, lacking 
in the dnigs field, particularly from the mid-1970s onwards, with the definition o f ‘good practice’ 
highly contentious both among professionals and patients. In such a divided arena, regulation,
Ixith within the profession and bv the state, was used rc|x-atedlv in attempts to control the range of 
drug services provided and the content of treatment, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, with little 
basis in research evidence. 'Hie changing constituents of die dmgs policy community interacting 
with wider developments in the health service and society at large pnxluced a range o f regulator,
14 Department o f  1 leallh, Scottish C Iffice 1 fomc and I lealth Department and Welsh ( )ffice, D/w? Misuse and 
Dependent. Ciuide/ines on ClinicalAlaHoymenl (1-ondon: I !M S( ), 1991).
17 UK Health Departments, (1999) op. dr.
18 M. K. Duval and J. Den Boer, ‘Consumer health education’ in A. levin (cd.), Repplating Health Carr. Tire 
Stnepg/e for Control, Prttcccdings o f  the Academy o f Political Science, 33, 4 (New York: Academy o f Political 
Science, 1980) pp. 168-1 HI.
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effects across the period, combining state and self-regulation in varying combinations with different 
groups o f doctors.
The thirty years under examination saw a number of regulatory interventions, both in changes to 
the existing framework through legislation and in the implementation o f existing regulatory systems 
against individuals. The treatment of addiction was one o f  the earliest examples o f  state and 
professional supervision of prescribing practice when heroin and cocaine licences were introduced 
for doctors at the end of the 1960s and drug treatment was one of the first areas to develop 
guidelines on good practice in the 1980s. The role of private practice was pivotal in these regulatory 
developments and was still a significant influence in the 1990s.
'ITie GMC, the Home Office Drugs Inspectorate, and the working parties which produced the 
clinical guidelines all formed part o f the formal regulation o f dmg doctors, representing both state 
sponsored self-regulation and direct regulation by the state. Formal regulation did not equate with 
fixed mies but instead was flexible and beset by ambiguity. Ih e  GMC avoided issuing specific 
advice, definitions, or clear mies o f conduct and this was exploited by particular factions wishing to 
use self-regulation for their own ends.
In the high profile disciplinary hearings against Ann Dally, the GMC showed an apparent bias 
against her but a conspiracy to drive her from practice was not proven. In the 1980s the system 
seemed to be used politically against non-conforming doctors. At the same time, under external 
pressure, the GMC had increased its scrutiny of practitioners’ conduct. 'Ihe profession had a poor 
record of concern for regulating the conduct of doctors in the treatment o f patients, and during the 
1970s and ’80s, the rise of patients’ rights and consumerism outside of the profession increasingly 
pressurised the GMC to address issues of clinical decision making, especially when it involved 
neglect, hann or death caused by practitioners.1'’ 'Ihe 1980s and ’90s saw a rise in disciplinan,’ cases 
concerning doctors’ conduct and the case o f Dr Tamcsby showed that the GMC did fulfil some 
role in protecting dmg using patients from private prescribes whose practice was dangerous, 
however reluctantly.
'Ihe regulatory tools available to the Inspectorate, and their use, passed through several different 
phases over the period, interweaving with the GMC: 1970-73 was a period o f frustration; the 
Tribunal system had passed into legislation in 1971 but was awaiting activation, with a GMC
,'1 M. Stacey, Regelating Rritish Medicine: the General Medical Council, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1992) 
pp. 173-199.
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reluctant to take action itself; from 1973 to ’82 the Tribunal system was used, but only occasionally, 
probably due to lay-medical sensitivities, while the GMC took some action itself. After 1982, the 
GMC continued to discipline private prescribes and the use of Tribunals became more frequent 
until die mid-1990s Garfoot ‘watershed’. From 1997 the Tribunals fell into disuse, partly as a  result 
o f supra-national regulation and the step up in medical self-regulation, with the GMC taking over as 
sole prosecutor o f ‘irresponsible’ prescribes and gathering momentum at the turn of the century. 
Although the Inspectorate and the GMC continued to co-operate, with the Inspectorate providing 
some of the information used for the GMC cases, the weight was on professional rather than state 
regulation.
During the 1990s the Inspectorate’s leadeship sought greater control over non-Clinic prescribes, 
but failed to protect its sources o f strength, losing two regulatory mechanisms: the Addicts Index 
and the Tribunal system. By the end of the twentieth century, the Inspectorate was a much 
diminished force. After an initially heightened status as the main advisory source o f mi in stes , it 
had failed to capitalise on the growing political importance of the drugs issue, losing out to o th er 
more specialised agencies and cost-cutting exercises. Other developments such as the government 
and media pressure on the GMC to increase its regulatory' activity across all of medicine, and the 
questioning o f doctore’ ability to sclf-regulatc, in addition to the costly failure of the Garfcxit case 
and the end to Tribunals, left the Inspectorate dependent upon the GMC to enforce the findings of 
its much reduced inspections.
lhroughout these three decades, the Inspectorate informally cooperated with die other strands in 
die regulatory network, both state and professional, to gather intelligence, and to advise and 
discipline those non-Clinic doctors it found wanting. Clinic doctors hail managed to establish 
themselves and maintain a position of expertise that the Inspectorate did not direcdv challenge. No 
(dinic doctors were taken to Tribunal for irresponsible prescribing, and they were left to largely self- 
regulate.
In form al R egulation
Alongside these fonnal systems were informal ones which were less overt in their regulatory aim s, 
but which also combined state and self-regulation. Three informal mechanisms were developed by 
the bun ion  Clinic doctors, private prescribere and NI IS general practitioners with the 
encouragement of civil servants: AIDA (1981-1988), the AIP or Association of Independent 
Prescribe« (1996-98) and the LCG (1968 to the present). Comparison of these three groupings 
using Cultural 'Iheory has shown how and why the London consultants succeeded in fending o ff
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outside regulation, and set the standards by which other doctors were judged, while the private 
doctors succumbed to extensive discipline.
In Cultural Iheory terms, the private prescribes tended to be individualistic entrepreneurs 
(although this term does not necessarily imply a profit motive), scoring low on social stratification 
with considerable individual autonomy over behaviour and status. I heir sense of group identity 
and boundaries with the outside w ere weak, meaning that there were few controls on who could 
become a private prescriber or a m em ber of AIDA or the AIP. Economic competition within 
AIDA and also between AIP members, with attendant issues o f  commercial confidentiality, led to a 
lack of trust.
Cultural Ibeory would define the Ixm don consultants as a hierarchy, with a strong sense of 
stratification and identity as a group. 'Ihere was competition between Ixrndon consultants for 
prestige and resources, but not for patients, and although they too had rivalries and resentments, 
these were held in check for the sake o f  the overriding interest o f  group.
AIDA and the AIP both drew memberships from doctors working outside the Clinics. Unlike the 
LCG, they did not try to regulate o ther groups of doctors but intended to raise standards among 
their own members and defend themselves from attack. Neither AIDA nor the AIP reached their 
goals and both collapsed from insufficient support and interest. They lacked sanctions that could 
lie applied to non-conforming members, other than expulsion, and so could not enforce their 
policies. I lowever, the London Consultants Group also lacked fonnal sanctions but succeeded in 
influencing its own members’ practice and wider policy, so what made the difference?
The patterns of involvement with the state and establishment bodies among these three groups 
affected their ability to influence prescribing policies and regulation. Individual personalities also 
played a role, but secondarily to the social organisation of the associations, the economic positions 
of their members, and their resulting values, priorities and perceived interests.
Ihe Uindon Consultants Group’s strengths lay less in its own meetings than in members’ 
perceived shared identity and their networks of mutual ties; bonds which integrated them both with 
each other and into establishment fxxlies inside and outside the state. Many of the I.CG members 
also belonged to at least one of the G M C , Royal College of Psychiatrists, Advisory Council on the 
Misuse o f Dnigs, or government w orking groups, so they encountered each other across a variety 
of settings, prom 1977 their meetings tcxik place at the 1 Iomc Office, a location they denied to
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AIDA. In contrast, the private prescribers generally only saw each other at AIDA or the AIP, so 
rarely had other links with each other, and also lacked the membership of establishment bodies 
with the exception o f the 1984 guidelines working group (see Chapter 4). WTiile LCG members had 
a lot to lose from ongoing feuds with each other, AIP and AIDA members who rarely encountered 
each other in different occupational settings, felt they had less to lose by staying true to their own 
preferences. 'ITiis also applied to the feud between private prescribers and London consultants 
who did not often encounter each other.
An ability to trust each other would give the members of a group an advantage in working together 
as infonnadon could be shared openly. As might be expected from a group with a greater sense of 
shared identity, the LCG drew a strong boundary against outsiders and there was less direct 
competition between members, fostering greater trust within the I -ondon Consultants Group than 
among the private prescribers. The latter’s mistrust on confidential matters was borne out to some 
extent, as the author was able to access the papers o f both the AIP and AIDA from the actions of 
single members acting alone in each case, whilst a lone member o f the I.CG felt unable to act 
without the consent o f its current membership. The LCG succeeded in controlling information 
that dated back to the 1970s, across generations, despite the fact that it was not held centrally. The 
LCG’s strong identity and sense of solidarity meant that an individual member did not feel able to 
act autonomously, but needed corporate permission to proceed, and its secrecy showed a strong 
boundary to the outside world.
What might be seen as the corporate weakness of the private doctors, they themselves would have 
prized as freedom to follow their own prescribing preferences independent of the peer pressure 
that affected the I xmelon consultants, lhe ir independence, although helping them to resist both 
formal and informal regulation in the short term, weakened their claims to self-regulation, and 
ultimately led to a loss of freedom when forced to confonn by formal regulation.
Klein, although not referring to Cultural Theory, has distinguished between individual and 
collective autonomy (weak and strong group) when discussing the introduction and 
implementation o f clinical audit in the National I Icalth Service. I le saw this as the medical 
profession accepting and participating in the restriction of inilividual clinicians’ autonomy in order 
to strengthen collective professional autonomy,2" a similar process to that seen in the I ,CG.
2,1 R. Klein, (1995) op. at., pp.24.3-244.
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However, the conformity of the London consultants should not be over stated. Although they 
pushed through restricted prescribing for new Clinic patients in the late 1970s and 1980s, they 
retained considerable autonomy for themselves in dealing with established patients, and in the 
1990s, they were offering a range o f different treatments, including injectable prescribing, heroin, 
and amphetamines, at their own discretion while still attempting to prevent such practices outside 
o f the Clinics.
Regulation o f Patients
An unusual aspect o f this area of medical practice was its role in controlling the supply o f dmgs. 
'Ihis tended to be couched either in terms of public health — preventing the spread of addiction - 
or crime prevention through curbing the illegal trade in pharmaceutical dmgs. In the 1980s 
doctors’ policing roles became more explicit through the actions of the GMC. 'lhc Inspectorate 
had prosecuted doctors for ‘irresponsible prescribing’ before diis, but in 1983 the GMC made clear 
that it expected doctors to predict the likelihood of the drugs they prescribed Ijcing diverted to 
other users, holding Or Oally to account for the sale of drugs that she might or might not have 
prescribed.
The conflicts this could bring between a doctor’s concerns over a patient’s health and his or her 
potential criminality or risks to public health were a recurrent theme in the prescribing debates. The 
regulation of doctors’ prescribing was therefore also the regulation of patients’ dmg use. Recom­
mendations for consumption of methadone doses to be supervised by pharmacists and picked up 
daily, for instance, aimed both at preventing individual binge use and overdoses and stopping 
supplies reaching unintended hands.
For private doctors particular conflict could arise over the non-pavment o f  fees. In view o f  the 
concerns expressed by some over the effect of payment of fees on the doctor-patient relationship, 
it might be expected that a doctor would be considered unethical to cease a patient’s treatment for 
non-payment, but the regulatory bodies concerns over the illicit sale of prescription drugs created a 
situation where a doctor was at risk of disciplinary action if he or she kept treating such a patient.
Role of the media
The interface between the media and medicine has been a complex one.'1 In tins debate the media 
acted as both a conduit for the views of both sides of the debate and as an actor in itself. The 21
21 K. Iamghlin, "’Your Life in Their Hands”: the context o f a medical-media controversy’, Mtdia History, 6 
(2000), 177-188.
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medical press featured articles and letters from proponents and opponents of private prescribing, 
which were then fed into the regulatory process. The general media were also involved in the 
debate. As well as featuring letters from both sides, a number o f ‘stings’ were carried out by 
undercover reporters posing as drug dependent patients to test the ease with which they could 
obtain drugs from private doctors. The resulting articles in the tabloid press prompted 
investigations by the 1 lome Office Drugs Inspectorate and were also featured in disciplinary cases 
before the GMC. I he stings continued into the 1990s and one by the News of the W 'oM  in 1996 
which encouraged a poor image o f private prescribers acted as a spur to the creation of the 
Association o f Independent Prescribers as a means of self-defence and improving their public 
p ro file ." ’
Ways in which the private prescribes and the Ixindon consultants used the media pointed up some 
o f die differences between them. Ann Dally, and later to a lesser extent Colin Brewer, wrote for 
and appeared in both the general and medical media; aside from one letter to T/je 7 'hues bv a group 
o f consultants and voluntary sector organisations written in 1981, Dr Daily’s chief opponents, Drs 
Connell and Bewley, restricted their expressions to the medical press. Daily’s very public attacks on 
the Clinics rarely received direct responses in the non-medical public sphere. Green the private, 
behind-the-scenes nature o f much policy-making in dmg treatment during the 1960s and TOs, 
drawing the debate outside medicine and into the public's gaze may have been seen bv the London 
consultants as particularly reprehensible in the 1980s and *90s. I lie  result was a more ‘private’ 
debate sought by the public doctors, who wished to keep the general public out o f the issues, and a 
‘public’ debate pursued by private doctors.
O f course, the two cases that brought Ann Dally before the GMC provoked a considerable 
amount o f coverage in both the medical and general media. Bringing the prescribing debate to the 
general public also drew scrutiny of the Council’s processes, seen by several commentators as 
unfair, and if  her accusers wished to see a vocal critic silenced, the cases partly backfired.
The Policy-Making Process
Changes in the make-up o f the dmgs policy community have been described above, showing the 
influence o f different professional groups and particular individuals, and reflecting the changing 
profile of drug treatment services in England. ITiroughout this period members o f  the policy 
community showed varying degrees o f interest in regulating prescribing. Government politicians 2*
22 M. Johnson, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2000).
’’ M. Johnson, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2(X)1).
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did not concern themselves with these details except for any implications for cost or overall service 
provision. Given Conservative governments’ favourable attinides towards private medicine, private 
prescribcrs might have expected some support. However, prescribing was not considered fodder 
for the party political debate on the public-private mix in health care provision, but rather as part of 
the cross-party ‘drugs’ issue and this dichotomy continued into the 1990s.24
By contrast, civil servants at the I lome Office and Department of 1 lealth took a keen interest in 
the prescribing debate and their shifting alliances with doctors influenced ventures to control 
prescribing outside the Clinics, and also the degrees of success these projects achieved. Kev senior 
civil servants, both medical and lay, tended to be very knowledgeable about the drugs field and held 
private views on appropriate prescribing and how treatment services should be arranged which they- 
did not openly declare but which guided the policies they initiated and pursued.
Methods used by civil sen-ants to push fonvard their aims included briefings to ministers, 
encouraging ministers to fund particular types o f services, provision of infonnal advice and 
information to clinicians, infonnal support for clinicians’ own political activities, and particularly 
important in the presenbing debates, advice and support for expert committees, such as the 
ACMD, and the good practice guidelines working groups. As might be expected in a small polio- 
community, changes in these key personnel in the 1980s anil 1990s had significant impacts on 
attempts to control private prescribing.
While the Clinics formed the main response to dm g problems in the early to mid-1970s and their 
prescribing was eclectic and often generous, they faced little opposition and generally co-existed 
with private alternatives outside. The medical profession dominated polio' making bodies such as 
the ACMD and was either decisive in or genuinely consulted about policy- changes. But once the 
1 xmdon consultants had used their collective strength to move away from such prescribing across 
the board in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and Nl IS GPs were becoming re-involved in dmg 
treatment, the consultants began to face competition and criticism from NI IS (IPs, private 
prescribcrs and voluntary- services, yvho in turn gained support from kev civil servants keen to see 
greater diversity o f provision beyond the Clinics. Ixmdon consultant leaders attempted to use both 
regulation by the state, in the form of the 1 lome Office Dnigs Inspectorate, and medical self-
24 eg. NIIS Kxecutive, Keyjthttin^ Pritut/e anil I olun/ary Hea/thi'an. A Consultation Poiument, (London: Department 
o f I lealth, 1999).
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regulation through the GM C and clinical guidelines to weed out this opposition.25 They also 
helped scupper one senior civil servant’s attempts to link with private interests and build a new 
policy community.
When successfully allied, even if differendy motivated, civil servants and consultant psychiatrists 
usually managed to increase regulation over other doctors during the 1980s. l i t i s  happened with 
the production of the first good practice clinical guidelines (1984), which were subsequendy used by 
both the GMC and I lome Office in their disciplinary cases, and in disciplinary cases against 
particular private doctors. However, this did not give the consultants all that their leaders wanted: 
they had actually been seeking statutory controls over other prescribers and probably agreed to a 
civil sen-ant’s proposal o f good practice guidelines as a compromise. Furthermore, consultants’ 
attempts to give the guidelines sharper teedi through an extended licensing system failed when 
opposed by civti sen-ants. Although powerful dirough existing routes of regulation, the London 
consultants were insufficicndy influential at ministerial level to achieve change in legislation without 
the help of senior civil servants.
Equally, senior civil servants in die Home Office and Department o f Health were not always 
supreme, and were aware o f  a number o f constraints on their actions. In the 1980s, when the 
private-public batde was at its height, these civil servants trod a carefiil path to appear non-partisan, 
and were sensitive not to antagonise the powerful I xmdon consultants. The Inspectorate in 
particular, through the 198()s and ’90s, was also sensitive to the potential conflicts o f interest 
between regulating the doctors outside the Clinics and its role in encouraging doctors’ involvement 
with tltis unpopular patient group and cultivating medical contacts for intelligence gathering.
During the 1990s, the balance between civil servants and the rest o f  the policy community changed. 
Major players at both the Department of I Iealth and I lome Office were intent on greater 
regulation of prescribing. Yet in the drug treatment field the voices o f psychiatrists had not only to 
compete with other professionals, but also with general practitioners and public health doctors, all 
now inside the policy community. l’ost-I I IN', the community response to dnig problems was 
further strengthened and hospital doctors, although sull clinging to the tide o f ‘addiction specialists’ 
had greater difficulty controlling what went on outside. In the late ’80s and 1990s, there was greater 
accord in the policy community than during most o f  the 1980s, partly with the precarious hann
2' S. Man, ‘Public versus private treatment for addiction: Britain in the 1980s’, Hcnllb Bc/urrn tht Prinilr and the 
Public -  Shifting Approaches. European Association for the 1 listory o f Medicine and I lealth Annual Conference, 
(( )slo, Norway: 3"l-7,,l Scptcmlrer 2003).
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reduction consensus, and also with the forced departure of vocal critic Ann Dally. These 
developments both helped and hindered the senior civil servants who were trying to gain greater 
central control over prescribing.
Overarching all these changes, the medical profession was under pressure to prove it could self- 
regulate and at the end o f the century, in this atmosphere o f increased scrutiny, the C M C prepared 
to mount a flurry of cases against private prescribers, which were to thin their numbers and deter 
those remaining from prescribing outside official guidelines.“  Yet at the same time, I xindon 
consultants failed once more to extend licensing to doctors outside the Clinics, ev en though this 
time they had gained the support o f the necessary civil servants. By this stage, the Home Office 
Drugs Inspectorate, under Alan Macfarlane, had lost its pivotal position as drugs policy advisor to 
ministers, so its support for the proposals had less impact. A t the same time, several vocal GP 
members of the policy community who opposed the licensing proposals had accrued more 
influence than their predecessors had held in the 1970s or ’80s, both reflecting the increased 
importance of general practice in drug services and their raised status and power across the N l IS.
The role o f civil servants in the policy community was critical throughout this period, and 
demonstrated a complex relationship between the state and the medical profession that did not fit 
what might be called a Foucauldian model: according to such a model, the central government 
inspectorate might have been expected to have taken an impersonal approach to monitoring its 
subjects but the changing leadership of the Inspectorate showed the very personal imprint left on 
the surveillance and disciplinary processes. Far from seeking conformity, Spear encouraged 
heterogeneity in treatment services and regulatory methods, while making opportunistic alliances to 
achieve this. David Armstrong’s Foucauldian concept of the ‘Infirmary’ fitted the Inspectorate’s 
mode o f working more closely than Foucault’s original ‘Panopticism’, but did not add significantly 
to understanding the role o f the Inspectorate.
The independent expertise that characterised the Inspectorate further developed Gerald Rhodes’ 
findings o f central government inspectorates’ tendencies to diversify their roles to develop their 
own knowledge bases and act as advisors to ministers on policy issues. Rhodes also saw 
inspectorates as not only enforcing standards, but setting them too. This also matched the I lome 
Office case and a similar division made by the inspectors between those they inspected tin a 26
26 eg. M. Johnson, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2000).
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friendly basis to gather intelligence, who were considered reputable, and the dishonest who were 
prosecuted.
'lb e  characteristics of this Inspectorate corresponded to a Weberian model of bureaucracy, where 
power was derived from technical expertise and knowledge developed through experience in the 
service, as did its tendency to self-perpetuate into a permanent institution through adapting its aims, 
rather than serving the ends for which they were originally designed. T he Drugs Inspectorate 
developed into a source of policy advice for government, training for prescribes, an occasional 
referral agency for patients, and policy actor in its own right.
Spear’s behind-the-scenes involvement with AIDA and invitation to host its meetings at the Home 
Office conformed to a pattern found elsewhere by Virginia Berridgc w ith the pressure group 
Action on Smoking and Health. In both cases the government was supporting voluntary 
organisations who could advocate polio,’ positions desired within government but not deemed 
acceptable or advantageous for government to express itself.2'
'Ihe roles o f private prescribes and N1 IS psychiatrists in the policy community have been 
discussed but the contribution o f GPs was also important. Through m ost of the 1970s, GPs had 
been excluded from treating drug users to the delight of some of their number28 and their re­
involvement later on in that decade was led by grass-roots patient demand radier than government 
or professional policy. Their representation in the policy community was initiallv weaker than the 
I-ondon consultants, but it grew through the rest of the century, refiecting their increased numbers 
in treatment services, their rising status within the medical profession, and after the Tneat meat and 
Rehabilitation report of 1982, official Department of I lealtli policy that encouraged their 
participation. Although more integrated into the state than private prescribers, as contractors to the 
N1 IS they were nonetheless more independent than the salaried psychiatrists anti shared some of 
the interests o f  each. By the late 1990s, some GPs in die policy community were acting as proxies 
for the excluded private prescribers, fearing that the proposed changes affecting both groups of 
doctors could increase centralised controls bnnging a loss of autonomy from themselves and their 
patients.
77 V. Bcrridgc, ‘Issue network versus producer network? ASH, the Tobacco Products Research Trust and UK  
smoking policy’ in V. Bcrridgc (cd.). M aking I irntth Pokey: Networks in Resenreb amt Pokey After 1945 (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2005) pp.101-124.
A. J. I lavves, ‘Goodbye junkies. A general practitioner takes leave o f his addicts’, l^etneet i (1970), 258-260.
267
With greater GP involvement and the diminishing impact o f private practice in the policy 
community, the debate over the appropriate prescribing moved from the language o f ‘public’ 
versus ‘private’, and ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the Clinics characteristic of the 1980s, to one increasingly 
expressed through a distinction between ‘specialists’ and ‘generalists’ in the 1990s. The specialist- 
generalist differentiation was used in Home Office disciplinary proceedings at this time and was a 
major subject o f debate in the 1999 guidelines working group meetings, using training and 
experience as the measure of specialism, rather than specialty or location o f work. This partly 
reflected wider changes in Department of I lealth policy for the NHS, with its promotion o f ‘shared 
care’ between specialist and primary care and a ‘primary care led’ NHS, but essentially came down 
to the same fundamental issues: the control o f  particular prescribing practices outside the Clinics.
ITie dmgs policy community has shown many parallels with the alcohol policy community, as 
described by Betsy Thom, where many of the same developments were seen at an earlier point in 
time. These included a powerful institutional and professional base within psychiatry in the 
Maudsley hospital, with strong lx>nds to medical civil servants in Ministry/Department of I lealth. 
Both sets of medical experts (sometimes the same people in alcohol and drugs) adhered to a 
medical disease model, which gave way to a more social and behavioural model in the drugs field in 
1980s and in alcohol a decade earlier. Both saw a widening o f the policy community, but with a 
strong position retained by the psychiatrists into the 1990s. Concepts moved in both directions, 
with the ‘problem drinker’ generating the ‘problem drug taker’ in the early 1980s, and support for 
‘harm reduction’ in the drugs field Ix-ing used to gain support for a similar approach in the 1980s 
and 1990s for alcohol policy."’
Although the move from the disease model o f  alcohol ‘dependence’ to the more behavioural 
model o f ‘problem drinker’, influenced by psychology, might seem to have reduced the role for 
medicine by necessitating input from the other professions and voluntary services, Betsy Thom has 
suggested that in the alcohol field this change also opened up new approaches for psychiatry. ’ A 
very similar effect could be seen in the dmgs field with the change from drug dependence to 
‘problem dnig taker’, the term introduced by the AC AID,’1 both normalised and re-pathologiscd 
dmg users: on the one hand it suggested that not all dnig users had problems resulting from their 
dnig use requiring medical or other care. On the other it widened the pitch so that addiction was
B. Thom, Dealing with Drink. Alcohol and Social Polity: prom Treatment to Manaeement (London ami New York: 
Free Association Books, 1999) p.217.
I b i d .  pp. 149 151.
11 ACMD, (1982) o p . a t . ,  p.34-35.
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not the limit of drug problems that medical services might need to address, extending them to 
regular excessive consumption and intoxication.
The terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ have an additional meaning in terms o f policy making, relating to 
spheres, rather than ownership. Stimson and I .art have described policy making visible in the drugs 
field in the 1960s and the 1970s as carried out behind the scenes in ‘an essentially private world 
where policy was made by accommodation between experts and civil servants’. The ACMD, 
established in 1971, continued in this tradition,1’ and its discussions and minutes were subject to the 
Official Secrets Act.
In the 1970s, policy changes among the Ixmdon consultants, such as the switch from heroin to 
methadone prescribing, took place through committees (the 1.CG) which met in private and in 
discussions at medical conferences, rarely involving public campaigns. Treatment policies were 
seen as a private affair, and it is the conclusion of this research that it was the public nature of Ann 
Daily’s attacks on the Clinics that so embittered the London consultants as much as the content of 
the attacks themselves. Discussing in public what the I .ondon consultants saw as matters for 
private, or at least confined to the profession, broke their code of private policy-making.
Others, such as Dr John Marks, consultant psychiatrist in a 1 jverpool DDU, famous for his 
advocacy of substitute heroin prescribing, and Dr Colin Brewer, a london  private prescriber who 
was briefly a member o f AIDA and the AIP, continued in a similar vein in the late 1980s and ’90s, 
and gained similar unpopularity with the Clinic establishment. Although doctors’ presenbing 
differences had been brought fully into the spotlight o f the general media, not all policy issues were 
dealt with in public after this. Aside from the rhetorical debates about issues such as links between 
drug dependence and acquisitive crime, much of drugs policy continued to be made in private 
meetings between doctors and civil servants. The licensing issues o f 1984 and 1999 were dealt with 
largely within the policy community and the committees’ licensing recommendations went directly 
to ministers. 'Ihe V9 Guidelines made only a brief mention o f these intentions.
Intermitiomii influent rs
The freedom from legislative controls enjoyed by doctors in the ‘British System’, even after the 
changes of 1968, was distinctive among most Western countries, where substitute presenbing was 
either non-existent or highly controlled. And although Britain was often held up as a model in the
G. V. Stimson ami R. 1 .art, l l i c  relationship between the state and local practice in the development o f 
national policy on drugs lie tween 1920 and 1990’ jn ). Strang and M. Gossop (1994) oft. til., pp.331 341, p.3.36.
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United States, the influence went in both directions. 'ITie switch from heroin prescription to 
methadone in the 1970s and ’80s in the London Clinics was partly due to pioneering work in the 
US observed by NHS psychiatrists visiting from England. I .ater, in the 1990s when ‘evidence 
based medicine’ came to the fore, international research became more prominent in the debate. 
'ILere was some indication, for instance in relation to  heroin and methadone prescribing in the V9 
Guidelines, that evidence was dted selectively to support existing preferences while equally robust 
research was ignored, but a more systematic analysis beyond the scope of this study would be 
required to confirm this.
Different m odels o f m edical practice
I h c  most appropriate and professional model of care for prescribing to dmg users, held up by the 
London psychiatrists, was that of the salaried hospital doctor. After 1982, NI IS GP practice could 
also be acceptable, but single-handed practices were criticised within the NHS. Private prescribing, 
especially by a lone practitioner with none o f die multidisciplinary support of the Clinics or GP 
group practices, were deplored by influential addiction consultants.
Financial encouragement of group general practices and health centres across the Nl IS had 
followed the 1966 new contract," and working alone gradually became seen as outmoded in the 
NI IS. Some criticism of private practitioners could be seen as part o f  die dominance of newer 
health service models over the old style of single-handed practitioners, also reflecting medicine’s 
accommodation o f other occupational groups.
Further insight can be drawn from the reverse situation found bv Smart Anderson in pharmacy, 
where conflict over models o f working was also part o f  policy debates. Among pharmacists, 
salaried professionals, such as those employed in hospitals, were in the minority and less well 
organised, while the small business model of community pharmacy dominated in number and 
influence. The tension between pharmacy as a profession and pharmacy as business was a major 
theme, and under the welfare state it was the business model that tended to triumph in tile latter 
half of the twentieth century." lliis contrast between doctors and pharmacists has suggested that it 
may have been the position of particular groups of professionals within their professions, and their 
degrees o f representation in their professional lx »dies that detennined the success of their favoured 
mtxlels and arguments, rather than any intrinsic merits o f their particular cases.
" C.Wcbstcr, The Nrttionit/1 \eitlth Service. A Toliticrtl History (C Oxford: ( Ixford University Press, 1998).
M S. Anderson, ‘1 lealth professionals and health care systems: the role o f  the state in the development o f  
community pharmacy in Great Britain 19(H) to 1990’, N atioeud Health I’ohd es  in  Contest Workshop, (Bergen, 
Norway, 27.28"' March 2003).
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Consum erism  in health care
Consumerism in health was a strengthening force throughout this period but was notably absent 
from  the development of NHS dmg treannent services, and private doctors argued that they 
responded to patients’ needs by providing a greater diversity of options. Fxjually it has been argued 
that the nature of addiction compromised patients’ free will and ability to exercise self 
determination; that what such patients Svanted’ was different from what they ‘needed’ and a 
financially disinterested doctor was needed to distinguish the two.
Sociologist Terence Johnson considered that there were contradictory processes at work within the 
development of a profession, one set of opposing forces was found between occupational control 
ie from within the medical profession, and consumerism -  control by the client. Consumer choice 
introduced pressure towards diversity in the occupational community which counter-balanced 
occupational control.15 These forces could be seen stmggling against each other in the battle over 
prescribing between the private doctors and the I xmdon psychiatrists. live strength of the 
consumer varied over the period in relation to doctors, depending upon factors such as the range 
o f  alternative services and the desire of health services to attract patients for instance to prevent 
11IV/AIDS, but overall, these patients’ stigmatised stams and poor collective organisation left them 
without a strong voice to influence provision. Ihe  patient activist groups that emerged were 
notably absent from expert committees such as the ACMD and all three clinical guidelines working 
groups. To some extent, the voluntary sector and occasionally particular GPs, have taken on the 
role o f ‘patient advocate’ within the policy community.
'Ih e  Clinics’ prescribing changes in the late 1970s t<x>k a paternalist approach using a more 
‘confrontational’ attitude to patients — one that the patients would not necessarily choose 
themselves — while the private doctors offered some of the services that the Clinics had withdrawn 
and gave greater autonomy to patients. At the same time, such views also represented different 
medical responses to consumerism in health — the duty to the individual or the wider role of 
regulating the flow o f drugs in society.
l it is  split could also to some extent be seen within the Nl IS between psychiatrists and public 
health doctors on the one side, and (IPs on the other, for instance in debates over the supervised 
consumption of methadone in the late 1990s. GPs on the V9 Ciiiiiielints U' orkjn^ ( tronp, though not
,s T. J .  Johnson, Professions <mti Poovr (Ixmdon and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1972).
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typical o f general practice in general, seemed to be the advocates o f greater autonomy and less 
central control, showing more trust in their own judgement and that of their patients, while those 
centrally employed, such as the psychiatrists and public health physicians, put their trust in central 
government and doctors who, like themselves, had received more extensive formal training. 
Explained in terms o f Cultural Theory, one would expect the independent entrepreneurs (private 
prescribers, and to varying degrees, GPs) to share a distrust o f central control in contrast to the 
hierarchical state-employed professionals and to value informal personal judgement over formally 
developed systems o f accreditation, such as post-graduate specialist training, and this was borne out 
by the findings.
It was noted in the 1980s that in the medical and general media the debate about the roles of public 
and private doctors and o f specialists and generalists ‘included very little on the views of addicts 
themselves’.v’ 'ITiis was found to be the case in this research during all three decades. Occasionally 
a letter would be published in the press from a drug user, but tins was the exception.'' Ann Dally 
attempted to give private patients a voice in the debate when she started up the Alba Association'“ 
but it failed to flourish. Other drug user groups active in the 1980s were allocated funding from a 
BBT appeal,' ' but also fell by the wayside. A number of user groups emerged in the late 1990s and 
these began to receive official recognition and support. At the same time, resistance to their 
influence persisted, for instance, from within the Home Office’s Drugs Inspectorate,4" and from 
some addiction psychiatrists.
Treatment and Drugs Supply Control
In 1916 medical prescription requirements and criminal justice penalties were added to the system 
of pharmaceutical and state control over cocaine and opium, setting up an enduring tension 
between medicinal and policing concerns about ‘narcotics’, The I lome Office Drugs Inspectorate 
played a key part in seeking to balance the two according to its own changing priorities over the 
century.
From the outset the Clinics were set up to centralise and establish under licensed state supervision 
the medicinal use of controlled dnigs from the less regulated prescribing of independent GPs anil
v* T. Bennett and R. Wright, *< )pioid users* attitudes towards and use o f  Nl IS clinics, general practitioners and 
private doctors’, British ]onnui/ o f  Aridiition. 81 (1986), 757-763, p.758.
‘7 eg. A. B. Robertson, ‘Prescription o f controlled drugs to addicts* |lctrcr|, British Medico/ Jounni!28"1 (1983),
126.
A. Dally, (1990) op. at. 
vt D. Turner, Intervif»’ by Samh Al/tn, (2002).
Senior 1 lomc ( )fficc < Ifficial, Interview by Sarah Mars, (2002).
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private doctors. Early on, the state, in the form of the Ministry of Health, tried to influence 
prescribing policies at the Clinics, but was rebuffed, 'lhe Clinics were entrusted with the tasks of 
controlling the spread of addiction, undermining the black market, and ministering to individual 
patients’ physical and psychological health, aim s which could conflict, and winch did not always suit 
their aspirations as an emerging professional specialty.
Similar problems faced drug doctors outside, whose own priorities could be at cxlds with die 
Inspectorate or from the 1980s, the GMC’s views on controlling the drug supply. The 
Inspectorate expected drug doctors, and particularly those in private practice, to incorporate a range 
of policing practices into their medical work to  detect any diversion of drugs by patients to other 
users. Rulings made by the GMC in the 1980s for the first time held a doctor responsible for the 
ultimate fate of drugs prescribed to a patient. In this the GMC absorbed into its code of ethics the 
criminal drug control concerns of the Inspectorate as a tool to distinguish between the acceptable 
and unacceptable treatment of addiction outside the Clinics. 'Ihis reflected the need of Clinic 
elements within and around the Council for an  alternative measure of competence as part o f their 
professionalizing strategy in a field where relatively low levels o f technical skill were required by 
practitioners and outcomes were hard to measure or even agree upon.
It is important to note that the division between the priorities o f drug control and treatment did not 
correspond neatly with the I lome Office on the one side and the Department o f I Iealth on the 
other. The Home Office Drugs Inspectorate had a long history of concern about treatment 
provision both overall and for individual patients, and the Department o f I lealth at certain points 
pushed for greater control over the dmg supply. The I lome Office was therefore a guardian of 
liberalism in health policy’ in the 1970s and ’80s.
Bureaucratic and medical expertise
Across the three decades studied, sensitivities jtersisted between medical and non-medical expertise. 
Relationships between bureaucratic and medical members of the policy community involved 
intricate step-work in the regulation process. T h e I lomc Office Drugs Inspectorate, while 
possessing extensive knowledge and experience, included no doctors on its staff. This was a 
potential weak point in its own eyes, prompting its support for the production of good practice 
guidelines, which could be used by its Inspectors as a tool of state regulation under the cloak of 
medical self-regulation during the 1980s. Similarly, in the 1990s, its further aims to regulate doctors 
outside the Clinics were pursued through the forum of the medically dominated V9 Guidelines 
working group.
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While the Inspectorate’s official remit was to keep prescription drugs within authorised channels, 
and it advised doctors outside the Climes accordingly, inspectors were wary o f appearing to give 
medical guidance and seemed to avoid advising the Clinic doctors entirely. Some doctors outside 
the Climes, although already prescribing to drug users, knew very little about the subject and for 
them the Inspectorate was a welcome source o f  unofficial and rarely acknowledged training in a 
dearth of other sources. During the 1970s and ’80s there was very little rime spent on addiction in 
the undergraduate medical curriculum and little opportunity for training for postgraduates other 
than psychiatrists specialising in addiction.
Role of research evidence in policy
Research evidence was significant in the public-private debate both for its misuse and its absence, at 
least until the late 1990s. Key pieces o f research assumed prominence in the debates on treatment 
and have given validity to ‘good practice’ in the NHS. The Hartnoll-Mitcheson research of the 
1970s justified changes away from predominantly heroin prescription towards oral methadone that 
became the NI IS norm, despite the equivocal nature of its findings which were acknowledged 
when they were eventually published.41 While private doctors complained about the misuse o f 
research by the opposition,4'  they did not supply any alternatives themselves, reiving only on their 
own experience and the testimony of patients.
From the 1970s to early ’90s, ‘expert committees’, such as the ACNID and the first good practice 
guidelines working group almost entirely relied upon informal evidence and their reputations to 
support their statements. In this polarised field, the idea of impartial expertise was particularly 
problematic. When the evidence based medicine movement had gained strength in the 1990s, and 
was promoted by the Department of Health across medicine, and in the drugs field through its 
commissioning and review of research,4' the clinical guidelines t<x>k on a new form, extensively 
referencing research studies. I lowever, like the role o f ‘expertise’, ‘evidence based medicine’ could 
be used as a legitimising banner under which a complex range o f decision making and negotiating 
took place within a committee, with compromise recommendations made to reconcile conflicting 
research findings and reach consensus.
11 R. Hartnoll, M. C. Mitcheson. A. Battrrsby f t  111. "Evaluation o f heroin maintenance in controlled trial’. 
Archives o f  General Psychiatry, 37 (1980), 877 884.
«  A. Dally, (1990) op. cit., pp.67-68.
*' eg. Task Force to Review Services for Drug Misusers. Report o f  an Inrlepemlent Renew o/ Drug Treatment S en n es  m  
England, Department o f  Health (London: The Stationery ( >fficc, 1996).
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Prescribing policy was determined by personal preferences, on-the-job experience and political 
beliefs in the 1970s and ’80s rather than by research findings and the research carried out was used 
to support these viewpoints regardless of its findings or methodologies. Even with the evidence 
based medicine movement in the mid and late 1990s, policy still seemed to lead the way ahead of 
research findings. Ihe V9 Guidelines were not a radical break with the old tradition of expen 
committees or previous guidelines and themselves stated that they were ‘primarily based on 
evidence obtained from expert committee reports and the clinical experience of respected 
authorities.’
This research has shown the mechanisms by which the I-ondon psychiatrists and opponents of 
private prescribing have dominated medical regulation both formal and informal between 1970 and 
1999. ih e  structures o f doctors’ own organisations and their alliances with parts of the state were 
crucial in the processes o f  the debate and resulting battles, but there were limits too on the 
dominant doctors’ influence when seeking legislative change, which required the agreement of 
politicians who considered pressures from both inside and outside the policy community.
Changes in the drugs policy community over the period worked both for and against private 
prescribcrs. The loss o f  a key ally in the 1 lome Office Drugs Inspectorate coupled with the 
disciplining and exit o f the leading voice of private prescribing in the latter 1980s were counter­
balanced by the emergence of harm reduction as an official policy, an alternative to abstinence 
based approaches favoured bv the Clinics. On the wider stage, from the early 1980s health services 
were moving out of the hospitals and into the community, gaining closer ties with an increasingly 
state funded voluntary sector, thus diversifying the policy community. By the 1990s, private 
prescribing issues had become a side issue, both cooling down the debate, but also reducing private 
doctors’ representation in policy circles. Attempts to redress tills and encourage greater self­
regulation through the late 1990s’ Association o f Independent Prescribes went the same way as its 
predecessor, AIDA, blighted bv a lack of cohesion among its individualistic, competitive and 
untrusting membership. Overshadowed bv the increasing density of N1 IS drug services outside 
the South East, Ixmdon dnig doctors’ conflicts were seen as a purely mctrop<ilitan concern. In the 
yeas to follow, the private prescribes were to face the threat o f Home Office licensing and 
decimation from a re-invigorated General Medical Council.
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Appendix A Interviewed Doctors’ Professional Roles (interviews conducted between 2000 and 2003)
Table A1 Specialism and sources of funding by individual doctor
Doctor interviewed Private GPs Private addiction 
psychiatrist
NHS GP NHS drug addiction 
psychiatrist
NHS non-addiction 
psychiatrist
DrOOl * ✓
Dr 002 (retired)
Dr 003 *
Dr 004
Dr 005 * ✓
Dr 006 *
Dr 00" * (preciously) * (previously)
Dr 008 •/ * alcohol addiction 
psychiatry, preciously)
Dr 009 V
Dr 010 *
Dr Oil V
Dr 012 *
Dr 013 *
Dr 014 *
Dr 015 (retired) *
Dr 016 ✓
Dr 017 * *
Dr 018 *
Dr 019 *
Dr 020 (retired) *
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■I Doctor interviewed Privare GPs Private addiction 
psychiatrist
NHS GP NHS drug addiction 
psychiatrist
NHS non-addiction 
psychiatrist
Dr 021 (retired) ✓
Dr 022 ✓
Dr 023
Dr 024 *
Dr 025 (retired) ✓
Dr 026 (retired) ✓
Dr 027 ✓
T ab le  A2 N u m b e rs  o f  d o c to rs  fu n d ed  from  d iffe ren t so u rces
R oles o f  doctors in terview ed (n=27) W ork ing  at tim e o f  interv iew  either 
privately o r in  N H S.
R etired a t tim e o f  interv iew Totals
Solely Private G Ps 3 2 5
Solely N H S A ddiction Psychiatrists 4 4 8
Solely N H S G Ps 5 0 5
Solely Private A ddiction Psychiatnsts 1 0 1
N H S and Private G Ps 2 0 2
N H S and P nvate A ddiction Psychiatrists 4 0 4
P nvate addiction psych iatnsts and N H S non- 
addicnon psychiatrists
2 0 2
2 7 7
Appendix B: Timeline of Major Events
1965 Publication o f second Brain report recommending tighter controls on prescribing and the 
establishment o f specialist treatment centres (drug dependency units — DDUs or ‘the 
Clinics’). (Virtually all recommendations implemented, except compulsory treatment.)
1966
1967 Dangerous Dmgs Act (licence requirements for doctors prescribing heroin and cocaine)
1968 Implementation of 1967 licensing requirements for prescribing heroin and cocaine. Requirement 
for doctors to notify patients to the Home Office Addicts Index if they were found to be 
dependent on opiates or cocaine.
1968 First meeting o f the London Consultants Group brought together by the Ministry of I lealth.
-70 Treatment o f drug users moved into specialist services in new Dmg Dependency Units
1969
1970
1971 Misuse of Dmgs Act, re-instituting I lome Office Tribunals to regulate doctors’ prescribing 
o f controlled dmgs.
1972
1973 I lom e Office Tribunals came into operation.
1974 White Paper ‘Better Services for the Mentally 111’ proposed multidisciplinary serv ices for 
dmg users.
1975 AGMD set up a working group to produce a report on treatment and rehabilitation.
1976
1977 Interim report produced by on treatment and rehabilitation by ACMD’ working group.
1978
1978/791.arge quantities o f trafficked heroin start entering Britain. Trafficked heroin begins to take 
the place of diverted prescribed/pharmaceutical opiates as cheaper and more plentiful.
Number of (opiate and cocaine) addicts notified to the I lome Office began to rise more 
steeply.
1980 First published attack on private prescribes by a doctor.1
1981 Dr Ann Dally started the Association of Independent Doctors of Addiction (AIDA) 
(independent meaning doctors outside the NHS Clinics).
1982 Radio Four broadcast sensationalist item ‘Dr Death’ and article in the 1 Jstener about 
private prescribes.
1 T. H. Bewley, "Prescribing psychoactive drugs to addicts', British M edical Journal, 281, (1980), 497-498.
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ACMD’ final Treatment and Rehabilitation report was published calling for multidisciplinary 
team working and recommended strict controls on prescribing by doctors outside specialist 
services, particularly private prescribes. It recommended drawing up o f ‘guidelines for 
good practice’ and the addition of dipipanone to heroin and cocaine licensing 
requirements. Also heralded expansion o f drug treatment to re-involve primary care.
1983 January: Norman Fowler (Secretary o f  State, DHSS) called a meeting of the medical 
profession to consult them on the recommendations of the ACMD’ Treatment and 
Rehabilitation report.
Conservative Government announced its Central Funding Initiative to hind local projects 
for treatment and rehabilitation of drug uses , stimulating the growth of the voluntary 
sector.
British Medical journal published Bewley and Ghodse article ‘Unacceptable face o f private 
practice’ and debate follows on the le ttes  page.
F is t  CMC heanng against Dr Ann Dally, President of Association of Independent 
Doctos o f Addiction.
BM J published anthropologist Angela Burr’s article identifying private prescribes and 
NI IS GPs as source of blackmarket opiates in London.
British journal of Addiction published Angela Burr’s article on ‘The Piccadilly Drug Scene’ 
describing sources of illicit drugs that include private doctos’ prescriptions.
1984 F is t clinical guidelines for the treatment o f dmg misuse published and circulated to 
doctos.
Addition of dipipanonc to licensing requirements (Misuse of Drugs Regulations)
1985 F is t comprehensive government strategy document on drugs policy published 7adding 
Drug Misuse.
Discovery of high IIIV prevalence in I Edinburgh and Dundee injecting drug uses.
I lome Office decided against extending licensing to all opioid prescribing.
1986 Second GMC case against Dr Ann Dally.
Druglink published Mike Ashton’s two-part article ‘Doctors at W ar’ about the Ann Dally 
GMC case.
McClelland Committee of Scottish I lom e and 1 Icalth Department recommended the 
establishment o f  needle exchanges in Scotland.
1987
1988 ACMD’» . L ID S  and drug misuse. Bart ! was published recommending development of 
community dm g services encouraging GP involvement and endorsing hann reduction. 
AIDA’s last meeting.
2 7 9
1989
1990
1991 Second edition o f the clinical guidelines published.
Bntlrfj Journal of 'Addiction published David Curson’s editorial on private treatment of alcohol 
and drug problems in Britain, commentary and subsequent letters.
1992
1993 Home Office start proceedings for Misuse o f Drugs Tribunal against Dr Adrian Garfoot.
1994 7 inkling Drugs Together Green Paper published by the Conservative Government. Included 
section atguing against changes to the laws on drugs.
1996 Working Party responsible for producing third edition of Clinical Guidelines on dnig 
misuse and dependence formed.
December First meeting o f the Association of Independent Practitioners in the Treatment 
of Substance Misuse (AIP).
1997 Closure of Home Office’s Addicts Index
AIP produced draft guidelines for private prescribcrs.
Replacement for Addicts’ Index (Addicts Central Enquiry System) proposed by die AIP to 
be established in private practices.
Dr Adrian Garfoot overturned Misuse of Drugs Tribunal mling on appeal. End of 
Tribunal system.
1998 I Iome Office wrote to private prescribcrs about methadone related deaths stating that, 
‘Private prescribing has been identified by the Coroner as a significant factor’.
Demise o f Association of Independent Practitioners in the Treatment of Substance Misuse 
(AIP).
1999 'Hiird edition o f clinical guidelines published, including proposals for extending system of 
licensing for prescription o f controlled drugs, with extra measures for private prescribcrs. 
Dispute between |ohn Strang et a l (NHS opponents o f private prescribing) and Colin 
Brewer (major private prescriber) in letters pages of BA// regarding opiate detoxification 
under anaesthesia. Strang et <i/apologised to Brewer on BA// lette’rs page.
I lome Office sent 1999 edition o f  the clinical guidelines on the treatment of drug use to 
private prescribe». (Nl IS practitioners received copies from Department of Health).
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Appendix C: Permission Form
The History Croup
Oral History Records
Sarah Mars and Professor Virginia Berridge
The Public/Private Relationship in Historical Perspective: The Treatment of
Addiction, I970’s-I990’s
FUNDED BY THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
CLEARANCE NOTE FOR TAPED INTERVIEWS
The purpose o f  this agreement is to allow use of your taped interview for research purposes. 
Please fill in this form according to your wishes.
I hereby assign the copyright in my contribution to the History Group o f the London School o f 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Signed....................................................................... D a te ...........................................................
Address..........................................................................................................................................
[Tick ONE o f  the following options:]
I permit use o f  my name with quotes from the interview/s [ ]
I would prefer any quotes from the interview/s to be checked with me before they are attributed
I I
I prefer quotes from interview/s to be used anonymously [ ]
If you have any further instructions you may add them  here:
2 8 1
Addiction/dependence: addiction and dependence are terms that have been subject to 
considerable controversy in the twentieth century. The changes in usage and meaning will be 
discussed in the thesis but are used interchangeably in this document to mean that the user of a 
drug is defined by a doctor as having adapted to its presence and would suffer if  it were withdrawn 
abrupdy.
Clinic: Colloquial name for the hospital-based Drug Dependency Units (DDUs) set up in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.
Controlled drugs: Dmgs controlled under the Misuse o f  Drugs Act, 1971. This included heroin, 
cocaine, methadone, amphetamines and benzodiazepines. This term replaced ‘dangerous drugs’ 
which was used in 20* Century' domestic legislation until 1971.
Drug: in this context a drug is a psychoactive substance used in either an illegal1 or unsanctioncd 
way. This would include heroin, cocaine, solvents and tranquillisers, but for convenience excludes 
alcohol and nicotine.
Drug doctors: this term is used to denote any doctor with significant involvement in treating drug 
related problems. The term ‘addiction doctor’ can be misleading, as not all the drugs involved arc 
addictive, and some of the patients are not treated for addiction but for other drug-related 
problems. The term does not imply the prescribing o f substitute drugs, although this may be 
involved.
M ethadone: synthetic opiate, also known as Phystptone, used to prevent withdrawal symptoms in 
opiate addicts. It is most commonly prescribed as an oral liquid but it also comes in an injectable 
form and as oral tablets.
Opioid: this tenn covers both derivatives of the opium poppy such as morphine and heroin 
(‘opiates’), and pharmacologically similar synthetic substances such as methadone.
Private prescriben a doctor paid by fee outside the NI IS who preseniles substitute drugs (opiates, 
stimulants and tranquillisers) to patients for the treatment o f addiction. I le/she may be a general 
practitioner or have specialist training in addiction psychiatry.
Substitute prescribing: is usually used to describe the prescribing o f one dnig to replace another, 
such as methadone for heroin. I lowever, here it also describes prescribing the same drug, such as 
heroin, as it is often intended to replace or obviate the need for a trafficked supply o f  the dntg. 
Trafficked dm gs: A tenn used in the 1980s anti in this thesis to differentiate between 
phannaceutically produced substances obtained legally or illegally by users, and drugs smuggled or 
‘trafficked’ into Britain from producer countries.
1 According to the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971.
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A p p e n d ix  E : A b b re v ia t io n s
ACMD Advisory eoundl on the Misuse of Drugs
AIDA Association of Independent Doctors in Addiction
AIP Association of Independent Prescribers, later termed the Association of 
Independent Practitioners in the Treatment of Substance Misuse
CFI Central Funding Initiative
DDU Drug Dependency Unit (colloquially known as a ‘(dime’)
DH Department of Health (the Department o f Health split from the Department for 
Social Security in 1988.
DIISS Department of Health and Social Security (formed by a merger o f  the M inistry of 
H ealth with the M inistry o f Social Security in November 1968).
GMC General Medical Council
GP General Practitioner (NHS or private)
Inspectorate
ISDD
I Iomc Office Dmgs Inspectorate 
Institute for the Study o f Dmg Dependence
LCG Ix>ndon Consultants Group
PCC Professional Conduct Committee (of the General Medical Council)
ppc : Preliminary Proceedings Committee (of the General Medical Council)
SCODA Standing Conference on Dmg Abuse
script
rc~ R
prescription
Treatment and Rehabilitation report of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, 
D indon: HMSO, 1982.
Tribunal 1 lom e Office Misuse o f  Drugs Tribunal
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A p p e n d ix  F: B ib lio g ra p h y
Due to the contemporary nature o f the debate, it is not appropriate to divide the materials 
used into prim ary and secondary sources. All ‘secondary’ sources also have potential to be 
primary sources, being created in or around the period studied. Documents listed as in a 
‘private arch ive’ are those either loaned or given to the author by interviewees during the 
research pro ject and not held in formal archives. Most o f the individual sources o f these 
private documents are not named for reasons o f confidentiality.
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